A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge
by
George Berkeley (1685-1753)
Part 2
51. Seventhly, it will upon this be demanded whether it does
not seem absurd to take away natural causes, and ascribe every
thing to the immediate operation of Spirits ? We must no longer
say upon these principles that fire heats, or water cools, but that
a Spirit heats, and so forth. Would not a man be deservedly
laughed at, who should talk after this manner? I answer, he
would so ; in such things we ought to ' think with the learned,
and speak with the vulgar.' They who to demonstration are
4 Philosophers have treated the relation of Matter to Mind in perception as one of cause
and effect — the result, according to Berkeley, of illegitimate analysis or abstraction, which
creates a fictitious duality of substance. By his new principles, philosophy is based on a
recognition of the fact that perception is neither the cause nor the effect of its object, but
in a relation to it that is sui generis and ultimate. Cf. Prof. Ferrier on ' perception' and
' matter,' in his Institutes of Metaphysics, Prop. IV., and Remains, Vol. II. pp. 261 — 288.
407—409.
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE.
223
convinced of the truth of the Copernican system do neverthe
less say 'the sun rises,' 'the sun sets/ or 'comes to the meridian;'
and if, they affected a contrary style in common talk it would
without doubt appear very ridiculous. A little reflection on
what is here said will make it manifest that the common use of
language would receive no manner of alteration or disturbance
from the admission of our tenets.
52. In the ordinary affairs of life, any phrases may be retained,
so long as they excite in us proper sentiments, or dispositions to
act in such a manner as is necessary for our well-being, how false
soever they may be if taken in a strict and speculative sense.
Nay, this is unavoidable, since, propriety being regulated by
custom, language is suited to the received opinions, which are not
always the truest. Hence it is impossible — even in the most
rigid, philosophic reasonings — so far to alter the bent and genius
of the tongue we speak, as never to give a handle for cavillers to
pretend difficulties and inconsistencies. But, a fair and ingenuous
reader will collect the sense from the scope and tenor and con
nexion of a discourse, making allowances for those inaccurate
modes of speech which use has made inevitable.
53. As to the opinion that there are no Corporeal Causes, this
has been heretofore maintained by some of the Schoolmen, as it is
of late by others among the modern philosophers, who though they
allow Matter to exist, yet will have God alone to be the immediate
efficient cause of all things 5 . These men [ 7I ] saw that amongst
all the objects of sense there was none which had any power or
activity included in it ; and that by consequence this was likewise
true of whatever bodies they supposed to exist without the mind,
like unto the immediate objects of sense 6 . But then, that they
should suppose an innumerable multitude of created beings,
which they acknowledge are not capable of producing any one
effect in nature, and which therefore are made to no manner of
purpose, since God might have done everything as well without
s He refers to Des Cartes, and especially Geulinx, Malebranche, &c, who, while they
argued for material substance, denied the causality of sensible things. With them, as with
Berkeley, there are no causes in the material or phenomenal world — only effects, which are
evolved in a constant order, contemporaneous and successive, and thus express the mean
ing of the Supreme Power. See Malebranche, Entretiens, VI., VII.
6 i. e. of their hypothetical material world, existing unperceived.
224
OF THE PRINCIPLES
them — this I say, though we should allow it possible, must yet
be a very unaccountable and extravagant supposition 7 .
54. In the eighth place, the universal concurrent assent of
mankind 8 may be thought by some an invincible argument in
behalf of Matter, or the existence of external things. Must we
suppose the whole world to be mistaken ? And if so, what cause
can be assigned of so widespread and predominant an error? — I
answer, first, that, upon a narrow inquiry, it will not perhaps be
found so many as is imagined do really believe the existence of
Matter or things without the mind. Strictly speaking, to believe
that which involves a contradiction, or has no meaning in it 9 , is
impossible ; and whether the foregoing expressions are not of
that sort, I refer it to the impartial examination of the reader.
In one sense, indeed, men may be said to believe that Matter
exists, that is, they act as if the immediate cause of their sensa
tions, which affects them every moment, and is so nearly present
to them, were some senseless unthinking being. But, that they
should clearly apprehend any meaning marked by those words,
and form thereof a settled speculative opinion, is what I am not
able to conceive. This is not the only instance wherein men im
pose upon themselves, by imagining they believe those proposi
tions which they have often heard, though at bottom they have
no meaning in them.
55. But secondly, though we should grant a notion to be never
so universally and stedfastly adhered to, yet this is but a weak
argument of its truth to whoever considers what a vast number
of prejudices and false opinions are everywhere embraced with
the utmost tenaciousness, by the unreflecting (which are the far
greater) part of mankind. There was a time when the antipodes
and motion of the earth were looked upon as monstrous absurd
ities even by men of learning : and if it be considered what a
7 On the principle, ' Entia non sunt multiplicanda prsster necessitatem.'
8 Commonly called the argument from Common Sense, and illustrated in the writings
of Reid and other Scotch psychologists. That the unreflecting part of mankind should
hold an unintelligible, or at least confused, Realism is not to be wondered at, when we
recollect that it is the very office of philosophy to interpret the sensible reality, which they
and philosophers acknowledge in common to be ' external,' in some meaning of the term.
9 Sect. 4, 9, 15, 17, 22, 24.
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 225
small proportion they bear to the rest of mankind, we shall find
that at this day those notions have gained but a very inconsider
able footing in the world.
56. But it is demanded that we assign a cause of this prejudice,
and account for its obtaining in the world. To this I answer,
that men knowing they perceived several ideas 10 , whereof they
themselves were not the authors — as not being excited from
within nor depending on the operation of their wills — this made
them maintain those ideas 10 or objects of perception had an
existence independent of and without the mind, without ever
dreaming that a contradiction was involved in those words. But,
philosophers having plainly seen that the immediate objects of
perception do not exist without the mind, they in some degree
corrected the mistake of the vulgar
" ; but at the same time run
into another which seems no less absurd, to wit, that there are
certain objects really existing without the mind, or having a
subsistence distinct from being perceived, of which our ideas are
only images or resemblances, imprinted by those objects 12 on
the mind. And this notion of the philosophers owes its origin
to the same cause with the former, namely, their being conscious
that they were not the authors of their own sensations, which
they evidently knew were imprinted from without, and which
therefore must have some cause distinct from the minds on
which they are imprinted.
57. But why they should suppose the ideas of sense to be
excited in us by things in their likeness, and not rather have
recourse to Spirit which alone can act, may be accounted for,
first, because they were not aware of the repugnancy there is,
as well in supposing things like unto our ideas existing without,
as in attributing to them power or activity. Secondly, because
10 i. e. sense-ideas. — Though his own sense-ideas or objects are independent of the will
of the finite percipient, it does not follow that they are independent of his perception. Cf.
sect. 29—33.
11 By recognising that what we are immediately percipient of must be ideal, or at least
that it is only known by us in sense as ideal — as a sense-percept.
12 i. e. by the unperceived or absolute objects which, on this hypothesis of a representa
tive sense-perception, were assumed to exist behind the properly perceived objects or ideas,
and to be (according to some) the cause of their appearance in our consciousness. Cf.
Third Dialogue between Hylas and Philonous, p. 359.
15
226 OF THE PRINCIPLES
the Supreme Spirit which excites those ideas in our minds, is
not marked out and limited to our view by any particular finite
collection of sensible ideas, as human agents are by their size,
complexion, limbs, and motions. And thirdly, because His
operations are regular and uniform. Whenever the course of
nature is interrupted by a miracle, men are ready to own the
presence of a superior agent. But, when we see things go on
in the ordinary course they do not excite in us any reflection ;
their order and concatenation, though it be an argument of the
greatest wisdom, power, and goodness in their creator, is yet so
constant and familiar to us that we do not think them the im
mediate effects of a Free Spirit ; especially since inconsistency
and mutability in acting, though it be an imperfection, is looked
on as a mark of freedom**.
58. Tentldy, [ ?2 ] it will be objected that the notions we advance
are inconsistent with several sound truths in philosophy and
mathematics. For example, the motion of the earth is now
universally admitted by astronomers as a truth grounded on the
clearest and most convincing reasons. But, on the foregoing
principles, there can be no such thing. For, motion being only
an idea, it follows that if it be not perceived it exists not : but the
motion of the earth is not perceived by sense. I answer, that
tenet, if rightly understood, will be found to agree with the prin
ciples we have premised ; for, the question whether the earth
moves or no amounts in reality to no more than this, to wit,
whether we have reason to conclude, from what has been ob
served by astronomers, that if we were placed in such and such
circumstances, and such or such a position and distance both from
the earth and sun, we should perceive the former to move among
the choir of the planets, and appearing in all respects like one of
them ; [ 73 ] and this, by the established rules of nature which we
have no reason to mistrust, is reasonably collected from the
phenomena.
59. We may, from the experience we have had of the train
J 3 Hence the difficulty men have in recognising that the Divine Ideas f\nd Will, and the
Laws of Nature, are coincident. But in fact the scientific discovery of laws in nature,
instead of narrowing, extends the sphere of intelligible Divine agency.
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE.
227
and succession of ideas 14 in our minds, often make, I will not say
uncertain conjectures, but sure and well-grounded predictions
concerning the ideas 14 we shall be affected with pursuant to a
great train of actions, and be enabled to pass a right judgment
of what would have appeared to us, in case we were placed in
circumstances very different from those we are in at present.
Herein consists the knowledge of nature, which may preserve
its use and certainty very consistently with what hath been said.
It will be easy to apply this to whatever objections of the like
sort may be drawn from the magnitude of the stars, or any other
discoveries in astronomy or nature. [ 74 ]
60. In the eleventh place, it will be demanded to what purpose
serves that curious organization of plants, and the animal me
chanism in the parts of animals ; might not vegetables grow, and
shoot forth leaves and blossoms, and animals perform all their
motions as well without as with all that variety of internal parts
so elegantly contrived and put together ; which, being ideas, have
nothing powerful or operative in them, nor have any necessary 15
connexion with the effects ascribed to them ? If it be a Spirit
that immediately produces every effect byajiator act of his will,
we must think all that is fine and artificial in the works, whether
of man or nature, to be made in vain. By this doctrine, though
an artist has made the spring and wheels, and every movement
of a watch, and adjusted them in such a manner as he knew
would produce the motions he designed, yet he must think all
this done to no purpose, and that it is an Intelligence which
directs the index, and points to the hour of the day. If so, why
may not the Intelligence do it, without his being at the pains
of making the movements and putting them together? Why
does not an empty case serve as well as another ? And how
comes it to pass that whenever there is any fault in the going of
a watch, there is some corresponding disorder to be found in
*+ ' ideas,' i. e. sense-ideas or sensations. This ' experience' consists of the established
association of sensations or percepts in the order of external nature, not mere ' association
of ideas' — in the popular meaning of the word idea.
*S Cf. sect. 25, and also various passages in Berkeley's writings in which he insists upon
the arbitrariness of the so-called causal relations among sensible things, and the conse
quent sense-symbolism of Nature. It is thus that he speaks of a language of Vision. Cf.
Theory of Vision Vindicated, passim.
228 OF THE PRINCIPLES
the movements, which being mended by a skilful hand all is right
again ? The like may be said of all the clockwork of nature,
great part whereof is so wonderfully fine and subtle as scarce to
be discerned by the best microscope. In short, it will be asked,
how, upon our principles, any tolerable account can be given, or
any final cause assigned of an innumerable multitude of bodies
and machines, framed with the most exquisite art, which in the
common philosophy have very apposite uses assigned them, and
serve to explain abundance of phenomena ?
61. To all which I answer, first, that though there were some
difficulties relating to the administration of Providence, and the
uses by it assigned to the several parts of nature, which I could
not solve by the foregoing principles, yet this objection could
be of small weight against the truth and certainty of those things
which may be proved a priori, with the utmost evidence and
rigour of demonstration 16 . [ 7S ] Secondly, but neither are the re
ceived principles free from the like difficulties ; for, it may still be
demanded to what end God should take those roundabout methods
of effecting things by instruments and machines, which no one
can deny might have been effected by the mere command of His
will without all that apparatus: nay, if we narrowly consider it,
we shall find the objection may be retorted with greater force
on those who hold the existence of those machines without the
mind ; for it has been made evident [ ?6 ] that solidity, bulk, figure,
motion, and the like have no activity or efficacy in them, so as to
be capable of producing any one effect in nature. See sect. 25.
Whoever therefore supposes them 17 to exist (allowing the sup
position possible) when they are not perceived does it mani
festly to no purpose ; since the only use that is assigned to
them 17 , as they exist unperceived, is that they produce those
perceivable effects which in truth cannot be ascribed to anything
but Spirit.
62. But, to come nigher the difficulty, it must be observed that
though the fabrication of all those parts and organs be not ab-
16 Cf. sect. 3, 4, 22 — 24.
x 7 ' them,' i. e. the solid and extended objects, which are supposed to exist unperceived
and unpercipient — as distinguished from the Intelligent Cause to whom Berkeley attrib
utes the orderly appearance, disappearance, and reappearance of ideas or objects in the
senses.
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 229
solutely necessary to the producing any effect, yet it is necessary
to the producing of things in a. constant regular way according to
the laws of nature. [ 77 ] There are certain general laws that run
through the whole chain of natural effects : these are learned by
the observation and study of nature, and are by men applied as
well to the framing artificial things for the use and ornament of
life as to the explaining the various phenomena — which expli
cation consists only in shewing the conformity any particular phe
nomenon hath to the general laws of nature, or, which is the same
thing, in discovering the uniformity there is in the production
of natural effects ; as will be evident to whoever shall attend to
the several instances wherein philosophers pretend to account for
appearances. That there is a great and conspicuous use in these
regular constant methods of working observed by the Supreme
Agent hath been shewn in sect. 31. And it is no less visible that
a particular size, figure, motion, and disposition of parts are neces
sary, though not absolutely to the producing any effect, yet to the
producing it according to the standing mechanical laws of nature.
Thus, for instance, it cannot be denied that God, or the Intel
ligence that sustains and rules the ordinary course of things, might
if He were minded to produce a miracle, cause all the motions
on the dial-plate of a watch, though nobody had ever made the
movements and put them in it : but yet, if He will act agreeably
to the rules of mechanism, by Him for wise ends established and
maintained in the creation, it is necessary that those actions of
the watchmaker, whereby he makes the movements and rightly
adjusts them, precede the production of the aforesaid motions;
as also that any disorder in them be attended with [ ?8 ] the per
ception of some corresponding disorder in the movements, which
being once corrected all is right again.
63. It may indeed on some occasions be necessary that the
Author of nature display His overruling power in producing
some appearance out of the ordinary series of things 18 . Such
exceptions from the general rules of nature are proper to surprise
and awe men into an acknowledgment of the Divine Being; but
18 So far as that series has been interpreted by us. The nature and moral office of
miraculous or supernatural events, in a system of Universal Providence, is here touched
upon.
230 OF THE PRINCIPLES
then they are to be used but seldom, otherwise there is a plain
reason why they should fail of that effect. [ 79 ] Besides, God seems
to choose the convincing our reason of His attributes by the
works of nature, which discover so much harmony and con
trivance in their make, and are such plain indications of wisdom
and beneficence in their Author, rather than to astonish us into
a belief of His Being by anomalous and surprising events.
64. To set this matter in a yet clearer light, I shall observe
that what has been objected in sect. 60 amounts in reality to no
more than this : — ideas are not anyhow and at random produced,
there being a certain order and connexion between them, like to
that of cause and effect : there are also several combinations of
them made in a very regular and artificial manner, which seem
like so many instruments in the hand of nature that, being hid
as it were behind the scenes, have a secret operation in producing
those appearances which are seen on the theatre of the world,
being themselves discernible only to the curious eye of the phi
losopher. But, since one idea cannot be the cause of another, to
what purpose is that connexion ? And, since those instruments,
being barely inefficacious perceptions^ 9 in the mind, are not sub
servient to the production of natural effects, it is demanded why
they are made ; or, in other words, what reason can be assigned
why God should make us, upon a close inspection into His
works, behold so great variety of ideas so artfully laid together,
and so much according to rule; it not being [ 2 ° credible] that He
would be at the expense (if one may so speak) of all that art and
regularity to no purpose. [ 8o ]
65. To all which my answer is, first, that the connexion of
ideas does not imply the relation of cause and effect, but only of
a mark or sign with the thing signified. The fire which I see is
not the cause of the pain I suffer upon my approaching it, but
the mark that forewarns me of it. In like manner the noise that
I hear is not the effect of this or that motion or collision of the
ambient bodies, but the sign thereof 21 . Secondly, the reason why
ideas are formed into machines, that is, artificial and regular com-
J 9 Cf. sect. 25.
20 ' imaginable' — in first edition.
21 According to Berkeley, Minds, Spirits, Persons are the only proper causes ; and it is
only by an abuse of language that the term ' cause' is applied to the ideas or objects which
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 231
binations, is the same with that for combining letters into words 22 .
That a few original ideas may be made to signify a great number
of effects and actions, it is necessary they be variously combined
together. And, to the end their use be permanent and universal,
these combinations must be made by rule, and with wise con
trivance. By this means abundance of information is conveyed
unto us, concerning what we are to expect from such and such
actions, and what methods are proper to be taken for the exciting
such and such ideas — which in effect is all that I conceive to be
distinctly meant when it is said 23 that, by discerning the figure,
texture, and mechanism of the inward parts of bodies, whether
natural or artificial, we may attain to know the several uses and
properties depending thereon, or the nature of the thing.
66. Hence, it is evident that those things which, under the
notion of a cause co-operating or concurring to the production
of effects, are altogether inexplicable, and run us into great
absurdities, may be very naturally explained, and have a proper
and obvious use assigned to them, when they are considered only
as marks or signs for our information. And it is the searching
after and endeavouring to understand this Language (if I may
so call it) of the Author of nature, that ought to be the employ
ment of the natural philosopher; and not the pretending to ex
plain things by corporeal causes, which doctrine seems to have
too much estranged the minds of men from that active principle,
that supreme and wise Spirit ' in whom we live, move, and have
our being.'
6y. In the twelfth place, it may perhaps be objected that —
though it be clear from what has been said that there can be no
are invariable antecedents of other ideas or objects — the prior form of their objective or
phenomenal existence. He contrasts so-called Physical with Spiritual Causation — the
latter being implied in our conception of mind ; the former consisting in the observable
relations of phenomena, in which causation proper is unperceived, and therefore non
existent. Physical Science is the interpretation of natural signs, and is only confused
(Berkeley would say) by reference to an unconscious agency which is inconceivable.
22 Berkeley, in meeting this objection, thus reverts to his favourite theory of a Universal
Natural Symbolism as the true character of the sensible world. See next section, which
describes the orderly co-existences and sequences of nature as not causally necessary, but
arbitrarily constructed — in order to be a means of social intercourse, and for the use of
man in his contemplation of the Supreme Mind.
=>3 See Locke's Essay, B. IV. ch. 3, g 25—28, &c.
232 OF THE PRINCIPLES
such thing as an inert, senseless, extended, solid, figured, move
able substance existing without the mind, such as philosophers
describe Matter — yet, if any man shall leave out of his idea of
matter the positive ideas of extension, figure, solidity and motion,
and say that he means only by that word an inert, senseless
substance, that exists without the mind or unperceived, which is
the occasion of our ideas, or at the presence whereof God is
pleased to excite ideas in us — [ 8l ] it doth not appear but that
Matter taken in this sense may possibly exist. In answer to
which I say, first, that it seems no less absurd to suppose a sub
stance without accidents, than it is to suppose accidents without
a substance 24 . But secondly, though we should grant this un
known substance may possibly exist, yet where can it be supposed
to be? That it exists not in the mind 23 is agreed; and that it
exists not in place is no less certain — since all place or extension
exists only in the mind 26 , as hath been already proved. It re
mains therefore that it exists nowhere at all.
68. Let us examine a little the description that is here given
us of matter. It neither acts, nor perceives, nor is perceived ;
for this is all that is meant by saying it is an inert, senseless,
unknown substance; which is a definition entirely made up of
negatives, excepting only the relative notion of its standing under
or supporting. But then it must be observed that it supports
nothing at all, and how nearly this comes to the description of
a nonentity I desire may be considered. But, say you, it is the
unknown occasion* 1 , at the presence of which ideas are excited in
us by the will of God. Now, I would fain know how anything
can be present to us, which is neither perceivable by sense nor
reflection, nor capable of producing any idea in our minds, nor
is at all extended, nor hath any form, nor exists in any place.
z 4 With Berkeley, material substance is merely the complement of simple ideas or
phenomena which arbitrarily constitute a particular thing. (Cf. sect. 37.) The Divine
Will is, with him, the cause of phenomena being thus constituted, combined, or substan
tiated. His substance-proper, i. e. mind, is necessary, because an object-perceived neces
sarily implies a percipient.
2 5 i. e. that it is not perceived.
26 i. e. ' place ' exists only as perceived or conceived by an intelligence — sense-percep
tion being its real, and conception its imagined existence. Mind is thus, with Berkeley,
the place of locality and of space. Cf. Siris, sect. 285, &c.
27 He refers to the Cartesian theory of occasional causes.
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 233
The words ' to be present,' when thus applied, must needs be taken
in some abstract and strange meaning, and which I am not able
to comprehend.
69. Again, let us examine what is meant by occasion. So far
as I can gather from the common use of language, that word
signifies either the agent which produces any effect, or else some
thing that is observed to accompany or go before it in the ordi
nary course of things. [ 82 ] But, when it is applied to Matter as
above described, it can be taken in neither of those senses ; for
Matter is said to be passive and inert, and so cannot be an agent
or efficient cause. It is also unperceivable, as being devoid of
all sensible qualities, and so cannot be the occasion of our per
ceptions in the latter sense — as when the burning my finger is
said to be the occasion of the pain that attends it. What there
fore can be meant by calling matter an occasion ? This term is
either used in no sense at all, or else in some very distant from
its received signification.
70. You will perhaps say that Matter, though it be not per
ceived by us, is nevertheless perceived by God, to whom it is the
occasion of exciting ideas in our minds 28 . For, say you, since
we observe our sensations to be imprinted in an orderly and con
stant manner, it is but reasonable to suppose there are certain
constant and regular occasions of their being produced. That
is to say, that there are certain permanent and distinct parcels of
Matter, corresponding to our ideas, which, though they do not
excite them in our minds, or anywise immediately affect us, as
being altogether passive and unperceivable to us, they are never
theless to God, by whom they are perceived 29 , as it were so many
occasions to remind Him when and what ideas to imprint on
our minds — that so things may go on in a constant uniform
manner.
71. In answer to this, I observe that, as the notion of Matter
is here stated, the question is no longer concerning the existence
28 So Geulinx and Malebranche.
=9 As known by the Divine intelligence, they are accordingly ideas. And, if this means
merely that the sensible system is the expression of Divine Ideas, which are its ultimate
archetype — that the Ideas of God are symbolised in our senses, to be interpreted or mis
interpreted by human minds, as reason in man is applied or misapplied — this theory allies
itself with the Platonic. It is partly worked out in Siris.
234 OF THE PRINCIPLES
of a thing distinct from Spirit and idea, from perceiving and being
perceived ; but whether there are not certain ideas of I know not
what sort, in the mind of God, [ 83 ] which are so many marks or
notes that direct Him how to produce sensations in our minds in
a constant and regular method — much after the same manner
as a musician is directed by the notes of music to produce that
harmonious train and composition of sound which is called a
tune, though they who hear the music do not perceive the notes,
and may be entirely ignorant of them. But, this notion of Matter
(which after all is the only intelligible one that I can pick from
what is said of unknown occasions) seems too extravagant to
deserve a confutation. Besides, it is in effect no objection against
what we have advanced, viz. that there is no senseless unper
ceived substance.
72. If we follow the light of reason, we shall, from the constant
uniform method of our sensations, collect the goodness and wis
dom of the Spirit who excites them in our minds ; but this is all
that I can see reasonably concluded from thence. To me, I say,
it is evident that the being of a Spirit infinitely wise, good, and
powerful is abundantly sufficient to explain all the appearances
of nature 30 . But, as for inert, senseless Matter, nothing that I per
ceive has any the least connexion with it, or leads to the thoughts
of it. And I would fain see any one explain any the meanest
phenomenon in nature by it, or shew any manner of reason,
though in the lowest rank of probability, that he can have for
its existence, or even make any tolerable sense or meaning of
that supposition. For, as to its being an occasion, we have, I
think, evidently shewn that with regard to us it is no occasion.
It remains therefore that it must be, if at all, the occasion to
God of exciting ideas in us ; and what this amounts to we have
just now seen.
73. It is worth while to reflect a little on the motives which
induced men to suppose the existence oi material substance ; that
so having observed the gradual ceasing and expiration of those
motives or reasons, we may proportionably withdraw the assent
3° ' It seems to me,' says Hume, ' that this theory of the universal energy and operation
of the Supreme Being is too bold ever to carry conviction with it to a mind sufficiently
apprised of the weakness of human reason, and the narrow limits to which it is confined
in all its operations.' Inqniiy concerning Human Understanding, sect. VII. p. i.
O F HUM A N KNO IV L EDGE. 235
that was grounded on them. First, therefore, it was thought that
colour, figure, motion, and the rest of the sensible qualities or
accidents, did really exist without the mind ; and for this reason
it seemed needful to suppose some unthinking substratum or sub
stance wherein they did exist — since they could not be conceived
to exist by themselves 31 . Afterwards, in process of time, men
being convinced that colours, sounds, and the rest of the sensible,
secondary qualities had no existence without the mind, they
stripped this substratum or material substance of those qualities 32 ,
leaving only the primary ones, figure, motion, and suchlike, which
they still conceived to exist without the mind, and consequently
to stand in need of a material support. But, it having been shewn
that none even of these can possibly exist otherwise than in a
Spirit or Mind which perceives them, it follows [ 84 ] that we have
no longer any reason to suppose the being of Matter 33 ; nay, that
it is utterly impossible there should be any such thing, so long
as that word is taken to denote an unthinking substratum of quali
ties or accidents wherein they exist without the mind.
74. But — though it be allowed by the materialists themselves
that Matter was thought of only for the sake of supporting acci
dents, and, the reason entirely ceasing 34 , one might expect the
mind should naturally, and without any reluctance at all, quit the
belief of what was solely grounded thereon — yet the prejudice is
riveted so deeply in our thoughts, that we can scarce tell how to
part with it, and are therefore inclined, since the tiling itself is
indefensible, at least to retain the na7ne, which we apply to I know
not what abstracted and indefinite notions of being, or occasion,
though without any show of reason, at least so far as I can see.
For, what is there on our part, [ 8s ] or what do we perceive,
amongst all the ideas, sensations, notions which are imprinted on
our minds, either by sense or reflection, from whence may be
inferred the existence of an inert, thoughtless, unperceived oc-
3 1 Is the assumption of the need for substance of some sort, percipient if not corporeal,
regarded by Berkeley as a truth of the absolute or common reason ?
3 2 e. g. Des Cartes, Malebranche, Locke, &c.
33 That is, if we mean by Matter, something existing unperceived and unperceiving.
But ' matter,' in another and intelligible meaning of the word, according to Berkeley, may
and does exist.
34 Seeing that sensible phenomena are sufficiently ' supported ' by mind.
236 OF THE PRINCIPLES
casion ? and, on the other hand, on the part of an All-sufficient
Spirit, what can there be that should make us believe or even
suspect He is directed by an inert occasion 35 to excite ideas in
our minds ?
75. It is a very extraordinary instance of the force of preju
dice, and much to be lamented, that the mind of man retains
so great a fondness, against all the evidence of reason, for a
stupid thoughtless somewhat, [ 86 ] by the interposition whereof it
would as it were screen itself from the Providence of God, and
remove it farther off from the affairs of the world. But, though
we do the utmost we can to secure the belief of Matter, though,
when reason forsakes us, we endeavour to support our opinion
on the bare possibility of the thing, and though we indulge our
selves in the full scope of an imagination not regulated by reason
to make out that poor possibility, yet the upshot of all is — that
there are certain unknown Ideas in the mind of God ; for this, if
anything, is all that I conceive to be meant by occasion with regard
to God. And this at the bottom is no longer contending for the
thing, but for the name.
j6. Whether therefore there are such Ideas in the mind of God,
and whether they may be called by the name Matter, I shall not
dispute 36 . But, if you stick to the notion of an unthinking sub
stance or support of extension, motion, and other sensible quali
ties, then to me it is most evidently impossible there should be
any such thing ; since it is a plain repugnancy that those qualities
should exist in or be supported by an unperceiving substance 37 .
yj. But, say you, though it be granted that there is no thought
less support of extension and the other qualities or accidents
which we perceive, yet there may perhaps be some inert, unper
ceiving substance or substratum of some other qualities, as incom
prehensible to us as colours are to a man born blind, because we
35 unless that ' occasion ' is only another term for His own Ideas.
3 6 Berkeley's philosophy seems to imply the existence of Divine Ideas, which receive
expression in the laws of nature, and of which human science is the imperfect interpreta
tion. In this view, the assertion of the existence of Matter, material substance, or occa
sion is simply an assertion that the phenomenal universe into which we are born is a
reasonable ®r interpretable universe ; and that it would be actually interpreted, if our
conceptions were harmonized with the Divine or Absolute Conception which it expresses.
The Divine Thought would thus be Absolute Truth or Being. Cf. Siris passim.
37 Cf. sect. 3 — 24.
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 237
have not a sense adapted to them. [ 87 ] But, if we had a new sense,
we should possibly no more doubt of their existence than a blind
man made to see does of the existence of light and colours. — I
answer, first, if what you mean by the word Matter be only the
unknown support of unknown qualities, it is no matter whether
there is such a thing or no, since it no way concerns us ; and I
do not see the advantage there is in disputing about what we
know not what, and we know not why.
78. But, secondly, if we had a new sense it could only furnish
us with new ideas or sensations ; and then we should have the
same reason against their existing in an unperceiving substance
that has been already offered with relation to figure, motion,
colour, and the like. Qualities, as hath been shewn, are nothing
else but sensations or ideas, which exist only in a mind perceiving
them ; and this is true not only of the ideas we are acquainted
with at present, but likewise of all possible ideas whatsoever.
79. But, you will insist, what if I have no reason to believe
the existence of Matter ? what if I cannot assign any use to it or
explain anything by it, or even conceive what is meant by that
word ? yet still it is no contradiction to say that Matter exists,
and that this Matter is in general a substance, or occasion of ideas ;
though indeed to go about to unfold the meaning or adhere to
any particular explication of those words may be attended with
great difficulties. I answer, when words are used without a
meaning, you may put them together as you please without
danger of running into a contradiction. You may say, for exam
ple, that twice two is equal to seven, so long as you declare you
do not take the words of that proposition in their usual accepta
tion but for marks of you know not what. And, by the same
reason, you may say there is an inert thoughtless substance with
out accidents which is the occasion of our ideas. And we shall
understand just as much by one proposition as the other.
80. In the last place, you will say, what if we give up the cause
of material Substance, and stand to it that Matter is an unknown
somewhat — neither substance nor accident, spirit nor idea, inert,
thoughtless, indivisible, immoveable, unextended, existing in no
place ? For, say you, whatever may be urged against substance
238 OF THE PRINCIPLES
or occasion, or any other positive or relative notion of Matter,
hath no place at all, so long as this negative definition of Matter
is adhered to. I answer, you may, if so it shall seem good, use
the word ' Matter' in the same sense as other men use ' nothing,'
and so make those terms convertible in your style. For, after
all, this is what appears to me to be the result of that definition
— the parts whereof when I consider with attention, either col
lectively or separate from each other, I do not find that there is
any kind of effect or impression made on my mind different from
what is excited by the term nothing.
81. You will reply, perhaps, that in the foresaid definition is
included what doth sufficiently distinguish it from nothing — the
positive abstract idea of quiddity, entity, or existence. I own, in
deed, that those who pretend to the faculty of framing abstract
general ideas do talk as if they had such an idea, which is, say
they, the most abstract and general notion of all ; that is, to me,
the most incomprehensible of all others. That there are a great
variety of spirits of different orders and capacities, whose facul
ties both in number and extent are far exceeding those the Author
of my being has bestowed on me, I see no reason to deny. And
for me to pretend to determine by my own few, stinted, narrow
inlets of perception, what ideas the inexhaustible power of the
Supreme Spirit may imprint upon them were certainly the utmost
folly and presumption — since there may be, for aught that I know,
innumerable sorts of ideas or sensations, as different from one
another, and from all that I have perceived, as colours are from
sounds 38 . But, how ready soever I may be to acknowledge
the scantiness of my comprehension with regard to the endless
variety of spirits and ideas that may possibly exist, yet for any
one to pretend to a notion of Entity or Existence, abstracted from
spirit and idea, from perceiving and being perceived, is, I suspect,
a downright repugnancy and trifling with words. — It remains
that we consider the objections which may possibly be made on
the part of Religion.
3 8 Matter and physical science is relative, inasmuch- as we may supppse an indefinite
number of additional senses, affording corresponding varieties of sense-experience, of
course at present inconceivable by man. Or, we may suppose an intelligence destitute of
all j-£«.r£-perceptions, and having ideas or objects of another sort altogether.
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 239
82. Some there are who think that, though the arguments for
the real existence of bodies which are drawn from Reason be
allowed not to amount to demonstration, yet the Holy Scriptures
are so clear in the point, as will sufficiently convince every good
Christian that bodies do really exist, and are something more
than mere ideas ; there being in Holy Writ innumerable facts
related which evidently suppose the reality of timber and stone,
mountains and rivers, and cities, and human bodies 39 . To which
I answer that no sort of writings whatever, sacred or profane,
which use those and the like words in the vulgar acceptation, or
so as to have a meaning in them, are in danger of having their
truth called in question by our doctrine. That all those things
do really exist, that there are bodies, even corporeal substances,
when taken in the vulgar sense, has been shewn to be agreeable
to our principles : and the difference betwixt tilings and ideas,
realities and chimeras, has been distinctly explained. See sect.
29, 30, 33, 36, &c. And I do not think that either what philoso
phers call Matter, or the existence of objects without the mind 4 °,
is anywhere mentioned in Scripture.
83. Again, whether there be or be not external things 41 , it is
agreed on all hands that the proper use of words is the marking
our conceptions, or things only as they are known and perceived
by us ; whence it plainly follows that in the tenets we have laid
down there is nothing inconsistent with the right use and sig
nificancy of language, and that discourse, of what kind soever,
so far as it is intelligible, remains undisturbed. But all this seems
so very manifest, from what has been largely set forth in the
premises, that it is needless to insist any farther on it.
84. But, it will be urged that miracles do, at least, lose much
of their stress and import by our principles. What must we
think of Moses' rod ? was it not really turned into a serpent, or
39 Holy Scripture, and the assumed possibility of its existence, added to our natural
tendency to believe, are the grounds on which Malebranche and Norris infer the existence
of a material world. Berkeley's material world needs no proof — unless of its permanent
orderliness, which he rests on suggestion and custom. His aim is not to prove that the
material world exists, but to explain what we should mean when we say that it exists.
4° i. e. existing uncognised by any intelligence — finite or Divine.
4 1 ' external things,' i. e. things existing absolutely, or out of all relation to any cognitive
agent.
240 OF THE PRINCIPLES
was there only a change of ideas in the minds of the spectators ?
And, can it be supposed that our Saviour did no more at the
marriage-feast in Cana than impose on the sight, and smell, and
taste of the guests, so as to create in them the appearance or
idea only of wine ? The same may be said of all other mira
cles ; [ 88 ] which, in consequence of the foregoing principles, must
be looked upon only as so many cheats, or illusions of fancy. —
To this I reply, that the rod was changed into a real serpent, and
the water into real wine. That this does not in the least con
tradict what I have elsewhere said will be evident from sect. 34
and 35. But this business of real and imaginary has been already
so plainly and fully explained, and so often referred to, and the
difficulties about it are so easily answered from what has gone
before, that it were an affront to the reader's understanding to
resume the explication of it in this place. [ 89 ] I shall only observe
that if at table all who were present should see, and smell, and
taste, and drink wine, and find the effects of it, with me there
could be no doubt of its reality 42 ; — so that at bottom the scruple
concerning real miracles has no place at all on ours, but only on
the received principles, and consequently makes rather for than
against what has been said.
85. Having done with the Objections, which I endeavoured to
propose in the clearest light, and gave them all the force and
weight I could, we proceed in the next place to take a view of
our tenets in their Consequences 43 . Some of these appear at first
sight — as that several difficult and obscure questions, on which
abundance of speculation has been thrown away, are entirely
banished from philosophy. ' Whether corporeal substance can
think,' ' whether Matter be infinitely divisible,' and ■ how it oper
ates on spirit' — these and the like inquiries have given infinite
amusement to philosophers in all ages; but, depending on the
4 s The simultaneous consciousness of, or participation in, the ' same ' sense-ideas, by
different persons, as distinguished from the purely individual or personal consciousness
of imaginary objects and emotions, is here referred to as a test of the reality of the
former.
43 They are unfolded in the remaining sections of the Treatise, sect. 85 — 156 : those
which apply to ideas and sensible things in sect. 86 — 134 ; what belongs to spirits, or sub
jective substances and powers, in the remainder of the Treatise.
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 241
existence of Matter, they have no longer any place on our prin
ciples. Many other advantages there are, as well with regard to
religion as the sciences, which it is easy for any one to deduce
from what has been premised ; but this will appear more plainly
in the sequel.
86. From the principles we have laid down it follows human
knowledge may naturally be reduced to two heads — that of ideas
and that of spirits. Of each of these I shall treat in order.
And first as to ideas or unthinking things. Our knowledge
of these has been very much obscured and confounded, and we
have been led into very dangerous errors, by supposing a two
fold existence of the objects of sense 44 — the one intelligible or in
the mind, the other mz/and without the mind; [ 9 °] whereby un
thinking things are thought to have a natural subsistence of their
own distinct from being perceived by spirits. This, which, if I
mistake not, hath been shewn to be a most groundless and absurd
notion, is the very root of Scepticism 4S ; for, so long as men
thought that real things subsisted without the mind, and that
their knowledge was only so far forth real as it was conformable
to real tilings, it follows they could not be certain that they had
any real knowledge at all. For how can it be known that the
things which are perceived are conformable to those which are
not perceived, or exist without the mind? [ 9I ]
87. Colour, figure, motion, extension, and the like, considered
only as so many sensations in the mind, are perfectly known,
there being nothing in them which is not perceived. But, if they
are looked on as notes or images, referred to things or archetypes
existing without the mind, then are we involved all in scepticism.
We see only the appearances, and not the real qualities of things.
What may be the extension, figure, or motion of anything really
and absolutely, or in itself, it is impossible for us to know, but
only the proportion or relation they bear to our senses. Things
44 Berkeley's 'principles' abo'ish this representative idea in perception, and recognise as
the real object only what we are sensibly conscious of — not any uncognised archetype.
45 So Hume, Reid, and Hamilton, who see in the hypothesis of a representative per
ception, implying ' a twofold existence of the objects of sense,' the germ of scepticism.
Berkeley claims that under his interpretation of what reality, externality, and existence
mean, an intuitive knowledge of the real existence of sensible things is given to us.
16
242 OF THE PRINCIPLES
remaining the same, our ideas vary, and which of them, or even
whether any of them at all, represent the true quality really exist
ing in the thing, it is out of our reach to determine. So that, for
aught we know, all we see, hear, and feel, may be only phantom
and vain chimera, and not at all aoree with the real things exist
ing in rerum natura. All this sceptical cant follows from our
supposing a difference between things and ideas, and that the
former have a subsistence without the mind or unperceived. It
were easy to dilate on this subject, and shew how the arguments
urged by sceptics in all ages depend on the supposition of exter
nal objects. [ 46 But this is too obvious to need being insisted on.]
88. So long as we attribute a real existence to unthinking
things, distinct from their being perceived, it is not only im
possible for us to know with evidence the nature of any real
unthinking being, but even that it exists. Hence it is that we
see philosophers distrust their senses, and doubt of the existence
of heaven and earth, of everything they see or feel, even of their
own bodies. And, after all their labouring and struggle of thought,
they are forced to own we cannot attain to any self-evident or
demonstrative knowledge of the existence of sensible things 47 .
But, all this doubtfulness, which so bewilders and confounds the
mind and makes philosophy ridiculous in the eyes of the world,
vanishes if we annex a meaning to our words, and do not amuse
ourselves with the terms ' absolute,' 'external,' 'exist,' &c. — sig
nifying we know not what. For my part, I can as well doubt of
my own being as of the being of those things which I actually
perceive by sense ; it being a manifest contradiction that any
sensible object should be immediately perceived by sight or
touch, and at the same time have no existence in nature, since
the very existence of an unthinking being consists in being per
ceived^.
4 6 This sentence is omitted in the second edition.
47 This is admitted by Des Cartes, Malebranche, and Locke.
4 8 On Berkeley's own principles, there is no contradiction in the non-existence in sense
of these ' qualities' of a material substance which we are not at the moment sensibly per
cipient of — which we merely infer we should be percipient of on certain conditions, e. g.
the smell, &c. of an orange whilst we are only looking at it. Their non-existence in
imagination, when they are suggested by what we are sensibly conscious of, is indeed, on
his principles, contradictory.
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 243
89. Nothing seems of more importance towards erecting a
firm system of sound and real knowledge, which may be proof
against the assaults of Scepticism, than to lay the beginning in a
distinct explication of what is meant by thing, reality, existence ;
for in vain shall we dispute concerning the real existence of
things, or pretend to any knowledge thereof, so long as we have
not fixed the meaning of those words *$. Thing or Being is the
most general name of all; it comprehends under it two kinds
entirely distinct and heterogeneous, and which have nothing
common but the name, viz. spirits and ideas. The former are
active, indivisible, [ 3 ° incorruptible] substances : the latter are
inert, fleeting, [ s ° perishable passions,] or dependent beings, which
subsist not by themselves 51 , but are supported by, or exist in
minds or spiritual substances. [ S2 We comprehend our own
existence by inward feeling or reflection, and that of other spirits
by reason 53 . We may be said to have some knowledge or notion
of our own minds, of spirits and active beings, whereof in a strict
sense we have not ideas 54 . In like manner, we know and have a
notion of relations 55 between things or ideas — which relations
are distinct from the ideas or things related, inasmuch as the
latter may be perceived by us without our perceiving the former.
To me it seems that ideas, spirits, and relations are all in their
49 The chief end of the Berkeleian philosophy is to reach an intelligible conception of
Being, Existence, or Thing, (favourite terms with philosophers) ; which, according to
Berkeley, are not, as Locke would have it, simple ideas, but general names. Being or
Existence, as explained by Berkeley, may be viewed either in relation to its permanent or
to its variable element. In the former aspect it is the spiritual sitbstance or self; in the
latter, when manifested in the sense-given co-existences of simple ideas or objects, it is
what we call material or sensible existence. Spirits and also syntheses of sense-given
objects may be called ' things.' With Berkeley the word ' thing' stands, not for an arche
type of the associated groups of phenomena of which a mind is percipient, but either for
the groups themselves, or for the minds cognizant of them, and who cause the changes
which they manifest.
5° Omitted in second edition.
5 1 But whilst ideas or objects depend on being perceived, do not spirits depend on ideas
in order to be percipient?
5 2 What follows to the end of this section was added in the second edition.
53 'reason, 'i.e. reasoning or inference, from the changes in the sense-ideas or phenomena
of which we are conscious.
54 Cf. sect. 139 — 142.
55 ' Notion' is thus applied by Berkeley to our knowledge of minds, and to our knowl
edge of relations amonz ideas.
244 0F THE PRINCIPLES
respective kinds the object of human knowledge and 56 subject of
discourse ; and that the term idea would be improperly extended
to signify everything we know or have any notion of]
90. Ideas imprinted on the senses are real things, or do really
exist 57 ; this we do not deny, but we deny they can subsist with
out the minds which perceive them, or that they are resemblances
of any archetypes existing without the mind 58 : since the very
being of a sensation or idea, consists in being perceived, and an
idea can be like nothing but an idea. Again, the things perceived
by sense may be termed external, with regard to their origin —
in that they are not generated from within by the mind itself, but
imprinted by a Spirit distinct from that which perceives them.
Sensible objects may likewise be said to be 'without the mind' in
another sense, namely when they exist in some other mind ; thus,
when I shut my eyes, the things I saw may still exist, but it
must be in another mind 59 .
91. It were a mistake to think that what is here said derogates
in the least from the reality of things. It is acknowledged, on
the received principles, that extension, motion, and in a word all
sensible qualities, have need of a support, as not being able to
subsist by themselves. But the objects perceived by sense are
allowed to be nothing but combinations of those qualities, and
consequently cannot subsist by themselves. 60 Thus far it is
agreed on all hands. So that in denying the things perceived
5 s 'and' = or (?),— unless 'object' is used in a vague meaning, including more than
idea. Cf. sect. 1; also New Theory of Vision Vindicated, sect. 11, 12; Siris, sect. 297,
308.
57 Cf. sect. 33, for the meaning of the term 'real.' t
5 8 i. e. without or unperceived by any mind, human or Divine ; which is quite consistent
with their being ' external ' to a finite percipient, i. e. independent of his will, and deter
mined by the conceptions of a higher mind than his— consistent also with the existence of
archetypal Ideas in the Divine Mind.
59 Berkeley here explains what he regards as the legitimate meanings of the term exter
nality. Men cannot act, cannot live, without assuming an external world — in some con
ception of the term ' external.' It is the business of the philosopher to say what that
conception ought to be. Berkeley here acknowledges (a) an externality in our own pos
sible experience, past and future, as determined by natural laws, which are independent
of the will of the percipient ; and (b) an externality to our own conscious experience,
in the contemporaneous, as well as in the past or future, experience of other minds, finite
or Divine.
60 i.e. they are not properly substances, though Berkeley sometimes speaks of them as
such. Cf. sect. 37.
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE.
245
by sense an existence independent of a substance or support
wherein they may exist [ 92 ], we detract nothing from the received
opinion of their reality, and are guilty of no innovation in that
respect. All the difference is that, according to us, the unthink
ing beings perceived by sense have no existence distinct from
being perceived, and cannot therefore exist in any other sub
stance than those unextended indivisible substances or spirits
which act and think and perceive them ; whereas philosophers
vulgarly hold the sensible qualities do exist in an inert, ex
tended, unperceiving substance which they call Matter — to which
they attribute a natural subsistence, exterior to all thinking
beings, or distinct from being perceived by any mind what
soever, even the eternal mind of the Creator, wherein they sup
pose only ideas of the corporeal substances 61 created by Him:
if indeed they allow them to be at all created 62 .
92. For, as we have shewn the doctrine of Matter or corporeal
substance to have been the main pillar and support of Scepti
cism, so likewise upon the same foundation have been raised all
the impious schemes of Atheism and Irreligion. Nay, so great
a difficulty has it been thought to conceive Matter produced out
of nothing, that the most celebrated among the ancient philoso
phers, even of those who maintained the being of a God, have
thought Matter 63 to be uncreated and coeternal with Him. How
great a friend material substance has been to Atheists in all ages
were needless to relate. All their monstrous systems have so
visible and necessary a dependence on it that, when this corner
stone is once removed, the whole fabric cannot choose but fall to
the ground, insomuch that it is no longer worth while to bestow
a particular consideration on the absurdities of every wretched
sect of Atheists.
61 ' ideas of the corporeal substances' — whereas Berkeley might say real ideas which
are themselves our world of sensible things.
6z On the scheme of intelligible Realism, ' creation' of matter is the production, in
finite minds, of sense-objects or ideas, which are, as it were, letters of the alphabet, in a
language which God employs for the expression of His Ideas, and of which human science
is the partial interpretation. Cf. Siris, sect. 326.
6 3 'Matter,' i.e. an unperceiving and unperceived Substance and Cause — to which
Atheists attribute our personal existence and that of the universe in which we find our
selves. Such Matter once allowed, what proof that it is not Supreme or Absolute Being ?
246 OF THE PRINCIPLES
93. That impious and profane persons should readily fall in
with those systems which favour their inclinations, by deriding
immaterial substance, and supposing the soul to be divisible and
subject to corruption as the body ; which exclude all freedom,
intelligence, and design from the formation of things, and in
stead thereof make a self-existent, stupid, unthinking substance
the root and origin of all beings ; that they should hearken to
those who deny a Providence, or inspection of a Superior Mind
over the affairs of the world, attributing the whole series of
events either to blind chance or fatal necessity arising from the
impulse of one body on another — all this is very natural. And,
on the other hand, when men of better principles observe the
enemies of religion lay so great a stress on unthinking Matter,
and all of them use so much industry and artifice to reduce
everything to it, methinks they should rejoice to see them
deprived of their grand support, and driven from that only fort
ress, without which your Epicureans, Hobbists, and the like[ 93 ],
have not even the shadow of a pretence, but become the most
cheap and easy triumph in the world.
94. The existence of Matter, or bodies unperceived, has not
only been the main support of Atheists and Fatalists, but on the
same principle doth Idolatry likewise in all its various forms
depend. Did men but consider that the sun, moon, and stars,
and every other object of the senses, are only so many sensations
in their minds, which have no other existence but barely being
perceived, doubtless they would never fall down and worship
their own ideas — but rather address their homage to that Eternal
Invisible Mind which produces and sustains all things.
95. The same absurd principle, by mingling itself with the
articles of our faith, has occasioned no small difficulties to Chris
tians. For example, about the Resurrection, how many scruples
and objections have been raised by Socinians and others ? But
do not the most plausible of them depend on the supposition
that a body is denominated the same, with regard not to the
form or that which is perceived by sense 64 , but the material sub
stance, which remains the same under several forms ? Take
6 4 Of which Berkeley does not predicate a numerical identity. Cf. Third Dialogue
letween Hylas and Philonous, pp. 343 — 345.
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE.
247
away this material substance — about the identity whereof all the
dispute is — and mean by body what every plain ordinary person
means by that word, to wit, that which is immediately seen and
felt, which is only a combination of sensible qualities or ideas,
and then their most unanswerable objections come to nothing.
96. Matter 65 being once expelled out of nature drags with it
so many sceptical and impious notions, such an incredible num
ber of disputes and puzzling questions, which have been thorns
in the sides of divines as well as philosophers, and made so
much fruitless work for mankind, that if the arguments we have
produced against it are not found equal to demonstration (as to
me they evidently seem), yet I am sure all friends to knowledge,
peace, and religion have reason to wish they were.
97. Beside the external 66 existence of the objects of percep
tion, another great source of errors and difficulties with regard
to ideal knowledge is the doctrine of abstract ideas, such as it
hath been set forth in the Introduction. The plainest things in
the world, those we are most intimately acquainted with and
perfectly know, when they are considered in an abstract way,
appear strangely difficult and incomprehensible. Time, place,
and motion, taken in particular or concrete, are what everybody
knows ; but, having passed through the hands of a metaphysi
cian, they become too abstract and fine to be apprehended by
men of ordinary sense. Bid -'our servant meet you at such a
time in such a place, and he shall never stay to deliberate on the
meaning of those words ; in conceiving that particular time and
place, or the motion by which he is to get thither, he finds not
the least difficulty. But if time be taken exclusive of all those
particular actions and ideas that diversify the day, merely for the
continuation of existence or duration in abstract, then it will
perhaps gravel even a philosopher to comprehend it.
98. For my own part, whenever I attempt to frame a simple
idea of time\y A ~\, abstracted from the succession of ideas in my
mind, which flows uniformly and is participated by all beings, I
6 5 ' matter,' i. e. absolute Matter, unknowing, and unknown by any intelligence.
66 ' external,' i. e. in the philosophical, but not in Berkeley's meaning of externality. Cf.
sect. 90, note.
248 OF THE PRINCIPLES
am lost and embrangled in inextricable difficulties. I have no
notion of it at all, only I hear others say it is infinitely divisible,
and speak of it in such a manner as leads me to harbour odd
thoughts of my existence 67 ; — since that doctrine lays one under
an absolute necessity of thinking, either that he passes away
innumerable ages without a thought, or else that he is annihi
lated every moment of his life, both which seem equally absurd.
Time therefore being nothing, abstracted from the succession of
ideas in our minds, it follows that the duration of any finite spirit
must be estimated by the number of ideas or actions succeeding
each other in that same spirit or mind. Hence, it is a plain
consequence that the soul always thinks ; and in truth whoever
shall go about to divide in his thoughts, or abstract the existence
of a spirit from its cogitation , will, I believe, find it no easy task 68 .
99. So likewise when we attempt to abstract extension and
motion from all other qualities, and consider them by them
selves, we presently lose sight of them, and run into great ex
travagances. [ 6 9 Hence spring those odd paradoxes, that the
' fire is not hot,' nor ' the wall white,' &c, or that heat and colour
are in the objects nothing but figure and motion.] All which
depend on a twofold abstraction ; first, it is supposed that exten
sion, for example, may be abstracted from all other sensible
qualities ; and secondly, that the entity of extension may be
abstracted from its being perceived. But, whoever shall reflect,
and take care to understand what he says, will, if I mistake not,
acknowledge that all sensible qualities are alike sensations and
alike real ; that where the extension is, there is the colour too,
i.e. in his mind 7 °, and that their archetypes can exist only in
some other mind? 1 ; and that the objects of sense 72 are nothing
6 7 i.e. of what Mind, Self, the Ego means, of its relation to, time, and what personal
identity consists in. Berkeley sometimes seems to imply that the existence of the Ego is
independent of time or succession, in an eternal present (an / am), amid the changes of
phenomena of which it is conscious.
68 As the esse of sense-ideas or sensible objects is percipi, according to Berkeley, so the
esse of minds or persons is percipere. The existence of a Mind thus depends on con
sciousness, and the sensible existence of Matter depends on a sense-percipient.
^9 This sentence is omitted in the second edition.
7° Cf. New Theory of Vision, sect. 43, &c.
7 1 i. e. as ideas, sensible or intelligible — human or Divine.
72 ' objects of sense,' i.e. sensible or external things. Cf. sect. 1, on the meaning of
thing, as distinct from object-proper or simple idea.
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 249
but those sensations combined, blended, or (if one may so speak)
concreted together ; none of all which can be supposed to exist
unperceived. [? 3 And that consequently the wall is as truly white
as it is extended, and in the same sense.]
100. What it is for a man to be happy, or an object good, every
one may think he knows. But to frame an abstract idea of happi
ness, prescinded from all particular pleasure, or of goodness from
everything that is good, this is what few can pretend to. So like
wise a man may be just and virtuous without having precise ideas
of justice and virtue. The opinion that those and the like words
stand for general notions, abstracted from all particular persons
and actions, seems to have rendered morality very difficult, and
the study thereof of small use to mankind. And in effect one
may make a great progress in school-ethics without ever being
the wiser or better man for it, or knowing how to behave him
self in the affairs of life more to the advantage of himself or his
neighbours than he did before. This hint may suffice to let any
one see the doctrine of abstraction has not a little contributed
towards spoiling the most useful parts of knowledge. [ 9S ]
101. The two great provinces of speculative science conversant
about ideas received from sense, are Natural Philosophy and
Mathematics ; with regard to each of these I shall make some
observations. — And first I shall say somewhat of Natural Phil
osophy. On this subject it is that the sceptics triumph. All
that stock of arguments they produce to depreciate our faculties
and make mankind appear ignorant and low, are drawn principally
from this head, namely, that we are under an invincible blindness
as to the true and real nature of things. This they exaggerate,
and love to enlarge on. We are miserably bantered, say they,
by our senses, and amused only with the outside and show of
things. The real essence 74 , the internal qualities and constitution
of every the meanest object, is hid from our view ; something
73 This sentence is omitted in the second edition.
74 With Berkeley, the nominal or logical essence is the real essence of things, in as far
as things are in sense what they are conceived to be. But this is quite consistent with the
fact that we may and do misinterpret the sensible symbols which constitute our material
universe ; and thus our conceptions of their meaning are often misconceptions — so that
their logical or nominal essence becomes different from their real essence.
250 OF THE PRINCIPLES
there is in every drop of water, every grain of sand, which it is
beyond the power of human understanding to fathom or com
prehend. But, it is evident from what has been shewn that all
this complaint is groundless, and that we are influenced by false
principles to that degree as to mistrust our senses, and think
we know nothing of those things which we perfectly compre
hend.
102. One great inducement to our pronouncing ourselves
ignorant of the nature of things is the current opinion that every
thing includes within itself the cause of its properties ; or that
there is in each object an inward essence which is the source
whence its discernible qualities flow, and whereon they depend.
[ 96 ] Some have pretended to account for appearances by occult
qualities, but of late they are mostly resolved into mechanical
causes, to wit, the figure, motion, weight, and suchlike qualities,
of insensible particles 75 ; whereas, in truth, there is no other agent
or efficient cause than spirit, it being evident that motion, as well
as all other ideas, is perfectly inert. See sect. 25. Hence, to
endeavour to explain the production of colours or sounds, by
figure, motion, magnitude and the like, must needs be labour in
vain. And accordingly we see the attempts of that kind are not
at all satisfactory. Which may be said in general of those in
stances wherein one idea or quality is assigned for the cause of
another. I need not say how many hypotheses and speculations
are left out, and how much the study of nature is abridged by
this doctrine ?6 .
103. The great mechanical principle now in vogue is attraction.
That a stone falls to the earth, or the sea swells towards the
moon, may to some appear sufficiently explained thereby. But
how are we enlightened by being told this is done by attraction?
Is it that that word signifies the manner of the tendency, and that
it is by the mutual drawing of bodies instead of their being
impelled or protruded towards each other ? But, nothing is
75 e. g. Locke's Essay, IV. 3.
7 6 Berkeleyism is so far a Spiritual Positivism, which eliminates all causation from the
objective world, concentrates it in Mind, and seeks among phenomena or ideas only for
the laws of their constant co-existence and succession. But the modern Positivists deny
that we may thus infer the ultimate causality of Mind, holding that the ultimate cause or
power is incognisable — that the universe is a ' singular effect.'
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 25 I
determined of the manner or action, and it may as truly (for
aught we know) be termed ' impulse,' or ' protrusion,' as ' attrac
tion.' [ 97 ] Again, the parts of steel we see cohere firmly together,
and this also is accounted for by attraction ; but, in this as in the
other instances, I do not perceive that anything is signified besides
the effect itself; for as to the manner of the action whereby it is
produced, or the cause which produces it, these are not so much
as aimed at.
104. Indeed, if we take a view of the several phenomena, and
compare them together, we may observe some likeness and con
formity between them. For example, in the falling of a stone to
the ground, in the rising of the sea towards the moon, in cohesion,
crystallization, &c, there is something alike, namely, an union or
mutual approach of bodies. So that any one of these or the like
phenomena may not seem strange or surprising to a man who
has nicely observed and compared the effects of nature. For that
only is thought so which is uncommon, or a thing by itself, and
out of the ordinary course of our observation. That bodies
should tend towards the centre of the $arth is not thought strange,
because it is what we perceive every moment of our lives. But,
that they should have a like gravitation towards the centre of the
moon may seem odd and unaccountable to most men, because it
is discerned only in the tides. But a philosopher, whose thoughts
take in a larger compass of nature, having observed a certain
similitude of appearances, as well in the heavens as the earth, that
argue innumerable bodies to have a mutual tendency towards
each other, which he denotes by the general name ' attraction,'
whatever can be reduced to that he thinks justly accounted for.
Thus he explains the tides by the attraction of the terraqueous
globe towards the moon, which to him does not appear odd or
anomalous, but only a particular example of a general rule or law
of nature.
105. If therefore we consider the difference there is betwixt
natural philosophers and other men, with regard to their know
ledge of the phenomena, we shall find it consists not in an exacter
knowledge of the efficient cause that produces them — for that can
be no other than the will of a spirit — but only in a greater large
ness of comprehension, whereby analogies, harmonies, and agree-
252 OF THE PRINCIPLES
ments are discovered in the works of nature, and the particular
effects explained, that is, reduced to general rules, see sect. 62,
which rules, grounded on the analogy and uniformness observed
in the production of natural effects, are most agreeable and sought
after by the mind ; for that they extend our prospect beyond what
is present and near to us, and enable us to make very probable
conjectures touching things that may have happened at very great
distances of time and place, as well as to predict things to come ;
which sort of endeavour towards omniscience is much affected
by the mind.
106. But we should proceed warily in such things, for we are
apt to lay too great a stress on analogies, and, to the prejudice
of truth, humour that eagerness of the mind whereby it is carried
to extend its knowledge into general theorems. For example, in
the business of gravitation or mutual attraction, because it appears
in many instances, some are straightway for pronouncing it uni
versal ; and that to attract and be attracted by every other body
is an essential quality inherent in all bodies whatsoever. Whereas
it is evident the fixed stars have no such tendency towards each
other; [9 8 ] and, so far is that gravitation from being essential to
bodies that in some instances a quite contrary principle seems to
shew itself; as in the perpendicular growth of plants, and the
elasticity of the air. [
"] There is nothing necessary or essential
in the case 77 , but it depends entirely on the will of the Governing
Spirit ?8 , who causes certain bodies to cleave together or tend
towards each other according to various laws, whilst He keeps
others at a fixed distance ; and to some He gives a quite contrary
tendency to fly asunder just as He sees convenient.
107. After what has been premised, I think we may lay down
the following conclusions. First, it is plain philosophers amuse
themselves in vain, when they enquire for any natural efficient
cause, distinct from a mind or spirit. Secondly, considering the
77 According to Sir W. Hamilton, for example, we are intellectually necessitated to
think that every new phenomenon must have previously existed in another form — but not
necessarily in this, that, or the other particular form ; for a knowledge of which we are
indebted to experience.
7 s In other words, what the preceding form of any new phenomena actually was, has
been determined by the Supreme Will, and is, in that sense, arbitrary. God is the proper
cause of the antecedent and consequent forms or phenomena of existence being what we
actually find them to be.
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 253
whole creation is the workmanship of a wise and good Agent, it
should seem to become philosophers to employ their thoughts
(contrary to what some hold 79 ) about the final causes of things ;
[ 8o for, besides that this would prove a very pleasing entertain
ment to the mind, it might be of great advantage, in that it not
only discovers to us the attributes of the Creator, but may also
direct us in several instances to the proper uses and applications
of things;] and I must confess I see no reason why pointing out
the various ends to which natural things are adapted, and for
which they were originally with unspeakable wisdom contrived,
should not be thought one good way of accounting for them, and
altogether worthy a philosopher. Thirdly, from what has been
premised no reason can be drawn why the history of nature should
not still be studied, and observations and experiments made —
which, that they are of use to mankind, and enable us to draw
any general conclusions, is not the result of any immutable
habitudes or relations between things themselves, but only of
God's goodness and kindness to men in the administration of the
world. See sect. 30 and 31. Fourthly, by a diligent observation
of the phenomena within our view, we may discover the general
laws of nature, and from them deduce the other phenomena ; I
do not say demonstrate, for all deductions of that kind depend
on a supposition that the Author of nature always operates uni
formly, and in a constant observance of those rules we take for
principles 8l — which we cannot evidently know.
108. [ 82 It appears from sect. 66, &c. that the steady consistent
methods of nature may not unfitly be styled the Language of
its Author, whereby He discovers His attributes to our view and
directs us how to act for the convenience and felicity of life. And
to me] Those men who frame 83 general rules from the phenomena,
and afterwards derive 84 the phenomena from those rules, seem 8s
79 He probably refers to Bacon.
80 Omitted in second edition.
81 Our assumed ' principles,' or supposed laws of nature, maybe subordinate or special,
and therefore variable, associations of sensible signs which, in their ultimate meaning,
express a perfect, and therefore necessary, Divine Idea.
82 Omitted in the second edition.
8 3 i. e. inductively.
8 4 i. e. deductively.
8 5 ' seem to consider signs rather than causes ' — ' seem to be grammarians, and their
254 OF THE PRINCIPLES
to consider signs rather than causes. 86 A man may well under
stand natural signs without knowing their analogy, or being able
to say by what rule a thing is so or so. And, as it is very pos
sible to write improperly, through too strict an observance of
general grammar-rules ; so, in arguing from general laws of nature,
it is not impossible we may extend 87 the analogy too far, and by
that means run into mistakes.
109. [ 88 To carry on the resemblance.] As in reading other
books a wise man will choose to fix his thoughts on the sense
and apply it to use, rather than lay them out in grammatical
remarks on the language ; so, in perusing the volume of nature,
methinks it is beneath the dignity of the mind to affect an exact
ness in reducing each particular phenomenon to general rules, or
shewing how it follows from them. We should propose to our
selves nobler views, namely, to recreate and exalt the mind with
a prospect of the beauty, order, extent, and variety of natural
things : hence, by proper inferences, to enlarge our notions of the
grandeur, wisdom and beneficence of the Creator; and lastly, to
make the several parts of the creation, so far as in us lies, sub
servient to the ends they were designed for, God's glory, and the
sustentation and comfort of ourselves and fellow-creatures. [ IOO J
no. [ 89 The best key for the aforesaid analogy or natural
Science will be easily acknowledged to be a certain celebrated
Treatise of Mechanics^] [ IDI ] In the entrance of which justly
admired treatise, Time, Space, and Motion are distinguished into
absolute and relative, true and apparent, mathematical and vulgar ;
art the grammar of nature. Two ways there are of learning a language — either by rule
or by practice' — in first edition.
86 'A man may be well read in the language of nature without understanding the gram
mar of it, or being able to say,' &c. — in first edition.
8 7 ' extend ' — ' stretch' — in first edition.
88 Omitted in second edition.
8 9 In the first edition, instead of this sentence, the section commences thus : ' The best
grammar of the kind we are speaking of will be easily acknowledged to be a treatise of
Mechanics , demonstrated and applied to nature by a philosopher of a neighbouring nation
whom, all the world admire. I shall not take upon me to make remarks on the perform
ance of that extraordinary person ; only some things he has advanced so directly opposite
to the doctrine we have hitherto laid down, that we should be wanting in the regard due
to the authority of so great a man did we not take some notice of them.' He refers, of
course, to Newton. The first edition was published in Ireland — hence ' neighbouring
nation.' — On absolute Space, cf. Sir is, sect. 270, &c.
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 255
— which distinction, as it is at large explained by the author,
does suppose those quantities to have an existence without the
mind ; and that they are ordinarily conceived with relation to
sensible things, to which nevertheless in their own nature they
bear no relation at all.
in. As for Time, as it is there taken in an absolute or ab
stracted sense, for the duration or perseverance of the existence
of things, I have nothing more to add concerning it after what
has been already said on that subject. Sect. 97 and 98. For the
rest, this celebrated author holds there is an absolute Space,
which, being unperceivable to sense, remains in itself similar and
immoveable ; and relative space to be the measure thereof, which,
being moveable and defined by its situation in respect of sensible
bodies, is vulgarly taken for immoveable sp'ace. Place he defines
to be that part of space which is occupied by any body; and
according as the space is absolute or relative so also is the place.
Absolute Motion is said to be the translation of a body from ab
solute place to absolute place, as relative motion is from one re
lative place to another. [ I02 ] And, because the parts of absolute
space do not fall under our senses, instead of them we are obliged
to use their sensible measures, and so define both place and
motion with respect to bodies which we regard as immoveable.
But, it is said in philosophical matters we must abstract from our
senses, since it may be that none of those bodies which seem to
be quiescent are truly so, and the same thing which is moved
relatively may be really at rest ; as likewise one and the same
body may be in relative rest and motion, or even moved with
contrary relative motions at the same time, according as its place
is variously defined. All which ambiguity is to be found in the
apparent motions, but not at all in the true or absolute, which
should therefore be alone regarded in philosophy. And the true
we are told are distinguished from apparent or relative motions
by the following properties. — First, in true or absolute motion all
parts which preserve the same position with respect of the whole,
partake of the motions of the whole. Secondly, the place being
moved, that which is placed therein is also moved; so that a body
moving in a place which is in motion doth participate the motion
of its place. Thirdly, true motion is never generated or changed
256 OF THE PRINCIPLES
otherwise than by force impressed on the body itself. Fourthly,
true motion is always changed by force impressed on the body
moved. Fifthly, in circular motion barely relative there is no
centrifugal force, which nevertheless, in that which is true or
absolute, is proportional to the quantity of motion.
112. But, notwithstanding what has been said, I must confess
it does not appear to me that there can be any motion other than
relative 90 ; so that to conceive motion there must be at least con
ceived two bodies, whereof the distance or position in regard to
each other is varied. Hence, if there was one only body in being
it could not possibly be moved. This to me seems very evident,
in that the idea I have of motion does necessarily include rela
tion. — [ 9I Whether others can conceive it otherwise, a little atten
tion may satisfy them.]
113. But, though in every motion it be necessary to conceive
more bodies than one, yet it may be that one only is moved,
namely, that on which the force causing the change in the dis
tance or situation of the bodies, is impressed. For, however
some may define relative motion, so as to term that body moved
which changes its distance from some other body, whether the
force [_ QZ or action] causing that change were impressed on it or
no, yet as [ 93 I cannot assent to this ; for, since we are told] rela
tive motion is that which is perceived by sense, and regarded in
the ordinary affairs of life, it follows that every man of common
sense knows what it is as well as the best philosopher. Now, I
ask any one whether, in his sense of motion as he walks along
the streets, the stones he passes over may be said to move, be
cause they change distance with his feet ? To me it appears that
though motion includes a relation of one thing to another, yet
it is not necessary that each term of the relation be denominated
from it. As a man may think of somewhat which does not
think, so a body may be moved to or from another body which
9° On motion, cf. Analyst, qu. 12, and De Motn. See also Malebranche, Recherche, I. 8.
All attempts to imagine space imply the thought, of locomotive sense-experience — an
unimpeded, as distinguished from an impeded power of locomotion. Cf. sect. 116.
9 1 Omitted in second edition.
9 2 Added in second edition.
93 Omitted in second edition.
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 257
is not therefore itself in motion, [ 94 I mean relative motion, for
other I am not able to conceive.]
1 14. As the place happens to be variously defined, the motion
which is related to it varies 95 . A man in a ship may be said to
be quiescent with relation to the sides of the vessel, and yet
move with relation to the land. Or he may move eastward in
respect of the one, and westward in respect of the other. In the
common affairs of life men never go beyond the earth to define
the place of any body ; and what is quiescent in respect of that
is accounted absolutely to be so. But philosophers, who have a
greater extent of thought, and juster notions of the system of
things, discover even the earth itself to be moved. In order
therefore to fix their notions they seem to conceive the corporeal
world as finite, and the utmost unmoved walls or shell thereof to
be the place whereby they estimate true motions. If we sound
our own conceptions, I believe we may find all the absolute mo
tion we can frame an idea of to be at bottom no other than rela
tive motion thus defined. For, as has been already observed,
absolute motion, exclusive of all external relation, is incompre
hensible ; and to this kind of relative motion all the above-men
tioned properties, causes, and effects ascribed to absolute motion
will, if I mistake not, be found to agree. As to what is said of
the centrifugal force, that it does not at all belong to circular
relative motion, I do not see how this follows from the experi
ment which is brought to prove it. See PJiilosopliiae Naturalis
Principia Mathematica, in Schol. Def. VIII. For the water in the
vessel [ io3 ] at that time wherein it is said to have the greatest
relative circular motion, has, I think, no motion at all; as is plain
from the foregoing section.
115. For, to denominate a body moved it is requisite, first,
that it change its distance or situation with regard to some other
body; secondly, that the force occasioning that change be im
pressed on it. If either of these be wanting, I do not think that,
agreeably to the sense of mankind, or the propriety of language,
a body can be said to be in motion. I grant indeed that it is
possible for us to think a body which we see change its distance
94 Omitted in second edition.
95 See Locke's Essay, B. II. 13. £ 7 — 10.
17
258 OF THE PRINCIPLES
from some other to be moved, though it have no force 96 applied
to it (in which sense there may be apparent motion), but then it
is because the force causing the change of distance is imagined
by us to be [ 97 applied or] impressed on that body thought to
move ; which indeed shews we are capable of mistaking a thing
to be in motion which is not, and that is all, [ 98 but does not
prove that, in the common acceptation of motion, a body is
moved merely because it changes distance from another; since
as soon as we are undeceived, and find that the moving force
was not communicated to it, we no longer hold it to be moved.
So, on the other hand, when one only body (the parts whereof
preserve a given position between themselves) is imagined to
exist, some there are who think that it can be moved all manner
of ways, though without any change of distance or situation to
any other bodies; which we should not deny if they meant only
that it might have an impressed force, which, upon the bare
creation of other bodies, would produce a motion of some cer
tain quantity and determination. But that an actual motion
(distinct from the impressed force or power productive of change
of place in case there were bodies present whereby to define it)
can exist in such a single body, I must confess I am not able to
comprehend.]
116. From what has been said it follows that the philosophic
consideration of motion does not imply the being of an absolute
Space, distinct from that which is perceived by sense and related
to bodies ; which that it cannot exist without the mind is clear
upon the same principles that demonstrate the like of all other
objects of sense. And perhaps, if we enquire narrowly, we shall
find we cannot even frame an idea of pure Space exclusive of all
body. This I must confess seems impossible 99 , as being a most
abstract idea. When I excite a motion in some part of my body,
if it be free or without resistance, I say there is Space ; but if I
find a resistance, then I say there is Body : and in proportion as
the resistance to motion is lesser or greater, I say the space is
more or less pure. So that when I speak of pure or empty space,
9 6 ' applied to' — ' impressed on' — in first edition.
97 Added in second edition.
9 s What follows to the end of this section is omitted in the second edition.
99 ' seems impossible' — ' is above my capacity' — in first edition.
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 259
it is not to be supposed that the word 'space' stands for an idea
distinct from or conceivable without body and motion — though
indeed we are apt to think every noun substantive stands for a
distinct idea that may be separated from all others ; which has
occasioned infinite mistakes. When, therefore, supposing all
the world to be annihilated besides my own body, I say there
still remains pure Space, thereby nothing else is meant but only
that I conceive it possible for the limbs of my body to be moved
on all sides without the least resistance ; but if that too were
annihilated then there could be no motion, and consequently no
Space 100 . Some, perhaps, may think the sense of seeing does
furnish them with the idea of pure space; but it is plain from
what we have elsewhere shewn, that the ideas of space and
distance are not obtained by that sense. See the Essay concern
ing Vision.
117. What is here laid down seems to put an end to all those
disputes and difficulties that have sprung up amongst the learned
concerning the nature oipitre Space. But the chief advantage aris
ing from it is that we are freed from that dangerous dilemma, to
which several who have employed their thoughts on that subject
imagine themselves reduced, viz. of thinking either that Real
Space is God, or else that there is something beside God which
is eternal, uncreated, infinite, indivisible, immutable. Both which
may justly be thought pernicious and absurd notions. It is cer
tain that not a few divines, as well as philosophers of great note,
have, from the difficulty they found in conceiving either limits or
annihilation of space, concluded it must be divine. And some
of late have set themselves particularly to shew the incommuni
cable attributes of God agree to it 1 . Which doctrine, how un
worthy soever it may seem of the Divine Nature, yet I must
confess I do not see how we can get clear of it, so long as we
adhere to the received opinions.
118. Hitherto of Natural Philosophy: we come now to make
some enquiry concerning that other great branch of speculative
100 i.e. pure Space, as immediately perceived, is ultimately the sensation of an unresisted
motion of the body, or of any of its organs. See this less fully developed in New Theory
of Vision.
1 Clarke's Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God, which appeared in 1706,
2 6o OF THE PRINCIPLES
knowledge, to wit, Mathematics 2 . These, how celebrated soever
they may be for their clearness and certainty of demonstration,
which is hardly anywhere else to be found, cannot nevertheless
be supposed altogether free from mistakes, if so be that in their
principles there lurks some secret error which is common to the
professors of those sciences with the rest of mankind. Mathe
maticians, though they deduce their theorems from a great height
of evidence, yet their first principles are limited by the considera
tion of quantity: and they do not ascend into any enquiry con
cerning those transcendental maxims which influence all the
particular sciences, each part whereof, Mathematics not excepted,
does consequently participate of the errors involved in them.
That the principles laid down by mathematicians are true, and
their way of deduction from those principles clear and incon
testable, we do not deny; but, we hold there may be certain
erroneous maxims of greater extent than the object of Mathe
matics, and for that reason not expressly mentioned, though
tacitly supposed throughout the whole progress of that science ;
and that the ill effects of those secret unexamined errors are dif
fused through all the branches thereof. To be plain, we suspect
the mathematicians are no less deeply concerned than other
men in the errors arising from the doctrine of abstract general
ideas, and the existence of objects without the mind.
119. Arithmetic has been thought to have for its object ab
stract ideas of Number ; of which to understand the properties
and mutual habitudes, is supposed no mean part of speculative
knowledge. The opinion of the pure and intellectual nature of
numbers in abstract has made them in esteem with those philos
ophers who seem to have affected an uncommon fineness and
elevation of thought. It hath set a price on the most trifling
numerical speculations which in practice are of no use, but serve
only for amusement; and hath heretofore so far infected the
minds of some, that they have dreamed of mighty mysteries
involved in numbers, and attempted the explication of natural
things by them. But, if we narrowly inquire into our own
thoughts, and consider what has been premised, we may perhaps
entertain a low opinion of those high flights and abstractions,
2 Sect. 118 — 132.
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 2 6l
and look on all inquiries about numbers only as so many difficiks
ni(g<2, so far as they are not subservient to practice, and promote
the benefit of life. [ io ^]
120. Unity in abstract we have before considered in sect. 13,
from which and what has been said in the Introduction, it plainly
follows there is not any such idea. But, number being defined a
'collection of units,' we may conclude that, if there be no such
thing as unity or unit in abstract, there are no ideas of number
in abstract denoted by the numeral names and figures. The
theories therefore in Arithmetic, if they are abstracted from the
names and figures, as likewise from all use and practice, as well
as from the particular things numbered, can be supposed to have
nothing at all for their object ; hence we may see how entirely
the science of numbers is subordinate to practice, and how jejune
and trifling it becomes when considered as a matter of mere
speculation.
121. However, since there may be some who, deluded by the
specious show of discovering abstracted verities, waste their time
in arithmetical theorems and problems which have not any use,
it will not be amiss if we more fully consider and expose the
vanity of that pretence ; and this will plainly appear by taking a
view of Arithmetic in its infancy, and observing what it was that
originally put men on the study of that science, and to what
scope they directed it. It is natural to think that at first, men,
for ease of memory and help of computation, made use of count
ers, or in writing of single strokes, points, or the like, each
whereof was made to signify an unit, i.e. some one thing of what
ever kind they had occasion to reckon. Afterwards they found
out the more compendious ways of making one character stand
in place of several strokes or points. And, lastly, the notation
of the Arabians or Indians came into use, wherein, by the repe
tition of a few characters or figures, and varying the signification
of each figure according to the place it obtains, all numbers may
be most aptly expressed ; which seems to have been done in
imitation of language, so that an exact analogy is observed be
twixt the notation by figures and names, the nine simple figures
answering the nine first numeral names and places in the former,
corresponding to denominations in the latter. And agreeably to
2 62 OF THE. PRINCIPLES
those conditions of the simple and local value of figures, were
contrived methods of finding, from the given figures or marks of
the parts, what figures and how placed are proper to denote the
whole, or vice versa. And having found the sought figures, the
same rule or analogy being observed throughout, it is easy to
read them into words; and so the number becomes perfectly
known. For then the number of any particular things is said to
be known, when we know the name or figures (with their due
arrangement) that according to the standing analogy belong to
them. For, these signs being known, we can by the operations
of arithmetic know the signs of any part of the particular sums
signified by them; and, thus computing in signs, (because of the
connexion established betwixt them and the distinct multitudes
of things whereof one is taken for an unit), we may be able rightly
to sum up, divide, and proportion the things themselves that we
intend to number.
122. In Arithmetic, therefore, we regard not the things but the
signs, which nevertheless are not regarded for their Own sake, but
because they direct us how to act with relation to things, and
dispose rightly of them. Now, agreeeably to what we have
before observed of words in general (sect. 19, Introd.) it happens
here likewise that abstract ideas are thought to be signified by
numeral names or characters, while they do not suggest ideas of
particular things to our minds. I shall not at present enter into
a more particular dissertation on this subject, but only observe
that it is evident from what has been said, those things which
pass for abstract truths and theorems concerning numbers, are in
reality conversant about no object distinct from particular numer
able things, except only names and characters, which originally
came to be considered on no other account but their being signs,
or capable to represent aptly whatever particular things men
had need to compute. Whence it follows that to study them for
their own sake would be just as wise, and to as good purpose as
if a man, neglecting the true use or original intention and sub
serviency of language, should spend his time in impertinent
criticisms upon words, or reasonings and controversies purely
verbal. [ io s]
3 Cf. New Theory of Vision, sect. 107, &c.
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 263
123. From numbers we proceed to speak oi Extension*, which
is the object of Geometry. The infinite divisibility of finite ex
tension, though it is not expressly laid down either as an axiom
or theorem in the elements of that science, yet is throughout the
same everywhere supposed and thought to have so inseparable
and essential a connexion with the principles and demonstrations
in Geometry, that mathematicians never admit it into doubt, or
make the least question of it. And, as this notion is the source
from whence do spring all those amusing geometrical paradoxes
which have such a direct repugnancy to the plain common sense
of mankind, and are admitted with so much reluctance into a
mind not yet debauched by learning ; so is it the principal occa
sion of all that nice and extreme subtilty which renders the
study of Mathematics so very difficult and tedious. Hence, if
we can make it appear that no finite extension contains innumer
able parts, or is infinitely divisible, it follows that we shall at
once clear the science of Geometry from a great number of diffi
culties and contradictions which have ever been esteemed a
reproach to human reason, and withal make the attainment
thereof a business of much less time and pains than it hitherto
has been.
124. Every particular finite extension which may possibly be
the object of our thought is an idea existing only in the mind,
and consequently each part thereof must be perceived. If, there
fore, I cannot perceive innumerable parts in any finite extension
that I consider, it is certain they are not contained in it ; but, it
is evident that I cannot distinguish innumerable parts in any
particular line, surface, or solid, which I either perceive by sense,
or figure to myself in my mind : wherefore I conclude they are
not contained in it. Nothing can be plainer to me than that the
extensions I have in view are no other than my own ideas ; and
it is no less plain that I cannot resolve any one of my ideas into
an infinite number of other ideas, that is, that they are not in
finitely divisible 5 . If by finite extension be meant something
4 Cf. New Theory of Vision, sect. 122 — 125, 149 — 160.
s Infinitely divisible extension, being unperceived, must be non-existent — if existence
necessarily depends on a percipient, and must be actually perceived. The only possible
extension is then sensible extension, which cannot be infinitely divided, but only divided
down to the point at which its parts become insensible or non-existent.
264 OF THE PRINCIPLES
distinct from a finite idea, I declare I do not know what that is,
and so cannot affirm or deny anything of it. [ Io6 ] But if the
terms ' extension,' ' parts,' &c, are taken in any sense conceiv
able, that is, for ideas, then to say a finite quantity or extension
consists of parts infinite in number is so manifest and glaring a
contradiction, that every one at first sight acknowledges it to be
so;[ 107 ] and it is impossible it should ever gain the assent of
any reasonable creature who is not brought to it by gentle and
slow degrees, as a converted Gentile 6 to the belief of transubstan
tiation. Ancient and rooted prejudices do often pass into prin
ciples ; and those propositions which once obtain the force and
credit of a principle, are not only themselves, but likewise what
ever is deducible from them, thought privileged from all exami
nation. And there is no absurdity so gross, which, by this
means, the mind of man may not be prepared to swallow.
125. He whose understanding is prepossessed with the doc
trine of abstract general ideas maybe [ 7 easily] persuaded that
(whatever be thought of the ideas of sense) extension in abstract
is infinitely divisible. And any one who thinks the objects of
sense exist without the mind will perhaps in virtue thereof be
brought to admit that 8 a line but an inch long may contain in
numerable parts — really existing, though too small to be dis
cerned. These errors are grafted as well in the minds of geo
metricians as of other men, and have a like influence on their
reasonings ; and it were no difficult thing to shew how the
arguments from Geometry made use of to support the infinite
divisibility of extension are bottomed on them. [ 9 But this, if it
be thought necessary, we may hereafter find a proper place to
treat of in a particular manner.] At present we shall only ob
serve in general whence it is the mathematicians are all so fond
and tenacious of that doctrine.
126. It has been observed in another place that the theorems
and demonstrations in Geometry are conversant about universal
ideas (sect. 15. Introd.) ; where it is explained in what sense this
6 ' converted Gentile' — ' pagan convert' — in first edition.
7 Omitted in second edition.
8 ' will perhaps in virtue thereof be brought to admit that,' &c. — 'will not stick to affirm
that,' &c. — in first edition.
9 Omitted in second edition.
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 2 6$
ought to be understood, to wit, the particular lines and figures
included in the diagram are supposed to stand for innumerable
others of different sizes ; or, in other words, the geometer con
siders them abstracting from their magnitude — which does not
imply that he forms an abstract idea, but only that he cares not
what the particular magnitude is, whether great or small, but
looks on that as a thing indifferent to the demonstration. Hence
it follows that a line in the scheme but an inch long must be
spoken of as though it contained ten thousand parts, since it is
regarded not in itself, but as it is universal ; and it is universal
only in its signification, whereby it represents innumerable lines
greater than itself, in which may be distinguished ten thousand
parts or more, though there may not be above an inch in it.
After this manner, the properties of the lines signified are (by a
very usual figure) transferred to the sign, and thence, through
mistake, thought to appertain to it considered in its own nature.
127. Because there is no number of parts so great but it is
possible there may be a line containing more, the inch-line is
said to contain parts more than any assignable number; which is
true, not of the inch taken absolutely, but only for the things
signified by it. But men, not retaining that distinction in their
thoughts, slide into a belief that the small particular line described
on paper contains in itself parts innumerable. There is no such
thing as the ten thousandth part of an inch ; but there is of a
mile or diameter of the earth, which may be signified by that
inch. When therefore I delineate a triangle on paper, and take
one side not above an inch, for example, in length to be the
radius, this I consider as divided into 10,000 or 100,000 parts or
more ; for, though the ten thousandth part of that line considered
in itself is nothing at all, and consequently may be neglected
without any error or inconveniency, yet these described lines,
being only marks standing for greater quantities, whereof it
may be the ten thousandth part is very considerable, it follows
that, to prevent notable errors in practice, the radius must be
taken of 10,000 parts or more.
128. From what has been said the reason is plain why, to the
end any theorem become universal in its use, it is necessary we
speak of the lines described on paper as though they contained
266 OF THE PRINCIPLES
parts which really they do not. In doing of which, if we examine
the matter throughly, we shall perhaps discover that we cannot
conceive an inch itself as consisting of, or being divisible into, a
thousand parts, but only some other line which is far greater than
an inch, and represented by it ; and that when we say a line is
infinitely divisible, we must mean a line which is infinitely great 10 .
What we have here observed seems to be the chief cause why,
to suppose the infinite divisibility of finite extension has been
thought necessary in geometry.
129. The several absurdities and contradictions which flowed
from this false principle might, one. would think, have been
esteemed so many demonstrations against it. But, by I know not
what logic, it is held that proofs a posteriori [ Io8 ] are not to be
admitted against propositions relating to infinity — as though it
were not impossible even for an infinite mind to reconcile contra
dictions ; or as if anything absurd and repugnant could have a
necessary connexion with truth or flow from it. But, whoever
considers the weakness of this pretence will think it was contrived
on purpose to humour the laziness of the mind which had rather
acquiesce in an indolent scepticism than be at the pains to go
through with a severe examination of those principles it has ever
embraced for true.
130. Of late [ IOQ ] the speculations about Infinites have run so
high, and grown to such strange notions, as have occasioned no
small scruples and disputes among the geometers of the present
age. Some there are of great note who, not content with holding
that finite lines may be divided into an infinite number of parts,
do yet farther maintain that each of those infinitesimals is itself
subdivisible into an infinity of other parts or infinitesimals of a
second order, and so on ad infinitum. These, I say, assert there
are infinitesimals of infinitesimals of infinitesimals, &c, without
ever coming to an end : so that according to them an inch does
not barely contain an infinite number of parts, but an infinity of
an infinity of an infinity ad infinitum of parts. Others there be
who hold all orders of infinitesimals below the first to be nothing
at all ; thinking it with good reason absurd to imagine there is
10 ' we must mean a line,' &c. — ' we mean (if we mean anything) a line,' &c. — in firsj:
edition.
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 267
any positive quantity or part of extension which, though mul
tiplied infinitely, can never equal the smallest given extension.
[ IIQ ] And yet on the other hand it seems no less absurd to think
the square, cube, or other power of a positive real root, should
itself be nothing at all ; which they who hold infinitesimals of
the first order, denying all of the subsequent orders, are obliged
to maintain.
131. Have we not therefore reason to conclude they are both
in the wrong, and that there is in effect no such thing as parts
infinitely small, or an infinite number of parts contained in any
finite quantity? But you will say that if this doctrine obtains it
will follow the very foundations of Geometry are destroyed, and
those great men who have raised that science to so astonishing
a height, have been all the while building a castle in the air. To
this it may be replied that whatever is useful in geometry, and
promotes the benefit of human life, does still remain firm and
unshaken on our principles — that science considered as practical
will rather receive advantage than any prejudice from what has
been said. But to set this in a due light, and shew how lines and
figures may be measured, and their properties investigated, with
out supposing finite extension to be infinitely divisible, may be
the proper business of another place 11 . For the rest, though it
should follow that some of the more intricate and subtle parts
of Speculative Mathematics may be pared off without any pre
judice to truth, yet I do not see what damage will be thence
derived to mankind. On the contrary, I think it were highly to
be wished that men of great abilities and obstinate application 12
would draw off their thoughts from those amusements, and employ
them in the study of such things as lie nearer the concerns of
life, or have a more direct influence on the manners.
132. If it be said that several theorems undoubtedly true are
discovered by methods in which infinitesimals are made use of,
which could never have been if their existence included a contra
diction in it — I answer that upon a thorough examination it will
not be found that in any instance it is necessary to make use of
11 See Analyst.
12 ' men of great abilities and obstinate application,' &c. — ' men of the greatest abilities
and most obstinate application,' &c. — in first edition.
268 OF THE PRINCIPLES
or conceive infinitesimal parts of finite lines, or even quantities
less than the minimum sensibile ; nay, it will be evident this is
never done, it being impossible. [ I3 And, whatever mathematicians
may think of fluxions, or the differential calculus and the like, a
little reflection will shew them that, in working by those methods,
they do not conceive or imagine lines or surfaces less than what
are perceivable to sense. They may indeed call those little and
almost insensible quantities infinitesimals, or infinitesimals of in
finitesimals, if they please ; but at bottom this is all, they being
in truth finite — nor does the solution of problems require the
supposing any other. But this will be more clearly made out
hereafter.]
133. By what we have hitherto said, it is plain that very
numerous and important errors have taken their rise from those
false Principles which were impugned in the foregoing parts of
this treatise ; and the opposites of those erroneous tenets at the
same time appear to be most fruitful Principles, from whence
do flow innumerable consequences highly advantageous to true
philosophy, as well as to religion. Particularly Matter, or the ab
solute^ existence of corporeal objects, hath been shewn to be that
wherein the most avowed and pernicious enemies of all knowledge,
whether human or divine, have ever placed their chief strength
and confidence. And surely, if by distinguishing the real exist
ence of unthinking things from their being perceived, and allow
ing them a subsistence of their own out of the minds of spirits,
no one thing is explained in nature, but on the contrary a great
many inexplicable difficulties arise ; if the supposition of Matter 15
is barely precarious, as not being grounded on so much as one
single reason ; if its consequences cannot endure the light of
examination and free inquiry, but screen themselves under the
dark and general pretence of ' infinites being incomprehensible ;'
if withal the removal of this Matter** be not attended with the
least evil consequence ; if it be not even missed in the world,
*3 What follows to the end of this section is omitted in the second edition.
z * ' absolute,' i. e. unperceived or irrelative existence — supposed to be either something
extended, or something of which we have no positive conception at all.
X S i. e. absolute or unperceived Matter, but not the relative or perceived material world
of the senses.
OF H UMA N KNO WL EDGE. 2 6g
but everything as well, nay much easier conceived without it;
if, lastly, both Sceptics and Atheists are for ever silenced upon
supposing only spirits and ideas, and this scheme of things is
perfectly agreeable both to Reason and Religion — methinks we
may expect it should be admitted and firmly embraced, though
it were proposed only as an hypothesis, and the existence of
Matter 15 had been allowed possible, which yet I think we have
evidently demonstrated that it is not.
134. True it is that, in consequence of the foregoing principles,
several disputes and speculations which are esteemed no mean
parts of learning, are rejected as useless [ l6 and in effect conversant
about nothing at all]. But, how great a prejudice soever against
our notions this may give to those who have already been deeply
engaged, and made large advances in studies of that nature, yet
by others we hope it will not be thought any just ground of dislike
to the principles and tenets herein laid down — that they abridge
the labour of study, and make human sciences far more clear,
compendious, and attainable than they were before.
135. Having despatched what we intended to say concerning
the knowledge of Ideas, the method we proposed leads us in the
next place to treat of Spirits 17 — with regard to which, perhaps,
human knowledge is not so deficient as is vulgarly imagined.
The great reason that is assigned for our being thought ignorant
of the nature of spirits is — our not having an idea of it. But,
surely it ought not to be looked on as a defect in a human under
standing that it does not perceive the idea of spirit, if it is mani
festly impossible there should be any such idea. And this if I
mistake not has been demonstrated in section 27; to which I shall
here add — that a spirit has been shewn to be the only substance
or support wherein unthinking beings or ideas can exist; but
J S See note 15 on previous page.
16 Omitted in second edition.
»7 Sect. 135 — 156 treat of the consequences of the new Principles of Human Knowl
edge, in their application to Spirits or Minds — the second of the two correlatives in the
dualism of Berkeley. This dualism Berkeley does not sufficiently explain. When he
speaks of Mind as a Substance, and of minds in the plural, he cannot mean by ' substance'
what Spinoza means — that which for its existence needs nothing beyond itself. Mind,
with Berkeley, needs ideas, and must be conscious ; and finite minds are dependent on
God, in a relation which he does not define.
270 OF THE PRINCIPLES
that this substance which supports or perceives ideas should itself
be an idea or like an idea is evidently absurd.
136. It will perhaps be said that we want a sense (as some
have imagined 18 ) proper to know substances withal, which, if
we had, we might know our own soul as we do a triangle. To
this I answer, that, in case we had a new sense bestowed upon
us, we could only receive thereby some new sensations or ideas
£>f sense. But I believe nobody will say that what he means by
the terms soul and substance is only some particular sort of idea
or sensation. We may therefore infer that, all things duly con
sidered, it is not more reasonable to think our faculties defective,
in that they do not furnish us with an idea of spirit or active
thinking substance, than it would be if we should blame them
for not being able to comprehend a round square.
137. From the opinion that spirits are to be known after the
manner of an idea or sensation have risen many absurd and
heterodox tenets, and much scepticism about the nature of the
soul. It is even probable that this opinion may have produced
a doubt in some whether they had any soul at all distinct from
their body, since upon inquiry they could not find they had an
idea of it. That an idea which is inactive, and the -existence
whereof consists in being perceived, should be the image or
likeness of an agent subsisting by itself, seems to need no other
refutation than barely attending to what is meant by those words.
But, perhaps you will say that though an idea cannot resemble
a spirit in its thinking, acting, or subsisting by itself, yet it may
in some other respects ; and it is not necessary that an idea or
image be in all respects like the original.
138. I answer, if it does not in those mentioned, it is impossible
it should represent it in any other thing. Do but leave out the
power of willing, thinking, and perceiving ideas, and there re
mains nothing else wherein the idea can be like a spirit. For,
by the word spirit we mean only that which thinks, wills, and
perceives ; this, and this alone, constitutes the signification of
that term. If therefore it is impossible that any degree of those
powers should be represented in an idea [ I9 or notion], it is evident
there can be no idea [ I9 or notion] of a spirit.
18 Locke. '9 Omitted in second edition. Cf. sect. 142.
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 27 1
139. But it will be objected that, if there is no idea signified by
the terms soul, spirit, and substance, they are wholly insignificant,
or have no meaning in them. I answer, those words do mean or
signify a real thing — which is neither an idea nor like an idea,
but that which perceives ideas, and wills, and reasons about them.
What I am myself — that which I denote by the term / — is the
same with what is meant by said or spiritual substance. [ 2 ° But if
I should say that /was nothing, or that /was an idea or notion,
nothing could be more evidently absurd than either of these pro
positions.] If it be said that this is only quarrelling at a word,
and that, since the immediate significations of other names are by
common consent called ideas, no reason can be assigned why
that which is signified by the name spirit or soul may not par
take in the same appellation, I answer, all the unthinking objects
of the mind agree in that they are entirely passive, and their
existence consists only in being perceived ; whereas a soul or
spirit is an active being, whose existence consists, not in being
perceived, but in perceiving ideas and thinking 21 . It is therefore
necessary, in order to prevent equivocation and confounding
natures perfectly disagreeing and unlike, that we distinguish
between spirit and idea. See sect. 2J.
140. In a large sense indeed, we may be said to have an idea
[ 22 or rather a notion] of spirit; that is, we understand the mean
ing of the word, otherwise we could not affirm or deny anything
of it. Moreover, as we conceive the ideas that are in the minds
of other spirits by means of our own, which we suppose to be
resemblances of them ; so we know other spirits by means of
our own soul — which in that sense is the image or idea of them;
it having a like respect to other spirits that blueness or heat by
me perceived has to those ideas perceived by another 23 .
20 Omitted in second edition. Cf. sect. 142.
21 If the existence of a mind consists in perceiving, it follows that mind is as dependent
on ideas (of some sort) as ideas are on mind.
22 Introduced in second edition, in which he professes to apply the term notion exclu
sively to our knowledge of the Ego, and to our knowledge of relations among our ideas.
Sect. 142.
=3 We know other minds or Egos phenomenally, i. e. through phenomena, or by infer
ence from them, but not as ideas or phenomena of which we ourselves are conscious. Cf.
sect. 148. It is thus a phenomenal knowledge that we have of other finite minds — of Ego
viewed empirically and in plurality. The real meaning of Ego in the plural number, dis-
272 OF THE PRINCIPLES
141. [ 24 The natural immortality of the soulj] 111 ] is a neces
sary consequence of the foregoing doctrine. But before we at
tempt to prove this, it is fit that we explain the meaning of that
tenet.] It must not be supposed that they who assert the natural
immortality of the soul 25 are of opinion that it is absolutely in
capable of annihilation even by the infinite power of the Creator
who first gave it being, but only that it is not liable to be broken
or dissolved by the ordinary laws of nature or motion. They
indeed who hold the soul of man to be only a thin vital flame, or
system of animal spirits, make it perishing and corruptible as the
body ; since there is nothing more easily dissipated than such a
being, which it is naturally impossible should survive the ruin of
the tabernacle wherein it is inclosed. And this notion has been
greedily embraced and cherished by the worst part of mankind,
as the most effectual antidote against all impressions of virtue
and religion. [ II2 ] But it has been made evident that bodies, of
what frame or texture soever, are barely passive ideas in the
mind — which is more distant and heterogeneous from them than
light is from darkness 26 . We have shewn that the soul is indi
visible, incorporeal, unextended, and it is consequently incorrupt
ible. Nothing can be plainer than that the motions, changes,
decays, and dissolutions which we hourly see befal natural
bodies (and which is what we mean by the course of nature) can
not possibly affect an active, simple, uncompounded substance :
such a being therefore is indissoluble by the force of nature ;
that is to say, ' the soul of man is naturally immortal 27 .'
142. After what has been said, it is, I suppose, plain that our
souls are not to be known in the same manner as senseless, inac
tive objects, or by way of idea. Spirits and ideas are things so
wholly different, that when we say 'they exist,' 'they are known,'
tinguished from the absolute or transcendental Ego, is a question which Berkeley has not
discussed.
34 Omitted in second edition.
2 5 ' the soul,' i. e. the finite mind or empirical Ego.
26 This is an emphatic assertion of the dualism of Berkeley — Minds or Egos being dis
tinguished from their ideas or objects.
=7 Although minds are dependent on ideas, as well as ideas on minds, yet minds are
not, by any abstract necessity, dependent on sense-ideas or physical organization. Hence,
while pure materialism is, on Berkeley's principles, a contradiction, the continued exist
ence of a disembodied spirit involves no necessary absurdity.
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 273
or the like, these words must not be thought to signify anything
common to both natures 28 . There is nothing alike or common
in them ; and to expect that by any multiplication or enlarge
ment of our faculties we may be enabled to know a spirit as we
do a triangle 29 , seems as absurd as if we should hope to see a
sound. This is inculcated because I imagine it may be of mo
ment towards clearing several important questions, and prevent
ing some very dangerous errors concerning the nature of the
soul. [ 3 °We may not, I think, strictly be said to have an idea
of an active being, or of an action 31 , although we may be said to
have a notion of them. I have some knowledge or notion of my
mind, and its acts about ideas — inasmuch as I know or under
stand what is meant by these words. What I know, that I have
some notion of. I will not say that the terms idea and notion
may not be used convertibly, if the world will have it so ; but
yet it conduceth to clearness and propriety that we distinguish
things very different by different names. It is also to be re
marked that, all relations including an act of the mind 32 , we can
not so properly be said to have an idea, but rather a notion of
the relations and habitudes between things. But if, in the mod
ern way, the word idea is extended to spirits, and relations, and
acts, this is, after all, an affair of verbal concern.]
143. It will not be amiss to add, that the doctrine of abstract
ideas has had no small share in rendering those sciences intricate
and obscure which are particularly conversant about spiritual
things. Men have imagined they could frame abstract notions
28 The objective essence of matter, or the sense-given non-ego, is, with Berkeley, purely
phenomenal or ideal ; the essence of mind — the Ego — is substantial and causal. Sense
ideas or phenomena are at once dependent on mind, and symbolical of the intentions of
mind. Mind and its ideas are, in short, at the opposite poles of existence — being related
as subject knowing and object known, as cause and effects, as substance and phenomenon.
But he does not say that these poles, thus opposed, are numerically distinguishable as
things independent of each other.
2 9 i. e. objectively — as an object or idea.
3° What follows was introduced in the second edition, in which the term notion is
defined, and assists to express Berkeley's duality in things.
3 1 Yet he speaks elsewhere (sect. 1, &c.) of ideas formed by attending to the ' operations'
of the mind. He probably refers to the effects of the operations, holding that the effects,
but not their cause, are ideal.
3 2 Here is the germ of Kantism. But Berkeley has not analysed that activity of mind
which constitutes relation, as distinguished from the personal acting of will. Cf. remarka
ble passages in Siris, sect. 297, 308, &c.
18
274 0F THE PRINCIPLES
of the powers and acts of the mind, and consider them prescinded
as well from the mind or spirit itself, as from their respective
objects and effects. [ II3 ] Hence a great number of dark and am
biguous terms, presumed to stand for abstract notions, have been
introduced into metaphysics and morality, and from these have
grown infinite distractions and disputes amongst the learned.
144. But, nothing seems more to have contributed towards
engaging men in controversies and mistakes with regard to the
nature and operations of the mind, than the being used to speak
of those things in terms borrowed from sensible ideas. For ex
ample, the will is termed the motion of the soul : this infuses a
belief that the mind of man is as a ball in motion, impelled and
determined by the objects of sense, as necessarily as that is by
the stroke of a racket. Hence arise endless scruples and errors
of dangerous consequence in morality. All which, I doubt not,
may be cleared, and truth appear plain, uniform, and consistent,
could but philosophers be prevailed on to f_ 33 depart from some
received prejudices and modes of speech, and] retire into them
selves, and attentively consider their own meaning. [ 33 But the
difficulties arising on this head demand a more particular disqui
sition than suits with the design of this treatise.]
145. From what has been said, it is plain that we cannot know
the existence of other spirits otherwise than by their operations,
or the ideas by them excited in us. I perceive several motions,
changes, and combinations of ideas, that inform me there are cer
tain particular agents, like myself, which accompany them and
concur in their production. [ II4 ] Hence, the knowledge I have
of other spirits is not immediate, as is the knowledge of my
ideas ; but depending on the intervention of ideas, by me referred
to agents or spirits distinct from myself, as effects or concomitant
signs 34 .
33 Omitted in second edition.
34 This is one of the most important sections in the book. It has been common (see
Reid's Essays, VI. 5, &c.) to allege that, on Berkeley's principles, I have no reason to be
lieve in the existence of other minds or wills — a plurality of Egos, or at any rate in other
Egos than my own, and the Supreme or Absolute. I can design or intend ; all the rest is
God's — my volitions and His determine the phenomenal universe. Now, Berkeley holds
that we have the same sort of reason to believe in the existence of other human minds that
we have to believe in the existence of God, viz. the sense-symbolism which implies the
existence of other finite minds, embodied like our own, as its only reasonable interpreta-
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 275
146. But, though there be some things which convince us
human agents are concerned in producing them, yet it is evident
to every one that those things which are called the Works of
Nature, that is, the far greater part of the ideas or sensations
perceived by us, are not produced by, or dependent on, the wills
of men. There is therefore some other Spirit that causes them ;
since it is repugnant that they should subsist by themselves.
See sect. 29. But, if we attentively consider the constant re
gularity, order, and concatenation of natural things, the surprising
magnificence, beauty and perfection of the larger, and the exqui
site contrivance of the smaller parts of the creation, together
with the exact harmony and correspondence of the whole, but
above all the never-enough-admired laws of pain and pleasure,
and the instincts or natural inclinations, appetites, and passions
of animals — I say if we consider all these things, and at the same
time attend to the meaning and import of the attributes One,
Eternal, Infinitely Wise, Good, and Perfect, we shall clearly per
ceive that they belong to the aforesaid Spirit, 'who works all in
all,' and 'by whom all things consist.'
147. Hence, it is evident that God is known as certainly and
immediately as any other mind or spirit whatsoever distinct from
ourselves. We may even assert that the existence of God is far
more evidently perceived than the existence of men ; because the
effects of nature are infinitely more numerous and considerable
than those ascribed to human agents 35 . There is not any one
mark that denotes a man, or effect produced by him, which does
not more strongly evince the being of that Spirit who is the
Author of Nature. For, it is evident that in affecting other per
sons the will of man has no other object than barely the motion
of the limbs of his body; but that such a motion should be
tion. Cf. sect. 147, 148. Both are beliefs gathered from the suggestions of experience.
This enables us to infer the existence not merely of other, and by us, at present, unper
ceived phenomena, in our own past or future experience ; and phenomena in the present,
past, or future experience of other minds ; but also, as implied in the latter, the existence
of other minds — other selfs. His mode of looking at the universe leaves the evidence for
the existence of other men as it was before (although our ideas and those of other men are
with him not numerically identical, but only in a harmony of similarity) ; while his
theory was believed by him to intensify the evidence of Divine Presence and Providence.
See Alciphron, Dial. IV., and Vindication of New Theory of Vision, sect. 8, 38, &c.
35 Cf. Alciphron, Dial. IV. 8 — 14; Vindication of New Theory of Vision, sect. 8.
2j6 OF THE PRINCIPLES
attended by, or excite any idea in the mind of another, depends
wholly on the will of the Creator. He alone it is who, ' uphold
ing all things by the word of His power,' maintains that inter
course between spirits whereby they are able to perceive the
existence of each other 36 . And yet this pure and clear light
which enlightens every one is itself invisible [ 37 to the greatest
part of mankind],
148. It seems to be a general pretence of the unthinking herd
that they cannot see God. Could we but see Him, say they, as
we see' a man, we should believe that He is, and believing obey
His commands. But alas, we need only open our eyes to see the
Sovereign Lord of all things, with a more full and clear view
than we do any one of our fellow-creatures. Not that I imagine
we see God (as some will have it) by a direct and immediate
view ; or see corporeal things, not by themselves, but by seeing
that which represents them in the essence of God, which doctrine
1s 38 , I must confess, to me incomprehensible. [ II5 ] But I shall
explain my meaning : — -A human spirit or person is not perceived
by sense, as not being an idea ; when therefore we see the colour,
size, figure, and motions of a man, we perceive only certain
sensations or ideas excited in our own minds ; and these being
exhibited to our view in sundry distinct collections, serve to mark
out unto us the existence of finite and created spirits like our
selves. Hence it is plain we do not see a man — if by man is
meant that which lives, moves, perceives, and thinks as we do —
but only such a certain collection of ideas as directs us to think
there is a distinct principle of thought and motion, like to our-
36 God so regulates the sense-given phenomena or ideas of which spirits are individually
conscious, as that these phenomena, while numerically different in each mind, are never
theless a practical medium of intercourse between minds. Egoism is seen not to be a ne
cessary result of the fact that no one but myself can be conscious of my own experience,
when we recognise that persons only are powers, and that /am not the cause of all the
changes which my ideas or phenomena exhibit. Without being themselves conscious of
my consciousness, we may infer that other persons or minds are at work to modify it. In
short, our experience of power or volition, and of our own limited power, is essential to
Berkeley's recognition of a plurality of minds or substances — to his escape from the unity
of Absolute Egoism, and to his scientific recognition of his external world.
37 Omitted in second edition.
38 Malebranche, as understood by Berkeley. According to Malebranche we see mate
rial or sensible things in God, who transcends, and in transcending unites the substantial
antithesis of Mind and Matter. See Recherche, liv. III. p. ii. ch. 6, &c.
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 277
selves, accompanying and represented by it. And after the same
manner we see God ; all the difference is that, whereas some one
finite and narrow assemblage of ideas denotes a particular human
mind, whithersoever we direct our view, we do at all times and
in all places perceive manifest tokens of the Divinity — everything
we see, hear, feel, or anywise perceive by sense, being a sign or
effect of the power of God ; as is our perception of those very
motions which are produced by men 39 .
149. It is therefore plain that nothing can be more evident to
any one that is capable of the least reflection than the existence
of God, or a Spirit who is intimately present to our minds,
producing in them all that variety of ideas or sensations which
continually affect us, on whom we have an absolute and entire
dependence, in short ' in whom we live, and move, and have our
being.' That the discovery of this great truth, which lies so near
and obvious to the mind, should be attained to by the reason of
so very few, is a sad instance of the stupidity and inattention of
men, who, though they are surrounded with such clear manifest
ations of the Deity, are yet so little affected by them that they
seem, as it were, blinded with excess of light.
150. But you will say, Hath Nature no share in the production
of natural things, and must they be all ascribed to the immediate
and sole operation of God ? I answer, if by Nature is meant
only the visible series of effects or sensations imprinted on our
minds, according to certain fixed and general laws, then it is plain
that Nature, taken in this sense, cannot produce anything at all 4 °.
But, if by Nature is meant some being distinct from God, as well
as from the laws of nature, and things perceived by sense, I must
confess that word is to me an empty sound without any intelli
gible meaning annexed to it. Nature, in this acceptation, is a
vain chimera, introduced by those heathens who had not just
notions of the omnipresence and infinite perfection of God. But,
it is more unaccountable that it should be received among Chris-
39 Cf. Alciphron, Dial. IV. and Vindication of New Theory of Vision, sect. 8, 38, &c.
The eternal existence of conscious Mind, and the present existence of other finite minds
than my own, are both inferences, according to Berkeley. The former, however, follows
from the assumption that something must be eternal, because something now exists ;
seeing that this ' something,' as existing, must be a mind conscious of ideas or objects.
4° Cf. sect. 25, 51 — 53, 60 — 66, &c.
2 ;8 OF THE PRINCIPLES
tians, professing belief in the Holy Scriptures, which constantly
ascribe those effects to the immediate hand of God that heathen
philosophers are wont to impute to Nature. ' The Lord He causeth
the vapours to ascend ; He maketh lightnings with rain ; He
bringeth forth the wind out of his treasures.' Jerem. x. 13. ' He
turneth the shadow of death into the morning, and maketh the
day dark with night' Amos v. 8. ' He visiteth the earth, and
maketh it soft with showers : He blesseth the springing thereof,
and crowneth the year with His goodness ; so that the pastures
are clothed with flocks, and the valleys are covered over with corn.'
See Psal. lxv. But, notwithstanding that this is the constant
language of Scripture, yet we have I know not what aversion
from believing that God concerns Himself so nearly in our affairs.
Fain would we suppose Him at a great distance off, and substitute
some blind unthinking deputy in His stead, though (if we may
believe Saint Paul) ' He be not far from every one of us.'
151. It will, I doubt not, be objected, that the slow, gradual,
and roundabout methods observed in the production of natural
things do not seem to have for their cause the immediate hand
of an Almighty Agent 41 . Besides, monsters, untimely births,
fruits blasted in the blossom, rains falling in desert places, mis
eries incident to human life, and the like, are so many arguments
that the whole frame of nature is not immediately actuated and
superintended by a Spirit of infinite wisdom and goodness. But
the answer to this objection is in a good measure plain from
sect. 62 ; it being visible that the aforesaid methods of nature are
absolutely necessary, in order to working by the most simple and
general rules, and after a steady and consistent manner; which
argues both the wisdom and goodness of God. [ 42 For, it doth
hence follow that the finger of God is not so conspicuous to the
resolved and careless sinner, which gives him an opportunity to
harden in his impiety and grow ripe for vengeance. (Vid. sect.
57.)] Such is the artificial contrivance of this mighty machine
of nature that, whilst its motions and various phenomena strike
on our senses, the hand which actuates the whole is itself unper
ceivable to men of flesh and blood. 'Verily' (saith the prophet)
1 thou art a God that hidest thyself.' Isaiah xlv. 15. But, though
4 1 Cf. sect. 60 — 66. 42 Omitted in second edition.
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 279
the Lord conceal Himself from the eyes of the sensual and lazy,
who will not be at the least expense of thought, yet to an un
biassed and attentive mind nothing can be more plainly legible
than the intimate presence of an All-wise Spirit, who fashions, regu
lates, and sustains the whole system of beings 43 , H 44 Secondly.] It
is clear, from what we have elsewhere observed, that the operating
according to general and stated laws is so necessary for our
guidance in the affairs of life, and letting us into the secret of
nature, that without it all reach and compass of thought, all
human sagacity and design, could serve to no manner of purpose;
it were even impossible there should be any such faculties or
powers in the mind. See sect. 31. Which one consideration
abundantly outbalances whatever particular inconveniences may
thence arise.
152. But, we should further consider that the very blemishes
and defects of nature are not without their use, in that they make
an agreeable sort of variety, and augment the beauty of the rest
of the creation, as shades in a picture serve to set off the brighter
and more enlightened parts. We would likewise do well to ex
amine whether our taxing the waste of seeds and embryos, and
accidental destruction of plants and animals, before they come to
full maturity, as an imprudence in the Author of nature, be not
the effect of prejudice contracted by our familiarity with impotent
and saving mortals 45 . In man indeed a thrifty management of
those things which he cannot procure without much pains and
industry may be esteemed wisdom. But, we must not imagine
that the inexplicably fine machine of an animal or vegetable costs
the great Creator any more pains or trouble in its production
than a pebble does ; nothing being more evident than that an
Omnipotent Spirit can indifferently produce everything by a mere
fiat or act of his will. Hence, it is plain that the splendid pro
fusion of natural things should not be interpreted weakness or
prodigality in the agent who produces them, but rather be looked
on as an argument of the riches of his power.
153. As for the mixture of pain or uneasiness which is in the
world pursuant to the general laws of nature, and the actions of
43 So Pascal in the Pensies. 44 Omitted in second edition.
45 So Butler, in his Analogy. Also cf. sect. 60 — 66.
280 OF THE PRINCIPLES
finite, imperfect spirits, this, in the state we are in at present, is
indispensably necessary to our well-being. But our prospects
are too narrow. We take, for instance, the idea of some one
particular pain into our thoughts, and account it evil ; whereas,
if we enlarge our view, so as to comprehend the various ends,
connexions, and dependencies of things, on what occasions and
in what proportions we are affected with pain and pleasure, the
nature of human freedom, and the design with which we are put
into the world ; we shall be forced to acknowledge that those
particular things which, considered in themselves, appear to be
evil, have the nature of good, when considered as linked with
the whole system of beings 45 .
154. From what has been said, it will be manifest to any con
sidering person, that it is merely for want of attention and com
prehensiveness of mind that there are any favourers of Atheism
or the Manichean Heresy to be found. Little and unreflecting
souls may indeed burlesque the works of Providence 46 — [ II6 ] the
beauty and order whereof they have not capacity, or will not be
at the pains, to comprehend ; but those who are masters of any
justness and extent of thought, and are withal used to reflect,
can never sufficiently admire the divine traces of Wisdom and
Goodness that shine throughout the Economy of Nature. But
what truth is there which glares so strongly on the mind that by
an aversion of thought, a wilful shutting of the eyes, we may not
escape seeing it, at least with a full and direct view ? Is it there
fore to be wondered at, if the generality of men, who are ever
intent on business or pleasure, and little used to fix or open the
eye of their mind, should not have all that conviction and evi
dence of the Being of God which might be expected in reason
able creatures ?
155. We should rather wonder that men can be found so stupid
as to neglect, than that neglecting they should be unconvinced
of such an evident and momentous truth. And yet it is to be
feared that too many of parts and leisure, who live in Christian
45 So Butler, in his Analogy.
4 s A constant Divine Thought and Providence in the changes of the phenomenal world,
rather than the original creation of finite minds and of their ideas or phenomena, is the
conception which runs through Berkeley's philosophy, conspicuously in Siris.
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 2 8l
countries, are, merely through a supine and dreadful negligence,
sunk into [ 47 a sort of Demy-] Atheism. [ 4S They cannot say there
is not a God, but neither are they convinced that there is. For
what else can it be but some lurking infidelity, some secret mis
givings of mind with regard to the existence and attributes of
God, which permits sinners to grow and harden in impiety ?]
Since it is downright impossible that a soul pierced and enlight
ened with a thorough sense of the omnipresence, holiness, and
justice of that Almighty Spirit should persist in a remorseless
violation of His laws. We ought, therefore, earnestly to meditate
and dwell on those important points ; that so we may attain con
viction without all scruple 'that the eyes of the Lord are in every
place beholding the evil and the good ; that He is with us and
keepeth us in all places whither we go, and giveth us bread to
eat and raiment to put on ;' that He is present and conscious to
our innermost thoughts; in fine, that we have a most absolute
and immediate dependence on Him. A clear view of which great
truths cannot choose but fill our hearts with an awful circum
spection and holy fear, which is the strongest incentive to Virtue,
and the best guard against Vice.
156. For, after all, what deserves the first place in our studies
is the consideration of God and our Duty; which to promote,
as it was the main drift and design of my labours, so shall I
esteem them altogether useless and ineffectual if, by what I have
said, I cannot inspire my readers with a pious sense of the Presence
of God ; and, having shewn the falseness or vanity of those barren
speculations which make the chief employment of learned men,
the better dispose them to reverence and embrace the salutary
truths of the Gospel, which to know and to practise is the highest
perfection of human nature.
47 Omitted in second edition. Our alleged necessary ignorance of the ultimate cause
and meaning of the Universe in which we find ourselves is, in the present day, a common
objection to the assumption that its phenomena may be interpreted as significant of Su
preme or Absolute Mind. As Hume or Comte would have it, the Universe is a singular
effect or complement of phenomena, which we can interpret only so far as our secular
wants and duties are concerned. They look to the physical or phenomenal, and not to the
moral and spiritual evidence.
4 8 Omitted in second edition.
APPENDIX.
A.
BERKELEY'S ROUGH DRAFT OF THE INTRODUCTION
TO THE PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE.
[After the Principles of Human Knowledge had passed through the
press, I found Berkeley's autograph of a rough draft of the Introduction,
in the manuscript department of the Library of Trinity College, Dublin.
It seems to have been written in November and December, 1708. I
here present it to the reader, who will find that it varies considerably
from the published version, besides containing erasures and interlinea
tions which have a biographical and literary, as well as a philosophical
interest. As this Introduction forms Berkeley's early attack upon
metaphysical abstractions, and his reasoned exposition of what has since
been called his Nominalism, it may be well 'to have so important a part
of his philosophy placed before us in various verbal forms which it
successively assumed when it was struggling into the final expression.
The student of his mind may like also to compare these with still
earlier illustrative fragments in the Commonplace Book, appended to
his Life and Lette?'s, as well as with the theory of universals in Alciphron
and especially in Sin's. What Berkeley here means to deny is the ex
istence of any physical reality, corresponding to general names, apart
from actual or imagined sensible phenomena. In this early attack
upon 'abstract ideas,' his characteristic ardour carried him in appear
ance to the extreme of rejecting the universalizing element, by which
Mind constitutes and gives objectivity to things, and of resting knowl
edge on the shifting foundation of phenomena or ideas — particular,
contingent, and subjective. But if he seems to do this in the Intro
duction, he virtually proceeds in the body of the Principles upon the
assumption that personal substantiality and efficient or voluntary cau
sality are universal and uncreated necessities of Being — axiomatic truths
involved in all concrete consciousness of phenomena. This assumption
(along with the assumed general fact of established cosmical order)
redeems his philosophy from subjectivity, and gives cohesion and fixed
ness to knowledge. This stable intellectuality is more manifest in Sin's.
But he everywhere leans on living acts, not verbal formulas.
A. C. F.]
285
286 APPENDIX A.
Philosophy being nothing else but the study of wisdom and
truth, it may seem strange that they who have spent much time
and pains in it, do usually find themselves embarrass'd with more
doubts and difficulties than they were before they pcame to that
study. There is nothing these men can [ 2 touch] with their hands
or behold with their eyes but has its inaccessible and dark sides.
Something] they imagine to be in every drop of water, every
grain of sand which can puzzle [ 3 and confound] the most clear and
[ 4 elevated] understanding, and are often by their principles led
into a necessity of admitting the most irreconcilable opinions for
true, or (which is worse) of sitting down in a forlorn scepticism.
The cause of this is thought to be the obscurity of things,
together with the natural weakness and imperfection of our under
standing. It is said the senses we have are few, and these design'd
by nature only for the support of life, and not to penetrate into
the constitution and inward essence of things. Besides, the mind
of man being finite when it treats of things which partake of
infinity, it is not to be wonder'd at if it run into absurdities 5 and
contradictions, out of which it is [ 3 absolutely] impossible it should
ever extricate itself, it being of the nature of Infinite not to be
comprehended by that which is finite 6 .
But I cannot think our faculties are so weak and inadequate in
respect of things, as these men would make us believe. I cannot
be brought to suppose that right deductions from true principles
should ever end 7 in consequences which cannot be maintain'd or
made consistent. We should believe that God has dealt more
bountifully with the sons of men than to give them a strong
desire for that which he had placed quite out of their reach, and
so made it impossible for them to obtain. Surely our wise and
good Creatour would never have made us so eager in the search
1 On the opposite page of the MS., instead of what follows within brackets — ' meddled
with that study. To them the most common and familiar things appear intricate and
perplex'd, there's nothing but has its dark sides. Somewhat'
2 'handle.'
3 Erased.
4 ' comprehensive.'
5 ' absurdities' instead of ' inconsistency's' erased.
6 on the margin of this paragraph is written — ' Nov. 15, 1708.'
7 ' end' instead of ' terminate' erased.
PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 287
of truth meerly to baulk and perplex us, to make us blame our
faculties, and bewail our inevitable ignorance. This were not
agreeable to the wonted indulgent methods of Providence, which,
whatever appetites it may have implanted in the creatures, doth
usually furnish them with such means as, if rightly made use of,
will not fail to satisfy them. Upon the whole my opinion is, that
the far greatest part, if not all, of those difficultys which have
hitherto amus'd philosophers, and block'd up the way to knowl
edge, are entirely owing to themselves. That they have first rais'd
a dust, and then complain they cannot see.
My purpose therefore is, to [ 8 try if I can] discover [ 9 and point
out] what those principles are which have introduc'd all that
doubtfulness and uncertainty, those absurditys and contradictions
into the several sects of philosophy, insomuch that the wisest
men have thought our ignorance incurable, conceiving it to arise
from the natural dulness and limitation of our faculties. And at
the same time to establish such principles in their stead, as shall
be free from the like consequences, and lead the mind into a clear
view of truth. And surely it is a work well deserving of our
pains, to try to extend the limits of our knowledge, and [ IO do
right to] human understanding, by making it to appear that those
lets and difficultys which stay and embarrass the mind in its
enquirys [
" after truth] do not spring from any darkness and
intricacy in the objects, or [ I2 natural] defect in the intellectual
powers, so much as from false principles which have been insisted
on, and might have been avoided.
How difficult and discouraging soever this attempt may seem,
when I consider what a number of men of very great and extra
ordinary abilitys have gone before me, [ 9 and miscarry'd] in the
like [ I3 designs, yet] I am not without some hopes, upon the con
sideration that the largest views are not always the clearest, and
that he who is shortsighted will be apt to draw the object nearer,
and by a close and narrow survey may perhaps discern that which
had escaped far better eyes.
8 Instead of ' endeavour to.' 9 Erased.
10 Instead of ' beat down those mounds and barriers that have been put to.'
11 Within brackets in the MS.
13 Instead of ' incurable' erased.
»3 Instead of ' undertakings.'
288 APPENDIX A.
[ I4 In my entrance upon this work] I think it necessary to take
notice of [ IS that w ch seems to have been the source of a great many
errours, and to have made the way to knowledge very intricate
and perplex'd, that w ch seems to have had a chiefe part in ren
dering speculation intricate and perplex'd, and to have been the
source of innumerable errours and difficulties in almost all parts
of knowledge] — and that is the opinion that there are Abstract
Ideas or General Conceptions of Things. He who is not a per
fect stranger to the writings and [ l6 notions] of philosophers must
needs acknowledge that [ I7 no small] part of [ l8 them] are spent
19 about Abstract Ideas. These are, in a more special manner,
thought to be the objects of those sciences that go by the name
of logic and metaphysics, and of all that which passes under the
notion of the most abstracted and sublime philosophy. In all
which [ 2 ° speculative sciences] you shall scarce find any question
handled [ 2 °by the philosophers] in such a manner as does not
suppose their existence in the mind, and that it is very well
acquainted with them; [ 2 °so that these parts of learning must of
necessity be overrun with [very much] useles wrangling and
jargon, [innumerable] absurdities and contradictions [opinions],
if so be that Abstract General Ideas are perfectly inconceivable,
as I am well assur'd they [never were — cannot be] conceived by
me, [ 2I nor do I think it possible they should be conceiv'd by
any one else].]
By abstract idea, genera, species, universal notions, all which
amount to the same thing, as I find these terms explain'd by the
best and clearest writers, we are to understand ideas which equally
*4 Instead of ' But here in the entrance, before I proceed any further.' On the blank
page opposite we have — ' In my entrance upon this work [before I descend to more par
ticular subjects] [and] [to more particular enquirys].'
*5 Instead of — ' y l w h seem to me [one] very powerful and universal cause of error and
confusion throughout the philosophy of all sects and ages' — and the opposite page, * that
which seems to me a wide-spread [in philosophical enquirys] throughout the philosophy
of all sects and ages.'
16 Brackets in the MS.
1 7 Instead of ' very great.
"
18 Instead of their disputes and contemplations [speculations].'
19 ' concerning' instead of ' about' erased.
20 Erased.
21 On opposite page — ' and I very much question whether they ever were or can rje by
any one else.'
PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 289
represent the particulars of any sort, and are made by the mind
which, observing that the individuals of each kind agree in some
things and differ in others, takes out and singles from the rest
that which is common to all, making thereof one abstract general
idea; which [ 22 general idea] contains all those ideas wherein the
particulars of that kind agree [ 22 and partake], separated from
and exclusive of all those other concomitant ideas whereby they
[ 22 individuals] are distinguished [ 22 from each other] one from
another. [ 22 To this abstract general idea thus framed the mind
gives a general name, and lays it up and uses it as a standard
whereby to judge what particulars are and what are not to be
accounted of that sort, those onely which contain every part of
the general idea having a right to be admitted into that sort and
by that name.]
For example, the mind having observed that Peter, James, and
John, &c, resemble each other in certain common agreements of
shape and other quality, leaves out of the complex idea it has of
Peter, James, &c, that which is peculiar to each, retaining onely
that which is common to all. And so it makes one [ 23 abstract]
complex idea, wherein all the particulars partake, abstracting
entirely from and cutting off all those circumstances and differ
ences which might determine it to any particular existence : and
after this manner you come by [ 24 the] precise abstract idea of
[ 22 a] man. In which [ 22 idea] it is true there is included colour
because there is no man but hath some colour, but then it can be
neither white [ 22 colour] nor black [ 22 colour] nor any particular
colour, but colour in general, because, there is no one particular
colour wherein all men partake. In like manner you will tell me
there is included stature, but it is neither tall stature nor low
stature, nor yet middling stature, but stature in general. And so
of the rest. [ 25 Suppose now I should ask whether you compre
hended, in this your abstract idea of man, the ideas of eyes, or
ears, or nose, or legs, or arms [this might perhaps put you to a
stand for an answer, for] you will own it to be an odd and mu-
82 Erased. 23 Instead of ' general.' z4 Instead of ' a clear.'
=5 Erased. On opposite page, but erased, are the words — ' an odd and mutilated idea,
that of man without all these.' And on the same page — ' it must needs [make an odd and
frightful figure the idea] of [a] man without all these,' also erased.
19
290 APPENDIX A.
tilated idea of a man w ch is without all these. Yet it must be
so to make it consistent with the doctrine of abstract ideas, there
being particular men that want, some arms, some legs [some
noses, &c.]]
f_ 27 But supposing the abstract idea of men to be very conceiv
able, let us proceed to see [ 26 how] it comes to be enlarg'd into
the more general and comprehensive idea of animal.] There
being a great variety of other creatures [ 27 as birds] that partake
in some parts, but not all, of the complex idea of man, the mind
leaving out those parts which are peculiar to men, and retaining
those onely which are common to all the living creatures, frames
the idea of animal, [ 2? which is more general than that of man,
it comprehending not only all particular men, but also all birds,
beasts, fishes, and insects.] The constituent parts whereof [ 2? of
the complex idea of animal] are body, life, sense, and spontaneous
motion. By body is meant body [ 27 in general], without any par
ticular shape or figure, there being no one shape or figure common
to all animals, without covering either of hair, or feathers, or
[ 28 scales], and yet it is not naked. Hair, feathers [ 28 scales], and
nakedness being peculiar distinguishing properties of [ 27 the] par
ticular animals, and for that reason left out of the [ 29 abstract]
idea. Upon the same account, the spontaneous motion must be
neither walking nor flying nor creeping, it is nevertheless a motion,
but what that motion is it is not easy to say.
In like manner a man [ 27 having seen several lines] by leaving
out of his idea of a line [ 3 °the particular colour and length]
comes by the idea of a line which is neither black, nor white,
nor red, &c, nor long nor short, which he calls the abstract idea
of a line, and which, for ought that: I can see, is just nothing.
[ 27 For I ask whether a line has any more than one particular
colour and one particular length, which [when they are] being
left out, I beseech any 3I one to consider what it is that remains.]
Whether others have this [ 32 wonderful] faculty of abstracting
their ideas, they can [ 33 best] tell. For myself, I dare be con-
26 Instead of ' by what steps and abstractions.' =7 Erased.
28 Instead of ' fins.' =9 Instead of ' general.'
3° Instead of ' all particular colour, and all particular length.'
31 'one' instead of ' man.' 32 Instead of ' marvellous.'
33 Instead of better.'
PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 29 1
fident I have it not; [ 36 and I am apt to think that some of those
who fancy themselves to enjoy that privilege, would, upon look
ing narrowly into their own thoughts, find they wanted it as much
as I. For there was a time when, being banter'd and abus'd by
words, I did not in the least doubt my having it. But upon a
strict survey of my abilitys, I not only discover my own deficiency
in that point, but also cannot conceive it possible that such a
person should be even in the most perfect and exalted under
standing.] I find I have a faculty of imagining, conceiving, or
representing to myself the ideas of those particular things I have
perceiv'd, and of variously compounding and dividing them. I
can imagine a man with two heads, or the upper parts of a man
joyn'd to the body of a horse. I can consider the hand, the
eye, the nose each by itself [ 34 abstracted or] separated from the
rest of the body. But then whatever eye or nose I imagine, they
must have some particular shape and colour. The idea of man
that I frame to myself must be either of a white, or a black, or a
tawny, a straight or a crooked, a tall or a low or a middling sized
man. I cannot by any effort of [ 35 thought] frame to myself an
idea of man [ 36 prescinding from all particulars] that shall have
nothing particular in it. [ s6 For my life I cannot comprehend
abstract ideas 37 .]
And there are grounds to think [ 38 most] men will acknowledge
themselves to be in my case. The generality of men, which are
simple and illiterate, never pretend to abstract notions. It is said
they are difficult and not to be attained without much study and
speculation, we may therefore reasonably conclude that, if such
there be, they are altogether confin'd to the learned.
But it must be confess'd, I do not see what great advantage
they give them above the rest of mankind. He who considers
that whatever has any existence in nature and can anywise affect
or concern [ 3f5 is] him is particular, will not find great cause to be
discontent with his facultys, if [ 3 nhey] cannot reach a piece of
knowledge as useless as it is refin'd ; [ 3<5 and] which whether it
34 Instead of ' singled out and.' 35 Instead of ' imagination.' 36 Erased.
37 On opposite page the words — ' I can conceive well enough what is meant by ade
quate and inadequate, clear and obscure, distinct and confus'd [ideas], but' — are written
and erased.
3 s Instead of ' the far greatest part of.' » Instead of ' he.'
292 APPENDIX A.
be to be found even in those deep thinkers may well be made a
question.
For besides the [ 4 °incomprehensibleness] of abstract ideas to
my understanding (which may pass for an argument, since those
gentlemen do not pretend to any new facultys distinct from those
of ordinary men), there are not wanting other proofs against them.
[ 4I It is, I think, a receiv'd axiom that an impossibility cannot be
conceiv'd. For what created intelligence will pretend to conceive
that which God cannot cause to be ? Now it is on all hands
agreed, that nothing abstract or general can be made really to
exist ; whence it should seem to follow, that it cannot have so
much as an ideal existence in the understanding.]
[ 42 1 do not think it necessary to insist on any more proofs,
against the doctrine of abstraction in this place, especially for that
the absurditys, which in the progress of this work I shall observe
to have sprung from that doctrine, will yield plenty of arguments
a posteriori against it.] I proceed [ 42 therefore] to examine what
can be alleged in defence [ 43 of the doctrine of abstraction], and
try if I can discover what it is that [ 44 inclines] the men of specu
lation to embrace an opinion so pregnant of absurditys, and so
remote from common sense as that seems to be.
There has been a late excellent and deservedly esteem'd phi
losopher, to whose judgment, so far as authority is of any weight
with me, I would pay the utmost deference. This great man, no
doubt, has very much countenanc'd the doctrine of abstraction
by seeming to think [ 43 it] is that which puts the widest difference
in point of understanding betwixt man and beast. Thus speaks
he : ' The having of general ideas is that which puts a perfect
distinction betwixt man and brutes, and is an excellency which
the facultys of brutes do by no means attain unto. For it is evi
dent we observe no footsteps in them of making use of general
signs for [ 46 making] universal ideas ; from which we have reason
4° Instead of ' incomprehensibility,' and on opposite page, but erased — ' incomprehen
sibleness to my understanding by any [intellect — understanding] whatsoever.'
4* Erased. On opposite page — ' That a contradiction cannot be conceiv'd by any human
understanding whatsoever is, I think, agreed on all hands. And to me it is no less clear
that the description of an abstract idea doth include a contradiction in it.'
42 Erased. 43 Instead of ' thereof.' 44 Instead of ' has inclined.'
43 Instead of ' the having abstract ideas.' & Within brackets in the MS.
PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 293
to imagine that they have not the faculty of abstracting, or making
general ideas, since they have no use of words or any other gen
eral signs.' And a little lower : ' Therefore I think we may sup
pose that 'tis in this that the species of brutes are discriminated
from men, and 'tis that proper difference wherein they are wholly
separated, and which at last widens to so wide a distance. For
if they have any ideas at all and are not bare machines (as some
would have them), we cannot deny them to have some reason.
It seems as evident to me, that they do some of them in certain
instances reason, as that they have sense, but it is only in partic
ular ideas, just as they receiv'd them from their senses. They
are the best of them tied up within those narrow bounds, and
have not (as I think) the faculty to enlarge them by any kind of
abstraction.' [Essay on Human Understaiiding , Book 2, chap II.
s. 10, 11.) I readily agree with this authour that the faculties of
brutes can by no means attain to the making of abstract general
ideas. But then if that inability to abstract be made the distin
guishing property of that sort of animals, I fear a great many of
those that now pass for men must be reckon'd into their number.
The reason which is here assign'd why we have no grounds to
think that brutes have general ideas, is that we observe in them
no use of words or any other general signs — which is built on
this supposition — that the making use of words implys the having
of general ideas, and that [ 47 on the other hand] those who have
general ideas fail not to make use of words, or other universal
signs, [ 48 whereby] to express [ 48 and signify them]. [ 4g That this
is the] From which it must follow, that men who use language
are able to abstract and generalize their ideas, but brutes [ 49 that]
use it not are destitute of that faculty. That this is the sense
and arguing of the authour of the Essay, will farther appear, by
his answering the question he in another place puts. Since all
things that exist are only particulars, how come we by general
terms ? His answer is — ' Words become general by being made
the signs of general ideas.' [Essay on Human Understanding, b.
3. c. 3. s. 6.) From which assertion I must crave leave to dissent,
being of opinion that a word becomes general by being [ 5 °the]
47 Instead of ' reciprocally.' 4 s Erased.
49 Instead of ' who.' 5° Within brackets in the MS.
294
APPENDIX A.
made the sign, not of a general idea, but of many particular
ideas. Sure I am, as to what concerns myself, when I say the
word Socrates is a proper [ 52 or particular] name, and the word
man an appellative or general name, I mean no more than this,
viz. that the one is peculiar and appropriated to one particular
person, the other common to a great many particular persons,
each [ 5I of which] has an equall right in propriety of language to
be called by the name man. [ 52 This, I say, is the whole truth
of the matter, and not that I make any incomprehensible abstract
idea where-unto I annex the name man. That were to [make]
my words stand for I know not what.]
That great man seems to think the necessary ends of language
could not be attain'd [ 52 to] without the use of abstract ideas. B.
3. c. 6. s. 39 [ 52 he shews it] and elsewhere he shews it to be his
opinion that they are made in order to naming. B. 3. c. I. s. 3
he has these words : ' It is not enough for the perfection of lan
guage that sounds can be made signs of ideas, unless those signs
can be so made use of as to comprehend several particular things :
for the multiplication of words would have perplex'd their use,
had every particular thing need of a distinct name to be signified
by. To remedy this inconvenience language had yet a farther
improvement in the use of general terms whereby one word was
made to mark a number of particular existences, which advan
tageous use of sounds was obtained only by the difference of the
ideas they were made signs of. Those names becoming general
which are made to stand for general ideas, and those remaining
particular where the ideas they are used for are particular.' Now
I would fain know why a word may not be made to comprehend
a great number of particular things in its signification, without the
[ 53 help] of a general idea? Is it not possible to give the name
[ S4 colour to black, white,- and red, &c] without having first made
that strange and to me incomprehensible idea of [ 55 colour in
abstract] ? Or must we imagine that a child upon sight of a par
ticular body, and being told it is called an apple, must first frame
to himself an abstract general idea [ s6 exclusive of] all particular
S 1 Instead of ' whereof.' 5 2 Erased. 53 Instead of ' interposition.'
54 Instead of ' man to Peter, James, and John.'
55 Instead of ' man which shall have nothing particular in it.'
5 6 Instead of ' thereof, abstracting from.'
PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 295
colour, tast, and figure before he can attain to the use of the word
apple, and apply it to all the particulars of that sort of fruit that
come in his way? [ s8 This surely is a task too hard and meta
physical to be perform'd by an infant just beginning to speak.]
Nay, I appeal to the experience of any grown man, whether this
be the course he takes in acquainting himself with the [ S7 right]
use and signification of any word ? Let any man take a fair and
impartial view of his own thoughts, and then determine whether
his general words do not become so only by being made to mark
a number of particular existences, without any the least thought
of abstraction. For what, I pray, are words but signs of our
thoughts ? and how are signs of any sort render'd universal other
wise than by being made to signify, or represent indifferently, a
multitude of particular things ?
The ideas that are in every man's mind ly hid [ s8 den], and
cannot of themselves be brought into the view of another. It
was therefore necessary, for discourse and communication, that
men should institute sounds to be signs of their ideas, which
being [ 59 excited] in the mind of the hearer [ 6o might] bring
along with them [ 58 into his understanding] such ideas as in the
propriety of any language were annex'd to them. But because
of the almost infinite number and variety of our [ 6l ideas], it is
impossible, and if it were possible would yet be a useless thing,
to appropriate a particular [ 58 word to a] sign or name to every
one of them. From which it must necessarily follow, that one
word be made the sign of a great number of particular ideas,
between which there is some likeness and which are said to be
of the same sort. [ 62 But then these sorts are not determin'd and
set out by nature, as was thought by most philosophers. Nor yet
are they limited by any precise abstract ideas settl'd in the mind,
with the general name annexed to them, as is the opinion of the
authour of the Essay, nor do they in truth seem to me to have any
precise bounds or limits at all. For if [there were] they had I
57 Instead of ' proper.' S 8 Erased. 59 Instead of ' raised.'
60 Instead of ' shall.' 61 Instead of ' thoughts.'
62 Erased. On the opposite page we have — ' Every one's experience may convince him
that this is all that's meant by general names, and that they do not stand either for universal
natures distinct from our conceptions as was held by the Peripatetics and generality of the
Schoolmen, nor yet for universal notions or ideas as is the opinion of that sort of School
men called Nominals and of the authour of the Essay.'
296 APPENDIX A.
do not see how there could be those doubts and scruples about
the sorting of particular beings which [that authour insists on as
a good proof] are observ'd sometimes to have happen'd. Neither
do I think it necessary the kinds or species of things should be
so very accurately bounded and marked out, language being
made by and for the common use of men, who do not ordinarily
take notice of the minuter and less considerable differences of
things.] From [ 63 all] which to me it seems evident that the
having of general names does not imply the having of general
ideas, but barely the marking by them a number of particular
ideas, and that all the ends of language may be and are attain'd
without the help of any such faculty as abstraction.
Which will be made yet more manifest if we consider the
different manners wherein words [ 63 and ideas [are] do stand for
and represent things] represent ideas, and ideas things. There
is no similitude or resemblance betwixt words and the ideas that
are marked by them. Any name may be used indifferently for
the sign of any idea, or any number of ideas, it not being deter
min'd by any likeness to represent one more than another. But
it is not so with ideas in respect of things, of which they are
suppos'd to be the copies and images. They are not thought to
represent them [ 63 any] otherwise than as they resemble them.
Whence it follows that an idea is not capable of representing
indifferently anything [^whatsoever], it being limited by the
likeness it beares to some particular [ 6s thing] to represent it
rather than any other. The word man may equally be put to
signify any particular man I can think of. But I cannot frame
an idea of man which shall equally represent and correspond to
each particular of that sort of creatures that may possibly exist.
I shall [ 6s only] add one more passage out of the Essay on
Human Understanding, which is as follows : ' Abstract ideas are
not so obvious or easy to children or the yet unexercised mind
as particular ones. If they seem so to grown men 'tis only
because by constant and familiar use they are made so. For
when we nicely reflect upon them we shall find that general
ideas are fictions and contrivances of the mind that carry diffi
culty with them and do not so easily offer themselves as we are
6 3 Erased. 6 4 Instead of ' or number of things.
" 6 S Instead of ' existence.'
PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 297
apt to imagine. For example, does it not require some pains
and skill to form the general idea of a triangle (which is yet none
of the most abstract, comprehensive and difficult), for it must be
neither oblique nor rectangle, neither equilateral, equicrural, nor
scalenon, but all and none of these at once ? In effect, it is some
thing imperfect, that cannot exist; an idea wherein some parts
of several different and inconsistent ideas are put together. Tis
true the mind in this imperfect state has need of such ideas,
and makes all the hast to them it can, for the conveniency of
communication and enlargement of knowledge, to both which
it is naturally very much enclin'd ; but yet one has reason to
suspect such ideas are marks of our imperfection. At least this
is enough to shew that the most abstract and general ideas are
not those that the mind is first and most easily acquainted with,
nor such as its earlyest knowledge is conversant about.' B. 4. c. 7.
s. 9. If any man has the faculty of framing in his mind such an
idea of a triangle as is here describ'd, it is in vain to pretend to
dispute him out of it, nor would I go about it. All I desire is
that every one would fully and certainly inform himself whether
he has such an idea or no. And this, methinks, can be no hard
task for any one to perform. What more easy than for any one
to look a little into his own understanding, and there try whether
he has, or can attain to have, an idea that shall correspond with
the description here given of the general idea of a triangle which
is neither oblique nor rectangle, neither equilateral, equicrural,
nor scalenon, but all and none of these at once ? He that can
conceive such manifest contradictions and inconsistencys, 'tis fit
he enjoy his privilege. For my part [ 66 I am well assur'd] 6? I
have not the power of so doing, nor consequently of making to
myself these general ideas ; neither do I find that I have any
need of them either for the conveniency of communication or the
enlargement of knowledge [ 66 for the conveniency of communi
cation and enlargement of knowledge. For which I am not
sorry, because it is here said one has reason to suspect such
ideas are marks of our imperfection. Tho', I must own, I do not
66 Erased.
6 7 On opposite page — erased — ' I must own I have so much ot the brute in my under
standing, that.'
298 APPENDIX A.
see how this agrees with what has been above quoted [out of the
same authour], viz. the having of general ideas is that which puts
a perfect distinction betwixt man and brutes, and is an excellency
which the faculties of brutes do by no means attain unto.]
It is observable [ 68 what it is here said] of the difficulty
that abstract ideas carry with them, and the pains and skill that,
is requisite to the forming [ 66 of] them. To the same purpose
Aristotle (who was certainly a great admirer and promoter of the
doctrine of abstraction) has these words : %£§ov ok xai ^aXe-curara
yvmpiZeiv rolq rhOpaj-ocq J ar\ rd (idXiara za.66J.ou ~oppiora.ru) yap rwv alq
6-jffecbv 'art. There is scarce anything so incomprehensible to men
as the most universal notions, because they are most remote from
sense. Metaph. lib. i. cap. 2 69 . It is on all hands agreed, that
there is need of great pains and toil and labour of the mind, to
emancipate [ 7 ° our thoughts] from particular ideas such as are
taken in by the senses, and raise [ 7 °them] to those lofty specu
lations [ ?I which] are conversant about abstract and universal
ones.
From all which the natural consequence should seem to be,
that so difficult a thing as the forming of abstract ideas is not
necessary for communication, which is so easy and familiar to all
sorts of men, even the most barbarous and unreflecting. But we are
told, if they seem obvious and easy to grown men, 'tis only because
by constant and familiar use they are made so. Now I would fain
know at what time it is men are employ'd in surmounting that
difficulty, and furnishing themselves with those necessary [^ma
terials] of discourse. It cannot be when they are grown up, for
then they are not conscious of any such pains-taking. It re
mains therefore to be the business of their childhood. And
surely the great and multiply'd labour of framing general no
tions will be found a hard task for that tender age. Is it not a
hard thing to imagine that a couple of children cannot commune
one with another of their sugar-plumbs and rattles, and the rest
of their little trinkets, till they have first tack'd together number-
68 Instead of ' that which is [here] said by that authour on this occasion.'
6 9 Text as in Schwegler — oxedbv dc ml ^'a/lsTrwrara ravra yvupiCpiv rolg avdpuiroig, rd
liakiGTa tcadolov
"oppuraru yup tuv aladijaeuv eotlv.
7° Instead of ' it.' n Instead of ' that.'
7 2 Instead of ' praeliminarys.'
PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE.
299
less inconsistencys, and so framed in their minds general abstract
ideas, and annex'd them to every common name they make use
of?
Nor do I think they are a whit more needful for enlargement
of knowledge, than for communication. For tho' it be a point
much insisted on in the Schools that all knowledge is about uni
versals, yet I [ 73 can by no means see the necessity of] this doc
trine. It is acknowledg'd that nothing has a fairer title to the
name of knowledge or science than geometry. Now I appeal to
any man's thoughts whether, upon the entrance into that study,
the first thing to be done is to try to conceive a circle that is
neither great nor small, nor of any determinate radius, or to make
ideas of triangles and parallelograms that are neither rectangular
nor obliquangular, &c. ? It is [ 74 true] one thing for a proposition
to be universally true, and another for it to be about universal
natures or notions. [ 75 Because] that the three angles of a tri
angle are equal to two right ones is granted to be a proposition
universally true, it will not therefore follow that we are to under
stand it of universal triangles, or universal angles. It will suffice
that it be true of [ 74 any particular tri] the particular angles of
any particular triangle whatsoever.
But here it will be demanded, how we can know any proposition
to be true of all particular triangles, except we have first seen it
demonstrated of the general idea of a triangle, which equally
agrees to and represents them all ? For because a property may
be demonstrated to belong to some one particular triangle, it will
not thence follow that it equally belongs to [ 74 some] any other
triangle which in all respects is not the same with the former.
For instance, having demonstrated that the three angles of an
isosceles, rectangular triangle are equal to two right ones, I can
not therefore conclude this affection agrees to all other triangles
which have neither a right angle nor two equal sides. It seems
therefore, that to be certain this proposition is universally true,
we must either make a particular demonstration for every partic
ular triangle, which is impossible, or else we must, once for all,
demonstrate it of the general idea of a triangle in which all the
73 Instead of [could never] bring myself to comprehend.'
1* Erased. 75 Instead of ' Thus [notwithstanding].'
300 APPENDIX A.
particulars do indifferently partake, and by which they are all
equally represented.
To which I answer, that notwithstanding the idea I have in my
mind, whilst I make the demonstration, be that of some partic
ular triangle, e. g. an isosceles, rectangular one whose sides are
of a determinate length, I may nevertheless be certain that it
extends to all other rectilinear triangles of what sort or bigness
soever. And that because neither the right angle, nor the
equality, nor determinate length of the legs are at all concern'd
in the demonstration. 'Tis true the diagram I have in my view
does include these particulars, but then there is not the least men
tion made of them in the proof of the proposition. It is not said
the three angles are equal to two right ones, because one of them
is a right angle, or because the legs comprehending it are [ 7<5 equal]
of the same length ; which sufficiently shews that the right angle
might have been oblique and the sides unequal, and yet the dem
onstration have held good. And for this reason it is that I con
clude that to be true of any obliquangular or scalenon which I
had demonstrated of a particular right angled equicrural triangle ;
and not because I demonstrated the proposition of the general
idea of a triangle which was all and none, it not being possible
for me to conceive any triangle whereof I cannot delineate the
like on paper. But I believe no man, whatever he may conceive,
will pretend to describe a general triangle with his pencill. This
being rightly consider'd, I believe we shall not be found to have
any great [ 76 want] need of those eternal, immutable, universal
ideas about which the philosophers keep such a stir, and without
which they think there can be no silence at all.
But what becomes of these general maxims, these first principles
of knowledge, [ 77 so frequently in the mouths] of [ 7<5 the] meta
physicians, all w ch are suppos'd to be about abstract and universal
ideas ? To which all the answer I can make is, that whatsoever
proposition is made up of terms standing for general notions or
ideas, the same is to me, so far forth, [ ?6 absolutely] unintelligible :
and whether it be that those speculative gentlemen have by earnest
and profound study attain'd to an elevation of thought above the
reach of ordinary capacities and endeavours, or whatever else be
7 6 Erased. 77 Instead of ' these curious speculations.'
PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE.
301
the cause, sure I am there are in their writings many things which
I now find myself unable to understand. Tho' being accustom'd
to those forms of speech, I once thought there was no difficulty
in them. But this One thing seems [ 8l to me] pretty plain and
certain. How high soever that goodly fabrick of metaphysics
might have been rais'd, and by what venerable names soever it
maybe supported, yet if [ 8l withall] it be built on [ ?8 no other]
foundation [ 79 than] inconsistency and contradictions, it is after
all but a castle in the air 8 °.
It were an endless as well as an useless thing to trace the
Schoolmen, those great masters of abstraction,, and all others
whether ancient or modern logicians and metaphysicians, thro'
those numerous inextricable labyrinths of errour and dispute,
which their doctrine of abstract natures and notions seems to have
led them into. What bickerings and controversys, and what a
learned dust has been rais'd about those matters, and what
[ 8l great] mighty advantage has been from thence deriv'd to
mankind, are things at this day too clearly known to need to be
insisted on by me. Nor has that doctrine been confin'd to those
two sciences, that make the most avowed profession of it. The
contagion thereof has spread through [ 8l out] all the parts of
philosophy. It has invaded and overrun those usefull studys of
physic and divinity, and even the mathematicians themselves
have had their full share of it.
When men consider the great pain, industry and parts that have
[ 8l in] for so many ages been lay'd out on the cultivation and
advancement of the sciences, and that [^notwithstanding] all
this, the far greatest part of them remain full of doubts and
uncertainties, and disputes that are like never to have an end,
and even those that are thought to be supported by the most clear
and cogent demonstrations do contain in them paradoxes that are
perfectly irreconcilable to the understandings of men, and that
taking all together a very small portion of them does supply any
real benefit to mankind, otherwise than by being an innocent
diversion and amusement — I say upon the consideration of all
this, men are wont to be cast into an amazement and despondency,
78 Instead of ' the sandy.' 79 Instead of ' of.'
80 On margin, ' Dec. 1.' 8l Erased. 82 Instead of ' for.'
302
APPENDIX A.
and perfect contempt of all study. But that wonder and despair
may perhaps cease upon a view of the false principles and wrong
foundations of science [ 86 which] that have been made use of.
Amongst all which there is none, methinks; of a more wide and
universal sway over the thoughts of studious men than that we
have been endeavouring to detect and overthrow. [ 86 To me
certainly it does not seem strange that unprofitable debates and
absurd and extravagant opinions should abound in the writings
of those men who, disdaining the vulgar and obvious informations
of sense, do in the depth of their understanding contemplate
abstract ideas 83 .]
I come now to consider the [ 84 source] of this prevailing.
[ 8s notion], and that seems to me most evidently to be language.
And surely nothing of less extent than reason itself could have
been the source of an opinion, as epidemical as it is absurd.
That [ 86 words are] the conceit of abstract idea ows its birth
and origine to words, will appear, as from other reasons, so also
from the plain confession of the ablest patrons of y £ doctrine,
who [ 86 do] acknowledge that they are made in order to naming ;
from which it is a clear consequence that there had been no such
thing as speech, or universal signs, there never had been [ 86 ab
stract ideas] any thought of abstract ideas. I find it also declared
in express terms that general truths can never be well made known,
and are very seldom apprehended but as conceived and expressed
in words ; all which doth plainly set forth the inseparable con
nexion and mutual dependence [ 86 on each other] that is thought
to be between words and abstract ideas. For whereas it is else
where said [ 86 there could be no communication by general names
[ 87 without there being] also general ideas of which they were to
be signs ; we are here, on the other hand, told that] that general
ideas [ 88 are] necessary for communication by general names;
here, on the other hand, we are told that names are needfull for
the understanding of [ 86 abstract notions] general truths. Now
by the bye, I would fain know how it is possible for words to
make a man apprehend that which he cannot apprehend without
8 3 On margin — ' Dec. 2.' 8 4 Instead of ' cause.'
8 5 Instead of ' imagination in the minds of men.' . 8fi Erased.
8 7 Instead of ' except there were.' s 8 Instead of ' were.'
PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE.
303
them. I do not deny they are necessary for communication, and
so making me know the ideas that are in the mind of another.
But when any truth, whether [ 89 about general or part] about
general or particular ideas, is once made known to me by words,
[ 89 I cannot see any manner of] so that I rightly apprehend the
ideas contained in it, I see no manner of reason why I may not
omit the words, and yet retain as full and clear a conception
of the ideas themselves, as I had [ 89 of them] while they were
cloathed with words. Words being, so far as I can see, of use
only for recording and communicating, but not absolutely appre
hending [ 8 9 of] ideas. [ 89 1 know there be some things which pass
for truths that will not bear this [stripping — being stript] of the
attire of words, but this I always took for a sure and certain sign
that there were no clear and determinate ideas underneath.] I
proceed to show the manner wherein words have contributed to
the growth and origine of that mistake.
That which seems [ 89 to me principally] in a great measure to
have drove men into the conceit of [ 9 ° abstract] ideas, is the
opinion, that every name has, or ought to have, one only precise
and settl'd signification: which inclines [ 89 men] them to think
there are certain abstract, determinate, general ideas that make
the true and only immediate signification of each general name,
and that it is by the mediation of these abstract ideas that a gen
eral name comes to signify any particular thing. Whereas there
is in truth [ 9I a] diversity of significations, in every general name
whatsoever [ 89 except only the proper names]. Nor is there any
such thing as one precise and definite signification annexed to each
[ 89 appellative] name. All which does evidently follow from what
has been already said, and will [ 89 be] clearly appear to any one
by a little reflexion.
But [ 89 here] to this, I doubt not, it will be objected that every
name that has a definition is thereby tied down and restrain'd to
[ 92 one certain] signification, e. g. a triangle is defin'd to be a plain
surface comprehended by three right lines, by which that name
is limited to denote one certain idea, and no other. To which I
answer, that in the definition it is not said, whether the surface
89 Erased. 9° Instead of ' general.'
9 1 Instead of ' an homonomy or.' 92 Instead of ' a particular.
"
304 APPENDIX A.
be great or small, black or white or transparent, or whether the
sides are long or short, equal or unequal, or with what angles they
are inclin'd to each other. In all which there may be great
variety, and consequently there is no one settled idea which limits
the signification of the word triangle. 'Tis one thing for to keep
a word [^everywhere] constantly to the same definition, and
another to make it stand everywhere for the same idea: [ 93 that]
is necessary, but [ 94 this] is useless and impracticable. [ 89 Nor
does it avail to say the abstract idea of a triangle, which bounds
the signification of that name, is itself determin'd, tho' the angles,
sides, &c. are not. For besides the absurdity of such an idea,
which has been already shown, it is evident that if the simple
ideas or parts, i. e. the lines, angles, and surface, are themselves
various and undetermin'd, the complex idea or whole triangle
cannot be one settled determinate idea.]
[ 9S But to give a farther account, how words came to introduce
the doctrine of universal ideas, it will be necessary to observe
there is a notion current among those that pass for the deepest
thinkers, that every significant name stands for an idea. It is
93 Instead of ' the former.' 94 Instead of ' the latter,'
95 On the opposite page, we have, instead of this paragraph, the following : — ' But to
give a farther account how words came to introduce the doctrine of general ideas, it
['must be observ'd] that [ 2 it is a receiv'd opinion] that language hath no other end than
the communicating our ideas, and that every significant name stands for an idea. This
being so, and it being withall certain that names which yet are not thought altogether
insignificant, do not always mark out particular ideas, it is straightway concluded that they
stand for general ones.
' That there are many names in use amongst speculative men, which do not always sug
gest to others determinate, particular ideas, or in truth anything at all, is what nobody will
deny. [3 And that there are significant names denoting things, whereof it is a direct repug
nancy that any idea should be form'd by any understanding whatsoever, I shall in its due
place endeavour to demonstrate that it is] not necessary (even in the strictest reasonings)
that significant names which [3 are marks of ideas] stand for ideas shou'd every time they
are used excite in the understanding the ideas they are made to [3 signify] stand for. In
reading and discoursing names are for the [3 thinking on] most part us'd as [3 figures in
casting up a sum in which to compute exactly is not necessary] letters are in Algebra, in
which, tho' a particular quantity be mark'd by each letter, yet to proceed right it is not
requisite that in every step [3 you have these particular quantitys in yr view. Tho' you
regard only the letters themselves without ever thinking on what was denoted by them,
yet if you work according to rule, you will come to a true solution of the question] each
letter suggest to your thoughts that particular quantity [4 which] it was appointed to
[s stand for].
i Instead of ' is necessary to observe.' 2 Instead of ' the common opinion of philosophers is.'
3 Erased. 4 Instead of ' whereof.
" 5 Instead of ' be the figure to make— denote.'
PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 305
said by them that a proposition cannot otherwise be understood
than by perceiving [ 9<5 the agreement or disagreement of] the
ideas marked by the terms [ 97 thereof] of it. Whence it follows,
that according to those men every proposition that is not jargon
must consist of terms or names that carry along with them each
a determinate idea. This being so, and it being [certain] withall
certain that names which yet are not thought altogether insig
nificant do not always mark out particular ideas, it is straightway
concluded that they stand for general ones.
In answer to this I say, that names, significant names, do not
always stand for ideas, but that they may be and are often used
to good purpose [tho' they are] without being suppos'd to stand
for or represent any idea at all. And as to what we are told of
understanding propositions by [perceiving] the agreement or dis
agreement of the ideas marked by their terms, this to me in many
cases seems absolutely false. For the better clearing and demon
strating of all which I shall make use of some particular instances.
Suppose I have the idea of some one particular dog to which I
give the name Melampus, and then frame this proposition —
Melampus is an animal. Where 'tis evident the name Melampus
denotes one particular idea. And as for the other name or term
of the proposition, there are a sort of philosophers will tell you
thereby is meant not only a universal conception, but also [cor
responding thereto] a universal nature or essence really existing
without the mind, whereof Melampus doth partake, as tho' it
were possible that even things themselves could be universal.
And [But] this with reason is exploded as nonsensical and ab
surd. But then those men who have so clearly and fully detected
the emptyness and insignificancy of that wretched jargon [of
S.G.W.(?)], are themselves to me equally unintelligible. For they
will have it that if I understand what I say I must make the name
animal stand for an abstract general idea which agrees to and
corresponds with the particular idea marked by the name Melam
pus. But if a man may be allow'd to know his own meaning, I
do declare that in my thoughts the word animal is neither sup
pos'd to stand for an universal nature, nor yet for an abstract idea,
which to me is at least as absurd and incomprehensible as the other.
96 Erased. 97 This and some words that follow are within brackets in the MS.
20
306 APPENDIX A.
Nor does it indeed in that proposition stand for any idea [at all]
at all. All that I intend to signify thereby being only this — that
the particular [creature] thing I call Melampus has a right to be
called by the name animal. And I do intreat any one to make
this easy tryal. Let him but cast out of his [thoughts] the words
of the proposition, and then see whether two clear and determi
nate ideas remain [j> s in his understanding] whereof he finds one
to be conformable to the other. I perceive it evidently in myself
that upon laying aside all thought of the words ' Melampus is an
animal,' I have remaining in my mind one only naked and bare
idea, viz. that particular one to which I gave the name Melampus.
Tho' some there be that pretend they have also a general idea
signified by the word animal, which they perceive to agree with
the particular idea signified by the word Melampus, [which idea
is made up of inconsistencys and contradictions, as has been
already shown.] Whether this or that be the truth of the matter,
I desire every particular person to consider and conclude for
himself]
And this methinks may pretty clearly inform us how men
might first have come to think there was a general idea of animal.
For in the proposition we have instanc'd in, it is plain the word
animal is not suppos'd to stand for the idea of any one particular
[anima] [creature] animal. For if it be made stand for another
different from that is marked by the name Melampus, the
proposition is false and includes a contradiction ; and if it be
made signify the very same individual that Melampus doth, it is
a tautology. But it is presumed that every name stands for an
idea. It remains therefore that the word animal stands for [the]
general abstract idea [of animal]. In like manner we may be able
with a little attention to discover how other general ideas [of all
sorts] might at first have stolen into the thoughts of man.
But farther to make it evident that words may be used to good
purpose without bringing into the mind determinate ideas, I shall
add this instance. We are told [that] the good things which God
hath prepared for them that love him are such as eye hath not
seen nor ear heard, nor hath it enter'd into the heart of man to
conceive. What man will pretend to say these words of the
9 8 Erased.
PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE.
307
inspir'd writer are empty and [ses(?)] insignificant ? And yet
who is there that can say they bring into his mind [determi] clear
and determinate ideas, or in truth any ideas at all [ideas] of the
good things [pre] in store for them that love God ? It may per
haps be said that those words lay before us the clear and deter
minate abstract ideas of good in general and thing in general ;
but I am afraid it will be found that those very abstract ideas are
every whit as remote from the comprehension of men as the
particular pleasures of the saints in heaven. But, say you, those
words of the Apostle must have some import. They cannot be
suppos'd to have been utter'd without all meaning and design
whatsoever. I answer, the saying is very weighty, and carrys
with it a great design, but it is not to raise in the minds of men
the abstract ideas of thing or good, nor yet the particular ideas
of the joys of the blessed. The design is to make them more
chearfull and fervent in their duty ; and how this may be cora
pass'd without making the words good things [to be] stand for
and mark out to our understandings any ideas either general or
particular, I proceed to show.
Upon mention of a reward to a man for 'his pains and perse
verance in any occupation whatsoever, it seems to me that divers
things do ordinarily ensue. For there may be excited in his
understanding an idea of the particular good thing to him pro
posed for a reward. There may also ensue thereupon an alacrity
and steddiness in fulfilling those conditions on which it is to be
obtain'd, together with a zealous desire of serving and pleasing
the person in whose power it is to bestow that good thing. All
these things, I say, may and often do follow upon the pronuncia
tion of those words that declare the recompence. Now I do not
see any reason why the latter may not happen without the former.
What is it that hinders why a man may not be stirr'd up to dili
gence and zeal in his duty, by being told he shall have a good
thing for his reward, tho' at the same time there be excited in his
mind no other idea than barely those of sounds or characters?
When he was a child he had frequently heard those words used
to him to create in him an obedience to the commands of those
that spoke them, and as he grew up he has found by experience
that upon the mentioning of those words by an honest man it has
3 o8 APPENDIX A.
been his interest to have doubled his zeal and activity for the
service of that person. Thus there having grown up in his mind
a customary connexion betwixt the hearing that proposition and
being disposed to obey with cheerfulness the injunctions that
accompany it, methinks it might be made use of, tho' not to intro
duce into his mind any idea marked by the words good thing,
yet to excite in him a willingness to perform that which is requir'd
of him. And this seems to me all that is design'd by the speaker,
except only when he intends those words shall [be the mark of]
signifie the idea of some particular thing : e. g. in the case I men
tion'd 'tis evident the Apostle never intended the words [good
things] should [mark out to] our understandings the ideas of
those particular things our faculties never attain'd to. And yet I
cannot think that he used them at random and without design ; on
the contrary, it is my opinion that he used them to very good
purpose, namely, to beget in us a cheerfulness and zeal and per
severance in well-doing, without any thought of introducing into
our minds the abstract idea of a good thing. If any one will
joyn ever so little reflexion of his own to what has been said, I
doubt not it will evidently appear to him that general names are
often used in the propriety of language without the speaker's
designing them for marks of ideas in his own which he would
[them] have them raise in the understanding of the hearer.
[99 Even] proper names themselves are not always spoken with
a design to bring into our view the ideas of those particular
things that are suppos'd to be annex'd to them. For example,
when a Schoolman tells you that Aristotle hath said it, think you
that he intends [ x thereby] to [ra] excite in your imagination the
idea of that particular man ? All he means by it is only to dis
pose you to receive his opinion with that deference and submis
sion that custom has annex'd to that name. When a man that
has been accustom'd to resign his judgment [of] to the authority
of that philosopher [shall] [upon] in reading of a book meet with
the letters that compose his name, he forthwith yields his assent
to the doctrine it was brought to support, and that with such a
quick and sudden [ 2 glance of thought] as it is impossible any
99 ' Nor is it less certain that' erased. * Erased.
• s ' action of the mind' — on opposite page.
PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 309
idea either of the person or writings of that man should go before
— so close and immediate a connexion has long custom establish'd
betwixt the very word Aristotle and the motions of assent and
reverence in the minds of some men.
I intreat the reader to reflect with himself, and see if it does not
oft happen, either in hearing, or reading a discourse, that the
passions of delight, love, hatred, admiration, disdain, &c. [
"do
not] arise immediately in his mind upon the perception of certain
words without any ideas coming between. At first, indeed, the
words might have occasion'd ideas that may be apt to produce
those emotions of mind. But if I mistake not, it will be found
that when language is once grown familiar, 3 to a man the hearing
of the sound or sight of the characters is oft immediately attended
with those passions which at first were wont to be produc'd by
the intervention of ideas that are now quite omitted.
[ 4 Further], the communicating of ideas marked by words is
not the chief and only end of language, as is commonly suppos'd.
There are other ends, as the raising of some passion, the exciting
to or deterring from an action. 5 To which the former is in many
cases barely subservient, and sometimes 6 entirely omitted when
these can be obtain'd without it, as I think does not infrequently
happen in the familiar use of language.
I ask any man whether [ 7 every time] he tells another that such
an action is honourable and vertuous, with an 8 intention to excite
him to the performance of it, he has at that instant ideas of honour
and virtue 9 in his [thoug] view, and whether in reality his inten
tion be to raise [ I0 that] idea, together with their agreement to the
[
"particular] idea of that particular action, in the understanding
of him he speaks to [
"or rather whether this be not his full pur
pose, namely, that those words should excite in the mind of the
hearer an esteem of that particular action, and stir him up to the
performance of it].
3 ' to a man' erased. 4 ' From which it follows, that' erased.
5 On opposite page — ' the putting the mind in some particular disposition. Hence we
may conceive how it is possible for the promise that is made us of the good things of
another life excite in us suitable dispositions, tho' the words good things do not bring into
our minds particular ideas of the pleasures of heaven, nor yet the ideas of good in general
or things in general.'
6 ' entirely' erased. 7 ' when' erased.
8 'vertuous, with an' substituted for 'vertuous.' 9 'virtue' substituted for 'vertue.'
10 ' those abstract' erased.
" Erased.
3io
APPENDIX A.
[ I5 Upon hearing the words lie [&] rascal, indignation, revenge,
and the suddain motions of anger do instantly [ensue] in the
minds of some men, without our attending to the definition of
those names or concerning the ideas they are suppos'd to stand
for — all that passion and resentment having been by custom con
nected to those very sounds themselves and the manner of their
utterance 12 .]
It is plain therefore that a man may understand what is said to
him without having a clear and determinate idea annexed to and
marked by every particular [ I3 word] in the discourse he hears.
Nay, he may perfectly understand it. For what is it, I pray, to
understand perfectly, but only to understand all that is meant by
the person that speaks ? which very oft is nothing more than
barely to excite in [ I4 his mind] certain emotions without any
thought of those ideas so much talk'd of and so little understood.
For the truth whereof I appeal to every [man's] one's experi
ence.
I know not how this doctrine will go down with those [philos
ophers] who may be apt to give the titles of gibberish and jargon
to all discourse whatsoever so far forth as the words contained
in it are not made the signs of clear and determinate ideas, who
think it nonsense for a man to assent to any proposition each
term whereof doth not bring into his mind a clear and distinct
idea, and tell us [ 15 over and over] that every pertinent [ l6 word]
[ I7 hath an idea annexed unto] which never fails to accompany it
where 'tis rightly understood. Which opinion of theirs, how
plausibly soever it might have been maintain'd by some, seems to
me to have introduced a great deal of difficulty and nonsense into
the reasonings of men. Certainly nothing could be fitter to bring
forth and cherish the doctrine of abstract ideas. For when men
were indubitably conscious to themselves that many [ l8 words]
they used did not denote any particular ideas, lest they should
12 On opposite page — ' Innumerable instances of this kind may be given — arise. But
why should I be tedious in enumerating these things, which every one's observation will,
I doubt not, plentifully suggest unto him ?'
J 3 ' name' — on opposite page. »4 ' the hearer' — on opposite page.
*5 Erased. l6 ' name' — on opposite page.
'7 ' is the mark of an idea' — on opposite page.
18 ' names' — on opposite page.
PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE.
311
be thought altogether insignificant, they were of necessity driven
into the opinion that they stood for [ I9 general ones].
But more effectually to show the absurdity of an opinion that
carrys with it so great an appearance of [clearness and strength
of] reason, but is [ 2 °in fact] most dangerous and destructive both
to reason and religion, I shall, if I mistake not, in the progress
of this work demonstrate there be names well known and familiar
to men, which tho' they mark and [stand] and signify things,
cannot be suppos'd to signifie ideas of any sort, either general or
particular, without the greatest nonsense and contradiction ; it
being absolutely impossible, and a direct repugnancy, that any
intellect, how exalted and comprehensive soever, should frame
ideas of these things. •
We have, I think, shown the impossibility of abstract ideas.
We have consider'd what has been said in behalf of them by
their ablest patrons, and endeavour'd to demonstrate they are of
no use for those ends to which they 2I are thought necessary.
And, lastly, we have traced them to the source from whence they
flow, which appears evidently to be language.
Since therefore words have been discover'd to be so very apt
to impose on the understandings of men, I am resolv'd in my
[ 22 inquiries] to make as little use of them as possibly I can.
Whatever ideas I consider, I shall endeavour to take them bare
and naked into my view, keeping out of my thoughts, so far as I
am able, those names which long and constant use hath so strictly
united to them.
Let us conceive a solitary man, one born and bred in such a
place of the world, and in such circumstances, as he shall never
have had occasion to make use of universal signs for his ideas.
That man shall have a constant train of particular ideas passing
in his mind. Whatever he sees, hears, imagines, or anywise con
ceives, is on all hands, even by the patrons of abstract ideas,
granted to be particular. Let us withall suppose him under no
necessity of labouring to secure himself from hunger and cold,
but at full ease, naturally of good facultys, [ 23 and] contemplative.
Such a one I should take to be nearer the discovery of certain
z 9 ' good sense and sound' — on opposite page. » Instead of ' withall.'
21 ' are' instead of ' were.'
" Instead of ' reasonings.' 2 3 ' but' erased.
312 APPENDIX A.
great and excellent truths yet unknown, than he that has had
the education of schools, [ 24 has been instructed in the ancient
and modern philosophy], and by much reading and conversation
has [furnish'd his head] attain'd to the knowledge of those arts
and sciences that make so great a noise in the [ 24 learned] world.
It is true, the knowledge of our solitary philosopher is' not like
to be so very wide and extended, it being confin'd to those few
particulars that come within his own observation. But then, if
he is like to have less knowledge, he is withall like to have fewer
mistakes than other men.
It cannot be deny'd that words are of excellent use, in that by
their means all that stock of knowledge, which has been pur
chas'd by the joynt labours of inquisitive men in all ages and na
tions, may be drawn into the view, and made the possession of
one [ 24 particular] single person. But there [ 2S are some] parts of
learning which contain the knowledge of things the most noble
and important of any within the reach of human reason, that have
had the ill fate to be so signally perplex'd and darken'd by the
abuse of words and general ways of speech wherein they are
deliver'd, that in the study [ 26 of them] a man cannot be too
much upo.n his guard, [ 2? whether] in his private meditations, or
in reading the writings or hearing the discourses of other men, to
prevent his being cheated [ 24 by the glibness and familiarity of
speech] into a belief that those words stand for ideas which, in
truth, stand for none at all : which grand mistake it is almost
incredible what a mist and darkness it has cast over the under
standings of men, otherwise the most rational and clear-sighted.
I shall therefore endeavour, so far as I am able, [ 28 to put
myself in the posture of the solitary philosopher. I will confine
my thoughts and enquiries to the naked scene of my own par
ticular ideas,] from which I may expect to derive the following
advantages.
First. I shall be sure to get clear of all [ 29 verbal] controversies
purely verbal. The [ 3 ° springing up of] which weeds in almost
all the sciences has, been [ 2 9 the] a most fatal obstruction to the
2 4 Erased. 2 5 Instead of ' is one.' 26 Instead of ' thereof.' ^ Instead of ' either.'
28 Erased. On the opposite page — ' to take off the mask of words, and obtain a naked
view of my own particular ideas.'
"9 Erased. 3 ° Instead of ' insisting on.'
PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE.
313
growth of true and sound knowledge: and accordingly is at this
day esteem'd as such, and made the great and just complaint of
the wisest men.
Secondly. Tis reasonable to expect that [ 3I by this] the trouble
of sounding, or examining, or comprehending any notion may
be very much abridg'd. For it oft happens that a notion, when
it is cloathed with words, seems tedious and operose, and hard to
be conceiv'd, which yet being stript of that garniture, the ideas
shrink into a narrow compass, and are view'd almost by one
glance of thought.
Thirdly. I shall have fewer objects to consider than other men
seem to have had. [ 32 Because] I find myself to want several
of those supposed ideas, in contemplating of which the philoso
phers do usually spend much pains and study. [ 29 nay, even
of those (which without doubt will appear very surprising) that
pass for simple, particular ideas. It [is inconceivable what] can
not be believ'd what a wonderfull emptyness and scarcity of ideas
that man shall descry who will lay aside all use of words in his
meditations.
Fourthly. Having remov'd the veil of words, I may expect to
have a clearer prospect of the ideas that remain in my under
standing. To behold the deformity of errour we need only un
dress it.]
Fifthly. This seemeth to be a sure [ 33 way] to extricate myself
out of that fine and subtile net of abstract ideas ; which has so
miserably perplex'd and entangled the minds of men, and that
with this peculiar circumstance, that by how much the finer and
the more curious was the wit of any man, by so much the deeper
was he like to be ensnar'd and faster held therein.
Sixthly. So long as I confine my [ 34 thoughts] to my own ideas
divested of words, I do not see how I can easily be mistaken.
The objects I consider I [ 35 clearly] and adequately know. I can
not be deceiv'd in thinking I have an idea which I have not.
Nor, on the other hand, can I be ignorant of any idea that I
have. It is not possible for me to think any of my own ideas are
3 1 Instead of ' hereby.' 32 Instead of ' For that.'
33 Instead of ' means whereby.' 34 Instead of ' contemplations.'
35 Instead of ' perfectly.
"
14
APPENDIX A.
alike or unlike which are not truly so. To discern the agree
ments and disagreements there are between my ideas, to see what
simple ideas are included in any [ 3<5 compound] idea, and what
not, [ 37 there is nothing requisite but] an attentive perception of
what passes in my own understanding.
But the attainment of all these advantages does presuppose
an entire deliverance from the deception of words, which I dare
scarce promise myself. So difficult a thing it is to dissolve a
union so early begun, and confirm'd by so long a habit, as that
betwixt words and ideas.
Which difficulty seems to have been very much encreas'd by
the [ s8 doctrine of abstraction]. For so long as men thought
abstract ideas were annex'd to their words, it does not seem
strange they should use words for ideas. It being found an im
practicable thing to lay aside the word and retain the abstract
idea in the mind, which in itself was perfectly inconceivable.
This made it necessary for them to reason and meditate about
words, to which they suppos'd abstract ideas were connected,
and by means whereof they thought those ideas could be con
ceiv'd, tho' they could not without them. [ 39 But surely those
ideas ought to be suspected that cannot endure the light without
a covering.]
Another thing which makes words and ideas thought much
[ 4 ° harder to separate] than in truth they are, is the opinion that
every name stands for an idea. [ 4I For] it is no wonder that men
should fatigue themselves in vain, and find it a very difficult
undertaking, when they- endeavour'd to [ 42 obtain a clear and
naked] view of [ 43 those] the ideas marked by those words, which
in truth mark none at all; [ 43 as I have already shown many
names often do not, even when they are not altogether [insignifi
cant], and I shall more fully show it hereafter].
[ 44 This] seems to me the principal cause why those men that
3 6 Instead of ' complex.'
37 Erased here — ' all this I can do without being taught by [another], there being requi
site thereto nothing more than.' Also — ['the writings and discoveries of other men or
without having any great parts of my own] there is nothing more requisite.'
3 s Instead of ' opinion of abstract ideas.' 39 Erased.
4° Instead of ' more inseparable.' 4* Instead of ' Now.'
42 Instead of ' strip and take a.' 43 Erased. 44 Instead of ' These.'
PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNO WLEDGE. 315
have so emphatically recommended to others the laying aside
the use of words in their meditations, and contemplating their
bare ideas, have yet been so little able to perform it themselves.
Of late many have been very sensible of the absurd opinions,
and insignificant disputes, that grow out of the abuse of words.
In order to redress these evils, they advise well that we attend
to the ideas that are signified, and draw off our attention from
the words that signify them. But how good soever this advice
may be that they have given others 4S men, it is plain they little
regarded it themselves, so long as they thought the only imme
diate use of words was to signifie ideas, and that the immediate
signification of every general name was a determinate abstract
idea.
Which having been shown to be mistakes, a man may now,
with much greater ease, deliver himself from the imposture of
words. He that knows he hath no other than particular ideas,
will not puzzle himself in vain to find out and conceive the ab
stract idea annexed to any name. And he that knows names
[ 5 °when made use of in the propriety of language] do not always
stand for ideas, will spare himself the labour of looking for ideas
where there are none to be had. Those obstacles being now
remov'd, I earnestly desire that every one would use his utmost
endeavour to attain a clear and naked view of [ 46 the] ideas he
would consider [ 47 by separating] from them all that varnish and
mist of words, which so fatally blinds the judgment and dissi
pates the attention of men.
This is, I am confident, the shortest way to knowledge, and
cannot cost too much pains in coming at. In vain do we extend
our views into the heavens, and rake into the entrails of the earth.
In vain do we consult the writings and discourses of learned men,
and trace the dark footsteps of antiquity. We need only draw
the curtain of words, to behold the fairest tree of knowledge,
whose fruit is excellent and within the reach of [ 48 our hand].
Unless we take care to clear the first principles of knowledge
from the [ 49 incumbrance and delusion] of words, [ 5 ° the conse
quences we draw from them] we may make infinite reasonings
*5 ' men' erased. * 6 Instead of ' his own.' *n Instead of having separated.'
& Instead of ' [any man] to pluck it.' 49 Instead of ' cheat.' so Erased.
3i6 APPENDIX A.
upon them to no purpose. We may [ 5I deduce consequences
from] consequences, and be never the wiser. The farther we go,
we shall only lose ourselves ,the more irrecoverably, and be the
deeper entangled in difficulties and mistakes.
I do therefore intreat whoever designs to read the following
sheets, that he would make^my words the occasion of his own
thinking, and endeavour to attain the same train of thoughts in
reading that I had in writing them. By this means it will be
easy for him [ 52 to discover the truth or falsity of what I say].
He will be out of all danger of being deceiv'd by my words.
And I do not see what inducement he can have to err in consid
ering his own naked, undisguised ideas.
That I may contribute, so far as in me lies, to expose my
thoughts [ 5 °to the] fairly to the understanding of the reader, I
shall throughout endeavour to express myself in the clearest,
plainest, and most familiar 53 manner, abstaining from [ 5 °all flourish
and pomp of words], all hard and unusual terms which are
[ 5 ° commonly] pretended by those that use them to cover a sense
[ 5 °intricate and] abstracted and sublime.
[ 5 °I pretend not to treat of anything but what is obvious and
[ 5 °accommodated to] the understanding of every reasonable
man.]
S° Erased. 5* Instead of ' lose ourselves in.'
5 2 Instead of ' whatever mistakes I might have committed.
"
53 After ' manner' ' I shall' erased.
B.
ARTHUR COLLIER.
The simultaneous publication of a conception of the nature of sensi
ble reality so far accordant as that of Berkeley and Collier has been
considered by historians of philosophy so curious that I am induced
here to reprint the Introduction to Collier's Clavis Universalis : or, a
new Inquiry after Truth, being a Demonstration of the Non-existence,
or Impossibility, of an External World x . The reader of Berkeley may
thus conveniently compare, with what Berkeley taught, Collier's thesis
regarding the inexistence of the material world.
Arthur Collier was born on the 12th of October, 1680 — more than
four years before Berkeley — at the rectory of Langford Magna in Wilt
shire.' He entered Pembroke College, Oxford, in July 1697. He
succeeded his father as rector of Langford Magna in 1704, and continued
to hold that living till his death in 1732. One of his near neighbours,
during the first years of his incumbency, was John Norris, the English
Malebranche, rector of Bemerton, author of An Essay towards the
Theory of the Ideal or Intelligible World (1701 — 4), who died in 1711.
From his own account, Collier seems to have adopted his new
thought regarding the meaning of sensible existence or reality about
1703, though he did not publish it till 1713, in the early part of which
year the Clavis Universalis appeared.
Five interesting letters of Collier, in exposition and defence of his
notion of Matter, are given in Benson's Memoirs. Two of them were
written in 1714, and the others in 1715, 1720, and 1722. That written
in 1 715 is addressed to Dr. Samuel Clarke. Two of the others are to
Samuel Low, a grammarian ; another was sent to Dr. Waterland ; and
the last is addressed to Mr. Shepherd, Fellow of Trinity College, Oxford.
Collier seems to have been more disposed than Berkeley to apply
philosophical speculation directly to Christian theology. His theologi-
1 The motto of this work, taken from Malebranche, is Vulgi assensus et approiatio,
circa materiam difficilem, est cerium argumentum falsitatis istius opinionis cui asscntitur.
«— De Inquir. Verit. Lib. III. p. 194.
317
318 APPENDIX B.
cal speculations occupied a considerable share of his life, and involved
a subtle modification of Arianism — according to which the sensible
world exists in the mind of man ; the mind of man exists in Christ ;
and Christ exists in God — all exemplifying what he calls 'in-existence,'
or dependent existence. This chain of inexistent being he deduces
from speculative reason, and also from the words of Scripture. Collier
was a friend and correspondent of Whiston, whose theory of ' Primitive
Christianity' was discussed about that time.
Collier was a Tory and High Churchman, and curiously, like Berke
ley, he published a sermon on the Christian obligation of submission
to the higher powers, founded on Romans xiii. i.
It does not appear that Berkeley and Collier ever met, nor is he
once named by Berkeley, though Berkeley is more than once named
by him.
THE INTRODUCTION TO THE CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS,
' Wherein the Question in General is explained and stated, and the whole
subject divided into two particular heads.
Though I am verily persuaded that, in the whole course of the
following treatise, I shall or can have no other adversary but prejudice ;
yet, having by me no mechanical engine proper to remove it ; nor
being able to invent any other method of attacking it, besides that of
fair reason and argument ; rather than the world should finish its
course without once offering to enquire in what manner it exists, (and
for one reason more, which I need not name, unless the end desired
were more hopeful) ; I am at last, after a ten years pause and deliber
ation, content to put myself upon the trial of the common reader,
without pretending to any better art of gaining him on my side, than
that of dry reason and metaphysical demonstration.
The Question I am concerned about is in general this —
"Whether
there be any such thing as an External World. And my title will
suffice to inform my reader, that the negative of this question is the
point I am to demonstrate.
In order to which, let us first explain the terms.
Accordingly, by World, I mean whatsoever is usually understood by
the terms body, extension, space, matter, quantity, &c, if there be
any other word in our English tongue which is synonymous with all or
any of these terms.
And now nothing remains but the explication of the word External.
ARTHUR COLLIER.
319
By this, in general, I understand the same as is usually understood
by the words, absolute, self-existent, independent, &c. ; and this is
what I deny of all matter, body, extension, &c.
If this, you will say, be all that I mean by the word external, I am
like to meet with no adversary at all, for who has ever affirmed, that
matter is self- existent, absolute, or independent?
To this I answer, What others hold, or have held in times past, I
shall not here inquire. On the contrary, I should be glad to find by
the event, that all mankind were agreed in that which I contend for as
the truth, viz. that matter is not, cannot be, independent, absolute, or
self-existent. In the mean time, whether they are so or no, will be
tried by this.
Secondly, and more particularly, That by not independent, not
absolutely existent, not external, I mean and contend for nothing less
than that all matter, body, extension, &c. exists in, or in dependence
on, mind, thought, or perception ; and that it is not capable of an
existence, which is not thus dependent.
This perhaps may awaken another to demand of me, How? to which
I as readily answer — just how my reader pleases, provided it be some
how. As for instance, we usually say, An accident exists in, or in
dependence on, its proper subject; and that its very essence, or reality
of its existence, is so to exist. Will this pass for an explication of my
assertion ? If so, I am content to stand by it, in this sense of the
words. Again, we usually say (and fancy too we know what we mean
in saying,) that a body exists in, and also in dependence on, its proper
place, so as to exist necessarily in some place or other. Will this
description of dependence please my inquisitive reader? If so, I am
content to join issue with him, and contend that all matter exists in,
or as much dependency on, mind, thought, or perception, to the full,
as any body exists in place. Nay, I hold the description to be so just
and apposite as if a man should say, A thing is like itself: for, I sup
pose I need not tell my reader that when I affirm that all matter exists
in mind, after the same manner as body exists in place, I mean the
very same as if I had said, that mind itself is the place of body, and so
its place, as that it is not capable of existing in any other place, or in
place after any other manner. Again, lastly, it is a common saying,
that an object of perception exists in, or in dependence on, its respect
ive faculty. And of these objects there are many who will reckon with
me, light, sounds, colours, and even some material things, such as
trees, houses, &c, which are seen, as we say, in a looking-glass, but
which are, or ought to be, owned to have no existence but in, or
respectively on, the minds or faculties of those who perceive them. But,
to please all parties at once, I affirm that I know of no manner in which
an object of perception exists in, or on, its respective faculty, which I
will not admit in this place to be a just description of that manner of
in-existence after which all matter that exists is affirmed by me to exist
in mind. Nevertheless, were I to speak my mind freely I should
choose to compare it to the in-existence of some, rather than some
other objects of perception — particularly such as are objects of the
320
APPENDIX B.
sense of vision ; and of these, those more especially which are allowed
by others to exist wholly in the mind or visive faculty; such as objects
seen in a looking-glass, by men distempered, light-headed, ecstatic,
&c, where not only colours, but entire bodies, are perceived or seen.
For these cases are exactly parallel with that existence which I affirm
of all matter, body, or extension whatsoever.
Having endeavoured, in as distinct terms as I can, to give my reader
notice of what I mean by the proposition I have undertaken the defence
of, it will be requisite in the next place, to declare in as plain terms,
what I do not mean by it.
Accordingly, I declare in the Jirst place, That in affirming that there
is no external world, I make no doubt or question of the existence of
bodies, or whether the bodies which are seen exist or not. It is with
me a first principle, that whatsoever is seen, is. To deny or doubt of
this is errant scepticism, and at once unqualifies a man for any part or
office of a disputant, or philosopher ; so that it will be remembered
from this time, that my enquiry is not concerning the existence, but
altogether concerning the extra-existence of certain things or objects ;
or, in other words, what I affirm and contend for, is not that bodies
do not exist, or that the external world does not exist, but that such
and such bodies, which are supposed to exist, do not exist externally ;
or in universal terms, that there is no such thing as an external world.
Secondly, I profess and declare that, notwithstanding this my asser
tion, I am persuaded that I see all bodies just as other folks do ; that
is, the visible world is seen by me, or, which is the same, seems to
me, to be as much external or independent, as to its existence, on my
mind, self, or visive faculty, as any visible object does, or can be pre
tended to do or be, to any other person. I have neither, as I know
of, another nature, nor another knack of seeing objects, different from
other persons, suitable to the hypothesis of their existence which I here
contend for. So far from this, that I believe, and am very sure, that
this seeming, or (as I shall desire leave to call it) quasi externeity of
visible objects, is not only the effect of the Will of God, (as it is his
Will that light and colours should seem to be without the soul, that
heat should seem to be in the fire, pain in the hand, &c.) but also that
it is. a natural and necessary condition of their visibility : I would say
that though God should be supposed to make a world, or any one
visible object, which is granted to be not external, yet, by the condition
of its being seen, it would, and must be, quasi external to the percep
tive faculty ; as much so to the full, as is any material object usually
seen in this visible world.
Moreover, thirdly, When I affirm that all matter exists dependently
on mind, I am sure my reader will allow me to say, I do not mean by
this — that matter or bodies exist in bodies. As for instance, when I
affirm or say, that the world, which I see, exists in my mind, I cannot
be supposed to mean that one body exists in another, or that all the
bodies which I see exist in that which common use has taught me to
call my body. I must needs desire to have this remembered, because
ARTHUR COLLIER. 321
experience has taught me how apt persons are, or will be, to mistake
me in this particular.
Fourthly, When I affirm that this or that visible object exists in, or
dependently on, my mind, or perceptive faculty, I must desire to be
understood to mean no more than I say, by the words mind and per
ceptive faculty. In like manner I would be understood, when I affirm
in general, that all matter or body exists in, or dependently on, mind.
I say this to acquit myself from the imputation of holding that the
mind causes its own ideas, or objects of perception ; or, lest any one
by a mistake should fancy that I affirm — that matter depends for its
existence on the will of man, or any creature whatsoever. But now,
if any such mistake should arise in another's mind, he has wherewith
to rectify it ; in as much as I assure him, that by mind, I mean that
part, or act 5> or faculty of the soul which is distinguished by the name
intellective or perceptive ; as in exclusion of that other part which is
distinguished by the term will.
Fifthly, When I affirm that all matter exists in mind, or that no
matter is external, I do not mean that the world, or any visible object
of it, which I (for instance) see, is dependent on the mind of any
other person besides myself; or that the world, or matter, which any
other person sees, is dependent on mine, or any other person's mind,
or faculty of perception. On the contrary, I contend as well as grant,
that the world which John sees is external to Peter, and the world which
Peter sees is external to John. That is, I hold the thing to be the
same in this as in any other case of sensation ; for instance, that of
sound. Here two or more persons, who are present at a concert of
music, may indeed in some sense be said to hear the same notes or
melody ; but yet the truth is, that the sound which one hears, is not
the very same with the sound which another hears — because the souls
or persons are supposed to be different ; and therefore, the sound which
Peter hears is external to, or independent on, the soul of John, and
that which John hears is external to the soul or person of Peter.
Lastly, When I affirm that no matter is altogether external, but
necessarily exists in some mind or other, exemplified and distinguished
by the proper names of John, Peter, &c, I have no design to affirm
that every part or particle of matter, which does or can exist, must
needs exist in some created mind or other. On the contrary, I believe
that infinite worlds might exist, though not one single created, (or rather
merely created,) mind were ever in being. And, as in fact there are
thousands and ten thousands, I believe, and I even contend, that there
is an Universe, or Material World in being, which is, at least, numeri
cally different from every material world perceived by mere creatures.
By this, I mean the great Mundane Idea of created (or rather twice
created) matter, by which all things are produced ; or rather, (as my
present subject leads me to speak,) by which the great God gives sen
sations to all his thinking creatures, and by which things that are not
are preserved and ordered in the same manner as if they were.
And now I presume and hope, that my meaning is sufficiently
21
322
APPENDIX B.
understood, when I affirm, That all matter which exists, exists in, or
dependently on, mind ; or, that there is no such thing as an External
World.
Nevertheless, after all the simplicity to which this question seems
already to be reduced, I find myself necessitated to divide it into two.
For, in order to prove that there is no External World, it must needs
be one article to shew that the visible world is not external ; and when
this is done, though in this all be indeed done which relates to any
opinion yet entertained by men, yet something still is wanting towards
a full demonstration of the point at large, and to come up to the
universal terms in which the question is expressed.
Accordingly, I shall proceed in this order. First, to shew that the
visible world is not external. Secondly, to demonstrate more at large,
or simply, that an external world is a being utterly impossible. Which
two shall be the subjects of two distinct Parts or Books.'
Collier in the end resolves the difference between sense-perception
and imagination into a difference in degree merely. To imagine an
object is to perceive it less vividly than we perceive it in the senses. ' I
can no more,' he says, 'understand how we can create the objects we
imagine than the objects we are said to see.' What is imagined 'exists
as much, to all appearance, without, or external to, the mind which
perceives it as any of those objects usually called visible — but not so
vividly ; and this is that whereby I distinguish the act which we call
imagination from the act which we call vision : but why is this, but
because the common cause of both, viz. God, does not, in the former
act, impress or act so strongly upon my mind as in the latter. If He
did, both acts would become one, or require the same name; and there
would be no difference between seeing and imagining 2 .' So Hume
afterwards. Berkeley's position in relation to the difference between
sense-perception and mere imagination I have elsewhere noted.
The difference is surely more than one of degree. There is a differ
ence in kind between real existence in place, and a subjective imagi
nation, peculiar to an individual mind. Is not this difference consistent
with the real things present in sense, and also the space or place in
which they exist, being alike dependent for their actual existence on
Mind — in short, with their being grounded on Knowing, and not on
an abstracted Unknown? May not space be the uncreated or necessary
condition of the possibility of all sense-experience like ours, but yet
dependent for its actual existence upon the existence of the sense
experience ? This is not to make it the abstract space against which
Berkeley argues, nor need it involve quantitative infinity.
a See Benson's Memoirs of Collier, pp. 26, 27.
c.
THE THEORY OF VISION VINDICATED.
Experience of Persons born blind.
In the last Section of the Vindication (p. 299), Berkeley refers to
the now well-known experiment of Cheselden, in which sight was
given to a boy born blind. As this case is described imperfectly in
the Vindication, and as it is often referred to in the controversy as to
whether our power of interpreting the tactual, muscular, and locomo
tive meaning of visual signs is, on the one hand, original and instinct
ive, or, on the other hand, the acquired result of mental association
and habit, I here reprint the entire Communication, given in the
Philos. Trans., No. 402 : —
' An accotmt of some observations made by a young gentleman, who
was born blind, or who lost his sight so early, that he had no remembrance
of ever having seen, and was couched between 1 3 and 1 4 years of age.
By Mr. Will. Chesselden, F.R.S., Surgeon to Her Majesty, and to St.
Thomas's Hospital.
Tho' we say of the gentleman that he was blind, as we do of all
people who have ripe cataracts, yet they are never so blind from that
cause but that they can discern day from night ; and for the most part
in a strong light distinguish black, white, and scarlet ; but they can
not perceive the shape of anything ; — for the light by which these
perceptions are made, being let in obliquely through the aqueous
humour, or the anterior surface of the chrystalline (by which the rays
cannot be brought into a focus upon the retina), they can discern in
no other manner, than a sound eye can thro' a glass of broken jelly,
where a great variety of surfaces so differently refract the light that the
several distinct pencils of rays cannot be collected by the eye into their
proper foci ; wherefore the shape of an object in such a case, cannot
be at all discern' d, tho' the colour may. And thus it was with this
young gentleman, who though he knew these colours asunder in a good
light, yet when he saw them after he was couch' d, the faint ideas he
had of them before were not sufficient for him to know them by after-
323
324 APPENDIX C.
wards ; and therefore he did not think them the same, which he had
before known by those names. Now scarlet he thought the most
beautiful of all colours, and of others the most gay were the most
pleasing, whereas the first time he saw black, it gave him great uneasi
ness, yet after a little time he was reconcil'd to it ; but some months
after, seeing by accident a Negroe woman, he was struck with great
horror at the sight.
When he first saw, he was so far from making any judgment about
distances, that he thought all objects whatever touched his eyes (as he
express' d it) as what he felt did his skin ; and thought no objects so
agreeable as those which were smooth and regular, tho' he could form
no judgment of their shape, or guess what it was in any object that was
pleasing to him : he knew not the shape of anything, nor any one
thing from another, however different in shape or magnitude ; but
upon being told what things were, whose form he knew before from
feeling, he would carefully observe, that he might know them again ;
but, having too many objects to learn at once, he forgot many of them ;
and (as he said) at first he learn' d to know, and again forgot a thousand
things in a day. One particular only (tho' it may appear trifling) I
will relate : — having forgot which was the cat and which the dog, he
was asham'd to ask ; but catching the cat (which he knew by feeling)
he was observ'd to look at her steadfastly, and then setting her down,
said, ' So, Puss ! I shall know you another time. ' He was very much
surpris'd that those things which he had lik'd best did not appear most
agreeable to his eyes, expecting those persons would appear most
beautiful that he lov'd most, and such things to be most agreeable to
his sight that were so to his taste. We thought he soon knew what
pictures represented which were shew'd to him, but we found after
wards we were mistaken; for about two months after he was couch'd,
he discovered at once, they represented solid bodies ; when to that
time he consider' d them only as party-colour' d planes or surfaces diver
sified with variety of paint ; but even then he was no less surpris'd,
expecting the pictures would feel like the things they represented, and
was amaz'd when he found those parts, which by their light and shadow
appear'd now round and uneven, felt only flat like the rest; and ask'd
which was the lying sense, — feeling or seeing ?
Being shewn his father's picture in a locket at his mother's watch,
and told what it was, he acknowledged a likeness, but was vastly sur
pris'd ; asking how it could be that a large face could be express' d in
so little room, saying, it should have seem'd as impossible to him as to
put a bushel of anything into a pint.
At first he could bear but very little sight, and the things he saw he
thought extreamly large ; but upon seeing things larger, those first seen
he conceiv'd less, never being able to imagine any lines beyond the
bounds he saw; the room he was in, he said, he knew to be but part,
of the house, yet he could not conceive that the whole house could
look bigger. Before he was couch'd he expected little advantage from
seeing, worth undergoing an operation for, except reading and writing;
for he said he thought he could have no more pleasure in walking
THE THEORY OF VISION VINDICATED.
325
abroad than he had in the garden, which he could do safely and readily-.
And even blindness, he observ'd, had this advantage, that he could go
anywhere in the dark much better than those who can see ; and after
he had seen, he did not soon lose this quality, nor desire a light to go
about the house in the night. He said every new object was a new
delight, and the pleasure was so great that he wanted ways to express
it ; but his gratitude to his operator he could not conceal, never seeing
him for some time without tears of joy in his eyes, and other marks of
affection ; and if he did not happen to come at any time when he was
expected, he would be so griev'd that he could not forbear crying at
his disappointment. A year after first seeing, being carried upon
Epsom Downs, and observing a large prospect, he was exceedingly
delighted with it, and called it a new kind of seeing. And now being
lately couch' d of his other eye, he says that objects at first appeared
large to this eye, but not so large as they did at first to the other ; and
looking upon the same object with both eyes, he thought it look'd about
twice as large as with the first couch' d eye only, but not double, that
we can anyways discover.'
No very satisfactory inference can be drawn from a narrative so
deficient in the refinement of thought and expression which the subject
requires. The question is too subtle for experiments conducted in this
fashion. Nor can more be said in favour of a succession of somewhat
similar experiments recorded in the Philosophical Transactions. The
most important are the following : —
1. Case described by Mr. Ware, Surgeon, in the Philos. Trans.
(1801).
2. Two cases described by Mr. Home, in the Philos. Trans. (1807).
3. Case of the lady described by Mr. Wardrop, Surgeon, in the
Philos. Trans. (1826).
To these may be added Stewart's 'Account of James Mitchell, a boy
born deaf and blind,' in the seventh volume of the Transactions of
the Royal Society of Edinburgh. See Hamilton's Edition of Stewart's
Works, Vol. III. Appendix, pp. 300 — 370; also p. 388.
As I have quoted one of the earliest described cases — that of Ches
elden, I shall end by giving the following, which is one of the last
and most philosophically described of any I have met with. It is con
tained in Mr. Nunnely's valuable scientific treatise on The Organs of
Vision : their Anatomy and Physiology (1858) : —
' The case was that of a fine and most intelligent boy, nine years of
age, who had congenital cataract of both eyes, in whom the retina was
326 APPENDIX C.
more perfect than it commonly is at so advanced an age, as shown by
the excellent sight he subsequently acquired. He had always lived in
a very large manufacturing village, about sixteen miles from Leeds.
He could find his way all about this place. Walking along the middle
of the road, when he heard any object approaching, he at once stopped,
groped his way to the side of the road, and remained perfectly still until
it had passed. Any one whom he knew he was able to recognise by
the sound of the voice, and by passing his hands over the face and
body of the person. He could perceive the difference between a
bright, sunny, and a dark, cloudy day, and could follow the motions
of a candle without discerning what it was. He had been sent to
school for some time, and by means of models and a raised alphabet,
could by touch alone arrange the different letters into short words. I
presented to him in succession a great number of different Objects, each
one of which he took into both hands, felt it most carefully over with
both, then with equal minuteness with one, turning the object over and
over again, in every direction ; the tongue was next applied to it ; and
lastly, he applied it so near to the eye as to touch the eyelids, when
he pronounced his opinion upon it, and generally with correctness, as
to the nature and form of the object, when these were distinct. Thus
he recognised books, stones, small boxes, pieces of wood and bone of
different shapes, a broken piece of hard biscuit. A cube and a sphere
he could readily recognise, saying the one was square and the other
round, and that both were made of wood ; but a sphere which was
made of perfectly smooth, hard wood, he was very confident was bone.
In an object where the angles were not very distinct, he made con
stant mistakes in the shape, first saying that it was square, then that
it was round. Very bright light colours, when touching the eyelids,
he could at once recognise, calling them all white ; all dull and dark
colours he said were black. Between a thin circle of wood and a
sphere or a cube he instantly decided by the hand alone. On putting
half-a-crown piece into his hands he immediately said it was money ;
but for long was undecided whether it was half-a-crown or a penny ;
however, after carefully turning it over for some time, so as frequently
to bring every part into contact with the hand, then putting it to the
tongue, and afterwards so close to the eye that it touched the eyeball
itself, he said decidedly,
" It is half-a-crown.
"
The lenses were very large, milky, with caseous particles, quite white
and opaque, the capsules being clear and transparent. As is well
known, in most cases, before this period of life, the lens itself has been
absorbed, leaving only a leathery, opaque capsule, and, of course, not
nearly so favourable for such observations as this one. After keeping
him in a dark room for a few days, until the opaque particles of lenses
were nearly absorbed, and the eyes clear, the same objects, which had
been kept carefully from him, were again presented to his notice. He
could at once perceive a difference in their shapes ; though he could
not in the least say which was the cube and which the sphere, he saw
they were not of the same figure. It was not until they had many times
been placed in his hands that he learnt to distinguish by the eye the
THE THEORY OF VISION VINDICATED. 327
one which he had just had in his hands, from the other placed beside
it. He gradually became more correct in his perception, but it was
only after several days that he could or would tell by the eyes alone,
which was the sphere and which the cube ; when asked, he always,
before answering, wished to take both into his hands ; even when this
was allowed, when immediately afterwards the objects were placed before
the eyes, he was not certain of the figure. Of distance he had not the
least conception. He said everything touched his eyes,, and walked
most carefully about, with his hands held out before him, to prevent
things hurting his eyes by touching them. Great care was requisite
to prevent him falling over objects, or walking against them. Im
provement gradually went on, and his subsequent sight was, and now
is, comparatively perfect.'
' x None of these experiments, taken by themselves, unequivocally de
termine the question — Whether the power of interpreting the visual
signs of real or tangible extension is inspired, or is, on the contrary,
acquired by association and constructive activity of intellect. But
they confirm the conclusion, that visible signs are not less indispensable
to an imagination of trinal extension than the artificial signs of lan
guage are necessary to abstract thought and reasoning — that one born
blind can have only a vague perception of an external world. More
over, when once we are experimentally acquainted with distances, a
mathematical analysis of the perspective lines leading from any object
to the eye is possible, with an involved sense of necessity, which seems
to presuppose relations common to the visible signs and the felt reality.
The difficulty which confronts Berkeley is, that on his theory space
and its mathematical relations are relative to sensations which, per se,
are contingent and phenomenal, and thus wanting in the element
which alone gives absolute stability to mathematical science : quanti
tative infinity disappears, and space and its relations are the real but
arbitrary results of creation or the voluntary activity of God.
ANNOTATIONS
ON
BERKELEY'S PRINCIPLES,
CONTAINING
UEBERWEG'S NOTES ENTIRE,
WITH ADDITIONS, TRANSLATED, SELECTED, AND
ORIGINAL.
329
ANNOTATIONS.
[i] Idea. — Abstract ideas.
Berkeley, Intr., § 6 : 'the opinion that the mind (Geist) hath a
power (Vermogen) of framing abstract ideas or notions (Begriffe) of
things.'
Ueberweg: '
"Idea
" was used by Plato in the objective sense, as
designation of the pure, archetypal essence of homogeneous things. In
the course of time, mainly because of the Aristotelian Scholastic doc
trine that the human mind, in the act of perceiving things, receives into
itself the form or shape (Idia, eldoq) without the matter of them, the
word came to have a subjective force as well as an objective one. In
the subjective sense it denotes the psychical image of the objective
form, and consequently came to be more and more limited to the sub
jective sense. It thus came in Descartes, and still more in Spinoza
and Locke, to have the meaning ' psychical image' or conception
(Vorstellung), in the wide sense of that word which embraces the
image in sense-perception. In this sense some recent psychologists
have employed it.
' In Berkeley, who did not regard the subjective forms as images of
objective forms,
"idea
" has exclusively the sense
"psychical image.
"
As he uses the term,
"ideas
" exist partly through sense-perception,
partly through reflection on the psychical antecedents, partly through
the reproduction, decompounding, and combining of the conceptions
which have risen.
' In the translation of Berkeley's work we retain the term
" idea.
" In
this use of it we must guard against the mistake of supposing that the
word refers merely to reproduced images, or to mere images of the
fancy at all.
'This mistake would be most effectually guarded against, if, as has
been suggested by T. Collyns Simon, one of Berkeley's adherents, the
term phenomenon (Erscheinung) were used.
331
332 ANNO TA TIONS.
' The objections to this rendering are :
' i. That
" Erscheinung
" is a translation of phenomenon rather than
of idea, and would consequently be a displacement of the word
"idea
"
rather than a rendering of it.
' 2. That exactly the opposite mistake would be encouraged, as if
the conceptions of the imagination were not included.
'3. That
"Erscheinung
" rather denotes a complex of sense-ideas
than the separate constituents of this complex.
' 4. That the being in the subject, or that
"esse,
" which is the same
as
"percipi,
" indubitably presents itself in the word
"idea,
" not in
the word
"Erscheinung
" (phenomenon).
'5. That
"Erscheinung
" (phenomenon) either presupposes a
"thing
in itself,
" of which it is the phenomenon (a supposition which Berkeley
rejects), or, as Berkeley himself uses the word phenomenon, stands in
antithesis to the
"essence
" or
"law,
" whose cognoscibility Berkeley
does not deny.'
Editor-: i : Berkeley discusses abstract ideas in the New Theory of
Vision :
§ 122 : 'I find it proper to take into my thoughts extension in ab
stract.' 123 : ' I do not find that I can perceive, imagine, or anywise
frame in my mind such an abstract idea as is here spoken of.'. . . 124 :
'It is commonly said that the object of geometry is abstract extension.'
125 : 'After reiterated endeavours to apprehend the general idea of a
triangle, I have found it altogether incomprehensible.'
Alciphron, Dial. vii. 5-7 : ' May not words become general by
being made to stand indiscriminately for all particular ideas, which,
from a mutual resemblance, belong to the same kind, without the in
tervention of any abstract general idea? May we not admit general
ideas though we should not admit them to be made by abstraction, or
though we should not allow of general abstract ideas? . . . A particular
idea may become general by being used to stand for or represent other
ideas, and that general knowledge is conversant about signs or general
ideas made such by their signification.'
A Defence of Free-thinking in Mathematics (§ 45-48): 'I hold that
there are general ideas, but not formed by abstraction in the manner
set forth by Mr. Locke. . . . According to Locke, the general name
colour stands for an idea which is neither blue, red, green, nor any
other particular colour, but somewhat distinct and abstracted from
them all. To me it seems the word colour is only a more general name
applicable to all and each of the particular colours ; while the other
specific names, as blue, . . . and the like, are each restrained to a
ABSTRACTION. 333
more limited signification. . . . Nothing is easier than to define in
terms or words that which is incomprehensible in idea; forasmuch
as any words can be either separated or joined as you please, but ideas
always cannot. It is as easy to say a round square as an oblong square,
though the former be inconceivable.'
2 : Berkeley has noted the difference between Plato's use of 'idea'
and his own (Siris, § 335): 'In Plato's style the term idea doth not
merely signify an inert inactive object of the understanding, but is used
as synonymous with ainov and dp^yj, cause and principle.'
[2] Locke.
Berkeley, Intr., § 11 : 'There has been a late excellent and de
servedly esteemed philosopher.'
Ueberweg: John Locke, b. 1632, d. 1704. His chief work is 'An
Essay concerning Human Understanding,' in four books. First edit.,
London : 1690.
[3] Brutes.
Berkeley, Intr., § 11 (quoting Locke): 'For if they (the brutes)
have any ideas (Vorstellungen), and are not bare machines (as some
would have them).'
Ueberweg : ' The reference is to the Cartesians, followers of the
system of Rene Descartes, b. 1596, d. 1650.
' The bold separation which Descartes made between spirit and
matter, which allowed of their having nothing in common, led to the
alternative either of ascribing to brutes souls, which like those of men
are spiritual in kind, and consequently independent of the body and
separable from it, or the entire denial of their possessing souls, and
the conceding that they had nothing more than
"vital spirits,
" which
were capable of none of the psychical functions, no sensation, no per
ception, or the like. Descartes accepted the second horn of the
dilemma. He also ascribed to man material vital spirits, which he
supposed to be the medium of the relation between the soul and the
grosser parts of the body.'
[4]
Berkeley, § 13: 'The Essay on the Human Understanding.'
Ueberweg : See Note 2.
[5] Abstraction.
Berkeley, §16: 'And here it must be acknowledged that a man
may consider a figure merely as triangular, without attending to the'
particular qualities of the angles or relations of the sides.'
334 4 NN TA TIONS.
Ueberweg : ' This admission on the part of Berkeley is sufficient to
secure for abstraction rightly understood its full value in scientific in
vestigation. His discussion of abstraction at this point is of great value.
' No contradiction arises unless it be maintained that an idea can be
entirely definite and at the same time be abstract ; for universal defini
tiveness, as the Leibnitzians correctly maintained, is the distinguishing
character of the individual conceptions. By abstraction is to be under
stood no more than the exclusive consideration of that in which the
entire ideas of a particular group coincide with one another.
' In a certain measure the process of abstraction is completed inde
pendently of our conscious concurrence, because of the predominance
which the concurrent marks, in consequence of their frequent occur
rence, have over the marks which differ and which are presented singly.
Abstraction is aided by the use of the common term which is associated
with every idea of the group involved ; it comes to completeness by
means of the conscious logical formation of definitions, in which the
common element is brought to consciousness in a complete and well
arranged order, and is distinguished from the differing elements.
' Abstraction involves the power of attributing common predicates
to all the objects of a group, in such a way that through what is defined,
and by means of the highest development of the defmitory conscious
ness in regard to the common marks of this group, it is accurately
bounded. Such, for example, is the power of making assertions in
regard to conic sections which hold good of every particular figure
of this kind, so that by means of the consciousness we have of the
marks of a conic section, all figures which are conic sections are accu
rately distinguished from all others.
'This capacity is in fact a prerogative of man, and in its highest
degree a prerogative of the man of scientific culture. Without it
there would be no scientific knowledge.'
[6] Tricks of phrase.
Berkeley, Intr., § 20: 'those things which every one's experience
will, I doubt not, plentifully suggest unto him?' (ins Bewusstsein
ruft ?)
Ueberweg : ' Berkeley here admirably characterizes the mystery of
phrase, of that false rhetoric, the aim of which is to produce great effects
upon the minds of the uneducated and half-educated, at the expense
of truth and rectitude.
' Where reasons are wanting, the Shibboleth is still mighty. The
commonplace, the formulary, still stirs men like the roll of the drum
OBJECTS OF KNOWLEDGE: IDEAS. 335
or the ensnaring tinkling of the lute. The feelings carry away the
judgment.'
[7] Words.
Berkeley, Intr., § 23: 'they advise well that we attend to the
ideas signified, and draw off our attention from the words which signify
them.'
Ueberweg: 'Locke says:
"I endeavour as much as I can to deliver
myself from those fallacies which we are apt to put upon ourselves by
taking words for things. It helps not our ignorance to feign a knowl
edge where we have none, by making a noise with sounds without clear
and distinct significations.
" (Ess. of Human Underst., 11. xiii. 18.)
'
" Men who abstract their thoughts and do well examine the ideas of
their own minds, cannot much differ in thinking, however they may
perplex themselves with words, according to the way of speaking of
the several schools or sects they have been bred up in.
" (lb. 28.)'
[8] Objects of knowledge : ideas.
Berkeley, Principles, § 1 : ' It is evident to any one who takes a
survey of the objects (Gegenstande) of human knowledge.'
Ueberweg : 'As Berkeley here designates
" ideas
" as the objects of
human knowledge, he assumes the very thing he ought first to prove,
and, without this, is guilty of begging the question.
' By ideas he means phenomena which exist in our consciousness,
sensations, and the complex of perceptions, and that which proceeds
from them.
'Any one disposed to dispute the truth of Berkeley's assertion might
reply that ideas are not the objects of our knowledge, but the means of
it. We have cognition by means of our ideas. Our ideas have actual
existence in our souls, or are something subjectively real or psychically
real. By means of our ideas we have cognition of the objectively real
external world standing over against us, inasmuch as a primitive think
ing (primitives Denken) coalesces with sensation (sinnlichen Empfin
dung) and in conjunction with it forms the sense-perception (seeing,
hearing, etc.). See Ueberweg's System der Logik, § 41, seq. 45-47,
etc. (tr. by Lindsay, London).
' This primitive thinking, not reflecting upon its separate elements
(Momente), but bringing only the results to consciousness, interprets
the image furnished in perception, and has the power to give it shape, —
for example, to bear its part in determining the form of the firmament,
a power not possessed by the subsequent reflective thinking, which
meets shapes already fixed.
336 A NNO TA TIONS.
' The complexes of sensations or ideas co-determined or shaped by
the primary thinking are subjective images, or at least subjective signs,
of the external world.
'But to these complexes of sensations Berkeley assigns names, such as
apple, tree, mountain, house, which, according to the usage of lan
guage and the popular consciousness on which that usage rests, desig
nate external objects, by which apparently, but only apparently, it is
proven that the so-called
"external objects
" exist in the spirit, for
"ideas
" (phenomena) have no other existence than in the percipient
spirit.
' The fixing on the complexes of sensations the names which pertain
to the external objects wears an appearance of truth, because of an
error in which the common view is involved.
' The common view is that what is in fact our sensation, that is our
psychical reaction toward the operation proceeding ffom the external
thing, the operation exercised directly or by certain media upon our
senses, that this is an attribute of the outer thing as such ; as, for ex
ample, it supposes the green colour to be a quality of the leaf as such,
the warmth a quality of the fire as such.
' Now as Berkeley considers and treats this error as if it were a truth,
in accepting the inseparableness of the object from these qualities, and
consequently, in accordance with the popular consciousness, refers the
names of the things to those objects to which these qualities pertain,
and as he then goes on to show that these qualities consist of sensa
tions of the subject, in Berkeley's view those objects (as the apple,
etc.) are identified with these sensations as something existing in the
subject.
' The popular apprehension considers these sensations as outward,
inasmuch as it considers our sensations as qualities of objects, and not
our own sensations, which are only possible in the subject.
'Berkeley considers the objects as internal, that is, in the subject, in
asmuch as he considers our sensations as qualities of the objects (to wit,
ideas), but at the same time apprehends these (qualities) as our own
sensations.
' But the argument of Berkeley presents the fittest occasion to sepa
rate in the distinctest manner the correct and incorrect in the popular
opinion as regards the existence and qualities of external objects,
and not simply to claim concession for what is really scientifically
justified, but over against Berkeley's very thorough and acute negation
to seek proofs of it. In this lie the suggestiveness and the abiding
scientific value of the paradox of Berkeley. Cf. notes 10 and 90.'
OBJECTS OF KNOWLEDGE: IDEAS. 337
Editor: i : Ueberweg, in his Logic, treating of the ' Combination
of Internal and External Perceptions,' says, § 41 : ' The knowledge of
the otiter world depends upon the combination of external with internal
perceptions. Our corporeal circumstances, sensibly perceived by our
selves, are in orderly coherence with circumstances belonging to our
internal perceptions.' § 42 : ' Extending his consideration of the ex
ternal world, man recognizes the internal characters of other things
chiefly by means of the related sides of his own inner existence.' § 43 :
' Every phenomenon objectively founded, as this very act of becoming a
phenomenon testifies, and as the scientific investigation of the laws of
nature makes evident, is to be traced back to some active power as its
real basis.' § 44: 'The order in space and time belonging to real
objects mirrors itself in the order in space and time of external and
internal perception. Sense-qualities, however, colours, sounds, etc.
are as such subjective only. They are not copies of motions, but are
regularly and connectedly related to determinate motions as their sym
bols.' § 45 : 'The individual conception, or intuition, is the mental
image of the individual existence, which is objective or at least is
imagined to be.' § 46 : i Individual intuitions gradually arise out of the
original confused aggregate image of perception, when man first begins
to recognize himself an individual being in antithesis to the outer
world.' §47: 'As the individual conception corresponds generally to
the individual existence, so its different kinds or forms correspond to
the different kinds ox forms of individual existence.''
2 : By ' objects of knowledge ' Berkeley means the objects of un
mediated cognition. For the objector to say that the ideas are not the
objects but the means of knowing the objects, is to admit that the
objects, in the objector's sense, are not known except through a
medium, to wit, the ideas. This means that the medium is itself known
directly, and that the object whose medium it is is known mediately.
But it is immediate knowledge of which alone Berkeley is speaking, so
that the opponent meets him by repeating his affirmation with a change
of phrase.
3 : The Cartesian and post-Cartesian definitions of ' idea ' illustrate
both the usage and the argument of Berkeley. Syrbius (d. 1738)
defines idea : exemplar rei in cogitante, — the copy of the thing in the
thinker. Locke (1. i. 8) defines it ' whatsoever is the object of the
understanding when a man thinks; whatever is meant by phantasm,
notion, species, or whatever it is which the mind can be employed
about in thinking.' In the Letter to the Bishop of Worcester: 'the
things signified by ideas are nothing but the immediate objects of our
22
338
ANN OTA TIONS.
minds in thinking. Me that thinks must have some immediate object
of his mind in thinking, /. e, must have ideas. ' Le Clerc defines idea
' the immediate object of the mind.'
Schubert : ' Representation in the soul is that operation by which
the characters of any object are expressed in the soul. That state of
soul which arises from this operation is called idea, and if the object
of representation be a universal entity it is called notion.''
4: Kant regarded the fixing of the proper sense of the word
' idea' as of great importance. ' I beseech those who have the in
terests of philosophy at heart, — and this involves more than is com
monly imagined, — . . . to protect the term idea in its original sense,
so that it be not confused among the words with which, in careless
disorder, all kinds of mental representations (Vorstellungen) are
ordinarily designated, to the great detriment of science. There is no
want of appellations adapted to every species of mental representa
tion, completely obviating any necessity of encroaching on the proper
province of others.' 1
Kant then gives these terms in a graduated list, which Mellin 2 has
reduced to a very convenient tabular form :
GRADUATED LIST OF THE MENTAL REPRESENTATIONS (Vorstellungen).
without Consciousness.
.r
Subjective,
Sensation,
Empfmdung.
with Consciousness.
Pevception.
Objective,
Cognition,
Erkenntniss.
immediate,
Intuition,
Anschauung,
Empirical,
mediate,
Concept,
Besriff.
Pure,
proceeding from
Pure Sense,
reiner Sinnlichkeit.
The Understanding,
Verstande,
Notion.
The Reason,
Verriunft,
Idea.
1 Krit. d. rein. Vern., II. Th. ii. Abt. 1. Buch.
2 Marginalien (1794), 87.
OBJECTS OF KNOWLEDGE: IDEAS. 339
5. Among the most serious difficulties which the English reader and
translator of German metaphysics encounters is the perplexity he finds
in the use of the terms Vorstellung, Begriff, and Idee. The perplexity
arises from the shifting senses attached to these words by the various
schools of philosophy. In ordinary life a German will say, ' I can form
no Begriff, no Idee, no Vorstellung of it,' just as we say in English, 'I
can form no notion, no idea, no conception of it.' The three terms
have this in common, that they involve the activity of a thinking being.
Each of them is sometimes used to translate idea, notion, and concep
tion, and those three terms are used in translating each one of the
German words.
Vorstellung is generally used as equivalent to Reprgesentatio and
Perceptio, and covers everything which is wrought by the activity of
the mind. It is a generic term for mental operation, mental presenta
tion, and representation, external and internal perception. It is often
best rendered in a translation by Conception. ' Under the term Vor
stellung,' says Krug, 'may be embraced everything which we call
Intuition, Sensation, Notion, Thought, and Idea. Consequently, all
our Cognitions rest on Vorstellungen.'
Begriff is an element of a judgment. Kant and his school depart
from the common usage by confining Begriff to the allgemeinen
Begriffe, the universal Notions. They give the name Begriff simply
to the Verstandes Begriff, the Concept of the Understanding, the
Notion.
Those who call the Vorstellung of individual things a Begriff do so
on the ground that there are also single judgments, which present a
logical relation between individual things. 1
The most generally available English representative of Begriff is
Notion.
Hamilton says, 'The distinction of ideas, strictly so called, and
notions, under the contrast of Anschauicngen and Begriffe, has long
been . . . established with the philosophers of Germany. ' ' No longer
Begriffe, but Anschauungen ; no longer Notions or Concepts, but images.''
'The terms Begriffe (Conceptions), etc.' 2
The term Representation as a translation of Vorstellung does not
correspond with Hamilton's usage. 'The term Representation I
employ always strictly as in contrast to Presentation, and, therefore,
with exclusive reference to individual objects, and not in the vague
generality of Representatio, or Vorstellung, in the Leibnitzian and sub-
1 Synonymik : Eberhard, Maas und Gruber, 1826, vi. 168.
3 Reid's Works, 291, 365, 407.
340 A NNO TA TIONS.
sequent philosophies of Germany, where it is used for any cognitive
act, considered, not in relation to what it knows, but to what is known ;
that is, as the genus including under it Intuitions, Perceptions, Sensa
tions, Conceptions, Notions, Thoughts proper, etc. as species.' 1 See
Schubert's definition under 3 in this note. As a rule the translator
of Ueberweg's notes represents Begriff by 'Notion,' Vorstellung by
'Conception,' Idee by 'Idea.' See Index.
[9] Esse — percipi.
Berkeley, § 3 : ' Their esse is percipi. Nor is it possible they should
have any existence out of the minds or thinking things which perceive
them.'
Ueberweg: 'Beyond question the being (esse) of ideas (phenom
ena) is identical with their being perceived (percipi) ; but it does not
follow from this that there are not other things,
"unthinking things,
"
which condition the existence of ideas (phenomena), things whose
existence is independent of the percipient subject, an existence in
itself, and not a mere being perceived.
'Such
"things in themselves
" must be accepted, if a connection of
natural phenomena in accordance with natural laws is not merely to
be asserted but actually demonstrated.' (See further in notes which
follow.)
Editor : If the esse is percipi, the percipi is also esse ; that is, the
thing perceived is the thing that is, and the thing as it is. Then arises
the difficulty in regard to the mistakes in sense-perception. The one
percipi in which a bush is taken for a man is corrected by a second
percipi, in which the man is cognized. Is each percipi in this case the
esse?
[10] Things perceived.
Berkeley, § 4: 'And is it not plainly repugnant that any one of
these, or any combination of them, should exist unperceived ?'
Ueberweg : ' The first thing necessary in the investigation is clearly
to fix what is meant by the expression
"things perceived
" (as an apple,
tree, etc.). In popular language, by such terms are meant things which
exist outside of our mind, and which yet have qualities, such as
greenness, warmth, and such like, which can only be sensations of the
percipient subject.
' If it be acknowledged that there is a contradiction in this, it is only
possible to retain one of the two elements which are united in popular
language in the same expression.
1 Reid's Works, 805, n.
ABSTRA CTION.
341
'As essential to this we must avoid the paralogism into which Berke
ley himself has fallen, of accepting as truths in this old and common
sense of the word what can be established only in the new sense of the
word.
' Either one sense or the other must be taken, to the exclusion of the
other in the argument. If, on the one hand, we take the
"things per
ceived' ' as meaning the complexes of sensation, images in perception,
we do what Berkeley does. In this case it is not only true, but it is a
truism, that these are in our consciousness only; but it is false to hold
this as proven in regard to what is understood in popular language by
the
"thing perceived;
" for example, the apple which I see, feel, and
eat; in this usage
"the thing perceived
" means a real thing external to
my mind, and that this thing is in fact reducible to a mere complex of
sensation is what Berkeley has not proved. Or if, on the other hand,
we must, as in correspondence with the general tendency of language,
understand by the
" things perceived
" external things, in this must also
be conceded that in perception is involved a primary thinking, which
blends with sensation, through which we infer (schliessen) (cf. Obs. 8)
the external things ; but from this would follow no more than this,
that the external things do not exist wholly as we perceive them, but
not that they do not exist at all.
' As we do not call the knowledge which we have of the intellectual
life of our friend his intellectual life itself which is known, just as little
do we call the image in our perception of an object the object per
ceived.
' By the object perceived we understand the external thing itself,
whose non-existence has been demonstrated by no proof.'
[11] Abstraction.
Berkeley, § 5 : 'So as to conceive them existing unperceived.'
Ueberweg : ' Not to them, but to those external things, is directed
the supposition of existence in itself.
' The error designated by Berkeley lies not in abstraction as such, but
in the supposition that by means of abstraction distinct things (such as
the existence of the idea, and its being perceived) can really be sep
arated. Abstraction (ayaipemi), rightly understood and properly
applied, is thoroughly proper and indispensable. (See Obs. 5.) The
fault which has most commonly characterized its use (the fault which
Aristotle calls ywpt.ciij.6q, separation) has no necessary connection
with it.'
342
ANNOTA TIONS.
[12] Abstraction.
Berkeley, 5: 'But my conceiving or imagining power (Fahigkeit
zu denken oder vorzustellen) does not extend beyond the possibility
of real existence or perception.'
Ueberweg : ' The possibility of Absfraction stretches itself, however,
in fact beyond this, for we are able to consider separately what in
every act of perception is united with something else. This takes
place, for example, in forming the notion (Begriff) of a mathematical
body.'
[13] Being and Perception.
Berkeley, § 6 : 'To be convinced of which, the reader need only
reflect, and try to separate in his own thoughts the being (Sein) of a
sensible (sinnlich wahrnehmbaren) thing from its being perceived.'
Ueberweg : ' Correct as is that which Berkeley says in reference to
our complexes of sensation or images in perception, he has not proven
that there are not things existing in themselves which operate in such
a way upon our senses that, in consequence of the excitation thus
received, the psychical principle dwelling within our organism begets
the sensations and their regular complexes (the images in perception) ;
and to those things existing in themselves — which, as the correlates of
our perceptions, maybe called the
" objects perceived,
" so far as in the
course of investigation sufficient grounds for accepting them are fur
nished — is to be ascribed an existence independent of the act of per
ception itself.
' This independence of the act of perception does not, however, ex
clude the supposition that between the things existing in themselves
and perceptible, and the mind capable of perception, there exists a
primitive affinity and correlation. Those things are the fore-steps of
the mind ; they condition it genetically, as on their side they are con
ditioned by it teleologically ; by means of them the mind has intel
lectual existence and perceives : they exist, at the most, for the sake
of the mind. By no means, however, do they exist in our mind. '
[14] Spirit the only Substance.
• Berkeley, § 7 : ' From what has been said, it is evident there is not
any other substance than spirit, or that which perceives.'
Ueberweg : ' This would only follow if the things in themselves
were identical with the images in perception, which they are not.'
THE PERCEIVABLE.
343
[15] An Idea like an Idea.
Berkeley, § 8 : 'An idea can be like nothing but an idea.'
Ueberweg : ' This proposition is not proven, and is false. There is
nothing to prevent our supposing that the figure of an image in per
ception — for example, the image we get of the course of a stream, or
of the path of a planet — is like the figure of the course or path itself,
although the one figure exists in the mind, the other outside of it.
' Not every figure is an
"idea,
" although every colour is an
" idea
"
(something purely subjective). See Obser. 17.'
[16] The Perceivable.
Berkeley, § 8 : 'I appeal to any one whether it be sense to assert a
colour is like something which is invisible ; hard or soft, like some
thing which is intangible; and so of the rest.'
Ueberweg : ' Only the double use of the word perceivable (to
which we have already alluded) leads to this dilemma.
' The originals are not perceivable in such sense that they can them
selves be perceptions, but in this sense that they by means of our
perception come to our consciousness.
'When, through touch and the eye, with the co-operation of the
primitive mental action (Denken), which consists of involuntary asso
ciations, we obtain a perceptive image of the stream, we call this result
"perceiving the stream.
"
' I see, feel, perceive, not the image, and not the constituents of the
image (the ideas), but the external object by means of the image.
' On the other side, it must be conceded that usage does not designate
exclusively the external things, — what is seen, heard, perceived, — but
also the particular qualities, as, for example, redness, sound (as we say,
I see the redness of the cheeks, I hear a sound), which are, in fact,
purely subjective.
' This language is used, however, only on the erroneous supposition
that they are objective, so that the tendency of the language here also
remains unchanged ; that is, to conjoin the objective as grammatical
object with the verb
"perceive.
" What is manifestly subjective, as,
for example, a
" pain,
" is not perceived, but is felt — is not the object
"
of sense-perception, but of sensation (nicht
" sinnlich wahrgenommen,
"
sondern
"empfunden
").'
344
ANNOTA TIONS.
[17] Primary and Secondary.
Berkeley, § 9 : ' Some there are who make a distinction betwixt
primary and secondary qualities.'
Ueberweg : ' This distinction, which is drawn by Locke, is a cor
rect one; only it would be better to style them Qualities in the pri
mary sense (inhering in the object itself), and Qualities in the second
ary sense (operations of the things on us ; qualities of sensation, which
they, the things, excite in us).
' The Geometrical is both objective and subjective. Everything else
in the sense-perception is purely subjective, but linked with the object
ive, in conformity with laws : for example, every separate sound and
every separate colour is linked with -vibrations of a separate kind.'
Editor: See Hylas and Philonous. First Dialogue. Works (Fraser),
i. 279.
Locke's Essay, B. II. ch. viii.
Hamilton's Reid, pp. 313-318, and Note D, pp. 825-875.
[18] Matter.
Berkeley, § 9 : 'By Matter, therefore, we are to understand an
inert (trage), senseless (empfindungslose) substance, in which exten
sion, figure, and motion do actually subsist.'
Ueberweg : ' It is entirely unnecessary to conceive of matter as
purely
" inert,
" without force. Something internal, on which rest its
motions (its forces, the analogues of our conceptions), may and must
be conceded to matter.'
Editor : Leibnitz was the first thoroughly to bring to scientific
consciousness ' force ' or power as an essential element of matter.
[19] Only Ideas.
Berkeley, § 9 : ' Are only ideas. '
Ueberweg : ' The
" only
" is not proven.'
[20] Matter or Corporeal Substance.
Berkeley, § 9 : ' Hence it is plain (offenbar) that the very notion
(der Begriff) of what is called matter or corporeal substance involves a
contradiction in it.'
Ueberweg : ' This would be plain (offenbar) only in case the un
proved assertion were true, that a figure can be 07tly an
" idea.
"
'The true proposition — that those figures which are in our perceptive
images are something psychical — Berkeley has incorrectly converted
into the proposition that figures exist only in the mind.'
QUALITIES OF MATTER. 345
[21] Extension and Movement.
Berkeley, § 10: 'to reflect (nachzudenken), . . try (erproben), . .
abstraction of thought (Vorstellungszerlegung), . . without all other
sensible (sinnlichen) qualities.'
Ueberweg : ' That extension and movement which is in the per
ceptive image (Wahrnehmungsbilde) can certainly not exist outside of
the mind sundered from the other constituents of the perceptive image.
This requires no argument. The real question is, Is there anything
eke ? — to wit, is there an objective extension existing outside the mind,
with figures and movements which are similar to the subjective ?
That this is impossible Berkeley has affirmed, but has not proved.'
Editor : Much of the difficulty of this question has arisen from the
loose and conflicting senses in which the terms ' similar ' and ' like ' are
used.
Strictly or materially taken, the external objective cannot be Mike'
the subjective, — matter cannot be 'like' a condition of mind, — but
the differences between the mental states produced by different objects
really correspond with, have real analogues in, the objects differing.
With reference to each other, objects have a relative likeness to the
subjective state they produce. A real lion has this sort of likeness to
the mental image of a lion, — it is like the mental lion in a sense in
which an ox or a flower is not. So, too, the picture of a lion is
materially neither like a real lion nor the mental image of a lion, but
it has a relative likeness to both — such a likeness as the picture of an
ox has not.
[22] Qualities of Matter.
Berkeley, § 10 : ' which is acknowledged to exist only in the
mind (Geiste).'
Ueberweg : ' It has already been observed that matter to which the
objectively real extension, figure, and motion belong is not to be con
ceived of as having no other qualities.
' But the nature of these other qualities is not as readily and as surely
known as the nature of the geometrical qualities of matter.
' If they are analogues of our conceptions, they are nevertheless cer
tainly not in our mind, and are not identical with its sensations (sinn
lichen Empfindungen). The questions bearing on this point will not
come up in a methodical discussion until the problems relating to the
primary qualities are solved.'
346 A NN OTATIO NS.
[23] Great and Small.
Berkeley, §11: 'The extension, therefore, which exists without
the mind is neither great nor small, the motion neither swift nor slow;
that is, they are nothing at all.'
Ueberweg : ' This false inference is reached by confounding the
position of scientific observation with that of the popular view. Scien
tific observation shows that great and little are relative conceptions ;
that consequently where no relation exists we can no longer, in the
strict sense, speak of greatness or littleness; from the fact that what
only in this strict sense can be called neither great nor little is to be
taken for something which is neither large nor small in the popular
sense (and consequently where the comparison is complete), the infer
ence is drawn that an extension which is neither great nor little is
"nothing at all.
"
' The fallacy is the same as in the Thesis (which has often been
adduced, and may be justified by the relativity of the notion of poison),
"Aut omnia aut nulla venena,
" with which is linked the inference that
it makes no difference whether we eat bread or arsenic.
'Every real extension is one distinct extension and no other (not at
all, however, as Berkeley immediately after imputes it to the defend
ers of the objectivity,
"extension in general
"). But the notion of
greatness or littleness cannot be applied to it without a comparison
which we ourselves make.
' The same is true of motion. A planet moves around the centre of
its system in a certain path, which, by means of a particular motion
(not
"motion in general
"), can be measured. Whether the motion is
to be called swift or slow depends upon the comparison which we make.
' The motion of Mars, for example, is slow in comparison with the
motion of the earth, but swift in comparison with the motion of
'Uranus ; in itself, not compared with other motions, it is neither swift
nor slow. But this would not justify us in saying
"that as it is in itself
neither swift motion nor slow motion
"// is nothing at all.
"
' The setting aside of antithetical predicates, which apart from com
parison have no meaning, does not set aside the thing itself. N01
indeed is the comparison always a purely subjective one, but in many
cases, and those of the highest scientific importance, it is brought out
in objective connections.'
[24] Unity.
Berkeley, § 12: 'in each instance, it is plain, the unit relates to
some particular combination of ideas arbitrarily (willkiirlich) put to
gether by the mind.' '
COLD AND WARM. 347
Ueberweg : ' The mind proceeds not arbitrarily, but in conformity
with objective relations, when it considers three persons or three trees
as three entities, and not as ten or twenty cubic unities, the size of each
of which is taken into consideration.
' Number as number is a structure of the mind which summarizes what
is homogeneous ; but the unity of measure is only in certain cases
and in a certain degree arbitrary. So far as individuals exist it is object
ively grounded.'
[25] Unity: Locke.
Berkeley, § 13: 'all the ways of sensation and reflection (der sinn
lichen und inneren Wahrnehmung).'
Ueberweg : ' Locke says (Ess. on H. U., n. xiii. 26),
"There is not
any object of sensation or reflection (sinnlichen und inneren Wahrneh
mung) which does not carry with it the idea of one.
" He maintains
(do., 11. xvi. 1) that no idea is so simple as that of unity, and that it is
most intimately interwoven with all our thoughts. This proposition
of Locke is here controverted by Berkeley.'
[26] Cold and Warm.
Berkeley, § 14: 'the same body which appears cold to one hand
seems warm to another.'
Ueberweg : ' This argument (as Berkeley himself grants) is not in
itself sufficient to prove that there is no particular grade of caloric in
the external object itself, — a grade which may be ascertained objectively
by the thermometer. The argument does no more than bring before us
the obvious fact that the expressions
"hot
" and
"cold,
" as they involve
a comparison with the grades of warmth in parts of our body, cannot be
used without a subjective reference. We cannot, therefore, just
"as
well,
" but rather can just
" as little
" infer that there is no particular
figure and no particular extension belonging in every case to the external
object involved. The conclusion, however, that the sensation of
warmth cannot be an image of an objective quality of caloric, while
yet the perception of a form can be an image of the perceived form of
the external object, rests upon different premises.
' All the qualities of sensation can be excited by processes of motion.
These latter must as such be objective, for otherwise the presupposition
of an objective causal (nexus), a thing established by all the results of
physical investigation, falls away with them. See (45).'
348 A NN OTATIO NS.
[27] Substance.
Berkeley, § 17 : 'but the idea of being (Wesens, eines Etwas, eines
Seienden) in general (iiberhaupt), together with the relative notion
(Begriff) of its supporting (Tragens) accidents.'
Ueberweg: 'Locke (H. Und.,n. xii. 3-6) reduces complex ideas
(zusammengesetzten Vorstellungen) to three classes: 1. Modes (Acci
dentien), 2. Substances, 3. Relations (Verhaltnisse). Under modes or
accidents he understands ' ' complex ideas which contain not in them
the supposition of subsisting by themselves (fiir sich bestehend), but are
considered as dependencies on or affections of substances
" inhering in
certain substances.
'
" The ideas of substances ,
" says Locke,
"are such combinations of
simple ideas (Vorstellungen) as are taken to represent distinct particular
things subsisting by themselves
" (fiir sich bestehende). The
"relation
consists in the comparing one idea (Vorstellung) with another.
"
'
"Under accidents,' 1 '' says Locke (H. U., 11. xiii. 19),
" is understood
a sort of real beings that needed something to inhere in,
" — something
real, which of necessity presupposes some other thing in which it sub
sists. ' ' Substance is that which supports accidents, ' ' — their substratum.
He adds,
" Of substance we have no idea what it is, but only a con
fused, obscure one of what it does. ' '
"The idea of substance we neither
have nor can have by sensation or reflection (aussere innere Wahrneh
mung) (1. iv. 18); it is furnished to us only by the constant association
of certain simple ideas. As we are unable to conceive how these can
subsist in themselves, we are accustomed to suppose some certain
substratum wherein they do subsist and from which they do result ;
which, therefore, we call substance' (H. U., 11. xxiii. 1).
' Only the constant combination of properties is given to us; the
nature of substance is hidden from us (do. do., 3-6).
'
" He has the perfectest idea of any of the particular sorts of sub
stances who has gathered and put together most of the simple ideas
which do exist in it
" (do. do., 7).
' It is true Locke would have been more logical, without, however, on
that account by any means reaching Berkeleyanism, if he had rejected
as an empty fiction the conception of substance as a something distinct
from qualities, and had acknowledged only the reciprocal combination
of qualities as real. As he, however, regarded this inference (sub
sequently drawn by Hume) as doubtful, he confined himself to charac
terizing as dark and of little use the idea of substance as something
distinct from all qualities.
IDEAS AS OBJECTS. 349
' In the Platonic Aristotelian view of material substance extension is
embraced.
' By Berkeley's negation of the existence of extension extra mentem
the notion of material substance is, as he justly says, also taken away ;
but the converse is by no means true, that the negation of that dark
something necessarily involves the negation of the objective reality of
extension.'
[28] Ideas as Objects.
Berkeley, § 18: 'Reason (Denken), Sensations (Sinnesempfind
ungen), immediately perceived by sense (unmittelbar sinnlich wahr
genommen werden) : but they do not inform us that things exist
without the mind, or unperceived, like to those which are perceived.'
Ueberweg: 'We have here again a return to the terminology which
has already been objected to, in which
"ideas
" are designated as the
objects of knowledge and of sense-perception; indeed, as
"the objects
immediately perceived. ' '
' In fact, ideas are only objects of contemplation in internal percep
tion ; that is, in reflection on an internal psychical image.
' Berkeley is indeed so far entirely right that it is actually only these
complexes of sensation (perception) which are immediately in our
consciousness ; the reference of them to the corresponding external
objects takes place by means of an accessory primitive thinking, which
presupposes partly nearer, partly more remote analogues of our own
existence, of which we know by internal perception on occasion of
those complexes of sensation, and indeed as the external causes of
them ; the perception (sight, touch, etc.), to the extent to which it is
more than mere sensation, already involves that primitive act of
thinking.
' But the complexes of sensation, though alone immediately in our
consciousness, are not therefore necessarily the immediate object of
sense-perception, to wit, if they be at all not the object but the means
of it; our attention, in the case of the complexes of sensation, is
directed entirely to the external things manifested to us through them ;
the external thing is that which I see, handle, perceive.
' The complexes of sensation are, as such, late in becoming the object
of psychological reflection.
' The act of thinking which enters into the sense-perception itself,
and forms a constituent part of it, is an elementary one, through which,
it is true, the existence of external objects is known ; but the distinction
is by no means yet consummated, which shows what constituents of
the complex of sensation correspond in a fuller and what in a more
3 50 A NNO TA TI O NS.
restricted measure with the particular nature of their objects; this dis
tinction (which Descartes and Locke have in the main correctly carried
through) only takes place as the product of a far-advanced scientific
penetration.'
[29] Materialists.
Berkeley, § 18: 'The Materialists.'
Ueberweg : ' That is, those who hold to the existence of a matter
external to the mind, — defenders of the doctrine of matter.'
[30] Dreams.
Berkeley, § 18 : ' With all the ideas.'
Ueberweg : ' With all ? In accordance with the order of natural
laws, assuredly not !
' Consequently no more follows than what is beyond doubt, aside from
the facts here urged by Berkeley, that the inference as to the existence
of external objects is in certain cases deceptive, and that the condi
tions under which the inference holds good must be ascertained. The
images in dreams and visions would not be possible without antecedent
affections made through actual external objects ; they are the result of
a reproduction and metamorphosis of the presentations furnished by
memory. If Berkeley's argument held good, the existence of other
persons — which can also be dreamed of — would, equally with the ex
istence of
"unthinking objects,
" be taken away. The weakness of the
argument is shown in its proving too much. '
[31] Materialists.
Berkeley, §19: 'The Materialists.'
Ueberweg : ' Here appears yet more clearly than above (29) that
Berkeley uses the term
"Materialist
" in a sense different from the
received one.
'The ordinary meaning of
" Materialist
" is one who believes that
nothing exists but material substance. Berkeley applies it to all who
hold that material substances exist, although at the same time they may
hold to the existence of spiritual substances.'
[32] Intercourse.
Berkeley, § 19 : 'And serve to no manner of purpose.'
Ueberweg : ' They serve at least to render possible, in a manner
conformed to natural laws, the intercourse between intellectual beings,
if indeed the very possibility of the existence of conscious being be not
conditioned through them.
A POSTERIORI. 351
'Language is the medium through which thought is imparted. Grant
that the word spoken by me can exist only in certain ideas linked to
my thoughts, which ideas, like the word itself, exist purely in the
mind ; and grant that the air itself exists only as the complex of ideas
in illocal essence or spirits, yet it would still be inconceivable why
similar ideas should be aroused by that word in the mind of another
who is near me (the nearness itself cannot be one of a local kind, on
this system), and still less would it be intelligible how a writing, long
after the death of its author, could continue to produce the same kind
of effects.
'All conformity to law would be the mere association of ideas in the
individual subject ; for all relations between persons we must have
recourse to the immediate or miraculous working of the divine Omnipo
tence. But if outside of the mind of the person who speaks or who
writes, and of the mind of the hearer or reader, the air and other
material media have an existence, the intermediation can be explained
by physics and the other natural sciences in a manner which cannot
be contemptuously set aside.
'It is true that something still remains unexplained; but the path
to the explanation is broken, and the difficulty made so prominent by
Berkeley is diminished, if we do not regard matter and spirit as so
utterly heterogeneous as Descartes and even Locke, and their cotem
poraries, have done.
' The view of Berkeley, on the other hand, removes all possibility
of an explanation based upon natural science.'
[33] Dreaming.
Berkeley, § 20: 'That you can possibly have for believing the
same thing. '
Ueberweg : ' Undoubtedly ; and in dreaming we actually have the
very belief without any grounds for it. But the supposition that waking
is but dreaming with open eyes can only be carried through by the
removal of all objective order of nature, of everything which goes
beyond the bare association of ideas in the individual subject.'
[34] A Posteriori.
Berkeley, § 21 : 'Arguments a posteriori.'
Ueberweg: '
"Arguments a posteriori
" in the old Aristotelian Scho
lastic sense of the term, according to which the argumentation a priori
(to wit, ad posterius) implies the inference from the cause, as that
which in its nature is earlier (tpvvei -porepov) to the operation or effect,
352 ANNOTATIONS.
or that which in nature is later (<puau Zaxspov), while the argument a
posteriori (to wit, ad prius natura) implies the inference from the opera
tions or effects to the cause, — the inference from the <poaei uarepov to the
<fUft£l TipOTtpOV.
' In the inference a posteriori, the later (the operations) is, according
to natural sequence, the nearer to us (nporepov npbq ^/Jtac), or that which
is earlier and more easily recognizable by us, — yvcupt/jLcurepov 7j/mv, — from
whence we go back to the earlier, — the Causes ; we argue in this case
regressively, while in the a priori (ad posterius) we argue progress
ively. For the use of the terms a priori and a posteriori which has
reference to the Course of Argumentation, Kant, partly following
Hume and others, has substituted a completely heterogeneous use.
According to Kant's use the distinction of a priori and a posteriori is
referred to the judgment as such ; by knowledge a posteriori he means
the knowledge derived from experience, empirical ; by knowledge a
priori, the knowledge (erroneously assumed by him as possible and
actual) which we have apart from experience.'
[35] Extended Substance.
Berkeley, §22: 'If you can but conceive it possible for one ex
tended moveable substance, or, in general, for any one idea.'
Ueberweg : ' The subsumption of
" extended moveable substance,
"
under the term
" idea,
" already implies the Berkeleyan doctrine. The
opponent of the view must consequently challenge this questionable
position itself, and must refuse to concede what it tacitly assumes.
Nego suppositum. As Berkeley here, however, simply repeats his
former positions, we could do no more than repeat our former objec
tions, which is unnecessary.'
[36] External Things.
Berkeley, § 23 : 'Which is a manifest repugnancy.'
Ueberweg : ' The existence of external things without my thinking
of them can very well be granted, but my consciousness that external
things can exist is not possible, unless I am thinking of these very things.
The periods of the formation of the earth, during which there were
no living creatures, have existed without being perceived by men ; but
we can know or conjecture that they existed, in no other way than by
having them in our thought. Berkeley does not separate the two
things. While the Opponent, whom he supposes to present himself,
directs his reflection only to the existence of the external object,
Berkeley makes this very reflection of the thinking subject upon the
THINGS IN THEMSELVES. 353
object the starting-point of his argument, and in the abstraction of
the object from the subject, made by the Opponent, does not follow
him. Berkeley is undoubtedly right in maintaining that the possibility
of performing this abstraction does not in itself demonstrate that things
in themselves exist ; but he is not justified in maintaining that this
possibility does not exist, because we, when we reflect upon it, do then
certainly (in addition) think about the Things.'
[37] Representation.
Berkeley, § 23 : ' Though at the same time they are apprehended
by (vorgestellt) or exist in itself?'
Ueberweg : • Not the things, but only a representation (Vorstellung)
of them, exists in me, just as, when I think of a psychical being dis
tinct from myself, it is not this being, but a representation of it, which
exists in me.'
[38] Things in themselves.
Berkeley, § 24 : ' Those words mark out either a direct contradic
tion or else nothing at all.'
Ueberweg : ' The alleged contradiction, as we have before shown,
does not exist.
'Were there such contradiction, there would be equally a contra
diction in supposing that there was a time previous to my own exist
ence. For to suppose this I must think of that time ; it is consequently
in me ; consequently it does not exist without me, or outside of me ;
consequently not before my existence : for that anything should be in
me, without myself being, is a palpable contradiction.
' The solution of Berkeley's argument is the same as that of the paral
ogism just given. I think of the past now as I now generate an image
of it in me, — not the past itself, but an image of it, is now in me ;
but the past itself has existed without me. I cannot know that it has
existed without me without (now in addition) thinking of it ; but it
can have existed, and has existed, without this thinking of mine.
' In the same way, things which exist in themselves are thought of by
me when I generate in me an image, more or less accurate, of them :
the things themselves are not in me, but this image of them is in
me ; but they themselves exist independently of my image. I cannot
know that they exist in themselves without thinking of them, but they
can exist, and many of them do, in fact, exist, indubitably, without
this thinking of mine. The objection made by Berkeley is brought
up again by Fichte, who denies Kant's assumption of ''Things in
themselves
" (Dingen an sich). The same thing is done by Reinhold
23
354 A NN0 TA TIONS.
Hoppe. In his work on the Sufficiency of the Empirical Method
in Philosophy (
" Zulanglichkeit des Empirismus in der Philosophic,
"
Berlin, 1852), he argues for a doctrine allied to that of Berkeley.
Hoppe shapes his statement in this form, — that the opposition be
tween Actuality and Cognition involves a contradiction, for in as far
as Actuality is discussed, investigated, brought into contrast, so far
is it thought of; from which he infers that everything we affirm of
it relates, in fact, only to our own thinking.
' The objection, however, in this mode of conception, is that it
involves a mingling of two grades of thinking, — to wit, that in which
thinking is simply concerned with the truth (meaning that there is a
harmony of our subjective apprehension with the objective Actuality ;
as, for example, the harmony of our apprehension of the assassination
of Caesar with the assassination as it actually occurred), and that in
which it is concerned with our insight into the essence of the truth.
Our notion of objective actuality belongs only to the second grade (in
its antithesis to the subjective apprehension). To this grade, too,
exclusively belongs the notion of cognition, and it is a matter of
course that we cannot have these notions without thinking them. It
is the first grade, indeed, which alone enables us to account for the
second ; and in connection with this first grade we have to do merely
with the existence of that harmony, not with our knowing of its
existence ; and in this it is not our thinking of the Actuality, but the
Actuality itself, which is determinative, — that is to say, the thing
which exists or which has happened, which is not dependent on my
knowledge of it (or is, in other words,
" the thing in itself
" —
" an sich
ist
"), but which conditions my knowing.'
Editor : It can exist without my knowing it, but I cannot know it
without its existing.
[39] Incitement of Ideas.
Berkeley, § 25: 'or pattern of any active being, as is evident
from § 8.'
Ueberweg : ' The argument in § 8 has already been met. The
inactivity of ideas is by no means established by self-observation : the
association of ideas testifies to exactly the opposite. The supposition
that our ideas are incited by external objects has not been proven false
by Berkeley.
' It is indeed false to suppose such a relation between mind and the
external world as imputes all the activity to the external world and
considers the mind as a passive substratum, like a writing-tablet or a
SOLIPSISM. 355
piece of wax ; but just as false is the opposite theory, which claims all
activity for the mind exclusively. The expression
" incitement
" (Anre
gung) or
"affection
" marks the actual relation most accurately
[40] Substance.
Berkeley, § 27: 'only by the effects which it produceth.'
Ueberweg : 'Locke says (Hum. Und., 11. xxiii. 5),
" the operations
of the mind, viz., thinking, reasoning, fearing, etc., ... we concluding
not to subsist- of themselves, nor apprehending how they can belong to
body, or be produced by it, are apt to think them the actions of some
other substance, which we call Spirit.
"
' According to Locke, we think of Spirit as the substratum of activi
ties which we perceive in our own (psychical) internal nature, as we
conceive of bodies as the substratum of qualities which affect our
senses.
' We have, according to Locke, no distinct idea either of corporeal
or of spiritual substance, but can on this account no more deny the
existence of one than of the other.
' Berkeley denies corporeal substance in behalf of spiritual substance ;
but at a later period Hume denied both, or, at least, declared them
equally doubtful, and adopted a self-dependent subsistence of concep
tions in their reciprocal connection.
' Kant explained the notion of substance as an original notion of the
understanding, which, just because of this its subjective origin, is
applicable only to phenomenal objects, which are in our consciousness.
By this view the skepticism is not confuted, but rather strengthened.
In fact, we form the notion of substance on the ground of the knowl
edge of ourself (in virtue of internal perception), as of an individual,
by transferring the notion thus formed to personal and impersonal
objects.'
[41] Subject.
Berkeley, § 27 : 'of its supporting or being the subject (zu tragen
oder ihr Substrat zu sein).'
Ueberweg : '
"Subject
" in the ancient Aristotelian Scholastic sense
(d-nozeifxtvov, substratum).'
[42] Solipsism.
Berkeley, § 27 : 'Though it must be owned at the same time that we
have some notion (Begriff ) of soul, spirit, and the operations of the
mind (den psychischen Thatigkeiten), such as willing, loving, hating,
inasmuch as we know or understand the meaning of these words.'
Ueberweg : ' Whether our consciousness of the psychical should be
356 A NNO TA TIONS.
designated by the term
"idea
" or
"notion,
" is rather a question of
verbal than of practical interest. It is worthy of remark, however, that
if we propose to designate the
" notions
" of the mind in regard to other
minds and their operations, as objects of cognition, in the manner in
which Berkeley in the case of sense-perception designates
"ideas
" as
the objects perceived, using in part the same arguments on which he has
grounded the conclusion that we know only our own ideas, and not
bodies, which are external to our mind, it would warrant the inference
that we know only our own
"notions
" of spirits, and not spirits them
selves, which have an existence outside of our own. Berkeley's argu
ments would lead to the acceptance of the sole existence of the person
arguing, — to what is called
"theoretic Egoism,
" or
"Solipsism,
" — and
as it proves too much must be faulty.'
[43] Senses.
Berkeley, § 29 : ' But whatever power I may have over my own
thoughts, I find the ideas actually perceived by Sense have not a like
dependence on my will.'
Ueberweg : 'Locke, in his
"Essay concerning Human Under
standing,
" treats in Book iv. chap. xi.
"of our knowledge of the ex
istence of other things,
" external to us. He supposes that we are
compelled to trust our senses, which give us notice of the existence of
other things, by which the senses are affected. No man can be so skep
tical as to doubt of the existence of these things (do., § 3). Among
the grounds of conviction he reckons also the circumstance which
Berkeley here mentions, that when our eyes are open we cannot avert
the entrance of the ideas (Vorstellungen) which sun and light occasion
in us. Locke draws the inference (§5) that the thing which evokes in
me ideas of this or that kind must be the impression of an external
object affecting my senses. In place of this cause Berkeley substitutes
the immediate operation of Deity on our souls.'
[44] Activity and Passivity.
Berkeley, § 28 : 'When in broad daylight I open my eyes — '
' There is, therefore, some other Will or Spirit that produces them.'
Ueberweg : ' If our spirit is susceptible of an operation, through
which another being calls forth ideas in it, it follows that it is not in
its own nature a perpetually active being, but is also capable of pas
sivity. It is worth giving prominence here to the fact that by this
view the distinction between Activity and Passivity is shown to be a
relative one.'
CAUSALITY. 357
[45] Laws of Nature.
Berkeley, § 30 : ' Now the set rules or established methods wherein
the mind we depend on excites in us the ideas of sense, are called the
laws of nature.'
Ueberweg : ' From the position of Berkeley, an order conformable
to the laws of nature, inasmuch as he interprets this as the order of our
own ideas, may be maintained ; but no laws of nature can be actually
demonstrated, so that by them we can explain the natural phenomena.
If, for example, the course of the planets is to be explained, that is, re
ferred to laws universally holding good, it is impossible to do so by
merely taking into account our own perceptions in their mutual rela
tions. For in these perceptions, if they be regarded in themselves, a
precise fixed order does not reveal itself. Such an order can only be
found if we suppose a causality which limits the subject (in the act of
seeing) with material objects external to the subject, to wit, the heavenly
bodies, which carry on their movements in consonance with the laws
of gravitation, the laws which Newton discovered. They carry them
on, not within our consciousness, but independently of it, and did
carry them on probably long before human consciousness existed,
though we are able to develop our consciousness supplementally
concerning them. It is not this supplemental consciousness which
works upon our eyes, but the real external course of the planets.'
[46] Causality.
Berkeley, §31: 'This gives us a sort of foresight, . . . and a
grown man no more know how to manage himself in the affairs of life
than an infant just born.'
Ueberweg : ' Locke says (Hum. Und., B. 11. xxvi. 1) :
"In the notice
that our senses take of the constant vicissitude of things, we cannot but
observe that several particular, both qualities and substances, begin to
exist, and that they receive this their existence from the due application
and operation of some other being. From this observation we get our
ideas of cause and effect. ' ' He gives as an example that in the sub
stance we call wax, fluidity is constantly produced by the application
of a certain degree of heat ; we call fluidity therefore the effect and heat
the cause. Locke concedes that, in this, the manner in which cause
brings forth effect remains unknown.
'Berkeley's theory of cause and effect is an application, in the most
subjective shape, of this doctrine of Locke. Hume's sceptical Reflec
tions on the Notion of Cause, which he traces to our habitually finding
358 A NNO TA TIONS.
certain perceptions linked with certain others, found here a point of
connection, as his sceptical reflections found their point of attachment
in sections xvi., xvii., and xxvii. In the internal perception of our will
and of the effort we make in overcoming obstacles, Reid and some
others of the Scotch school found the solution of our notion of causality,
and among French thinkers Maine de Biran adopted this view. Kant
on the contrary regarded this notion and that of substance as a primary
notion, originally immanent in the mind,
"a category.
" With this
view he imagined that he had vanquished the scepticism of Hume,
while in fact he had only promoted the extremest subjectivism, — a
subjectivism which soon emerged in Fichte's doctrine of the Ego, but
shifted round into the objectivism of Schelling, which objectivism in
turn has led to new attempts at solution. Adhuc sub judice lis est.'
[47] Causal Connection.
Berkeley, § 32: 'Perceiving (wenn wir wahrnehmen) the motion
(die Bewegung) and collision (Zusammenstoss) of bodies to be attended
with sound, we are inclined to think the latter the effect (Wirkung) of
the former.'
Ueberweg : ' Here again holds good what was observed before, that
the Causal Connection, if it be apprehended as merely the order estab
lished by God in the ideas which are in the subject, can merely be
asserted, not actually demonstrated and formulated. But if the Causal
Connection be associated with the external things, it is explained in
conformity with mathematical mechanical laws. For example, the
union of collision with sound is explained by the displacement con
nected with the visible motion of bodies in the motions of the minute
parts of body.'
[48] Prejudice.
Berkeley, § 34 : 'It will be objected that by the foregoing princi
ples all that is real and substantial in nature is banished out of the
world, and instead thereof a chimerical scheme of ideas takes place.'
Ueberweg : 'Berkeley has only too much to justify him in believing
that the first objections urged against a theory which departs from the
current opinion will be of the kind he here describes. As children
are wont to say No, when anything is demanded of them which they
have not themselves imagined or desired, so adults thrust away what is
strange to them, simply because it is strange. They cry out that it is
odd and absurd, while the only real question is whether it is asserted
EATING AND DRINKING IDEAS. 359
on sufficient grounds. Berkeley's task is easy enough with this class
of objections; there is another class which has more weight.'
[49] Reality'.
Berkeley, § 36: 'If any man thinks this detracts from the existence
or reality of things, he is very far from understanding what hath been
premised in the plainest terms I could think of.'
Ueberweg: 'As Locke, who (iv. xi. 8) characterizes the negation
of the corporeal world as a view according to which
"all we see and
hear, feel and taste, think and do, during our whole being, is but the
series and deluding appearances of a long dream, whereof there is no
reality. ' ' '
[50] Substance.
Berkeley, § 37: 'If it (substance) be taken in a philosophic sense
for the support (Trager) of accidents or qualities (Eigenschaften) with
out the mind, then indeed I acknowledge that we take it away, if one
may be said to take that away which never had any existence, not even
in the imagination (blossen Vorstellung).'
Ueberweg : ' The two questions are not identical, whether there be
extended things without our minds, and whether there be substance
which is the support of qualities. It is not true that Berkeley simply
contests the second supposition, and is on other points in unison with
the common view. The existence of extension, figure, magnitude, and
impenetrability, and also of gravitation and of forces in general, with
out the percipient mind, is the very essence of the question. Locke's
notion of substance can be denied without denying that existence
without the percipient mind. He who denies this existence denies
indeed of necessity, at the same time, the notion of corporeal sub
stances, but not merely this. To this add that Berkeley himself
acknowledges spiritual substances as the supports of the inherent.'
[51] Eating and Drinking Ideas.
Berkeley, § 38: 'It sounds very harsh to say, we eat and drink
ideas, and are clothed with ideas. I acknowledge it does so, — the
word idea not being used in common discourse to signify the several
combinations of sensible qualities which are called things. 1
Ueberweg : ' Were this the only ground, it would sound less harsh
to say that we eat and drink sense-perceptions. The true ground is
that the things we eat and drink are things existing without our con
sciousness (in themselves), and are not ideas in the mind of the per
cipient subject, and are regarded as such by the non-philosophic also.
360 A NN OTATIO NS.
The theory of Berkeley does not deviate from the ordinary use of
language merely, but from the conviction which lies at the root of this
usage. To be sure, this is no proof that Berkeley's theory is not right;
but the deviation is unmistakable.
' Berkeley himself not only acknowledges that he deviates from the
ordinary use of language, but subsequently (§ 39, with which compare
the beginning of § 56) acknowledges his deviation from the common
supposition on which the usage of language rests. With this is not in
consonance the assertion made in § 35, and frequently elsewhere,
"the
only thing whose existence we deny is that which philosophers call
matter or corporeal substance.
" Berkeley's assertion, moreover, that
we eat and drink ideas, is not only opposed to the usage of language
and the common presuppositions on which that usage rests, but to
Berkeley's own position, which is at once necessary on the one side
and untenable on the other. Nothing of the colour and taste of the
apple or of wine enters into the stomach, — the stomach neither sees
nor tastes ; the processes of assimilation run through their normal
course with scarcely any recognition on the part of consciousness.
How, consequently, can
"ideas,
" or sensations, or sensible qualities, be
eaten ? The chemical processes which science has gradually, in part,
discovered, are known only in their effects. So long as they are
unperceived, they are upon the one side, according to Berkeley's
principles, nothing, and on the other side, as they are associated with
operations, they are something, — which is a complete contradiction.
Consequently, the negation of things which exist without the con
sciousness (and of whose existence we can only gradually attain a con
sciousness) is untenable. See the note on § 52.'
Editor: Schulze, 1 who rejects Berkeley's view, says, 'The system
seems ludicrous only because our modes of speech and of thought are
not in conformity with it.' It may be said, however, that the language
which Berkeley uses is not self-consistent, for the eating is as ideal as
the thing eaten. We have the eating-idea of the apple-idea, the
dressing-idea of the raiment-idea. The relation in Berkeley is not
that of an objective act brought to bear on an ideal thing, but of ideal
on ideal. On the other hand, if the idea is the thing, the idea is the
apple, the idea is the eating. Strictly speaking, the apple of Berkeley
is not the idea of an apple, but is an idea-apple ; the eating is not the
idea of eating, but is the idea-eating. Berkeley himself falls into
the trap of the every-day formulary in the first part of the phrase.
As he defines reality, the idea-eating of the idea-apple is a real eating
1 Grundr. d. philosoph. Wissenschaft, 2 v., 1788, i. 23.
THE SENSORIUM.
361
of a real apple ; but this makes our psychical activity depend on God
as much as our psychical passivity, and overthrows the infallibility of
cur consciousness to our own mental acts. My idea that I am eating
is not a mere sense-impression, but a consciousness of will.
[52] Testimony of the Senses.
Berkeley, § 40 : ' But, say what we can, some one perhaps may
be apt to reply, he will still believe his senses, and never suffer any
arguments, how plausible soever, to prevail over the certainty of them.'
Ueberweg : 'Compare Locke, iv. xi. 3:
"This is certain, the
confidence that our faculties do not herein deceive us is the greatest
assurance we are capable of concerning the existence of material beings.
. . . Our senses do not err in the information they give us of the
existence of things without us, when they are affected by them.
"
' He says further (§8),
"the certainty of things existing in rerum
natura, when we have the testimony of our senses for it, is not only as
great as our frame can attain to, but as our condition needs.
" '
[53] Fire and the Idea of Fire : Locke.
Berkeley, § 41 : 'if you suspect it to be only the idea of fire which
you see, do but put your hand into it and you will be convinced with
a witness.'
Ueberweg: 'Locke (iv. xi. 7):
"He that sees a fire may, if he
doubt whether it be anything more than a bare fancy, feel it too
" ; (§ 8) :
" if our dreamer pleases to try whether the glowing heat of a glass
furnace be barely a wandering imagination in a drowsy man's fancy,
by putting his hand into it he may perhaps be wakened into a certainty
greater than he could wish.
" '
[54] The Sensorium.
Berkeley, § 42 : 'In a dream we do oft perceive things as existing
at a great distance off, and yet, for all that, those things are acknowl
edged to have their existence only in the mind.'
Ueberweg : ' It must undoubtedly be acknowledged that all the
perception-images which are outside the perception-image of our own
body are by no means on that account without our mind. But this
does not forbid that there should be without the entire sphere of the
perception-images those real objects which affect our senses, and that
there should be organs of sense which are affected, from which organs,
by means of the sensible nerves, the affections are conveyed to the
central parts, in which we are to look for the seat of the sensorium
362
ANN OTA TIONS.
commune, and the seat consequently, also, of the perception-images
themselves. The following figure may be of service in elucidating the
statement just made :
' AB is the external object ; ba is the image of AB in the right and
in the left eye ; b'a! is the image of AB in the sensorium commune ;
Od is the right eye ; Os is the left eye ; C is the brain (linear, half the
natural size) ; od, os, c, the represented (vorgestellten) places of the
right and left eye and of the brain.
' The sensorium lies within the real brain C, but within the sensorium,
in addition to images of the rest of objects, lie the images of our eyes,
of our head, of our retina, of our optic nerves, and of the brain itself,
so far as we know them by anatomy; it is a mistake to seek the objects
here.'
[55] 'New Theory of Vision.'
Berkeley, § 43 : ' The consideration (Erwagung) of this difficulty
it was that gave birth to my Essay towards a New Theory of Vision
(Sehens), which was published not long since.'
Ueberweg : '
"An Essay towards a New Theory of Vision' ' appeared
1709. In this Essay Berkeley maintained that we do not estimate the
remoteness of the object by the
"optic axes,
" or the lines from the two
eyes to the object seen, and the angle which they form with each other
by their concurring at the object.
' In defence of this opinion he advanced three arguments :
'1, We do not perceive these lines and angles, and yet our estima
tion of distance can only rest on what is perceived.
1 2. These lines and angles have no real existence in nature, but are
merely a geometrical hypothesis (Voraussetzung).
'NEW THEORY OF VISION: 363
'.3. Though we should grant their real existence, and that it is
possible for the mind to perceive them, they would yet be insufficient
to explain the phenomena of distance.
' In accordance with the clearness or confusion of the perceptions of
colours, and in accordance with other changes which associate them
selves with certain sensations of touch (Tastempfindungen), the person
seeing judges in regard to distances, judges, consequently, on the
ground of experience.
' From this Berkeley draws the conclusion that if a person born blind
should recover his sight by an operation, he would at first have no idea
of distance, and that sun and stars, and all the remotest objects,
equally with the nearest,
"would all seem to be in his eye, or rather in
his mind.
" (Essay, § 41.) This supposition of Berkeley's has been
confirmed by the fact that persons born blind who have obtained sight
by an operation do not at first know how to estimate distances, but
are obliged to learn to do it gradually. Such persons, also, while they
can distinguish forms from each other, as, for example, a dog from a cat;
are not able at once to connect with them the shapes which had pre
viously become familiar by touch. Berkeley is undoubtedly right in
maintaining that we judge of the third dimension — Depth — only accord
ing to certain signs, though many other signs are to be added to those
which he makes prominent. This judging takes place through that
primary thinking which is performed by virtue of associations involun
tarily arising, a thinking which exercises an essential influence in
shaping the perception-image, — for example, in producing the form of
the firmament. There is another question, however, Whether the
shaping in vision in general rests only in this primary thinking, or
whether a beginning of the shaping already lies in the original sensa
tion (Empfindung) itself. The great physiologist John Muller
( 1 801-185 8) adopted the latter view, as he grants that the superficial
shape of the image on the retina (or of a representation of it within
the sensorium ?) immediately, as such, reaches the consciousness.
' Others, for example Lotze, suppose that no shape as such enters
immediately into the consciousness, but that all apprehension of form
fashions itself in us out of qualitative distinctions ; the theory of the
punctual existence of the soul necessitates this latter assumption ; and
this assumption seems also on its part necessarily to presuppose that
punctual position of the soul, inasmuch as in a soul not punctual there
must of necessity already be some grouping in the Sensations (Empfind
ungen) themselves.
' The ' ' Empiristic (Empiristische) theory' ' represented by Helm-
3 64 A NN OTA TIO NS.
holtz, which aims at reducing all apprehension of form to uncon
scious inferences, must either advance to the doctrine of punctual
position or return to Muller's doctrine. The controversy is still
undecided.'
Editor : Berkeley's New Theory is generally regarded as a discovery.
Such it is in the only sense in which anything intellectual is a discovery:
it is the actualizing and culmination of a series of efforts. There are
hints of the theory in Descartes, dim anticipations of it in Malebranche
(Rech. d. 1. Verite, i., ch. 9), and in Glanville's Scepsis Scientifica
(ch. 5), and a nearer approach in Molyneux's Dioptrics (1690), and in
Locke's Essay (4th ed., 1694), B. 11., ch. ix. § 8.
[56] Constant Creation.
Berkeley, § 45: 'Fourthly, it will be objected (eingewandt) that
from the foregoing principles it follows things are every moment anni
hilated (vernichtet) and created anew.'
Ueberweg : ' This objection to Berkeley's doctrine is well grounded :
the objection is but a special form of the more general one, that the
actual existence of any causality of nature is not compatible with
Berkeley's view. The opening and shutting of the eyes produces in
the same person, at the same place, and at the same time, and accord
ingly under the same psychical conditions, entirely different results
according as long ago a gardener or a carpenter has or has not bestowed
a certain activity on the place which lies before his eyes, according as
a storm or a fire has or has not destroyed the results of that activity.
This can only be explained in conformity with natural laws, if the
results of that activity relate to objects, which exist in themselves with
out the consciousness, experience changes by the labours of certain
persons, or by the operations of external circumstances, and in con
formity with these operate on the senses of other persons. If such
objects are wanting, then there is wanting between the earlier and later
processes the connection established by the laws of nature, and the
sequence of our ideas, which in dreaming is explained by the images
stored in memory and by subjective laws of association, can in our
waking time be explained only by an interference of divine Omnipo
tence at once immediate and without order.'
[57] Existence of an Idea.
Berkeley, § 45 : ' I . . . desire he (the reader) will consider whether
he means anything by the actual existence of an idea distinct from its
being perceived.'
INFINITE DIVISIBILITY. 365
Ueberweg: 'By the actual existence of an idea (perception, or
representation of imagination) certainly not, but by the existence of the
object, through whose operation on us the idea is excited in us.'
[58.]
Berkeley, § 46 : ' Philosophers . . . agree on all hands that light
and colours, which alone are the proper and immediate objects of sight,
are mere sensations (sinnliche Empfindungen), that exist no longer
than they are perceived.'
Ueberweg : ' But that which can excite these sensations continues,
according to the common doctrine, to exist.'
[59.]
Berkeley, do. : ' that things should be every moment creating
... is very commonly taught in the schools. '
Ueberweg : ' This is taught only so far as the subsistence of matter
is regarded as a preservation of it by God, and this — as Augustine had
taught — is compared to a constant creation ; but not in such sense as
to involve an interruption of existence.'
[6o.]
Berkeley, § 48 : ' Though we allow the existence of Matter or Cor
poreal Substance, yet it will follow from the principles which are now
generally admitted that the particular bodies of what kind soever do
none of them exist whilst they are not perceived.'
Ueberweg : ' If, to wit, these bodies be connected with the Berke
leyan subjectivating of magnitude, form, and motion.'
[61.]
Berkeley, do. : ' Hence (from the infinite divisibility of matter) it
follows that there is an infinite number of parts in each particle of
matter which are not perceived by sense. '
Ueberweg: 'To wit, potentially, not actually; that is, matter is
infinitely divisible, but not actually infinitely divided. It lies in the
very nature of infinite division that it shall never be completed, and
that every actual division can be carried yet further.'
[62] Infinite Divisibility.
Berkeley, do. : ' but because the sense is not acute enough to dis
cern them.'
Ueberweg : ■ And because the parts are not actually sundered one
366 A NNO TA TIO NS.
from another into an infinite number, — for even on the Atomistic
theory they are divided only into a very great number, — that rather
only the divisibility is unlimited.'
[63] Sense infinitely acute.
Berkeley, do. : 'that is, the object appears greater.'
Ueberweg : 'This does not necessarily follow, if the parts as they
grow in number diminish in bulk in the same ratio. A
"sense in
finitely acute
" would know the
"infinitely small parts
" as infinitely
small, while our senses cannot pass beyond the ' ' sensible minima. ' ' The
eye, for example, can perceive two points separated, only by means of a
certain extremely minute angle of vision. The microscope does not
change this angle of vision at all, but only allows other points of the
object to form it with our eye.'
[64] Sense infinitely acute.
Berkeley, do. : ' When the sense becomes infinitely acute the body
shall seem infinite.'
Ueberweg : ' Entirely wrong ; because it wholly leaves out of con
sideration the diminution in the size of the parts, which takes place in
inverse proportion to the increase of their number.'
[65] Infinite Extension.
Berkeley, do. : 'is infinitely extended.'
Ueberweg : ' For this assertion not even a show of proof is adduced.'
[66] Intervals of Perception.
Berkeley, § 58: 'or exist not at all during the intervals between
our perception of them.'
Ueberweg : ' This reply to the objection involves the supposition
that one uniform object subsists. But in fact if the being of the object
in itself be set aside, and no existence be ascribed to it beyond that
which it has in individual percipient spirits, what we call a house is
rather a number of houses, each one of which exists in a single percip
ient spirit. Each single one of this multitude is certainly annihilated
and created anew with the closing and re-opening of the eyes. Add
to this that there are frequently intervals during which no one perceives
particular objects. Are we, for instance, to say that the Herculanean
Manuscripts did not exist during the centuries through which they
remained buried, and that God at a later period created them anew ?
The restoration is certainly not to be explained by an order established
SUBSTANCE AND ESSENCE. 367
by natural laws. This order subsists only in case that there is an ex
istence without all (finite) minds during the interval. The existence
in the divine mind cannot explain the permanence of the object, inas
much as this supposition would involve too much, to wit, an eternal
existence of the object, which nevertheless has a beginning and an
end in time ; there must, consequently, be an object distinct from
God's idea of the object, which subsists during the interval in which
no finite spirit perceives it.'
[67] Subject.
Berkeley, § 49 : ' Since extension is a mode or attribute which (to
speak with the schools) is predicated of the subject (Substrat) in which
it exists.'
Ueberweg : 'The term
"subject
" is not used here in the special
sense given it in modern philosophy, as designating merely the sub
stratum of the psychical phenomena. Berkeley uses it in the older
sense, in which it corresponds with the Greek v1zo7.eiiJ.zvov, designating
the substratum in general. It is a term which can also be employed
to designate the grammatical subject in a sentence. This paragraph
shows very clearly how, out of the original use of the word, has
grown on the one side the grammatical sense, and on the other the
prevalent philosophical one.'
[68] Extended Idea.
Berkeley, do. : ' but only by way of idea.'
Ueberweg : 'How an extended
"idea
" can be in an unextended
being is absolutely inconceivable, and is not in the least explained by
Berkeley, or even made plausible. An object may have in it objects
which are red or blue, without at the same time being itself as a whole
red or blue ; but it cannot have extended objects in it without itself
being extended. If the meaning is that the idea of a thing extended
is not itself extended, that would be in part false, in part in conflict
with Berkeley's principles, according to which there is no extended
different from the idea of the extended, but that idea is itself the ex
tended.'
[69] Substance and Essence.
Berkeley, do. : ' but only an explication of the meaning of the
word die.'
Ueberweg : ' The Aristotelians understand by the subject or sub
stratum (vnoy.siiJ.evov) the support of the qualities. By substance (obaia
or zi iffzcv), they meant in addition to this substratum the complex of
368 A NN OTATIO NS.
the essential ; that in virtue of which the thing is what it is, and which
is consequently stated in its definition (6ptaiJ.6q). This essential with
out the substratum is essence abstractly conceived, what Aristotle calls
to ti rjv shat. To the constituents of this essence— the essentialia —
are yet to be added, according to Aristotle and his followers, the
<ru/ij3s/37]x6Ta, the accidentia or modi. These definitions Berkeley rejects.'
[70] Natural Science.
Berkeley, § 50 : 'as might easily be made appear by an induction
of particulars.'
Ueberweg : ' This is an assertion unproven and false. Not a solitary
fact is adduced to support it, and it is in conflict with the entire con
dition of the physical sciences. The mathematico-physical explanation
of the mechanical operations in the stricter sense, of the acoustic and
optical processes, of electricity and of magnetism, rests entirely upon
the supposition that certain movements exist without our minds, which
stand partly in a causal connection with each other, partly so operate
upon our senses as to affect the optic, the auditory, and other nerves ;
and in consequence of these affections there rises in us a consciousness
partly of shapes and movements as such, partly of colours, sounds, et
cetera. And here come in, in a pre-eminent sense, what Berkeley
could not know, as they belong to the most recent scientific discoveries,
the facts that mechanical movements can be transmuted into heat and the
converse, by virtue of the transposition of the movement of entire bodies
into the movement of molecules, and the converse, and in general the
explanation of the transposition of one group of physical phenomena
into another group, in conformity with the laws of the conservation of
force. In what manner the movements result has been differently ex
plained by the physicists in the time of Berkeley and of a later period ;
as, for example, whether the ray of light is to be regarded as the recti
linear progress of a material object or as the transmission of undulatory
movements, in which the material particles have a vibratory motion.
The next assertion of Berkeley is certainly correct, that the operation
of matter on spirit has remained unexplained. The Cartesian theory of
a complete heterogeneousness between the two substances rendered im
possible any attempt at an explanation of the matter which rested upon
the connection of the processes of nature. But the true inference from
this was that the Cartesian philosophy needed a reshaping of principles,
and not that the results of natural science reached by mathematico
mechanical investigations should be despised, or that a new path which
no one had actually struck out should be entered on.'
ASTR ONOMI CAL MO VEMENTS. 369
[71] Occasionalists.
Berkeley, § 53 : ' These men.'
Ueberweg: 'The
"Occasionalists
" Geulinx and Malebranche, who,
proceeding from the Cartesian view of the complete heterogeneousness
of soul and body, denied that a reciprocal operation exists between the
two, and supposed that on occasion of the one process God wrought the
other ; for example, that God takes the occasion of an affection of my
senses to call forth the corresponding perception, and takes the occa
sion of my desire and moves my arm. Bodies can only operate on
bodies, and conceptions can only operate on conceptions (Vorstel
lungen). From occasionalism, and especially from the doctrine of
Malebranche, that we know objects by means of the representation of
their essence in the divine mind, and that we behold, in general, all
things in God, the transition was easy to the Berkeleyan view.'
[72] The Ninth Objection.
Berkeley, § 58: 'Tenthly.'
Ueberweg : 'What has become of the ninth objection? It must lie
in § 56, and §54 should begin,
"In the eighth and ninth place.
" '
Editor: The ninth objection is stated and answered in §§ 56, 57.
[73] Astronomical Movements.
Berkeley, § 58 : 'and appearing in all respects like one of them.'
Ueberweg : ' Berkeley here seems in two respects to lower the sig
nificance of the question. First, with respect to the processes of
movement as such ; secondly, with respect to the forces on which
these processes depend. In the first respect, and still more in the
second, the actual view, taken by the artificial aids which astronomy
calls into its service, the view from a fixed position, has an advantage
of completer truth, as compared with the view from a second position.
This better view Berkeley has not touched. The advantage it presents
is of the same kind as the view that the dancer moves round the room,
has over the view that the room moves round the dancer. The first
theory can only be maintained under distinctly subjective determina
tions ; the second is not bound in the same way to such determinate
conditions, and does not offer itself, therefore, in the same isolated
way, but holds equally good in the main under an infinite diversity of
conditions, and in this very way demonstrates its objective superiority.
If, however, we consider the movements with respect also to the forces
by which they are produced, in conformity with the Newtonian law of
24
370 A NNO TA riO A T S.
gravity, we reach the certainty that only the one view holds good object
ively, that is, is in harmony with the process as it takes place in itself,
in the material world apart from our consciousness of it; for the earth
has not the force to move daily the universe around it, and in addition
give to the sun its annual course. The other conception, on the con
trary, solves the processes by the mathematical mechanical explanation.
See Note 103.'
[74] Order of Nature.
Berkeley, § 59 : 'or any other discoveries in astronomy or nature.'
Ueberweg : ' We can reply to this in a similar manner. The pos
sibility of forming well-grounded anticipations cannot be explained
merely by the laws of the association of ideas, but requires the refer
ence of the Subject to \ normal order of nature, an order which com
prehends objects existent without the Subject.'
[75] Proofs untenable.
Berkeley, § 61 : ' which may be proved a priori.''
Ueberweg : 'Were it not that the
"proofs,
" as we have seen, are
entirely untenable.'
[76] Begging the Question.
Berkeley, do. : ' for it has been made evident.'
Ueberweg : 'As if this proof (given in § 25) did not rest upon the
very supposition which his opponent contests, that figure, etc., can
exist only as an idea in the mind of the Subject.'
[77] Order of Nature.
Berkeley, § 62 : 'the laws of nature.'
Ueberweg: 'This answer of Berkeley's is in itself admirable; it is
the very one which must also be given from the point of view opposed
to his own. But this very answer, run out into its consequences, can
be turned against Berkeley himself. If he made no appeal to an order
conformed to the laws of nature, and if he ascribed to his God an
operation without order, a thing of freak, as it were (as if He were
like Setebos, the god of Caliban's dam, in Shakspeare's Tempest), his
view might perhaps be beyond confutation, though it would be com
pletely unproven and totally destitute of probability. But the moment
he concedes the order of nature his position becomes untenable, as
from it the conformity with natural laws, as we have seen, may indeed
be asserted, but cannot be carried out. If I take my watch to be put in
order, and when I get it back find that it keeps good time, the pro-
THE WA TCH.
371
cesses in my consciousness have been taken for themselves alone, and
manifestly not in connection with the result fixed by the laws of nature.
For, instead of the perception that my watch goes right, which followed
taking it away and returning it, there might just as readily have been
the exactly opposite result ; if, for instance, the watchmaker had been
unskilful or had put the watch into the hands of a bungling workman.
With the conceptions and operations of this workman, however, my
ideas stand in no normal connection, unless this connection be brought
about by an external object, which, from the consciousness of the one
(the workman), experiences effects, and which, when it is afterwards
brought to the other (the owner), produces effects on his consciousness.
But this is the very thing which Berkeley denies. His negation is
consequently untenable.'
[78] The Watch.
Berkeley, § 62 : 'As, also, that any disorder in them be attended
with the perception (Wahrnehmung) of some corresponding disorder
in the movements, which being once corrected all is right again.'
Ueberweg : ' According to this, the irregularity we perceive in the
movement of the hands seems to be the prior and conditioning thing,
and the derangement in the interior of the watch, which, on Berkeley's
principles, does not exist until it is perceived, is the subsequent and
conditional thing; the natural mechanical connection, however, is
exactly the reverse. By what antecedent perceptions or
"signs
" is
the irregularity of the whole conditioned? If, for example, a little
dust, which no one has perceived, has got into the watch and put it
out of order, the result is linked with something unperceived in the in
terior of the watch. This thoroughly unperceived something, of which
not even a dim suspicion exists, is, according to Berkeley, a nothing,
and out of the nothing comes the change in the running of the watch.
But that this, as a thing self-contradictory, is not possible, must, to
adopt Berkeley's way of speaking, be clear to any one who will reflect
even a little. The recognition of the fact, therefore, that nature is
regulated by law, draws with it irresistibly the inference that material
objects exist without the mind. What we see to be true in the com
paratively simple relations of the parts of a watch holds good in a yet
stronger degree in complex organisms, where none of the subtler pro
cesses are perceived, and where they yet are the conditions of processes
which are palpable. Between the perceptions we have, for example,
of the taking of food and drink, and those we have of the growth of
the body, there lie not only certain sensations, but a multitude of pro-
372 A NNO TA TIO NS.
cesses also, which, though not perceived, are not nothing, but must be
acknowledged to be processes which go on without all finite conscious
ness. Of existence in the consciousness of God, we have spoken in
Note 66.'
[79] Miracles.
Berkeley, § 63 : ' otherwise there is a plain reason why they should
fail of that effect.'
Ueberweg : ' It cannot be denied that Berkeley succeeds, by this
reflection, in harmonizing the recognition both of the laws of nature
and of miracles; but it is manifest that in attaining this end he presses
the analogy of the divine education of our race, so as to bring it very
close to the style of thinking natural to a schoolmaster.'
[80] Sign and Link.
Berkeley, § 64 : ' it not (being credible) that He would be at the
expense (Aufwand) (if one may so speak) of all that art and regu
larity to no purpose.'
Ueberweg : ' The difficulty does not lie in the fact that these groups
of ideas come forth at a later period, and that we consequently are also
able to base anticipations on them, but rather in this fact, that they did
not come forth at an earlier period, were not in our consciousness, when
they must yet have served as intermediate links between our earlier and
our later ideas, so that they consequently must have existed before they
existed. This is the contradiction involved, and the solution of it can
hardly be any other than this, that what becomes by degrees better
known — as, for example, the chemical process connected with the act of
digestion — must have previously existed, and consequently have existed
without the consciousness ; in which case it could not have served as a
sign, for that which is unknown to us cannot be a sign to us, but must
have been a link in the chain of mechanical causes. '
[81] Analogues.
Berkeley, § 67 : ' or at the presence whereof God is pleased to ex
cite ideas in us.'
Ueberweg : ' It would have been more correct to proceed in exactly
the opposite way, to drop the negative determinations and to hold fast
to the positive mark extension (by which the question as to the where
is decided ; a question which, from the Berkeleyan position, also exists
in reference to other minds), and at the same time to ascribe to
substances, by whose movements our senses are affected, operativeness,
power, and, indeed (unconscious), analogues of our conscious concep-
THINGS IN THEMSELVES. 373
tions. In a certain respect Leibnitz had struck into this path ; but
Leibnitz supposes each of his
" monads
" to have merely representations
(Vorstellungen) and forces, a place also, but not extension and form.
The view of Herbart is in affinity with that of Leibnitz. Nor is the
view of Spinoza remote from it, so far as with this philosopher we
have in view less the uniform substance than the individual as imma
nent modes of it down to the minutest corpuscles ; in all of which,
according to the fundamental doctrine of Spinoza, in virtue of the
inseparable union of the attributes extension and cogitation, there
must exist, at the same time with size and form, an internal something,
a mode of
" cogitation,
" consequently an analogue of our conceptions.
To the method of Berkeley, which proposed the aggregation of mere
negations, lies nearest that which Kant struck out in his doctrine of
the
"thing in itself.
" The difference is this, that Kant denies exten
sion to the
"things in themselves,
" but does not expressly mention
the existence of the sensitive faculty, though he is inclined to recog
nize it. Kant's view rests on his a priori method, which has been
disputed by Beneke, Ueberweg, v. Kirchmann and others, and in
certain respects by Herbart and his school. Fichte's rejection of
the
"thing in itself
" brings his doctrine very close to Berkeley's;
but Fichte considers the Ego itself as the Producer of the Non-Ego.
The philosophy of Schelling and Hegel throws out the problem en
tirely by objectivating the subjective, etc. ; as, for example, in optics,
by adopting Goethe's theory of colours, in this respect returning to
the simple hypotheses.'
[82] Occasion.
Berkeley, § 69 : ' what is meant by occasion (Veranlassung),— the
agent which produces any effect (Erfolg), or else something that is ob
served to accompany or go before it in the ordinary course of things.'
Ueberweg : ' Not the being observed as accompanying the effect or
as going before it, but the presence of it as the condition of the effect,
is its characteristic. That which is to God the occasion need not in
every case fall into the sphere of our observation. We may also
venture to speak of an occasion where we cannot directly observe it,
but can only in some way reach it by inference.'
[83] Things in themselves and Ideas of God.
Berkeley, § 71 : 'as the notion (Begriff) of matter is here stated
(gefasst) ... in the mind (Geiste) of God, which are so many marks
(Merkmale) or notes (Zeichen) . . . sensations (Sinnesemphndungen)
374 A NN 0TAT10 NS.
. . . tune (Tonstiick) . . . perceive (wahrnehmen) . . . extravagant
(ausschweiffend) . . . senseless (empfindungslose).'
Ueberweg : ' This is the shape which the question assumes on
Berkeley's principles, while those whom he supposes to combat his
views by no means, from their own position, regard of necessity the
"things in themselves
" as ideas of God. The aim of the assumption
is, in fact, rather the very reverse : its aim is to restore between our
earlier and later perceptions a normal causal connection by means of
natural media which exist in themselves, without our mind. The ideas
of God are eternal, the objects of nature are temporal. But even the
doctrine which concedes that the things in themselves are ideas of God,
is by no means as extravagant and baseless as Berkeley would represent
it. The comparison with the musician suggests the idea that God
needs some mnemonic aid, an idea whose inadequacy is instantly felt
by every one ; but it does not follow that the same is true of a hypoth
esis which is built upon a speculation not in regard to God's power,
but in regard to his will, his volition to act in accordance with a
natural order or normal regularity. This order, however, demands
those intermediate links which, as they do not exist in our conscious
ness, must either exist in themselves or in the mind of God. So much,
however, is to be conceded, that as this hypothesis in both forms, in
regard to the
"things in themselves
" or
"ideas of God,
" either dis
regards or explicitly denies order in space, it loses the best part of its
force. For the actual conceivableness of an order of nature links itself
with special tenacity to the order in space reached by mathematical
study. This arrangement, in view of the affections experienced by
our senses, is not merely valid as an order within our consciousness,
but must be recognized as reaching beyond it ; as an order common
to our consciousness and to the things which exist without it.'
[84] Existence external to the Mind.
Berkeley, § 73 : 'to stand in need of a material support (Tragers)
... it follows that we have no longer any occasion to suppose the
being of matter.'
Ueberweg : ' This inference is false. Were it granted that none of
the qualities known to us had an existence without the mind, yet on the
basis of the normal order of nature we would still be justified in in
ferring from the incitation of our sensations that something external to
the mind, some
"thing in itself,
" exists; and the only inference justi
fied on this supposition would be that attributes pertained to it of
which we were ignorant.'
A SOMEWHAT. 375
[85] Consciousness, its External Stimulations.
Berkeley, § 74 : ' being (seienden) . . . What is there on our part
(was fur einen Anhalt haben wir) . . . sensations (Sinneswahrneh
mungen) . . . notions (Begriffen) . . . reflection (Selbst-betrachtung)
inert (tragen) . . . directed (geleitet).'
Ueberweg : 'In Notes 32, 45, 54, 77, and elsewhere, it has been
sh<5wn that our consciousness, in its empirical determination, is not
without distinct external stimulations. In this lies what there is
"on
our part
" to induce us to suppose that there is an
"occasion,
" though
it is not necessarily to be regarded as something absolutely
"inert
"
and heterogeneous to the mind.'
[86] A Somewhat.
Berkeley, § 75 : 'a stupid thoughtless somewhat (JEtwas) ... in
terposition (Einschiebung) . . . forsakes us (uns im Stich lassen) . . .
if anything (wenn iiberhaupt irgend etwas).'
Ueberweg: '
"The things in themselves,
" says Herbart,
"are
not to be banished by reproaches.
" Herbart is right; and this fact
is a proof, not of the power of prejudice, but of the power of sound
reason. But it is not necessary to conceive of
"the things in them
selves
" as a mere incognizable
"somewhat.
" '
[87.]
Berkeley, § 77: ' support (Trager) . . . inert (trage) . . . because
we have not a sense adapted to them (weil wir keinen auf sie einge
ri elite ten Sinn haben).'
Ueberweg : ' The point here made puts into the mouth of the op
ponent a false turn. It is out of place at this point to take refuge in
other possible senses. The right way would be to mark that it would
be hard for us to refer the sensations (sinnlichen Empfindungen) to
their two co-operative causes, the subjective or psychical force and the
external excitant (Reiz), and to apprehend the external purely in ac
cordance with its own nature (Beschaffenheit). He who regards this
as impossible must regard the nature of
"matter,
" or, still better, of
"things in themselves,
" as something completely unknown, and may
yet have good ground, in conformity with the laws of causality, to infer
the existence of this thing unknown. It is, nevertheless, to be noted,
in conformity with what was before said, that the inference is robbed
of some of its force if it be denied that the extension, with the forms
and movements in our sense-perceptions (Sinneswahrnehmungen), is the
376 A AW OTATIO NS.
representation, for the most part faithful and capable of increasing
fidelity, of a homogeneous extension, with its various shapes and
movements, situate without our mind.'
[88] Miracles.
Berkeley, § 84 : ' The same may be said of all other miracles. '
Ueberweg: 'That is, of all the biblical miracles, which alone Berke
ley has in view, and for which his solution is adequate. It is doubtful,
however, whether it would suffice for the miracle of transubstantiation,
maintained by the Catholics, which Berkeley indeed did not believe.
In that miracle substance as such comes directly into consideration,
and is said to be transubstantiated, though the accidents, especially the
taste of bread and wine, remain. This assertion does not seem capa
ble of ready harmonizing with a view according to which we could
only give the designation of substance of bread and wine either to the
mind of the participant or to the unity of the accidents, that is, to their
connection with one another. Yet the difficulty may be met perhaps
if we might understand by substance, not the substratum or support,
but the sum or complex (Inbegriff ) of the essential (Wesentlichen), and
might then say that in the religious act there was an access of Christ's
body and blood, and a union of them with bread and wine, and that
the qualities of the bread and wine as bodily food ceased to be essential
and sank into mere accidents ; so that instead of the earlier substance
there was now another substance present. This explanation would also
allow of a harmony of the Catholic and of the Lutheran doctrine.'
Editor: Ueberweg's harmony of transubstantiation with idealism
turns upon a mere verbal play. Transubstantiation in its own nature
denies that esse is percipi. It has an esse which it is impossible percipi
by the natural powers. What is perceived is not the esse, and the real
esse is entirely unperceived. Berkeley's doctrine is in conflict, also,
with the church doctrine of the incarnation and of the resurrection.
[89] Miracles of two classes.
Berkeley, §84: 'it were an affront to the reader's understanding
to resume the explication of it in this place.'
Ueberweg : ' The objection, so far as the wine is concerned, is
certainly met, in the sense of Berkeley's doctrine and use of words,
by what has been said before ; but Berkeley is not entirely justified in
assuming that the difficulty in regard to the serpent is equally met, for
in the case of the serpent the question involves more than its being
perceived in the vicinity of the spectators, and more than the concep-
OBJECTS OF SENSE. 377
tion of these persons that the snake is possessed of animation. The
question involves the actual animation of the serpent, an animation
existing outside of the consciousness of these persons. The change of
water into wine involves, according to Berkeley, merely the change of
one set of perceptions into another set. But the change of a staff into
a serpent involves this also in part, but in addition to this the trans
mutation of the staff into the soul of the animal, a soul which is also
furnished with perceptions. It is, consequently, a potentiated miracle,
whose special features deserved a separate consideration.- A well
grounded objection to the Berkeleyan principles is nevertheless just as
little to be deduced from this as from the rest of the miracles. In
spite of the judgment of some recent writers to the contrary, it must be
conceded that these principles are in as good harmony with the mira
cles, as they are irreconcilable with a recognition, severely carried
through, of the conformity of nature to law.'
[go] Objects of Sense.
Berkeley, § 86 : ' the one intelligible, or in the mind, the other
real and without the mind.'
Ueberweg : ' It is worthy of note that Kant applies this very term
" intelligible' 1 '' to the
"things in themselves,
" which exist without the
mind of the percipient and thinking subject ; while he holds that the
phenomena, which are in our consciousness merely, are to be accepted
as the things or objects which are empirically real in us. Those phi
losophers, however, who accept a real existence of material things with
out the mind, may very well grant that the forms {IbiaC) of them exist
representatively (abbildlich) in the mind also, — and this is explicitly
taught by the Aristotelians, — but they can only metaphorically give the
title objects of sense to those sense-images which they suppose to have
an existence in the mind, and to
" be immediately perceived. ' ' The use
of this expression readily misleads ; and to speak of a twofold existence
of the
" objects of sense
" would be as preposterous (verkehrt) as if I
were to call my conception (Vorstellung) of the spirit of Csesar the
immediately presented Csesar, and the spirit of Caesar himself the
mediately presented Caesar, and should consistently with this speak
of a twofold existence of Caesar. The objects of sense exist only extra
mentem — without the mind. See Notes 8, 12, 28.'
3/8 A NNO TA TIONS.
[gi] Conformity of the Perceived to the Unperceived.
Berkeley, § 86 : ' How can it be known that the things which are
perceived are conformable (conform) to those which are not perceived,
or exist without the mind (Geistes) ?'
Ueberweg : ' Berkeley here touches upon a real, though by no
means insoluble, difficulty. But, besides this, he need not oppose it in
the exclusive manner in which he has here done it, to the represent
atives of the views which conflict with his own ; for the same difficulty,
though in a narrower compass, also exists if we accept his position, to
wit, in so far as the knowledge of other spirits, outside of the mind of
the cognizant subject himself, is concerned. In the history of states,
of culture, of religions, of the sciences, and similar departments, the
main object is the intellectual life of the time antecedent to our own.
This life may, in fact, have passed completely outside the conscious
ness of the historical investigator, who, as a rule, was not living in
the era in which occurred the events with which he desires to make
himself familiar. His knowledge is true, or has validity in reference
to the reality to be known, so far as it is conformed to that reality. Our
historical apprehension of the Homeric religion, of the Platonic phi
losophy, or of the Arabian astronomy, is true or has objective reality
(or, to speak more accurately, has validity in respect to the reality to
be known, which in this case is an intellectual reality) in as far as it
is conformed to Homer's mode of religious thought, to Plato's specu
lation, to the astronomical conceptions of the Arabians. Here, too,
the question arises, How can I know that my knowledge which is in
my consciousness is conformed to such (intellectual) objects as are not
in my consciousness, but have been in the consciousness of other per
sons centuries ago ? But we must not press these questions here, nor
in reference to the external things which are without our consciousness,
as if they were unanswerable, and as if the theory on which they rest is
absurd. They are to be pressed solely for the purpose of finding an
answer. The assurance of the harmony of my knowledge with the
thing to be known, if this thing lies without my consciousness, can
never be reached directly, by comparison, as I can never pass beyond
the bounds of my own consciousness ; but I can reach it indirectly, by
inferences, which rest upon the presupposition that there is a' causal
nexus linking itself in with my consciousness. See Ueberweg, System
of Logic, §§ 41-44.'
Editor: See additions from Ueberweg's Logic to Note 8. As the
question here raised is perhaps on the whole the greatest which arises
CONFORMITY OF THE PERCEIVED, ETC. 379
in metaphysical speculation, it may be well worth while to give a
synopsis of the entire view of Ueberweg, as presented in his ' System
der Logik :'
' 1. Perception is the immediate cognition of things existing in juxta
position and in succession. External or sense-perception is directed
to the external world ; internal or psychological perception to the
psychical life.
' 2. The immediateness of the cognition in perception is, however,
always merely relative, since in it there are fused, even with the very
activity of the sense, many operations of the mind. These operations,
though they do not enter separately into consciousness, conjointly
condition the total result.
' 3. Perception (Wahrnehmung) is distinguished from simple sensa
tion (Empfmdung) by this, that in sensation consciousness is fixed upon
the subjective condition only, while in perception is involved a refer
ence to something perceived. This percept, whether it*belongs to the
external world or the subject himself, is opposed to the act of percep
tion, as in some respect objective.
' 4. Perception is distinguished from thought (Denken) by its rela
tive immediateness. Thought may, however, be used with a latitude
which makes it embrace perception.
'5. To logic, as the doctrine of cognition, belongs the question,
Whether in sense-perception (sinnlichen Wahrnehmung) things appear
to us as they exist in actziality, that is, as they are in themselves ? To
returning an affirmative answer to this question, is opposed, first of all,
the sceptical argument that the consonance of Perception with Being
would not, even if such a consonance existed, be cognizable ; as the
sense-perception can never be compared with its object, but only with
another perception. The doubt is confirmed when we reflect upon the
essential nature of sense-perception. For as an act of our mind the
perception must either be of purely subjective origin, or in any case
contain in it a subjective element : on either supposition, the theory that
it renders the proper real being of the percept undisturbed and ex
haustively can be sustained only by artificial hypotheses, which it is
difficult to justify. The character of the phenomenal world is, in any
case, conditioned by the subjective nature of our senses. The senses
may be differently constructed in other beings, and may, consequently,
lead to a different sort of sense7intuition of the world. From all these
the actuality as such, as, apart from every particular mode of appre
hending it, it is in itself, that is, the
" Ding an Sich,
" is different.
' 6. Not only can we adjust, on the basis of sense-perception alone,
3 80 A NN OTATIONS.
the proportion in which it is conditioned by what is objective, but we
cannot even at all cognize the existence of the affecting objects. For,
as the perceptions are acts of our own minds, they cannot as such lead
us beyond ourselves. The conviction of the existence of external ob
jects, which affect us, is grounded on the hypothesis of causal relations,
a hypothesis which does not rest upon sense-perception alone.
' 7. The doctrine of the Scotch School (Reid, Beattie, and others),
that
" Common Sense
" reveals immediately the existence of an external
world, and the affiliated doctrine of Jacobi, who claims the same power
for Feeling or Belief, is a fiction, which dispenses with a scientific
foundation.
' 8. Internal or psychological perception, or the immediate cognition
of the psychical acts and images, can apprehend, with material truth,
its objects as they are in themselves. '
Logik, Dritte AufL, §§ 36-41. Ueberweg's development from this
point is given m [8],
[92] Substance.
Berkeley, § 91 : 'an existence independent of a substance, or sup
port (Trager), wherein they may exist.'
Ueberweg : 'Berkeley argues as if the difficulty he urges (§ 16)
against the notion of substance as a
"support
" (Trager) of accidents
involved exclusively the notion of material substance, and were not of
equal and perhaps of higher force against the notion of a spiritual sub
stance. Berkeley says rightfully that in regard to spirit he harmonizes
with the dominant view of substance as a support (Tragerin) of acci
dents ; but he shows neither here nor elsewhere that he rightfully holds
fast to this supposition, and that in this respect his argumentatio ex
concessis is an argumentatio ex concedendis, that his argument from
things conceded is an argument from things that ought to be conceded. '
[g3] Epicureans and Hobbists.
Berkeley, § 93 : ' and supposing (voraussetzen) . . . fatal (verhang
nissvollen) . . . impulse (Einwirkung) . . . without which your
Epicureans, Hobbists, and the like have not even the shadow of a pre
tence (Vorwands).'
Ueberweg: 'Epicurus (341-270 B.C.), following Democritus,
taught that the universe came into being by the concourse of atoms
without the co-operation of a Deity. Similar views were taught by
Hobbes (1588-1679), who is more generally known by his political
absolutism than by his philosophy of nature. He maintains that
matter can have sensation and thought. '
ABSTRACTION. 381
[94] Time.
Berkeley, § 98 : ' Whenever I attempt to frame a simple idea of
time . . . cogitation (Denken).'
Ueeerweg : 'According to Aristotle (Phys., IV. ii.), time is the
number of movements (of change) in relation to earlier or later. Ac
cording to him (Phys., vi. ii.), time and space are equally infinitely
divisible. According to the doctrine of Locke (Hum. Und., B. 11.,
ch. xiv., §§ 3, 5, 17), reflection on the train of ideas, which appear
one after another in our minds, is that which furnishes us with the
notion of succession ; the distance between any parts of that succession,
or between the appearance of any two ideas in our mind, is that we
call duration; and duration, set out by certain periods and marked by
certain measures or epochs, is time — duration designated by a definite
measure. Though the notion of duration has arisen from reflection
on the sequence and number of ideas, it is yet applicable to things
which exist while we do not think, as the notion of the extension of
bodies, though it has been derived from the impressions of sight and
touch, can be applied to distances where no body is seen or felt.'
[95] Abstraction.
Berkeley, § 100 : ' the doctrine of Abstraction has not a little con
tributed towards spoiling the most useful parts of knowledge.'
Ueberweg: 'The definite demarcation of the groups of conceptions,
of which each can be represented by a definite word, by means of com
plete and well-arranged specification of the material constituents which
come into the consideration of those conceptions, in other words, by
means of definition, is an indisputable demand of all scientific reflection.
There is great merit in Berkeley's denial, on principle, of the false
substantializing of abstracts, and in his own striving to give a complete
basis to general notions and judgments in the corresponding concrete
conceptions. Yet we cannot approve of his polemic against the effort
to form and define the most general notions. In the ethical sphere the
expressions of Berkeley are in complete opposition to the Socratic
basing of all ethical action on the notional cognition of the ethical.
There is a justifiable polemic against a one-sided over-estimate of the
notion and of the rule. This polemic has been directed, in the sphere
of ethics, against Kantianism, especially by F. H. Jacobi, who, in his
polemic, gives prominence to the moral tact, and who lays stress on
the ethical right of the individual, as Schleiermacher also does. But
this polemic is exposed to the peril of falling into a one-sidedness of
382 A NNO TA TIONS.
an opposite kind, when it arrays itself not simply against an over
estimate of the general notion, but against the thing itself. Scholastic
and sceptical errors are to be overcome by genuine science, not by
returning to a pre-scientific position. This latter, however, though it
was not Berkeley's design, seems to be a very easy result of the assault
which, without the proper restrictions, he makes upon the attempts to
define certain very general notions.'
[96] Essence.
Berkeley, § 102 : 'that everything includes within itself the cause
of its properties, or that there is in each object (Dinge) an inward
essence (inneres Wesen), which is the source whence its discernible
(unterscheidbaren) qualities flow, and whereon they depend. '
Ueberweg : ' This is the view of Aristotle and of the Scholastics,
by whom essence (ovaia), that is, the sum of the essential or of that
which is involved in the definition, is regarded as the cause of the
qualities (jzoid).'
[97] Gravitation.
Berkeley, § 103: 'and it may as truly (for aught we know) be
termed
"impulse,
" or
"protrusion,
" as
"attraction.
"'
Ueberweg : ' Undoubtedly Newton himself has left this possibility
open ; but the majority of those who adopt his views have found in at
traction an essential property of matter. The Cartesians, on the
contrary, denied the doctrine of attraction, and endeavoured to ex
plain the turning aside of the celestial bodies from a rectilinear course,
as also the falling of the terrestrial bodies, on the theory of an impulse
imparted by cether. This hypothesis of Descartes was held by French
scholars as late as the middle of the eighteenth century, but more and
more lost its hold as the conviction grew more general that every por
tion of matter in the universe attracts every other, in conformity with
the Newtonian law of gravitation [/.<?., with a force proportional directly
to the quantity of matter they contain, and inversely to the squares of
their distances]. The comets especially, whose course it is impossible
to co-ordinate with that of the aether, furnish a powerful argument,
in fact, an unanswerable one, for the Newtonian school. There has
been a growing tendency to consider attraction as an immanent prop
erty of all matter. Yet the mooted question has remained and yet
remains undecided, whether there can be an.
"actio in distans.
"
Such an
"actio
" seems demanded by attraction, yet leaves it incon
ceivable, what the former is while it traverses the space intervening
between the masses, whether it be a substance or a property. And if
GRAVITATION UNIVERSAL. 383
we suppose — as it seems thoroughly necessary we should — that there
is a substantial continuity filling all space, within which the corporeal
atoms exist, still the question as to the mode of the extension of
power or force remains unsolved. Kant's Dynamic, but still more
Herbart's doctrine that the approximation rests on modifications of
the
"internal conditions,
" Schiller's comparison of attraction with
love, and Schopenhauer's Doctrine of the Will, seem to shed some
light on the darkness.'
[98] The Fixed Stars.
Berkeley, § 106: 'Whereas it is evident the fixed stars have no
such tendency towards each other.'
Ueberweg : ' That Berkeley is mistaken in this assertion is, in our
day, placed beyond all dispute. The error into which he falls was a
pardonable one in his day, for astronomy at that time very properly
concentrated itself on the investigation of our planetary system, and
the question in regard to the movement of the fixed stars had not yet
been seriously looked at. In our day the movement of the fixed stars
is no longer a matter of doubt. It is known that all the bodies belong
ing to the system of our Milky Way move around a common centre of
gravitation. Madler maintains that this centre is in or near the Pleia
des; but the question is not settled.'
[99] Gravitation universal.
Berkeley, § 106: 'as in the perpendicular growth of plants, and
the elasticity of the air.'
Ueberweg: 'These errors also of Berkeley no longer need a con
futation. Every part of the growing plant and of the elastic air has
gravity. The gravity itself does not cease, though its operation be
paralyzed by counter-operations and be transmuted into its counter
part. But, throughout, where several forces co-operate with each
other, and in part compensate one another, it is impossible, in accord
ance with Berkeley's principles, to trace and acknowledge the efficacy
of the very laws of nature which clearly reveal themselves in the more
simple, uncomplicated cases; for, on Berkeley's principle, the results
follow the immediate operation of God.
' These laws appear as if they were not of universal validity, though
they really are so, and only seem to yield to other laws, to which we
can, therefore, ascribe no more than a very limited validity. The
principle of Berkeley, as we again see, though it may be harmonized
with a sort of general recognition of the laws of nature as rules of the
3 84 A NN0 TA TIONS.
divine activity, cannot be brought to unison with an acknowledgment
of the laws of nature, scientifically carried through.'
[ioo] The Practical.
Berkeley, § 109 : ' God's glory, and the sustentation and comfort
of ourselves and fellow-creatures.'
Ueberweg : ' If Berkeley's advice were acted on, the result would
be a zealous striving after material good, and a comfortable enjoyment
of life on work-days, and a striving equally zealous, on Sundays and
church-festivals, after heavenly blessedness. Another result would be a
theology in correspondence with these practical tendencies, and with
both we should have the sort of science and art which is wont to fall
very short in the striving after the true and the beautiful without
regard to subordinate aims, either mundane or supramundane.
Though this result is not that at which Berkeley aims, yet in this way
what he here recommends does in fact most commonly take shape.'
Editor : Berkeley's advice, interpreted by his intellectual and prac
tical life, hardly justifies Ueberweg' s stricture.
[101] Newton.
Berkeley, §110: 'The best key for the aforesaid analogy or natural
Science will be easily acknowledged to be a certain celebrated Treatise
of Mechanics. '
Ueberweg : ' In § 114 Berkeley gives the full title of this Treatise.
It is Newton's Philosophise Naturalis Principia Mathematica, first pub
lished 1687. The distinctions which Berkeley here cites and contro
verts are presented in the Scholion to the Eighth Definition in
the Introduction to his Principia (edit, of 1687, p. 5, seq.).'
[102] Motion Absolute and Relative.
Berkeley, § in : 'Absolute Motion is said to be the translation of
a body from absolute place to absolute place, as relative motion is
from one relative place to another.'
Ueberweg: 'According to this, in the figure given in Note 54 a
movement in the external object AB would be an absolute movement,
a movement of the image a'b' among the other images in the space of
consciousness would be a relative movement. Yet this determination
is not exactly correct, inasmuch as the movement of the external object
AB may be referred in part to absolute space, in part to particular ex
ternal objects. This latter relation, also, is not merely brought into
consideration by us, but is grounded in the real co-operation of the
NUMBERS. 385
powers of nature itself. Thus, for example, the double motion of the
moon, the one motion around the earth, the other, with the earth,
around the sun, is the result of a twofold attraction, an attraction to
the earth and an attraction to the sun. Our subjective relative notions
in general rest upon objective relations : for example, the subjective
relative notion of number rests upon the objectively real existence,
one with another, of individual things with like natures; the sub
jective relative notion embodied in the word
"and
" rests upon an
objective connection; and so in other cases.'
[103] Movement.
Berkeley, § 114 : ' For the water in the vessel at that time wherein
it is said to have the greatest relative circular motion has, I think, no
motion at all.'
Ueberweg : ' The water is supposed to be in a vessel which is attached
to a cord and suddenly whirled round. The water is gradually drawn
into the movement of the vessel. — If Berkeley's theory be correct, that
in every movement the power of God operates directly, or without
"secondary causes,
" it is not very clear what is meant by saying that
God directs his power, not to our ideas of the heavens, but to our ideas
of the earth, and in our apprehension of what seems to be offered to
the senses there may be an error in this direction.'
[104] Numbers.
Berkeley, § 119 : 'so far as they are not subservient to practice, and
promote the benefit of life.'
Ueberweg: 'This utilitarian view of Berkeley's, like various others
which he expresses in depreciation of the pure mathematics, reminds us
greatly of Bacon of Verulam. We may regard it as an illustration of
what was said in Note 100. There have been various fantastic specula
tions in numbers, which rest upon a spurious attributing of substantial
character to the results of abstraction. There have been mystic dream
ings, such as the definition which Xenocrates, the Platonist, gives of
the soul, that
"it is a self-moving number,
" or the Pythagorean defi
nition of rectitude as a square number. But Berkeley makes a mistake
in placing in a line with these fancies the serious, strictly scientific
theory of numbers. We admit that this theory is not directly
"sub
servient to practice,
" and that it rests on very broad and compre
hensive abstractions. But these abstractions are of the class which are
scientifically justifiable ; they are abstractions which concentrate the
25
386 A NNO TA TIO NS.
observation on particular aspects of the total object, and do not involve
the vice of a false substantializing of that which is viewed abstractly.'
[105] Number.
Berkeley, § 122 : 'or reasonings and controversies purely verbal.'
Ueberweg : ' It would be far more correct than this to compare the
theory of numbers with the investigation of the laws of language. That
which in a certain respect is a sign may yet have in it a certain con
formity with law, which makes it worth while to estimate it, not as a
mere auxiliary, but as itself an object of investigation.'
[106] Extension.
Berkeley, § 124: ' If by finite extension be meant something dis
tinct from a finite idea, I declare I do not know what that is, and so
cannot affirm or deny anything of it.'
Ueberweg : ' Though Berkeley cannot, from his point of view,
accept any extension subsisting outside of the mind, yet this, as has
been shown, by no means proves that the supposition he rejects is
false. In extension in itself there is no minimum. In our subjective
perception as such there are minima, the minutest separations, in which
two tactual impressions on the end of the finger, the back of the hand,
the tip of the tongue, the lips, and other parts of the body, two exci
tations of the retina, the distance of which from each other is con
ditioned by the visual angle, call forth two separate or distinguishable
sensations.
'As, however, any external object, say, for example, an inch line
drawn on paper, at different degrees of closeness, and especially when
we call the microscope to our aid, allows us to see a different number
of parts, restricted in fact to no precise limits, it follows that we cannot
fix any minutest perceptible part of an object, — at least any minutest
part perceptible by sight. The microscope shows us even the ten
thousandth part of an inch.'
[107] Sum and Members of a Series.
Berkeley, § 124: 'to say a finite quantity or extension consists of
parts infinite in number, is so manifest and glaring a contradiction
that every one at first sight acknowledges it to be so.'
Ueberweg: 'Berkeley has simply asserted this
"contradiction;
"
he has not proved it. A contradiction is the affirmation and denial
of the same thing. It would be a contradiction to call the sum of a
series both finite and infinite, or to call at the same time the number
THE CALCULUS. 387
of the members of that series both finite and infinite ; but to call the
sitm finite and the number of the members infinite is not a contradiction,
either on the supposition that the magnitude of the collective members
is an infinitely little one, or that the magnitude of the individual mem
bers diminishes, in a definite manner, infinitely. Locke, however
(Hum. Und., ir. xxiii. 31), holds that
"the divisibility in infinitum
of any finite extension involves us, whether we grant or deny it, in
consequences impossible to be explicated or made in our apprehensions
consistent.
" '
[108] A posteriori.
Berkeley, § 129 : ' it is held that proofs a posteriori are not to be
admitted against propositions relating to infinity.'
Ueberweg : ' Berkeley here uses the term
" proofs a posteriori
" in
the good old sense — proofs which are drawn from the effects (the uarepov
<puau, natura posterius). He knew nothing of the Kantian abuse of
terms, in which a priori implies an independence of what is empirically
given, an independence which has in fact no existence whatever, and,
in harmony with that definition, makes a posteriori completely synony
mous with empirical.'
[103] The Calculus.
Berkeley, § 130 : 'Of late the speculations about infinites have run
so high.'
Ueberweg : ' Especially after Newton had discovered the method
of computation by fluxions. With this method essentially coincides
the differential and integral calculus, brought forward by Leibnitz soon
after, and in fact before Newton had made his own discovery public.
Both come together under the notion of the
"infinitesimal calculus.
"
The difference is only in form ; but the notation and mode of operation
presented by Leibnitz must be acknowledged to be preferable. New
ton began in 1665 to develop the
"Arithmetic of Fluxions,
" and up
to 1672 had communicated it to particular friends, rather, however, by
way of hints than of complete statement. He first presented it to the
world in his Principia Philosophise Naturalis, 1687. Leibnitz, perhaps
not entirely without some knowledge of Newton's hints, sustained,
however, by his own earlier investigations of series, had, with at least a
relative independence, reached the new calculus in 1676, and first gave
it to the public in the
"Acta Eruditorum,
" 1684.'
388 A NNO TA TIONS.
[no] Infinitesimals.
Berkeley, § 130 : ' thinking it with good reason absurd to imagine
there is any positive quantity or part of extension which, though multi
plied infinitely, can never equal the smallest given extension.'
Ueberweg : 'Not
"with good reason,
" but simply because of a
pure misunderstanding of the notion of infinitesimal quantities, this
idea of Berkeley's has been maintained by some. Such a misunder
standing is only possible when the representatives of the opposite view
foster the error that the infinitesimal can be a fixed quantity. By an
"infinitesimal
" is not to be understood a fixed quantity, but a quan
tity which, by a fixed law, takes diverse values which have zero as the
ultimate value. The ultimate value is that value which a variable
quantity constantly approximates without ever reaching it, and so that
the distance from it may be less than any particular fixed quantity you
may name. In a series which has zero as the final value it must con
sequently always be, name what fixed quantity you please, that a mem
ber can be found which, in common also with all that follow it, is less
than that fixed quantity named. Thus, the infinite quantity in the
mathematical sense — or the reciprocal value of an infinitesimal — is not
a fixed quantity, but one which in accordance with the series takes
diverse values, and may because of that fact be greater than any fixed
quantity which can be named.
' Two quantities which are infinitely small or infinitely large may
be compared with one another by comparing with one another the
corresponding members of the two series, from which arises a series of
relations. The ultimate value of this series makes the relation of the
one infinitely little or infinitely great quantity to the other.
' The augmentation of a quantity simply by infinitesimals is continu
ous. The series in which a single infinitesimal is represented need by
no means, however, consist of members which differ from one another
simply by infinitesimals, yet.it can become continuous by the unlimited
insertion of members.
' Let, for example, the first series be as follows :
< 1 1 1 1
2» 4' ~B> 16' * * *
' Let the other series be the following :
< A _9_ 17. 33
4' 16' 64' 256' * * *
' These series are so formed that the common member of the first is
1 l , r , 1 ■ 2 J 2 n +I-fl
— , the common member of the second is — + — = .
2 n 2 n 2 2n 2 zn
INF IN I TESIMA LS. 3 89
1 If we call the first infinitesimal a, the second is = 2a + <?• On
the dependence of n rests the association of the members.
'If we now compare with one another the corresponding members of
both series, we obtain the series of relations :
.1 oi 2 1
'8' z 16>
2i, 2i
I 2 n -}- I + I
whose common member is 2 -i- — = . Now, the members
2 n 2 n
of the third series have an ultimate value, which they approximate be
yond every difference however minute, yet without ever wholly reach
ing it. This ultimate value is = 2, because the ultimate value of the
fraction yet to be added to 2 (which fraction coincides with a, as given
before) is = o. The ultimate value 2 is not the relation of any two
members to one another. If we should consider it as the relation of
the last members, or of the members in process of vanishing, we should
involve ourselves in a contradiction, for there are no last or vanishing
members. As long as we remain within the first two series, and com
pare two corresponding members with each other, the relation is not
= 2, but >■ 2 ; but if we go beyond to the ultimate values of the first
two series, both of these are = o, their relation to one another is con
sequently = -§-, which, again, is not = 2, but is something wholly in
determinate. But we are involved in no contradiction if we seek
neither a relation of the last members, nor a relation of the ultimate
values, but the ultimate value of the relation of the entire members.
This answers for all applications, as in them we have also to do with
ultimate values. Thus, for example, the tangent has the position to
which, as the ultimate position, the chords protracted from the point
of contact, constantly, by continuous diminution, approximate, beyond
every angular difference however minute. As upon both sides, in the
arithmetical consideration and in the geometrical application, the ulti
mate values are regarded, an absolutely accurate result may be attained ;
the mistake would be to identify an ultimate value with one member of
the series.
' It may, however, happen that the members of the series of relation
itself increase or diminish infinitely. In this case the one infinitesimal
is considered as an infinitely small portion of the other, that is, as an
infinitesimal of the second order. If, for example, we take the first
series we have given, and make the second \, y^, -^-j, ^ii
"' • • • ( or »
make the first quantity = a, the second = a 2 ), the series of relation is
identical with the first series, and consequently diminishes infinitely;
the quantity therefore which runs through the values in the second
390
ANNOTATIONS.
series is an infinitesimal of the second order. With this determination
of the notion, which coincides with that of Eisenstein, R. Hoppe, and
others, all the contradictions which Berkeley and others have urged
against the doctrine of Infinitesimals fall away. They are contradic
tions, which in fact have no existence, unless the infinite be regarded
as & fixed quantity.'
Editor: Playfair (Prel. Dissert., Enc. Brit., 650) says of the Con
troversy on Fluxions, ' Though the defenders of the calculus had the
advantage, it must be acknowledged that they did not always argue the
matter quite fairly, nor exactly meet the reasoning of their adversary.
The true answer to Berkeley was that what he conceived to be an acci
dental compensation of errors was not at all accidental, but that the
two sets of quantities that seemed to him neglected in the reasoning
were in all cases njecessarily equal, and an exact balance for one an
other. ... If the author of the Analyst has had the misfortune to
enroll his name on the side of error, he has also had the credit of pro
posing difficulties of which the complete solution is only to be derived
from the highest improvements of the calculus.'
[111] Immortality of the Soul.
Berkeley, § 140 : - The natural immortality of the soul is a neces
sary consequence of the foregoing doctrine.'
Ueberweg : ' The soul consequently has not merely an immortality
conferred on it by the grace of God, as Justin and some others of the
early fathers maintained in express opposition to Platonism. At a
later period, mainly through the mighty influence of Augustine, the
Platonic doctrine of the natural immortality of the soul, an immortality
grounded in its very essence, became the predominating doctrine of
the Christian Church.'
Editor: On hardly any point did Christianity find a completer
chaos of human thought than on the doctrine of the future state. The
confusion yielded very slowly.
[112] Opinion and Character.
Berkeley, § 141: 'And this notion (Vorstellung) has been greedily
embraced and cherished by the worst part of mankind, as the most
effectual antidote against all impressions of virtue and religion.'
Ueberweg : ' This position of Berkeley involves a support of the
argument by the moral degradation of the opponent. Its confirmation
in experience is not without exceptions. There has been faith in im-
HOW CAN MIND COMMUNICA TE WITH MIND? 391
mortality which has not been conditioned by character, and character
not conditioned by this faith.'
Editor : Berkeley simply speaks of a class, and, thus qualified, his
remark is true. Opinion is not the sole shaper of the external life, but
it is the mightiest of moral forces ; but it often requires a long time
and a multitude of examples to determine what is the influence of
opinions. Centuries of experience have left some questions of this
class still in doubt.
[113] Sundering of the Faculties.
Berkeley, § 143: 'Men have imagined (sich vorgestellt) they could
frame abstract notions (Begriffe) of the powers and acts of the mind,
and consider them prescinded (abgelost) as well from the mind (Seele)
or spirit (Geiste) itself, as from their respective (beziiglichen) objects
and effects (Wirkungen).'
Ueberweg : ' This attack of Berkeley's on the abstractive sundering
or hypostasizing of the
"faculties of the soul
" has great merit ; it would
require, however, to be carried much farther to lead to the results
which long after followed upon Herbart's resumption of it.'
[114] How can Mind communicate with Mind?
Berkeley, § 145 : 'I perceive (nehme . . . wahr) several motions,
changes, and combinations of ideas, that inform (bekunden) me there
are certain particular agents (bestimmte einzelne thatige Wesen) like
myself, which accompany them and concur (Theil haben) in their pro
duction (Hervorbringung).'
Ueberweg : ' How this concurrence (Antheil) is to be conceived
of, is obscure. The concurrence of the mind in the evoking of its own
ideas has been defined by Berkeley, § 28-30; but how, in any
ordinary manner, can my mind operate on other minds, or in any way
whatever concur in their operation ? According to the doctrine of
Berkeley I cannot evoke thoughts in others immediately, but only by
means of my own
"ideas.
" My
"ideas,
" however, and their changes,
as, for example, in the complex of ideas which I call my body, can,
according to this very doctrine, produce no operations in another
person, nor evoke ideas in him. How do the complexes of ideas in
different persons come into relation to one another? The answer
" by the will of God
" of course helps out in every case ; but a cogni
zable order of nature falls before such a view. Without the supposition
of a connection conformed to the laws of nature, I can only infer the
existence of God, not the existence of finite beings beside myself. On
392 A NN O TA TIONS.
the supposition of this connection, however, words, writing, and other
signs can only be the means of producing a relation between different
thinking beings, in as far as they are not mere ideas, but are changes
in certain objects existing in themselves ; on which objects the one
mind produces operations, and these thereby modified operate in their
way on the mind of the other person.'
[Ueberweg has alluded to this argument against Berkeleyanism in his
Sketch of the History of Philosophy, vol. iii., 2d edit., Berlin, 1868,
p. 331: ' the relations between thinking beings must be mediated by
real unthinking beings.']
He has developed the argument in the Zeitschrift fur Philosophic,
Ed. 54, Heft 2. Halle, 1869.
[115] Berkeley and Malebranche.
Berkeley, § 148: 'Not that I imagine (stelle mir. . . vor) we see
God (as some will have it) by a direct and immediate view, or see cor
poreal things, not by themselves, but by seeing that which represents
them in the essence of God, which doctrine is, I must confess, to me
incomprehensible. '
Ueberweg : ' The doctrine referred to is that of the Cartesian,
Malebranche (1638-1715), that we see all things in God. Berkeley
expresses himself more at large on this point in his
" Dialogues between
Hylas and Philonous,
" a little before the middle of the Second Dia
logue (Works, Fraser, i. 308). Berkeley does not say, as Malebranche
does, that we see the things by perceiving that by which they are
represented in the infinite substance of the Godhead, but only that
the things which we perceive, that is, our ideas, are known in virtue
of the will of an infinite Spirit. According to Berkeley, our ideas,
which are purely passive, cannot be like the divine substance, which is
wholly active, nor even like a part of this substance, which is wholly
indivisible. In the system of Malebranche, moreover, the existence of
a material universe, whose
"perfections
" are embraced in the spiritual
essence of the Godhead, is accepted in a completely purposeless way,
and involves Malebranche's theory in all the contradictions to it,
which are derived from the supposition that material things exist out
side the mind.'
[116] Providence.
Berkeley, § 154: 'Little and unreflecting souls may indeed bur
lesque the works of Providence.'
Ueberweg : £ But not as such. Berkeley from his own point of view,
not that of the supposed antagonist, regards the phenomena in question
CONSCIOUSNESS DEFINED. 393
as the works of Providence. If he did take that view, he would involve
himself in gross self-contradiction; as he does not, it would greatly aid
in establishing his own view if he would enter thoroughly into the antag
onistic position to evince its untenableness. It is admitted that among
modern thinkers this has been done most thoroughly by Leibnitz
(1646-17 1 6). In his Theodicee, which appeared in the same year as
Berkeley's Principles (17 10), he examines the problems here touched
upon.'
[117] General Recognition of the Basis of Idealism.
Definitions of Consciousness. Definitions of Realism.
Editor : It is an element of strength in Idealism that beyond other
systems it seems at least to have these elements :
1. It sharply defines consciousness ; 2. It separates the primary and
unmistakable acts of consciousness from the inferences made from those
acts; 3. It maintains the absolute infallibility of consciousness; 4.
It denies, or puts on a lower plane of evidence, whatever is not thus
infallibly testified to. That its position here is a strong one will be
apparent from the definitions generally given of Consciousness.
'Consciousness is the perception of what passes in a man's own
mind.' x
' To the mind is attributed apperception, as it is conscious to itself
of its own perception. Leibnitz uses the term apperception, as synony
mous with consciousness in the writings of Descartes.' 2
Consciousness, self-consciousness ; Apperceptio (Leibnitz), Consci
entia (Descartes) ; Bewusstseyn, Selbstbewusstseyn ; perception, con
science, sentiment interieur. This word is used by' Kant in two senses:
1 . It means consciousness of self, that is, the simple conception of
the Ego. When a subject capable of conceptions has conceptions,
there is constantly linked with them the further conception that it (the
subject) has them. The second conception, that I, the concipient
subject, have these conceptions, is called consciousness of myself, or
apperception.
2. Kant understands by the term ihefacutty (Vermogen) of conscious
ness the faculty of accompanying the conception with the conception
of the Ego. 3
' Those changes in the mind by which it is made possible to it to
conceive things external to itself are called in the Leibnitzo-Wolfian
system perceptions. If with these is united the consciousness of self,
1 Locke, Hum. Und., II., i. 19. 2 Wolff, Psychol. Empir., $ 25 (1732), Verona, 1779.
3 Mellin, Worterbuch d. kritischen Philosophic, 1797.
394
ANN OTA TIONS.
as well as of the things perceived, we have apperception. ' ' Conscious
ness is that condition in which we distinguish from each other, and
from ourselves, the conceptions of things as changes in us, and with
them their objects. ' J
Stewart : ' Consciousness denotes the immediate knowledge which
the mind has of its sensations and thoughts, and, in general, of all its
present operations.' 2
Krug : ' Consciousness is knowledge of being, an immediate linking
of both.' 3
Reid : ' Consciousness is . . . used ... to signify that immediate
knowledge which we have of our present thoughts and purposes, and,
in general, of all the present operations of our minds.' 4
Hamilton: 'This knowing that I know or desire or feel, this
common condition of self-knowledge, is . . . consciousness.'
' Consciousness is . . . the recognition by the mind or Ego of its acts
and affections.'
Regis : 'We obtain this knowledge [of our own minds] by a simple
and internal intimation, which precedes all acquired knowledge, and
which I call consciousness {conscience).' ' 5
Brown : ' Consciousness ... is only a general term for all our feel
ings, of whatever species these may be, — sensations, thoughts, desires;
in short, all those states or affections of mind in which the phenomena
of mind consist.' 6
Porter : ' Consciousness is . . . the power by which the soul knows
its own acts and states.' 7
' Consciousness is the term applied to the internal perception of that
which is presented and takes place in us as determination of the mental
life.' 8
Fraser: 'By being conscious I mean knowing phenomena, whether
extended or unextended, which are immediately and actually present
to the conscious mind, — with all the conditions or relations implied in
this.' 9
Morell : 'Locke's fundamental principle that all our knowledge
consists in ideas as the immediate objects of consciousness (is) a principle
1 Lossius, Real-Lexicon, 1803.
a Dugald Stewart, Outlines of Moral Philosophy, 1793, 1801. Works (Hamilton), 1854,
i. 13-
3 Krug, Handwort, 1832. 4 Reid, Int. Powers, Ess. I.
5 Syst. de la Philosoph., quoted by Blakey, Hist, of Philos., ii. 297.
6 Philos. of Human Mind., Lect. XL 7 Human Intellect, New York, 1869, 83.
8 Brockhaus, Convers. Lex., Elft. AufL, 1864, iii. 189.
9 Life and Letters of Berkeley, Works, iv. 389.
CONSCIOUSNESS DEFINED. 395
which had never been questioned from the time when it was asserted
by Plato and Aristotle to the time when it was put into so clear a light
by the great author of the
"Essay on the Human Understanding.
"
"
To this may be added that few out of the entire body of metaphysicians
have doubted it since.
It may be useful to have some of the definitions of Realism before
us. (For definitions of Idealism, see Prolegomena, VII.)
' Realism as opposed to Idealism is the dogmatic affirmation that the
things in themselves are as we perceive them in our conception.' 2
'The reality of mind and the reality of matter, — Natural Realism.'
'A scheme which endeavours, on the one hand, not to give up the
reality of an unknown material universe, and, on the other, to explain
the 'ideal illusion of its cognition, may be called the doctrine of . . .
Hypothetic Realism.' 3
' Realism has different meanings, according to the different antitheses
which it involves. In antithesis to Idealism it is the system which
maintains that the existent, that which constitutes the foundation of the
phenomena, is independent of the thinking subject, and of thought in
general.' 4
' Realism, as opposed to Idealism, is the doctrine that in perception
there is an immediate or intuitive cognition of the external object,
while, according to Idealism, our knowledge of an external world is
mediate and representative, i.e. by means of ideas.' 5
'Realism, . . . the system which maintains that what is exists external
to and independently of the concipient subject.' 6
'Realism, the philosophical doctrine which ascribes to external
things an actual being independent of our conceptions.' 7
The reader can hardly fail to be struck at some of the approximating
points of the definitions of Idealism and Realism, with the illustrations
of Iordano Bruno's principle of the 'Coincidence of Opposites.' He
can understand how some thinkers have hesitated between the two,
how some have defended the one system on the principles of the other,
how some have passed from one to the other, how some have declared
for both, and some have refused either, and some again are claimed on
both sides, and some have left their relations to the two theories wholly
insoluble.
1 Historical and Critical View of the Speculative Philosophy of Europe in the Nineteenth
Century, New York, 1851. 2 Lossius, Real-Lexicon : Realisrnus.
3 Hamilton, Reid's Works, 748, 749. 4 Pierer, Realisrnus.
5 Fleming, Vocabulary, — edited by C. P. Krauth, Philad., Smith, English & Co., 1S60.
6 Brockhaus, Convers. Lex. : Realisrnus.
7 Heyse, Fremdworterbuch, 12th ed., 1859.
396 A NNO TA TIONS.
Hamann said that ' only the scholastic reason separates Idealism and
Realism, — genuine philosophy knows nothing of such a separation.'
The point at which the modern tendencies divided is, according to
Erdmann, a point at which philosophy was neither Realism nor Ideal
ism. The attempt to prove the existence of the things of sense, says
Jacobi, leads to the denial of them, — that is, to Idealism. The most
that can be reached in that way is an empty thing of the understanding,
a non-entity, — chaos, in fact. He says that Kant's position was that of
a chameleon shifting between the hues of Idealism and Realism ; had
he been consistent with his position that the transcendental object is
but an x, an unknown quantity posited by consciousness, he would
have been an idealist. Fichte was the true Messiah of speculation,
Kant was no more than its John the Baptist, Reinhold its Nathariael.
There are only two logical systems, the Material-Idealism of Spinoza,
or the inverted Spinozism, the Ideal-Materialism of the moderns,
especially of Fichte.
All this connects itself with what Hamilton calls 'the startling'
'general approximation of thorough-going Realism and thorough-going
Idealism. ' *
It is hoped, however, that the definitions will at the same time be an
aid to the reader in determining the precise question involved in these
controverted cases.
[118J Idealism — what is not and what is its Question.
Editor : Consciousness in its direct attestation, according to the
general judgment of thinkers of all schools, absolutely demonstrates no
more than the mind's own states or acts. (See [117].) It cannot then
directly attest the external causes of those acts or states. The proof
of the external world, in every philosophy, on this basis, is therefore an
inference from the facts of consciousness proper. The inference may
be justified, may be regarded as necessary and intuitive, but it is an
inference, and is not, in any case, in the precise grade of certainty that
the act of consciousness itself is.
When Sir William Hamilton says that the object non-Ego is given in
consciousness, he can only with propriety mean that it is logically or
mediately given, or necessarily involved logically in the consciousness
of the Ego : it is given in the idea of consciousness, not in its act : it
is implied, not expressed.
In other words, Ego and non-Ego are intuitional logical correlates
in consciousness. Both, as more than empirical, are involved in the
1 See Prolegomena, V. 20.
IDEALISM— ITS QUESTION. 397
inferences of a Logic which is intuitional, or, at least, ^indistinguishable
from the intuitional. But the Ego is no more conscious of itself in
consciousness than the eye sees itself va. seeing. Self-consciousness, as
the consciousness of intellectual acts and states, is directly and infalli
bly known ; but if it means that we have consciousness of a self apart
from acts and states, or distinct from the acts and states while it is in
them, it is not true that we have .sr^-consciousness. Consciousness
itself is a specifically conditioned state ; and to know ourselves apart
from or distinct from a conditioned state would imply two absurdities :
one, that mind, as known, is unconscious ; the other, that the mind
knowing, which in this case is the same mind which is known, is
unconscious. Furthermore, unconsciousness itself is a state. To be
conscious of absolute self is a contradiction in terms. To be conscious
of self in its states and acts, or through its states and acts, is to be
conscious of the acts and states, that is, to have an immediate cognition
of them, while our judgment of the essence or substance acted upon
and acting is mediate. We can make a dialectic separation of a mind
( from its states, but there can be no real separation. And in the dia
lectic separation there would be left to the mind nothing but dialectic
being. So far as conceivable reality is concerned, its being would be
equivalent to non-being. There is no absolute to man's cognition.
He does not knozv substance, either matter or spirit. The Ego itself
we know then only in and by its acts and states, not apart from them.
Mental acts and states are alone the objects of immediate or strictly
philosophical cognition.' The real primary question hinges on this
point only. The sole and consequently infallible utterance of con
sciousness is on the mind's own states and acts. Out of the facts thus
testified to, and acknowledged in general, alike by every school of
philosophy, everything else is to be built up. On this general ground,
the ground of the phenomenal facts, there is no controversy whatever
between Berkeley and the extremest of his opposers. That the thing
to which consciousness testifies, as the act of putting the finger into
the fire, is followed by what consciousness testifies to as the sensation
of pain, is as certain on Berkeley's view as on Locke's and Reid's.
The world of the phenomenal, both as regards causes and effects, is left
untouched by Idealism. Body and spirit remain phenomenally as dis
tinct as ever ; our fellow-men stand in every phenomenal relation as
before. Our own bodies are known as they were known before. The
divergence belongs to the sphere of the supersensuous. The question
is, What is that something to which consciousness does not immediately
testify, which is the cause on which are conditioned those mental acts
398 A NNO TA TIONS.
or states to which consciousness does immediately testify by being
their inseparable condition ?
There are then two distinct questions. The first is,— What is it to
which consciousness immediately testifies ? The second question is, —
What is involved mediately in that testimony ? There is a question of
testimony and a question of judgment.
On the first question, Idealism, as we have seen, accepts the com
mon answer of philosophy, past and present, — the mind is conscious
not of what is not in it, but of what is in it, and nothing can be in it
but its own acts and states. Nothing is known immediately but what is
known to consciousness, and whatever is known to consciousness is
known immediately. The worlds of immediate knowledge and of
consciousness are conterminal; each is in each. The mental state
associated with the sense-perception of a tree is immediately known,
because there is no medium between the state and the consciousness, —
the mental state is consciousness itself. The tree itself is mediately
known, if it be known at all ; though Idealism and other schools of
thought concur in the principle that mediate knowledge is no knowledge.
The tree is known through a medium, or rather through a series of
media, terminating in the final excitant of the perceptive act, which
excitant may be called the medium of the media. Nearly all thinkers
agree that there is no consciousness of this excitant ; we only know
the state which results from it. Sir William Hamilton's 'Natural
Realism' assumes that there is a consciousness of it, — it is the only
non-Ego of which we are conscious; but as the great non-Ego, the
external empirical world, is as clearly external to our bodies as it
is to our minds, Sir William defies the 'common sense' to which
he appeals. Nor would the race be better satisfied with a universe
which is confined to Sir William's optic nerve, or to his thalami, than
with one which would be shut up in his mind. At the risk of being
thought a blasphemer by some of Sir William's admirers, we are com
pelled to confess that his 'Natural Realism' seems to us virtually a
restoration of the clumsy and exploded theory of 'a representative
entity present to the mind.' The hypothesis on which the Scotch
school combated Idealism had reached a point at which ' there is no
escape from confession but in suicide;' and Hamilton's Natural
Realism is the proof that 'suicide is confession.'
But neither on the ordinary view, nor on Hamilton's, can the mind
be. conscious of the tree. On either theory it can only be conscious
of a state, for which it supposes, or does not suppose, the existence of
a material, substantial tree, external to the mind and the body, as a
IDEALISM— ITS QUESTION. 399
necessary cause ; for the state itself and the act of reference of that
state, or the refusal to refer, are both in itself. It cannot indeed shake
off the empirical reference. The world of an idealist's experience is
precisely that of every other man. He sees a tree as a Materialist sees
it. Fichte, born idealist as he was, acknowledges that Idealism cannot
be a way of thinking, — can only be speculation, though he none the
less held that it was the veritable truth in speculation. It is the specu
lative reference on which the question hinges. It is time thrown away,
therefore, to attempt to settle the question with an idealist by the
mere urging of the empirical phenomena as in themselves decisive. As
empirical, Nature puts them more emphatically than Beattie and Reid
can put them. No idealist ever, in this respect, doubted them, or
could doubt them, or pretended to doubt them, and no realist ever
felt himself in any degree strengthened by an argument at this point.
So far as the direct reaching of the empirical facts is concerned,
nearly all philosophy is idealistic, and hence going so far only does not
constitute what is pre-eminently and by antithesis Idealism. It is
simply generic, not specific, Idealism. Generic Idealism has been the
predominant viewof thinkers in all ages. Specific Idealism has by no
means shared so largely in the philosophic confidence.
When we come, therefore, to the second question, we come to the
dividing point. The phenomenal or empirical being conceded, the
great facts being, in general estimation, beyond dispute, how are we
to account for them ?
Through the whole range of the perceptive acts of all educated
consciousness there rises a phenomenal external world, whose normal
features are generically the same to the masses of men of all lands and
of all time. How are we to account for that phenomenal world ?
The first answer is, The phenomenal, empirical, external world
involves, as its concause, the existence of a real, substantial, material
world, which is brought into mediated relations to the mind through
the organs of sense, or by the act of God to which they furnish occa
sion, or by a pre-established harmony, or in some unknown way. The
world is substantially real, the mind is substantially real ; phenomena
are the results, in some sense, of the existence of both. This is the
answer of Realism. [117.]
The second answer is, either : The phenomenal world involves no
more than the existence of mind, real, substantial spirit, which, by
the action of another mind or other minds on it, or by the laws of
its own self-originated conditions, attains its various states and acts ; or,
That world involves no more than ideas, conscious states and acts,—
400 A NN 0TATI0 NS.
the question, What is conscious? being thrown out, as beyond the reach
of knowledge. The systems involved in these answers, and pre
eminently the second (and, if logic be laid to the line, only the second),
are Idealism.
But as the generally received Realism of philosophy is idealistic in
the recognition of the first principles of human knowledge, so a great
deal of Idealism, and especially that of Berkeley and his school, has
been realistic, in acknowledging real spirit, and in real spirits real
phenomena (that is, phenomena objectively produced, by object-spirit,
not by the subject-mind).
It is not true that Berkeley maintains that all is mere 'show,' or
'illusion,' or 'idea.' In Berkeley's view neither that which receives
nor that which imparts ideas is an idea. Both the giver and the
recipient are substantial realities, and the 'ideas' themselves, either
directly or by succession, spring from God. They are not illusions,
but divine verities. The objection is not that they are incredibly
unreal, but that they are incredibly real ; they are not revelations
through media, but revelations direct. In an overwhelming sense, in
Berkeley's view of man, 'the inspiration of the Almighty giveth him
understanding.' The theophany of nature is one in which God speaks
to man face to face. Berkeley's world is one in which a Peniel is
never far off. Our realities are indeed subjective, for they are ours;
but our subjectivities are realities, for their cause, their objective base, is
a substantial personal God. In this aspect Berkeley claimed to be the
true realist, — his opponents were charged with unrealism.
The philosophical division between the generally accepted Realism
and the various forms of Idealism turns entirely upon the answers
given to the second question. There is an unmixed Realism which
acknowledges nothing but the objectively real, and makes the seemingly
subjective real no more than a phenomenon of the objective. There is an
absolute subjective Idealism which acknowledges nothing but the idea,
and makes the seemingly real in both matter and mind mere conditional
ideas. But the mass of philosophers are idealistic realists, holding
to direct consciousness of the idea alone, but regarding the realistic
inference as valid. On the other hand, Berkeley is a realistic idealist;
holding that the realistic inference is invalid as regards matter, but
conceding it as regards mind. He holds to real substantial spirits,
God and man. Hence, too, his monism is only generic. He holds to
a monism of genus, — to spirit alone ; but he concedes a dualism of
species, — infinite Spirit, the Cause of ideas, and finite spirits, the
recipients of them. But this his strength is also his weakness. Every
MIND AND MATTER. 40 1
moral advantage of his Idealism over its successors is secured at the
expense of its development and of its logical consistency.
[119] Mind and Matter. Spirit and Body.
Editor : No Physics can ever be worthy of its name which excludes
Metaphysics ; no Metaphysics is entitled to attention which does not
accept and attempt to harmonize the facts of Physics. Both by the
law of its genesis, and of its intellectual supremacy, Tfcfetephysics must
be after Physics, and Physics has no intellectual value except as it
prepares the path and the materials for Metaphysics. Metaphysics is
after Physics, but Mind is before both, and by Mind both consist. The
great weakness of psychology has been that it has not done justice to
the personal unity of man. Receding, as it ought, from the monism
which annihilates either mind or matter, spirit or body, it has run into
the dualism which hopelessly antagonizes them. Man is a unit, beyond*
all the ordinary concessions of his unity. Up to the last point at which
human philosophy can trace him he is an inseparable unity. When
the bond of that unity is broken, philosophy knows him no more. He
has passed out of the world whose best souls can only love wisdom, to
that world whose pure intelligences possess it. Philosophy must not
be a philosophy of mind apart ; she must not emphasize the and, and be
a philosophy of mind and body, but, taking what God offers her,
become a philosophy of man. Except as man she knows not soul ;
except as man she knows not the human body, for when matter is
severed from the knitting soul which made it body, it no longer is for
her ; philosophy surrenders it to the dissecting-table or the grave.
No theory of the body of man is worthy of attention which does not
acknowledge the soul as the controlling force of the body. No theory
of the soul, as we know the soul in philosophy, is entitled to respect,
which ignores or diminishes the reality of the personal union into
which it has taken the body with itself, — a union the most consummate
and absolute of which we know, or of which we can conceive, infinitely
transcending the completeness of the most perfect mechanical and
chemical unions, — a union so complete that, though two distinct
substances are involved in it, it makes them, through a wide range of
observations, as completely one to us as if they were one substance ; so
that we can say the human body does nothing proper to it without the
soul, the human soul does nothing proper to it without the body. As
the soul operates through the body, the body operates by the soul.
The soul cannot perform the most exquisite act of abstract thinking
without a co-operation of the body which can be distinctly demon-
26
402 A NNO TA TIONS.
strated, and the most involuntary and trifling acts distinctive of the
body involve and demonstrate the presence of the soul. So much is
this the case that, if the body gave no other evidence of the presence
of the soul than the distinctive tremulousness of the smallest muscle,
or the slightest conceivable act involving true muscular movement, it
would constitute ample evidence that the soul was still there. The
best modern science accepts, practically at least, these principles. The
extremest spiritualist in philosophy, though he may talk the old jargon
which treats the body as, if not a prison, at least a mere mechanical
and chemical appendage of the soul, cannot think or write without
showing the extravagance and hollowness of his view. To nothing
does the common, as well as the educated, consciousness more positively
testify than to the personal unity of man ; his body is not an append
age to himself, but it is a part of himself. He is not, as he has been
# called, an 'intelligence served by organs,' but he is a being in whom
two natures constitute one indivisible person, — that is, so constitute
the person that if divided from each other, absolutely and forever, the
personality itself, as it now exists, would lose its completeness : there
would remain after such a dissolution, not man, but at most the spirit
of man, a higher and nobler part, and yet but a part. The soul of
man is but a part of man.
The dualism of the current speculation, most commonly allied with
what passes for orthodoxy, is so shallow that it has been the great pro
moter of the monism of Materialism. Over against the dualism which
persists in yoking together two heterogeneous ihcompatibles, on the one
side, and the spurious monism which ignores or perverts the most
important and well-grounded half of the facts, on the other, Idealism
comes in to reach a higher Monism by throwing out utterly the false
everything of Materialism, and the disturbing, helpless, useless one
thing — matter — of dualism. Materialism abuses matter, and the re
ceived dualism cannot use it ; and Idealism comes in to take out of
the way what is either not used or misused. To this hour Berkeley's
sarcasm retains its point. The mass of sticklers for substantial matter
do not know what to do with it when they have it, and if it could be
quietly taken away from them they would never miss it. It is true
that over against even this poor dualism, Idealism demonstrates
nothing. So far it has no advantage over the other view. It is
guess against guess. But it has the charm of simplicity. It offers
one great absorbing mystery, instead of a thousand frittering, irritating
difficulties. Instead of the perplexity of tracing, and of attempting
in vain to trace, the manifold streams to their obscure springs, it brings
MIND AND MATTER.
403
before the mind an all-embracing ocean of speculative mystery. It
goes forth
' dread, fathomless, alone.
"
It is at least deep enough for a despairing man to drown himself in.
Some of the systems spread out great shallow morasses on bottoms of
mud. You may be stifled in them, but you cannot be drowned.
Idealism is like the old Church of the West, resting on one idea, the
idea of the One, building all conclusions on a solitary premise, giving
you all, to the last, if you grant but the first. Not without a mighty
charm for the active mind in the proud independence it offers him,
Idealism also has its fascinations for souls weary of the many and of
the much, ready to cry, —
' The world is too much with us.'
It is the cloister of the system-worn thinker. Relatively it meets some
great tendency of the human mind. Many of the greatest minds have
been tempted by it, — some of the greatest have yielded, others have
resisted it ; some have dreaded ; but no real metaphysician has despised
— no real metaphysican can despise — it. If it be an error, it is the
error most difficult to sound; if it rest on sophisms, they are the most
perplexing of sophisms. Herbart, the greatest of its direct assailants
in recent time, says, ' Idealism is an opponent we dare not despise ; it
plants itself in our way, and we must arm ourselves for the battle. ' r
It is on grounds of great importance then that able works on 'Body
and Mind,' even though written with a prevailingly physical or medical
aim, have a great attraction to the true metaphysician. Metaphysics
shall be perfect in all its theories so soon as physics shall be perfect in
its collection of all its facts. The contempt which ignorant or arrogant
physicists heap on metaphysics is really the disgrace or the misfortune
of the physical sciences. Reach the demonstrably absolute in physics,
and we shall not demand in vain that the thinkers of the race shall
give us a demonstrably absolute philosophy. On the general theme,
Mind and Matter, Spirit and Body, the ages have pondered. A great
body of literature exists in connection, in various aspects, with their
relations. Tuke, one of the most recent writers on Body and Mind,
enumerates ninety works among the principal authorities to which he
refers. Nearly all of these are English, or translations into English ;
a few are French. Not one, except through translations, is German,
1 Metaphysik, Werke, iv. 265.
3 See a review of his ' Illustrations of the Influence of the Mind upon the Body,'
Penn Monthly, Oct. 1873, 722-728.
404 A NN 0TATI0NS.
though the German possesses, beyond all other languages combined, a
fund of books bearing on this theme. In addition to the ample treat
ment of the topic in the systems, and the more general psychological,
anthropological, practical, and religious works, there are special treatises
by Erdmann (1837, 1849), Ennemoser (1825), Beneke (1826), Beraz
(1836), Hilgers (1834), Messerschmidt (1837), and by others of more
recent date, devoted to the discussion of the essential conception of
body and soul, their relation to each other, their distinctness, their
intimate reciprocal action, and the connection between just views of
them and of man's moral freedom and accountability, the question
whether the phenomena of intellectual activity are mere operations of
a high organization, or of an essence, united intimately indeed with
it, but distinct, spiritual, immortal.
The whole body of evidence in regard to mind and matter justifies
certain conclusions in regard to soul and body. First, they prove that
soul and body are distinct. Their laws of action on each other belong
neither in species nor in genus to any of the departments of physical
power. No analogies exist to them, even in the subtlest forms in which
matter is operative. Matter is operative on mind, but under laws
wholly distinct from those by which it operates on unpsychical matter.
Light operates on the mind in awakening consciousness, perception,
certain sensations of pleasure, but not as it operates in the whole sphere
of the unpsychical. The operation of light and of all matter on the
body is accompanied by entirely distinct sets of results, when the body
is possessed of the soul, and again when it is destitute of it. Fire
will not burn a living body in precisely the same manner in which it
burns a dead one, and the vast array of forces which dissolve the dead
body are the elements of the life and power of the living body.
Oxygen consumes the dead body : the living body consumes oxygen
and converts it into force.
Second, the facts show that though body and soul are distinct, their
unity is very close, so close and peculiar that out of it arises what is so
transcendently wonderful that up to this hour it has failed of due
recognition, though the evidences of it have such overwhelming force
that glimpses of it exist from the earliest time and through all time.
This great ignored or imperfectly recognized principle is the principle
of the personal 'fellowship of attributes ; that is, that in the unity of the
person, by it, and in consequence of it, the two essences really share
each other's properties, so that we have a personally corporeal soul and
a personally psychical body. In consequence of this the body receives,
in its personal union with the soul, real attributes which it cannot have
MIND AND MATTER. 405
outside of that union, and which, within it, give to it capacities which
mere impersonal matter cannot possess. The 'seeing eye' and 'hearing
ear' are not mere forms of phrase, but the eye does really see by the
soul, as the soul sees through the eye. The nerve which thrills with the
pain feels pain by the soul, as the soul feels pain through the nerve.
There is one real, indivisible, personal act.
Every sensation, perception, cognition, imagination, involves a real
conjoint affection or action of the personal soul, and of the personalized
organ. The soul is not a spider in the centre of a cobweb of nerves,
but is an essence, which has evolved organism by taking matter into
personal union with itself, and which gives to the nerves power to feel
by it, as it uses the nerves in turn to receive influence through them,
neither ever acting apart from the other. The two sets of acts are, in
a certain sense, distinct as the essences themselves are; in some cases
the intervals can be marked by time, but their coalescence is the act
of consciousness, the act of their complete unity. The separate action
of touch upon the nerves is conveyed with an ascertainable interval to
the soul, but the perceived touch is that in which the separation ceases,
and the one indivisible act of consciousness, in the personal mind and
the personalized body, takes place. There is no interval in perception.
It takes place indivisibly, in the mind through the nerve, and in the
nerve by the mind. The motion which becomes a co-factor in percep
tion takes time, but the perception takes none. Meanwhile, the nerve
has not acted apart from the mind ; the soul has not been separated
from it in the interval of unconsciousness; the soul has given the nerve
its nerve-power. The power of the nerve to transmit depends upon its
personal organic union with the soul. The nerve of a dead body
carries no force from a touch. The nerve receives real attributes from
the soul in the union, and in this personal connection, and because of
it, though real matter, does what matter, as such, cannot do, — it feels ;
feels none the less really because it feels by the soul. The people and
the philosophers here, as in many cases, divide the truth between them.
The illiterate man thinks that the pain is in his toe, and not in his
mind ; the philosopher thinks the pain is in his mind, and not in his toe.
The fact is, it is in both. The nerve has real pain by the mind, the
mind real pain through the nerve. The pain is in both, indivisibly, —
not two pains, but one pain ; not two parts of one pain, but a pain
without parts in one person ; in the mind as person, in the body as
personalized by the mind. It can exist in neither without the personal
co-operation of the other. Take away the nerve from the organism,
and neither nerve nor mind can feel pain; abstract the mind by an
406 A NN OTATIO NS.
intense interest, and neither mind nor nerve feels pain. We can hold
a burning coal within our hand by thinking on the frosty Caucasus, —
on a simple condition, — that we think of nothing else. We assert that
there is no cure for the spurious monism of Materialism and Idealism
on the one side, and for the hopeless dualism which reigns in the
current philosophy and the popular thinking on the other, except in
the recognition of the personal unity of man, — the monism of person
harmonizing the duality of natures. Man is not two persons, or a
jumble of person and non-person, — a muddle of spirit resenting matter,
and of matter clogging and embarrassing spirit. Man is a personal
unity. Man is a unity of two parts. In this is implied that the parts
are not co-ordinate and independent. Two, as two, cannot be one.
One must be first, the other second; one must be higher, the other
lower ; one must depend, the other sustain ; one must have personality,
the other must receive it.
Physics and Metaphysics, the former negatively, the latter positively,
demonstrate that the psychical is the first, the higher, the sustainer,
the personal; the physical is the second, the lower, the dependent, the
personalized. The entire world of the conscious, taking the term
conscious in its widest reach, shows that the psychical in the organism
is that for which the physical in it exists. The reason why the matter
of an oyster's organism is not left inorganic is found in the psychical
element of the oyster. The matter in his organism is all arranged in
adaptation to his little circle of sensations and perceptions. Taking
it for granted that all conscious being is in part an object for itself, the
conscious element is that to which the material element is adjusted.
All nature illustrates this. The inorganic is for the organic. The
organic is for the psychical in it. The psychical, then, is first. It is
the conditioning power of the material. It is the organizing force
which lifts the organic out of the inorganic. The reason why that
which grows from the germ of an oyster differs from that which grows
from the germ of a man, is not in the material, as physical science
knows it. The difference in the material is already conditioned with
reference to the character and purpose of the psychical. The chemical
and all the physical differences between the two germs shed no light
on the differences of the result. The psychic is not a mere undis
covered material force, — it is a force generically different from matter.
The elementary psychical is as multiform and varied as the element
ary physical, and out of its varieties, assimilating the varieties of the
material, each to its own wants, arises the organic world.
What are the psychical and the organic? They are the embodiment
MIND AND MATTER.
407
of two great ideas, — creator and creature, artificer and workmanship,
the plastic power and the moulded matter. The universe is the out
thought of God, and God's out-thought can be nothing other than the
revelations of his own mind and activity. He is conscious, free Cre
ator, Artificer, Moulder. His work is creation, the Divine Art of
Nature, the shape through which the finite shifts in the eternal and
infinite line of grace, power, and mystery. In the psychical, God
posits the forces which are shadows and remembrancers of his own
creative, plastic power, and puts it into nature for its work of sub
creation. The psychical is, in a larger or smaller sphere, a Vice
Creator, in which a determinate set of forces is divinely immanent.
The psychical enfolds the plan, the material submits to plan, and the
organic is the result. The organic is the harmony of the psychical
and material in plan. As the psychical is a little sub-creator, the
organic is a little sub-creation, in which the psychical remains imma
nent, as the sub-cause. Each organism is the rising of a new world
of order out of the chaos of the inorganic. On each little deep, minia
ture of the vast whole, hovers and broods the psychic spirit, with the
less or greater measure of embodied force appointed to it. This power
of the psychic on the physical is followed, as God pleases, by the feeble
glimmer of mere sensation, never growing, or by the day-spring of a
light whose noon is the resplendent glory of reason and immortality.
INDEX.
The leading topics of the Prolegomena are indexed by the divisions
and paragraphs. The pages are given where a minuter subdivision is
necessary.
The Prefaces of Fraser and Berkeley are indexed by the page.
The Introduction and the Principles of Berkeley are indexed by
paragraphs, and this Index answers for every edition of them. The
Appendixes are indicated by Letters.
The Annotations are indexed by their Numbers in brackets [ ].
ABBREVIATIONS.
introduction) of Berkeley.
I*ref (aces) of Fraser and Berkeley.
J y /in(cip\es).
-/Vtf/(egomena).
#(otes) by Fraser, at the foot of the page.
Abbild (image), Prin. \ 140.
Absolute dependence, Prin. \ 88, 155.
" matter, 18.
" space, no.
" truth, 76.
Absoluteness of primary qualities, Prin. \
12, n.
Abstract existence, Prin. § 4.
Abstract ideas, In. \ 6, 10, n., II, 12, 14,
15, 18; Prin. \ 5, 11, 17, 97, 143.
Abstract ideas, Ueberweg on, [n].
Abstraction, Pref. 154; In. \ 8, 10, n,
17, 19, «., 23; Prin. I 5, [11, 12,] 100,
[95] ; App. A.
Abstraction, Ueberweg on, [5, II, 12].
Accidents, Prin. \ 73.
Activity, Prin. \ 61.
Advantages of considering ideas apart
from names, In. \ 21-24, [7]; -App. A.
Alciphron, Prol. I. \ 8.
Algebra, names like the letters in, In. \ 19.
America, Berkeley visits, Prol. I. \ 6.
" lines on, 6.
" returns from, 7.
" adherents of Berkeley in, Prol.
IV. I 15.
Analogies, caution in, Prin. \ 106-108.
Analyst, on motion, Prin. \ 112, n.
" on infinite divisibility, 130, n.,
[no].
Annihilation and creation every moment,
Prin. \ 45, 56, [57], 48, [66].
'An sich,' existence, things, [9, 81, 86,
90].
409
4io
INDEX.
Antipodes, Prin. \ 55.
A posteriori arguments, Prin. \ 21, [34,
108], 129.
Apparatus, Prin. § 61.
Appendixes to Principles, Prol. XV. \ 3.
" A. Rough draft of Principles,
283.
" B. Arthur Collier, 317.
" C. Theory of Vision vindi-
cated, 323.
Apperception defined, [117]
Apple, Prin. \ 1.
A priori arguments, Prin. \ 2i,.[34, 108],
129.
Arbitrary character of laws of nature,
Prin. \ 31, [46].
Archetype of sensible system, the divine
idea the ultimate, Prin. $ 71, [83].
Archetypes, external, Prin. \ 87; Pref.
158; Prin. \ 9, 41, n., 99.
Aristotelian scholastic definition of idea,
Aristotle, materia prima, Prin. \ n.
Arithmetic, its object, Prin. \ 119, 121.
" regards signs, not things, 122.
Arrogance, fostered by Idealism, Prol.
XIV. \ 13.
Atheism, atheists, Prin. \ 35, 92, 94,
[116], 154, 155
Attraction, Prin. \ 103, 104, [97].
Attribute defined, Prin. \ 49.
Attributes, personal, fellowship of in man,
[119],
Augustine, existence of an external world
not demonstrable, Prol. III. \ 15.
Bacon and Berkeley, Prol. II. § 1.
" In. I 17; Prin. \ 107.
Baxter, Andrew, opponent of Berkeley,
Prol. V. § 3.
Beasley, F., Dr., opposes Berkeley, Prol.
V. \ 16. (See Princeton.')
Beattie, opponent of Berkeley, Prol. V. \ 8.
" defines ' common sense,' \ 8.
Beck shows that the critical system is
• Idealistic, 87.
Begriff, -e, a notion, Prin. \ 74, 140, 142.
notions, 143 ; In. \ 6.
Begriff, -e, ideas, [46].
Being (Wesens, eines Etwas, eines Seien
den), incomprehensible, abstract idea
of, Prin. \ 17, 74.
Being, conception of intelligible, Prin. §
99, n.
Being, and being perceived, Prin. \ 6.
" Ueberweg on, [13].
Beneke disputes Kant's method, [81].
" ' on body and soul, [119].
Beraz, on body and soul, [119].
Berkeley, Life and Writings, Prol. I. :
early life, works, travels, \ 1-3, 6, 7 ;
bishop, 8 ; controversies, mathematical,
9; death, at Oxford, II; works, 12,
13; translations of, 14.
Berkeley, precursors of, Prol. II.
" System, summaries of, Prol. III.
" estimates of character, writings,
and influence, Prol. VI. (See
Berkeleyanism.)
" Principles, present edition, char
acteristics of, Prol. XV.
" a student of Locke's Essay, Pref.
153.
" influenced by Malebranche, 153.
" combats Locke, 154.
" Idealism and Realism, 155, n.
" follows Locke, In. \ 6, n.
" proof of his doctrine, Prin. \ 3,
4, n.
" held unity of substance, 7.
" assumes causality, 26, n.
" connects cause and substance,
37, »•
" what meant by his potential ex
istence, 45, n.
" on continual creation, 46, n.
" on miracles, 84.
" abolishes representative idea in
perception, 86, n.
" holds a sort of spiritual positiv
ism, 102, n.
" a true realist, [118].
" his monism only generic, [118].
" his dualism, [118].
Berkeleyanism, its friends, affinities, and
influence, Prol. IV.; influence of, § I;
INDEX.
411
first reception, 2 ; opponents and objec
tions to, V.; ridicule of, 1.
Bewusstseyn, consciousness, [117].
Blackwell, estimate of Berkeley, Prol. VI.
§3-
Bodies, external, useless, Prin. \ 18, 19,
20; denied by Ueberweg, [32].
" exist in the mind, 23 ; denied by
Ueberweg, [37].
" do not exist when not perceived,
47, [60].
Body, spirit and, [118].
Bolingbroke on abstract ideas, In. \ 10, n.
Brahm, Brahma, and Schelling's God,
Prol. XL 98-100.
Brain, Schopenhauer on, Prol. XIII. 114.
Brockhaus (Real-Encyclop.) :
" summary of Berkeley, Prol.
III. \ 11.
" Idealism defined, VII. § 11.
" Realism defined, [117].
Brown, Thomas, Dr., on Idealism, and
Reid, Prol. V. \ 15.
" on power in ideas, Prin. $ 25, n.
" eliminates all power from material
world, 32, 11.
" definition of consciousness, [117]
Browne, Peter, Bishop, controversy with
Berkeley, Prol. I. \ 7.
" on abstract ideas, In. \ 10, n.
Bruno and Schelling, Prol. XI. 97.
" and Spinoza, 118.
" coincidence of opposites, [117].
Buddhism, Schopenhauer on, Prol. XIII.
116, 117.
Buhle, arguments against Berkeley, Prol.
V.? 11.
Burthogge, Prol. II. \ 7.
Butler, Bishop, on atheism, Prin. \ 145, n.
Calculus, differential, Prin. § 132.
" infinitesimal, 130, [109].
Cartesian theory of occasional causes, Prin.
§ 69.
"
" of nature, 102.
"
" of brutes, Ueberweg, [3].
Causality, Schopenhauer on, Prol. XIII.
109.
Causality and Idealism, Prol. XIV. \ 7.
" principles of, assumed and inter
preted by Berkeley, Prin. \
26, n.
" notion of, 31, 32.
" views of Locke, Hume, Reid,
Maine de Biran, Kant, Fichte,
Schelling, [46,47].
Causation, physical, contrasted with spirit
ual, Prin. \ 65, n.
Cause, final, Schopenhauer on, Prol. XIII.
109.
" and Idealism, XIV. \ 7.
" free voluntary activity, Pref. 165.
" substance connected with, Prin. \
27, n.
" corporeal, 53, [71].
" and effect, 65.
" spirit the only efficient, 102.
Che-;elden's account of the blind boy,
App. C, 323 ; Prol. XV. \ 3.
Chimeras, difference between real things
and, Prin. $. 34.
Clarke, S., opposed to Berkeley, Prol.V.| 2.
" approaches his views, V. 2.
" on continual creation, Prin. \ 46, n.
" on the being and attributes of God,
117, n.
Coexistent qualities, idea of, In. \ 9.
Collier, theory of matter, Prin. \ 49, n.
" incidents of his life, App. B.
P theoiy of inexistence, App. B.
" his philosophy applied to Chris
tian theology, App. B.
" introduction to his Clavis, App. B.
" makes sense-perception and im
agination differ only in degree,
App. B.
" and Berkeley, Prol. I. $ 5 ; App. B.
Colour and extension, In. §7,8; Prin. § 99.
Colours, secondary qualities, Prin. \ 9, 10.
" exist no longer than perceived,
46; [58].
Commonplace Book, Pref. 17 1, n.
Common sense, argument from, Prin. §
54. «•
Communication, abstract ideas not neces
sary for, In. \ 14.
412
INDEX.
Comte, on power in ideas, Prin. \ 25, n.
" eliminates all power from material
world, 32, n.
" on the universe, 155, n.
Conceive, we cannot, of things existing
unconceived, Prin. \ 23 ; Ueberweg on,
[36].
Conform, [91].
Conformable, the perceived, to the unper-
ceived, Prin. \ 86; [91].
Conscious experience, objects of, what,
Pref. 157.
Consciousness, generally recognized prin
ciples in regard to, Ideal
ism rests on, Prol. XIV.
" definitions of, [117].
Consequences of Principles of Human
Knowledge, Pref. 157 ; Prin. \ 86.
Copernican system, Prin. § 51.
Corporeal causes, Prin. \ 53.
" substances, 19.
Creation, continual, advocated by school
men, Prin. I 46, [59].
Creative act continuous, Prin. § 152.
Cudworth on abstract ideas, In. \ 10, n.
' Darstellen ' — present themselves, Prin.
§29.
Day, our own, Berkeleyanism in, Prol. IV.
Death and life, Schopenhauer on, Prol.
XIII. g 24.
Deception of words, In. \ 23, 24.
Definition, [95].
Demi-atheism, Prin. \ 155.
Demonstration, Berkeley claims, Prin. \
61, [75]
Derodon on abstract ideas, In. § 10, n.
Descartes and Berkeley, Prol. II. \ 3.
" theory of matter, Pref. 154;
Prin- \ 73. «•
" on man's finite mind, In. \ 2, n.
" on principles of knowledge, 5, n.
" on causality in sensible things,
Prin. \ 52, n.
" on the existence of sensible
things, 88, n.
Descartes on idea, [1].
" on animals, In. \ II, [3].
" on consciousness, [117].
Dictionnaire des Sciences Philosophiques,
objections to Berkeley, Prol. V. \ 17.
Diderot opposed to Berkeley, Prol. V.
I 7
Distance, Prin. \ 42, 43, [54].
Distrust of senses by philosophers, Prin.
§88.
Divine ideas and will coincident with
laws of nature, Prin. \
57> »•
"
" ultimate archetype of sen-
sible system, 72, n.
Divine thought, absolute truth, Prin. §
76, n.
Divisibility, infinite, Prin. § 47, [61, 62,
63, 64, 65], 124, [107].
Divisible, infinitely, Prin. \ 128, 129, 130,
[110].
Douval, Jouve, Idealism defined, Prol.
VII. I 9
Dreams, ideas in, Prin. \ 18, [30].
Dualism, Berkeley's, Pref. 155, [118].
" or intelligible Realism, Prin. \
3. «•
" spurious, [119].
Duality of existence held by Berkeley,
Prin. \ 7, n.
Dublin University and Berkeley, Prol. IV.
I 12.
Durandus, the world a machine, Prin. \
46, n.
Duty, Prin. \ 156.
Edinburgh Review on Berkeley, Prol. VI.
Editor, American, Prolegomena, 1-148.
" translation of Ueberweg's notes on
Berkeley, 329-407.
" additional notes: idea, abstract
idea, [1].
" on objects of knowledge, ideas,
[8]. 337-34C
" on esse, percipi, [9].
" on primary and secondary, [17].
" on matter, [18].
INDEX.
413
Editor, American, on similar and like,
[21].
" on things in themselves, [38].
" on 'eating and drinking ideas,' [5 1 ] .
" on New Theory of Vision, [55].
" on transubstantiation, [88].
" on Ueberweg's view of the con
formity of the perceived to the
unperceived, [91].
" on infinitesimals, [no].
" on immortality of the soul, [m].
" on opinion and character, [112].
" Idealism, basis of; consciousness;
Realism, [117].
" Idealism, its question, [118].
" body and mind, matter and spirit,
C
"9].
Edwards, Jon., views in consonance with
Berkeley's, Prol. IV. $ 4.
" said to be in affinity with Spi
noza's, 4.
Efficient cause none but spirit, Prin. §
102.
Ego is substantial and causal, Prin. \
142, n.
the non-Ego given in, [118].
Eleati, Pantheists, Prol. XIII. 117.
Ennemoser, body and soul, [119].
Entity, abstract idea of, Prin. § 81.
Epicureans, Prin. \ 93, [93].
Erdmann, objections to Berkeley's sys
tem, Prol. V. \ 14.
" point of modern division,
[»7].
" on body and mind, [119].
Esse is percipi in unthinking things, Prin.
I 3
Ueberweg on, [9].
Essence nominal, Prin. \ 102.
" ovala, [96].
Exist (existiren), existence, Prin. § 3,
[9], 35
Existence, abstract idea of, Prin. § Si.
" of an idea consists in its being
perceived, 2.
" intelligible conception of, 89, n.
Experience, conscious objects of, what,
Pref. 157.
Experience, presentative and representa
tive, Pref. 159.
Extension (ausdehnung), &c, only ideas,
Prin. \ 9 ; denied by Ueber
weg, [19].
" neither great nor small, is no-
thing, 1 1 ; denied by Ueber
weg, [23].
" and colour, 99.
" and figure, 49, [68].
" abstraction frames the idea of
colour exclusive of, In. § 8.
" a primary quality, Prin. \ 9.
" and motion, 10, 161.
" Ueberweg on, [21].
" the characteristic of the mate-
rial world, 11, n.
" an accident of matter, 16.
" an object of geometry, 123.
" finite, 124, [106, 107].
External bodies, supposition of, Prin. §
19, 20.
"
" their existence within
our knowledge im
possible, 20.
External things (aussere) are perceived
by sense, Prin. § 90.
Externality, how seen, Pref. 156; Prin. §
90, n.
Eyes, Prin. \ 29, [43].
Fall, dogma of, Schopenhauer on, Prol.
XIII. 119.
Ferrier, Prof., on perception and matter,
Prin. § 50, n.
" friend of Berkeleyanism, Prol. IV.
§6.
Fichte, system of, Prol. X.
" compared with Schelling, 97, 98.
" his trilogie, Hegel adopts, 102.
" and Hegel, 103.
" illustration of the arrogance of
Idealism, Prol. XIV. g 13.
" 'thing in itself,' Prol. X., [81].
" 'Messiah of Idealism,' [117].
Figure, a primary quality, Prin. $ 9.
Fire, idea of, and real fire, Prin. \ 41.
" Locke on, [53].
4H
INDEX.
Fleming, Realism defined, [117].
Fraser, summary of Berkeley, Prol. III.
In-
" on Berkeleyanism in our day, Prol.
IV. I 5
friendly to Berkeleyanism, 13.
opinion of Baxter, Andrew, Prol.
V. §3
on Hamilton's natural Realism, 20.
estimate of Berkeley, Prol. VI.
§18.
edition of Berkeley's works, Prol.
XV. I 1 ; XVI. \ 1, 2.
notes to Principles, Prol. XV. \ 2.
definition of consciousness, ['117].
Freedom, Prin. \ 57, 93.
Gassendi, on abstract ideas, In. \ 10, n.
General, how idea becomes, In. \ 12.
General ideas not denied, In. $ 12.
Generalization, Locke on, In. \\\.
Geometry, objects of, Prin. \ 123.
German metaphysical terms, Prol. XV. \ 8.
Germany, Berkeley in, Prol. IV. \ 14.
Geulinx, on causality in sensible things,
Prin. \ 53, n.
" on matter, 70, n., [71].
God, natura naturans is, Prin. § 147, 148,
152.
" his existence known like that of
men, 145, n.
" is known certainly, 164, 174.
" ideas of, 71, [83].
" seeing things in, Malebranche's view,
148, [115]. (See Nature, author
of, language of.)
Gravitation. (See Attraction.')
" not essential to bodies, Prin.
\ 106.
" denied by Ueberweg, [99].
Grote, Prof. John, tends to Berkeley
anism, Prol. IV. \ 7.
Hamann, Berkeley and Hume, Prol. VI.
§17.
" Idealism and Realism, [117].
Hamilton, Sir William, on Reid, Stewart,
Idealism, Prol. V. \ 20.
Hamilton, Sir William, natural Realism
of, Fraser's estimate of, Prol.
V. I 20.
" on Berkeley, Prol. VI. \ 14.
" Idealism defined, Prol.VII. §13.
" consciousness defined, [117].
" Realism defined, [117].
" Idealism and Realism, [117].
" his ' natural Realism,' [118].
" ideas of sense exist without the
mind, Prin. \ 8, n.
" on representative perception,
86, n.
" on previous existence of every
new phenomenon, 106, n.
Happiness, Prin. \ 100.
Heat and cold, Prin. \ 14, 32.
"
" Ueberweg on, [26].
Hegel, summary of Berkeley, Prol. III.
" objections to Berkeley, Prol. V.
I 13.
" system of, Prol. XII.
Hegel, [Si].
Hegelian schools, Prol. XII. 104.
Herbart and Schopenhauer, Prol. XIII.
106, 121; [81, 86].
Herder, on Kant, Prol. IX. 86.
Heyse, Realism defined, [117].
Hilgers, on soul and body, [119].
Hillebrand, summary of Berkeley, Prol.
HI. \ 5
Hobbes and Berkeley, Prol. II. 2.
" referred to, In. \ 6, [93].
Hobbists, Prin. \ 93, [93].
Home, Henry, of Karnes, opposed to
Berkeley, Prol. V. \ 5.
Hume, on Berkeley's philosophy, Prol.
VI. 4.
" Idealism of, Prol. VIII.
" refers to Berkeley as a nominalist,
In. \ 6, n.
" on power in ideas, Prin. | 25, «.,
30, n.
" eliminates all power from material
world, 32, n.
" on theory of universal energy of
Supreme Being, 72, n.
INDEX.
415
Hume, on representative perception, Prin.
\ 86, n.
" on the universe, 155, n.
" as pessimist, 1 1 9.
Idea. (See Ideas.)
" defined, Prin. § 5, n., 49, «., 89.
" none of substance, In. \ 14, n.
" nor of spirit, Prin. § 135.
" its esse is percipi, 2.
" implies passiveness, 25.
" denied by Uebervveg, [39].
" in contradistinction to thing, 39.
" history of the word : how should it
be expressed in German in trans
lating Berkeley, Ueberweg on, [1] .
" can be like nothing but an idea, 8.
" Ueberweg denies it, [15].
" distinct from its being perceived,
45. [57].
Ideal and real not identical, Prol. XIII.
US
Idealism defined, Prol. VII.
" definitions of, diversity, \ 15.
" development of, from Berkeley
to the present, Prol. VIII.-
XIII.
" sceptical, Prol. VIII.
" critical, Prol. IX.
" subjective, Prol. X.
" objective, Prol. XI.
" absolute, Prol. XII.
" theoretical, Prol. XIII.
" ancient, Schopenhauer on, 107.
" modern development, history
of, by Schopenhauer, 108.
" systems of, contemporary with
Schopenhauer, contrasted,
108.
" strength and weakness of, Prol.
XIV. 122-142.
" received in the East, rejected in
the West, \ 14.
" versatility of, 15.
" not ripest result of speculation,
16.
" logical issues of, 19.
" Fichte's description of, 20.
Idealism and Realism, Berkeley's, Pref.
155
" basis of, general recognition of,
[
"7].
" what is not and what is its
question, [118].
" leaves the phenomenal un-
touched, [118].
" its advantage over the current
dualism, [119].
Ideas, phenomena, sensible things, Pref.
154
" archetypes of, 157.
" advantages of considering them
apart from names, In. § 22.
" relations of to principles of knowl
edge, Prin. \ 1-8.
" visibly inactive, 25.
" cause of, 26, 27.
" succession, 26, 28.
" of sense and imagination, 33.
" and things, 38, 39.
" divine, ultimate archetype of sensi
ble system, 70, n.
" and spirits make up the whole of
knowledge, 86.
" are real things, 90.
" scheme of, not chimerical, 34, [48].
" succession of, 59, [74].
" abstract, In. \ 6-16.
" (vorstellung, -en), 21, 22; Prin. \
5-11, 13,97, 125, 143.
" occasion of, Prin. § 69.
" sensible, 144.
« train of, 59, 71,77.
" universal, 126.
Idolatry (gotzendienst), Prin. \ 94.
Images of things, ideas, Prin. $ t>Z'
Imagination, its power, Pref. 160.
" confounded with sense, Prin. §
23, n.
" ideas o
", 30.
" Colli r and Hume on, App. B.
Imagining, faculty of, In. § 10.
Immortality of the soul, Prin. \ 141,
[in, 112 1 .
" proved by Berkeley's Princi-
ples, Pref. 165.
416
INDEX.
Impenetrability a secondary quality, Prin.
Inch, Prin. \ 127.
Inexistence of sensible things, Collier's,
App. B.
Infinite divisibility of finite extension,
Prin. \ 124.
Infinites, speculations about, Prin. \ 124,
[109].
Infinitesimals, Prin. \ 130, [no].
Infinity, difficulties about, In. % 2^
" quantitative, App. B.
In itself (in sich), In. § 102.
Intelligence, an, without help of external
bodies, Prin. \ 20, [33].
Intelligible Realism and dualism, Prin. \
39, n., 91, n.
" existence of sense-objects, 86.
" meaning of, [90].
Jacobi, F. H., on Fichte's doctrine, Prol.
X. 92.
" system of, 100, 101.
" on ethics, [95].
" the world as free act of will, 118.
" on Fichte, Kant, Reinhold, and
Spinoza, [117].
Jamieson, George, opposes Berkeley, Prol.
V. § 18.
Jean Paul (Richter), picture of Idealism,
Prol. XIV. I 17.
Johnson, Samuel, of Stratford and New
York, a Berkeleyan, his
works, Prol. III. § 3.
" Berkeley addresses him on his
essays, Pref. 152.
" addressed by Berkeley on con-
tinual creation, Prin. \ 46, n.
Johnson, Dr. Samuel, on Berkeley, Prol.
V. $ 1 ; VI. 5.
Kant, summary of Berkeley, Prol. III. \ 3.
" system of, Prol. IX.
" compared with Schelling, Prol. XI.
97
" and Hegel, Prol. XII. 103.
" and Schopenhauer, Prol. XIII. 105.
" Schopenhauer's estimate of, 106.
Kant lies nearest to method of Berkeley,
[81].
" use of term 'intelligible,' [90].
" definition of consciousness, [117].
Kantianism, in Berkeley, Prin. \ 142, «.;
in the sphere of ethics, [95].
Knowledge, objects of human, defined,
Pref. 155.
Kroeger, translation of Fichte, Prol. X.
92, n.
Krug, summary of Berkeley, Prol. III. § 8.
" definition of Idealism, Prol. VII.
§7-
" definition of consciousness, [117].
Language, phenomena of universe as,
Prol. XIV. I 5.
" difficulty of, Prin. \ 144.
" its nature and abuse, In. \ 6,
139-
" cause of error, 18-20.
" visible ideas are a, Prin. § 44.
" of Author of nature, 66.
" use of, 83.
" and numbers, study of, 122,
[105].
Laws of nature, Prin. § 30, 62, [45, 77].
" divine ideas and will coincident
with, 57, n.
Leibnitz on symbolical knowledge, In. §
19, n.
" on the idea, Prin. \ 33, n.
" on continual creation, 46, n.
" Theodicee, [116].
" apperception, [117].
Leibnitz, [81, 109].
Lewes's estimate of Berkeley, Prol. VI. \
13-
Life and death, Schopenhauer on, Prol.
XIII. \ 24.
Locke and Berkeley, Prol. II. § 6.
" a friend of Molyneux, Pref. 152.
" essay introduced into Trinity Col
lege by Molyneux, 153.
" Berkeley a student of the essay,
LS3» In - \ 6 > n
" combated by Berkeley, Pref. 154.
" quoted, 171, n.
INDEX.
W
Locke on man's finite mind, In. \ 2, n.
" principles of knowledge, 6, n.
" on abstraction, II.
" on generalization, II.
" on abstract ideas, 12, 13.
" on abuse of words, 23.
" ideas of sense and reflection, Trim
I 1, n.
" notion of material substance self
contradictory, 9, 11.
" on matter, 10, «., 73, n.
" on unity, 13, n.
" on methods for exciting ideas, 65,
n.
" on existence of sensible things, 88,
n.
" on being, 89, n.
" on motion, 114, n.
" quoted by Ueberweg, [2, 4, 7, 17,
25, 27, 53, 94].
" anticipations of ' Theory of Vision,'
[55]
" definition of consciousness, [117].
Locomotive experience in sense, Prin. \
II, n.
Logic, In. \ 6.
Lossius, Idealism defined, Prol. VII. \ 6.
" consciousness defined, [117].
" Realism defined, [117].
Mackintosh, Sir James, estimate of Berke
ley, Prol. VI. I II.
Maja, popular form of Hindoo Idealism,
Prol. XIV. \ 14, 15.
Majer and Schopenhauer, Prol. XIII.
105.
Malebranche and Berkeley, Prol. II. \ 4.
Malebranche, In. \ 2, n. ; Prin. \ 70, n.
" influence of, on Berkeley,
Pref. 153.
" causality of insensible
things, Prin. \ 53, n.
" on matter, 73, n., 82, «., 88,
n.
" on motion, 112, n.
" seeing in God, 148, [71,
115].
" Norris a disciple of, App. B.
Malebranche, occasionalism, [71].
Man and the animals, Schopenhauer on,
Prol. XIII. 109.
Man, powers of, their feebleness, In. \ 2.
" personal unity of, [119].
Manicheism, Manichean heresy, Prin. \
154.
Mankind, assent of, Prin. \ 54, 55.
Mansel approaches Berkeley, Prol. IV. \ 8.
Materia prima of Aristotle, Prin. \ 11.
"
" modern notion of matter
resembles, II.
Material substance defined, Prin. § 17.
" motives for supposition of, 73.
Material world, extension the characteris
tic of, Prin. \ 11.
Materialism, Idealism as opposed to, Prol.
XIV. I 9.
Materialists acknowledge that the senses
do not prove the existence
of matter, Prin. \ 18.
" cannot tell how our ideas are
produced, 19.
" invent matter to support acci-
dents, 74.
" Berkeley's peculiar use of the
word, [29, 31].
Mathematics, application of Berkeley's
principles to, Pref. 165.
" a province of speculative
science, Prin. \ 58, 118,
119, 123.
" discussed, 101.
Mathematicians, Prin. \ 132.
Matter, what, Prin. \ 9-76.
" Descartes' theory of, Pref, 154.
" a negative notion, 156.
" Locke on, Prin. \ 10, n.
" substratum of external qualities,
16.
" infinite divisibility of, 47.
" unknown occasion, 67, 68, 70,
[81].
" support of accidents, 72, 73, 74.
" unknown somewhat, 75, 80.
" Scriptures on existence of, 82.
" idea of, pernicious, 26, 96, 133.
" inert, 9.
27
4i8
INDEX.
Matter, denied by Ueberweg, [18].
" involves a contradiction, Prin. \ g.
" denied by Ueberweg, [20].
" and its qualities, Ueberweg on,
[22].
" relation of, to mind, Prol. XIV.
§3-
" and mind, [119].
M'Cosh, Dr. Jas., against Berkeley, Prol.
v. s 19.
" estimate of Berkeley, Prol. VI.
Mellin, graduated list of Kant's terms, [8].
" definition of consciousness, [117].
Messerschmidt, body and soul, [119].
Metaphysics, nature of, Schopenhauer on,
Prol. XIII. no.
" abstract ideas, objects of, In.
I 6.
" true position, [118].
Mill, J. S., defends ' Berkeley's Theory of
Vision,' Prol. IV. \ 10.
" permanent possibilities of sen
sation, Prin. \ 3, n.
" on power in ideas, 25, n.
" eliminates all power from ma
terial world, 32, 11.
" on touch, 44, n.
Mind, the acting perceiving spirit, Prin. \
2.
" sensible qualities must be in the, 10.
" acts and powers, not to be pre
scinded, 143, [113].
" its omnipresence, 148.
" and matter, [118].
Mind, Prin. g 2.
Minimum, sensibile, Prin. \ 132.
Miracles, relation to Berkeley's princi
ples, Prin. § 84, 63, [79, 88, 89].
Mitchell, James (deaf and blind), case
of, App. C.
Molyneux, William, made Locke's Essay
known in Trinity College, Pref. 152.
Monism, systems of, Prol. XIV. \ 8.
Morell, on Locke's definition of con
sciousness, [117].
Moses' rod, Prin. § 84.
Motion of the earth, Prin. \ 58, 186, [73].
Motion, absolute and relative, Prin. §110
in, 112, 113, 114, 115, [102, 103].
Music, Schopenhauer on, Prol. XIII. 116.
Names, like letters in algebra, In. \ 19.
Natura naturans, is God, Prin. $ 46, n.
Natural effects, uniformity in producing,
Prin. § 62.
Natural philosophy, purified by the Prin
ciples, Pref. 165.
"
" discussed, Prin. § 101.
Nature, laws of, Prin. \ 30-32.
" laws of, coincident with divine
ideas and will, 57, n.
" sense symbolism of, 60, n.
" methods of, styled language of
its Author, 33, 64, 66, 106, n.,
107.
" volume of, how to read, 109,
[100].
" what, 150.
Necessary connection between ideas, no,
Prin. I 31.
Newton, Sir Isaac, on motion, Prin. \
114.
" treatise on mechanics, no,
[101].
" on infinites, 130.
" and Leibnitz, the calculus,
[109].
Nichol, summary of Berkeley, Prol. III. §
10.
Nirvana and Sansara, Prol. XIII. 117.
Noblest spirits, many, nurtured by Ideal
ism, Prol. XIV. I 13.
Nominal essence, the real essence of
things, Prin. \ 101, n.
Nominalism, Pref. 1 19.
Nominalist, Berkeley not a, App. 416, n.
Nominals, App. A.
Norris, John, of Bemerton, a Male
branchian, Pref. 153.
" on material world, Prin. $ 82, n.
" a neighbor of Collier, App. B.
Nothing, Prin. § 80.
Notion (begriff) and idea (idee), Prin. §
27, [42].
Notions of relations, Pref. 154.
INDEX.
419
Notions, particular or universal, In. \ 15,
n.
" how represented in the phantasy,
18, n.
" how applied to the object- world
of the senses, Prin. § 5, «.
" visibly inactive, 25.
Number, a primary quality, Prin. g 9.
" a creature of the mind, 12.
" abstract ideas of, object of arith
metic, 1 19.
Nunneley, on case of born blind, App. C.
Object, external, Prin. \ 14.
" outward, a contradiction, 15, n.
" signification of, 5, n.
Objections to Berkeley's Principles of
Knowledge, Pref. 157, 162 ;
Prin. I 34-84
" ninth of these, [72].
Objects of knowledge, defined, Prin. \ I.
" perceived by sense, defined, 91.
" ideas as objects of knowledge,
Ueberweg on, [8].
" of conscious experience, what,
Pref. 157.
" in themselves, a contradiction,
Prin. \ 24; denied by Ueber
weg. [3 8 ]
Occasion, Prin. \ 68, 69, 70, 74, [82, 85].
Occasional causes, theory of, Prin. \ 53,
68, n.
Occasionalists, [71].
Omnipresence of mind, Prin. \ 148.
One, the, and all, Schopenhauer on, Prol.
XIII. I 23.
Optimism, Prin. \ 153, [116].
" Schopenhauer on, Prol. XIII.
§-23.
" Leibnitz, and Voltaire's Can-
dide, Prol. XIII. 119.
Origin of Essay towards a New Theory of
Vision, Prin. \ 43.
Oswald, James, against Berkeley, Prol.
V.? 9
Outness, Prin. \ 43.
Pain in the world, Prin. \ 153.
Pantheism, Schopenhauer on, Prol. XIII.
g2 3 .
Parr, on mode or attribute, Prin. § 49, n.
Passiveness implied in an idea, Prin. \
25.
Pembroke, Earl of, dedication to, Pref.
169.
Perceivable, Prin. \ 8.
Perceivable, Ueberweg on the term, [16].
Perception of God, Prin. \ 147, 148, n.
" images of, [54].
Perceptions, inefficacious, Prin. \ 64.
" defined, [117].
Personality of man, and Idealism, Prol.
XIV. \ 2.
Pessimism, Schopenhauer's, Prol. XIII.
\ 2 3
Phantasy, notion how represented in, In.
I 1 8, n.
Phenomena, sensible things, ideas of
sense, Pref. 154.
" objects of human knowl-
edge, Prin. \ i t n.
" numerically different in each
mind, 147, n.
" explained without matter,
5°
" denied by Ueberweg, [70].
Philosophical spirit, and Idealism, Prol.
XIV. I 12.
Philosophical Transactions, Cheselden's
and other cases, App. C.
Philosophy defined, In. $ 1.
Physical causation, contrasted with effi
cient or spiritual, Prin. § 65, «.
Physics and metaphysics, [11S].
Pierer (Univ. Lex.), Idealism defined,
Prol. VII. I 10.
" Realism defined, [117].
Platner, summary of Berkeley, Prol. III.
u-
" estimate of Berkeley, Prol. VI. \
8.
" definition of Idealism, Prol. VII.
§3
Plato and Schelling, Prol. XL \ 97.
" idea, [1].
Plotinus and Schelling, Prol. XL \ 97.
420
INDEX.
Polytheism, Schopenhauer on, Prol. XIII.
§116.
Porter, definition of consciousness, [117]..
Positivism, spiritual, Berkeleyanism a sort
of, Prin. § 102, n.
Potential existence, what Berkeley meant
by, Prin. \ 45, n.
Potentially, sensible things exist, Prin. §
45, »•
Power, voluntary activity, Pref. 153.
" impossible in world of ideas, Prin.
\ 25, n.
Practical, arithmetic should be, Prin. \ 1 19,
[104].
Prediction, scientific, Prin. \ 59.
Presentative and representative experience,
Pref. 159.
Primary qualities, ideas of, Prin. § 9.
"
" their absoluteness, 12,
n.
Primary and secondary qualities, distinc
tion between, Prin. \ 9.
Primary and secondary qualities, Ueber
weg on, [17].
Princeton, Berkeleyanism at, Prol. IV.
\ 4
Princeton Club, Prol. XVI. \ 6.
Principles of Human Knowledge, present
edition, objects and uses of,
Prol. XVI.
" Berkeley's, best book for com
mencing reading, Prol. XVI.
I 3-
'•' a classic in philosophy and lit
erature, Prol. XVI. \ 4.
" arranged as an introduction,
Prol. XVI. \ 5.
" criticisms of, Pref. 151.
" editions of, Pref. 151.
" analysis of, Pref. 155.
" consequences of, Pref. 157.
" objections to the, Pref. 157,
162; Prin. I 85-156.
'* universals combated in, Pref.
154.
" against sceptics, Pref. 171.
" original introduction to, App.
A.
Principles of human knowledge investi
gated, In. \ 4.
Production of ideas, Prin. $ 19.
Prolegomena to Principles, 1-148.
Proof, Berkeley's, of his doctrine, Prin. §
4, n.
Pravidence, immediate works of, little
souls burlesque, Prin. \ 154, [116].
Psychical and physical, [119].
Psychology, its weakness, [118],
Qualities, do not exist apart, In. \ 7.
" coexistent, idea of, 8.
" primary and secondary, Prin.
p.
" primary, can exist only in the
mind, 73, [84].
Quiddity, abstract idea of, Prin. $ 81.
Real and substantial in nature, what, Prin.
I 34, 3 6
Real, sense-ideas are, Prin. \ 90.
Realism defined, [117].
Realism and Idealism contrasted, Prol.
XIV. I 10.
" Berkeley's, Pref. 155, n.
" or dualism, intelligible, Prin. \
39» »•
" foundation of, 92.
Reality in ideas, Prin. \ 36.
" meaning of, 89.
" of things, 91.
" not denied, 36, [49].
Reason gives us knowledge of external
things, Prin. § 18.
Reasoning and thinking, distinction be
tween, In. $ 12, n.
Reflection, Locke's ideas of sense and,
Prin. § I, n.
Regis, definition of consciousness, [117].
Reid, summary of Berkeley, Prol. III.
§2.
" first accepts, then rejects, his views,
Prol. V. I 4.
" estimate of Berkeley, Prol. VI. \ 9.
" on representative perception, Prin.
I 86, n.
" on plurality of Egos, 145.
INDEX.
421
Reid, on definition of consciousness,
[»7]
Reinhold, K. L., argument against Ideal
ism, Prol. X. 87.
Relativity of motion, &c, Prin. \ 1 13.
Religion, Hegel on, Prol. XII. 104.
Representative idea in perception, Prin. \
86, n.
Representative and presentative experi
ence, Pref. 159.
Rest, a primary quality, Prin. \ 9.
Ritter, estimate of Berkeley, Prol. VI. $ 15.
Rothenflue, summary of Berkeley, Prol.
III. \ 9.
" of Hume, Prol. VIII.
" of Kant, Prol. IX.
" of Fichte, Prol. X.
" of Schelling, Prol. XI.
" of Jacobi, Prol. XI.
of Hegel, Prol. XII.
Satze, propositions, Prin. § 129.
Sansara and Nirvana, Prol. XIII. 117.
Scepticism, refuted by Berkeley's Princi
ples, Pref. 165.
" its causes, In. \ I.
" its root, Prin. \ 86.
Sceptics, Principles useful to, Pref. 171.
Schelling, system of, Prol. XI.
" relation to Hegel, Prol. XII.
102.
Schiller, on the laws of nature, Prin. \
32, n.
Schlegel, Frederick, Idealism, definition,
Prol. VII. § 4.
Schmid, Heinrich Th., on the strength
and weakness of Idealism, Prol. XIV.
§17.
Scholten, summary of Berkeley, Prol. III.
" Fichte's system, Prol. X. 89, 92.
" on Schelling, Prol. XI. 93.
Schoolmen, their doctrine of abstraction,
In. I I 7 .
" argue for a continued crea
tion, Prin. \ 46.
Schopenhauer, definition of Idealism, Prol.
VII. I 14.
Schopenhauer, Idealism of, Prol. XIII.
" estimates of, by Herbart
and Zeller, Prol. XIII.
§25.
Schwegler, summary of Berkeley, Prol.
III. \ 12.
Scotch school, runs into Idealism, [118].
Scotus Erigena, pantheist, [117].
Scripture, on existence of matter,Prin. §82.
Secondary qualities, their occasion, Prin.
§9- ■
Sensation, signification of, Prin. \ 5, n.
Sensations, cannot exist but in a percipient
mind, Prin. \ 3.
" visibly inactive, 25.
" uniformity of, 72.
" in the mind are perfectly
known, 87.
Sense, and reflection, Locke's ideas of,
Prin. § l,n.
" ideas of, exist without the mind,
Sir William Hamilton, 8, n.
" locomotive experience in, II, n.
" and imagination confused, 23, n.
" ideas of, 29, [43].
" supposed want of a, 77, [87].
Sense, common, Beattie's definition, Prol.
V.? 8.
Sense-ideas, how distinguished from imag
ination, Prin. \ 28-30.
Sense-objects, archetypes of real things,
Prin. \ 41, n.
Sense-symbolism of nature, Prin. § 60, n.
Senses are to be believed, Prin. \ 40, n.
[52] ; distrusted by philoso
phers, 88.
" do not prove matter, 18 ; Ueber
weg on, [28].
Senses, the, Schopenhauer on, Prol. XIII.
US-
Sensibile, minimum, Prin. § 132.
Sensible objects, have no abstract exist
ence, Prin. § 4.
"
" Uebenveg on, [10].
Sensible qualities, are the secondary, Prin.
§9
"
" must be in the mind,
10, n.
422
INDEX.
Sensible system, divine ideas ultimate
archetype of, Prin. \ 72, n.
Sensible and perceivable, the terms,
Ueberweg on, [16].
Sensible things, exist potentially, Prin. \
45
"
" existence of, 88.
Shaftesbury, Alciphron, Prol. I. \ 7.
Sight, ideas of, distinct from those of
touch, Prin. $ 44.
" gives the idea of light and colour, I .
Sign, a word a sign of general ideas, In.
§»•
" relation of with thing signified,
Prin. I 65, [80].
Signs, regarded by arithmetic, not things,
Prin. £ 22.
Simon, Collyns T., a Berkeleyan, Prol.
IV. I 7 -
" suggested rendering of 'idea,' [1].
Sinneswahrnehmung, 'sensation,' Prin.
I 137, 146.
Siris, Prol. I. § IO.
" its relation to the Principles, Prin.
\ 67, n.
Solidity, a primary quality, Prin. \ 9.
" figure, &c, have no activity, 61,
[76].
Somewhat, matter as, Prin. \ 75, [86].
Soul, its natural immortality, Prin. \ 141.
" and body do not act apart, [119].
" and body distinct, yet in unity,
[119].
Sounds, secondary qualities, Prin. \ 10.
Space, absolute, Prin. \ 112, n.
Spinoza and Berkeley, Prol. II. \ 5.
" and Schelling, Prol. XI. 97.
" Schopenhauer on, Prol. XIII. \
21, 22.
" on substance, Prin. \ 135, n. ;
idea, [1].
Spirit, defined, Pref. 160; Prin. § 27,
[40], 89, 138.
" is the only substance, 7 ; Ueber
weg on, [14, 40].
" alone can act, 57.
" the only efficient cause, 102.
" no idea of, 135.
Spirit and bod}', [118].
Spirits and ideas, or phenomena, every
thing known, Prin. § 86.
" heterogeneous, 89.
" other, how known by us, 145,
[114].
Spiritual causation, contrasted with physi
cal, Prin. \ 65, n.
Spiritual positivism, Berkeleyism a sort
of, Prin. \ io2,n. ■
Stars fixed, not attracted, Prin. \ 106;
denied by Ueberweg, [98].
Stewart, Dugald, on abstraction, In. §
19, n.
"
" on Baxter, Prol. V. \ 3.
"
" on Diderot, 7.
"
" on Berkeley, 10.
"
" on Malebranche,Norris,
and Reid, 10.
"
" estimate of Berkeley,
Prol. VI. \ 10.
"
" definition of conscious-
ness, [117].
Stirling and Berkeley, Prol. IV. \ II.
" estimate of Berkeley, Prol. VI. §
17
Strauss and Hegel, Prol. XII. 104.
Subject, Prin. \ 27, [41], 49, [67].
" or substance, 49.
" Aristotelian distinctions, [69J.
Substance, and Idealism, Prol. XIV. \ 6.
" meaning of, Pref. 153, 156,
159; Prin. I 37.
" no idea of, [50], 14, n.
" unity of, held by Berkeley, 7, «.
" is spirit, soul, 135.
" no unthinking, 139.
" connected by Berkeley with
cause, 26, ;z.
" cause of ideas must be a, 27.
" in vulgar sense, 37.
" as a support of qualities, 91.
" cannot be an idea, [92], 135.
" and accidents, 17; Ueberweg
on, [27].
" extended moveable, an idea,
22; denied by Ueberweg,
[35]-
INDEX.
423
Substantial and real in nature, Prin. \ 34.
Substratum, no unthinking, Prin. \ 7.
" matter is a, 16.
" of qualities, 77.
Succession of ideas, Prin. \ 26, 59, 98.
Suggestion of experience, Prin. \ 145.
Swift, estimate of Berkeley, Prol. I. § 3 ;
VI. I 1.
Symbolical knowledge, Leibnitz on, In.
I I9» «•
Symbolism, sense-, of nature, Prin. \ 60, n.
Symbolism of nature, universal, Prin. §
65, n.
Tar-water, Prol. I. \ 10.
Tastes, secondary qualities, Prin. \ 100.
Tennemann, summary of Berkeley, Prol.
III. I 6.
" objections to Berkeley, Prol.
V. I 12.
" definition of Idealism, Prol.
VII. I 8.
Theism, Schopenhauer on, Prol. XIII. 116.
Thing, meaning of, Pref. 155, 11., Prin. \
89, n.
" in contradistinction to idea, 38,
[51].
" real, 33, 172.
" not regarded by arithmetic, but
sign, 122, 219.
Things, reality and existence of, not de
nied, Prin. § 36, [49].
Thinking and reasoning, distinction be
tween, In. \ 12, n.
Thought, universe as a thing of, Prol.
XIV. I 4.
" divine, absolute truth, Prin. \
76, n.
Tiedemann, estimate of Berkeley, Prol.
VI. ?i 7.
Time, finite, apprehension of changes of
our ideas, Pref. 153.
" idea of, Prin. \ 98, [94].
Touch and sight, heterogeneous, Prin. \
44.
" the ideas acquired by, 1.
Transcendental, Prin. \ 118.
Tuke, literature on mind and body, [119].
Ueberweg, edition of Principles, Prol. I.
I IS-
" Preface, 15.
" summary of Berkeley, Prol.
III. I 15.
" ' correspondence with Simon,
Prol. IV. I 9.
" estimate of Berkeley, Prol. VI.
\ 16.
" Annotations on the Principles,
Prol. XV. §4; XVI.; 329.
" Logic, Prol. XV. \ 4.
Understanding implies spirit, Prin. § 27.
Uniformity, in production of natural ef
fects, Prin. \ 62.
" of sensations, 72.
Unity, love of, Idealism appeals to, Prol.
XIV. \ 8.
" an abstract idea, 13.
" arbitrary, 12.
" denied by Ueberweg, [24].
" Locke on, quoted by Ueberweg,
[25]
" in abstract denied, 120.
" of substance held by Berkeley, J,
n.
Universal assent of mankind, an argu
ment for matter, Prin. § 54.
Universal or particular notions, In. \ 15,
n.
Universality, in what it consists, In. \ 16,
147.
Universals combated in the Principles,
Pref. 154.
Vanini and Spinoza, Prol. XIII. 118.
Virtue, strongest incentive of, Prin. \ 155.
Visible ideas, are a language, Prin. \ 44.
Vision, origin of Essay towards a New
Theory of, Prin. ? 6 43, [55]
" essay on, referred to, 116.
Vogel, summary of Berkeley, Prol. III. \
16.
Voltaire, opposed to Berkeley, Prol. V. \
6.
Voraussetzung, principle, Prin. \ 129.
Vorstellung, Schopenhauer, Prol. XIII.
106, 107.
424
INDEX.
Vorstellung, notion, Prin. \ 130, 141,
142.
" idea, [43].
Warburton, on Baxter, Prol. V. \ 3.
" on Berkeley, Prol. VI. § I.
Watch, illustration from, Prin. \ 62,
[78].
Will, the world is, Schopenhauer on, Prol.
XIII. in, 112.
" defined, 113.
" world as, universal recognition of,
"3-
" is active spirit, Prin. \ 27.
" or spirit, some other produces our
ideas, Prin. g 29.
" Ueberweg on, [44].
Willich, Idealism, definition of, Prol. VII.
$5-
Wolff, definition of Idealism, Pro!
" definition of consciousness,
Words, deception of, In. § 23.
" Locke on abuse of, 23.
" embarrass and delude, 24.
" men amuse themselves with, ^....
§24.
" Ueberweg on, [6].
" Locke on, quoted by Ueberweg,
[7]
World not a dream, Schopenhauer on,
Prol. XIII. in.
" is will, III.
" a makranthropos, 117.
Zeller on Beck, Prol. X. 87.
" on Hegel, Prol. XII. 105.
" on Schopenhauer, Prol. XIII. \ 25.
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