A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge 2 of 2

Share this book | A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge by George Berkeley (1685-1753) Part 2 51. Seventhly, it will upon this be demanded whether it does not seem absurd to take away natural causes, and ascribe every thing to the immediate operation of Spirits ? We must no longer say upon these principles that fire heats, or water cools, but that a Spirit heats, and so forth. Would not a man be deservedly laughed at, who should talk after this manner? I answer, he would so ; in such things we ought to ' think with the learned, and speak with the vulgar.' They who to demonstration are 4 Philosophers have treated the relation of Matter to Mind in perception as one of cause and effect — the result, according to Berkeley, of illegitimate analysis or abstraction, which creates a fictitious duality of substance. By his new principles, philosophy is based on a recognition of the fact that perception is neither the cause nor the effect of its object, but in a relation to it that is sui generis and ultimate. Cf. Prof. Ferrier on ' perception' and ' matter,' in his Institutes of Metaphysics, Prop. IV., and Remains, Vol. II. pp. 261 — 288. 407—409. OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 223 convinced of the truth of the Copernican system do neverthe less say 'the sun rises,' 'the sun sets/ or 'comes to the meridian;' and if, they affected a contrary style in common talk it would without doubt appear very ridiculous. A little reflection on what is here said will make it manifest that the common use of language would receive no manner of alteration or disturbance from the admission of our tenets. 52. In the ordinary affairs of life, any phrases may be retained, so long as they excite in us proper sentiments, or dispositions to act in such a manner as is necessary for our well-being, how false soever they may be if taken in a strict and speculative sense. Nay, this is unavoidable, since, propriety being regulated by custom, language is suited to the received opinions, which are not always the truest. Hence it is impossible — even in the most rigid, philosophic reasonings — so far to alter the bent and genius of the tongue we speak, as never to give a handle for cavillers to pretend difficulties and inconsistencies. But, a fair and ingenuous reader will collect the sense from the scope and tenor and con nexion of a discourse, making allowances for those inaccurate modes of speech which use has made inevitable. 53. As to the opinion that there are no Corporeal Causes, this has been heretofore maintained by some of the Schoolmen, as it is of late by others among the modern philosophers, who though they allow Matter to exist, yet will have God alone to be the immediate efficient cause of all things 5 . These men [ 7I ] saw that amongst all the objects of sense there was none which had any power or activity included in it ; and that by consequence this was likewise true of whatever bodies they supposed to exist without the mind, like unto the immediate objects of sense 6 . But then, that they should suppose an innumerable multitude of created beings, which they acknowledge are not capable of producing any one effect in nature, and which therefore are made to no manner of purpose, since God might have done everything as well without s He refers to Des Cartes, and especially Geulinx, Malebranche, &c, who, while they argued for material substance, denied the causality of sensible things. With them, as with Berkeley, there are no causes in the material or phenomenal world — only effects, which are evolved in a constant order, contemporaneous and successive, and thus express the mean ing of the Supreme Power. See Malebranche, Entretiens, VI., VII. 6 i. e. of their hypothetical material world, existing unperceived. 224 OF THE PRINCIPLES them — this I say, though we should allow it possible, must yet be a very unaccountable and extravagant supposition 7 . 54. In the eighth place, the universal concurrent assent of mankind 8 may be thought by some an invincible argument in behalf of Matter, or the existence of external things. Must we suppose the whole world to be mistaken ? And if so, what cause can be assigned of so widespread and predominant an error? — I answer, first, that, upon a narrow inquiry, it will not perhaps be found so many as is imagined do really believe the existence of Matter or things without the mind. Strictly speaking, to believe that which involves a contradiction, or has no meaning in it 9 , is impossible ; and whether the foregoing expressions are not of that sort, I refer it to the impartial examination of the reader. In one sense, indeed, men may be said to believe that Matter exists, that is, they act as if the immediate cause of their sensa tions, which affects them every moment, and is so nearly present to them, were some senseless unthinking being. But, that they should clearly apprehend any meaning marked by those words, and form thereof a settled speculative opinion, is what I am not able to conceive. This is not the only instance wherein men im pose upon themselves, by imagining they believe those proposi tions which they have often heard, though at bottom they have no meaning in them. 55. But secondly, though we should grant a notion to be never so universally and stedfastly adhered to, yet this is but a weak argument of its truth to whoever considers what a vast number of prejudices and false opinions are everywhere embraced with the utmost tenaciousness, by the unreflecting (which are the far greater) part of mankind. There was a time when the antipodes and motion of the earth were looked upon as monstrous absurd ities even by men of learning : and if it be considered what a 7 On the principle, ' Entia non sunt multiplicanda prsster necessitatem.' 8 Commonly called the argument from Common Sense, and illustrated in the writings of Reid and other Scotch psychologists. That the unreflecting part of mankind should hold an unintelligible, or at least confused, Realism is not to be wondered at, when we recollect that it is the very office of philosophy to interpret the sensible reality, which they and philosophers acknowledge in common to be ' external,' in some meaning of the term. 9 Sect. 4, 9, 15, 17, 22, 24. OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 225 small proportion they bear to the rest of mankind, we shall find that at this day those notions have gained but a very inconsider able footing in the world. 56. But it is demanded that we assign a cause of this prejudice, and account for its obtaining in the world. To this I answer, that men knowing they perceived several ideas 10 , whereof they themselves were not the authors — as not being excited from within nor depending on the operation of their wills — this made them maintain those ideas 10 or objects of perception had an existence independent of and without the mind, without ever dreaming that a contradiction was involved in those words. But, philosophers having plainly seen that the immediate objects of perception do not exist without the mind, they in some degree corrected the mistake of the vulgar " ; but at the same time run into another which seems no less absurd, to wit, that there are certain objects really existing without the mind, or having a subsistence distinct from being perceived, of which our ideas are only images or resemblances, imprinted by those objects 12 on the mind. And this notion of the philosophers owes its origin to the same cause with the former, namely, their being conscious that they were not the authors of their own sensations, which they evidently knew were imprinted from without, and which therefore must have some cause distinct from the minds on which they are imprinted. 57. But why they should suppose the ideas of sense to be excited in us by things in their likeness, and not rather have recourse to Spirit which alone can act, may be accounted for, first, because they were not aware of the repugnancy there is, as well in supposing things like unto our ideas existing without, as in attributing to them power or activity. Secondly, because 10 i. e. sense-ideas. — Though his own sense-ideas or objects are independent of the will of the finite percipient, it does not follow that they are independent of his perception. Cf. sect. 29—33. 11 By recognising that what we are immediately percipient of must be ideal, or at least that it is only known by us in sense as ideal — as a sense-percept. 12 i. e. by the unperceived or absolute objects which, on this hypothesis of a representa tive sense-perception, were assumed to exist behind the properly perceived objects or ideas, and to be (according to some) the cause of their appearance in our consciousness. Cf. Third Dialogue between Hylas and Philonous, p. 359. 15 226 OF THE PRINCIPLES the Supreme Spirit which excites those ideas in our minds, is not marked out and limited to our view by any particular finite collection of sensible ideas, as human agents are by their size, complexion, limbs, and motions. And thirdly, because His operations are regular and uniform. Whenever the course of nature is interrupted by a miracle, men are ready to own the presence of a superior agent. But, when we see things go on in the ordinary course they do not excite in us any reflection ; their order and concatenation, though it be an argument of the greatest wisdom, power, and goodness in their creator, is yet so constant and familiar to us that we do not think them the im mediate effects of a Free Spirit ; especially since inconsistency and mutability in acting, though it be an imperfection, is looked on as a mark of freedom**. 58. Tentldy, [ ?2 ] it will be objected that the notions we advance are inconsistent with several sound truths in philosophy and mathematics. For example, the motion of the earth is now universally admitted by astronomers as a truth grounded on the clearest and most convincing reasons. But, on the foregoing principles, there can be no such thing. For, motion being only an idea, it follows that if it be not perceived it exists not : but the motion of the earth is not perceived by sense. I answer, that tenet, if rightly understood, will be found to agree with the prin ciples we have premised ; for, the question whether the earth moves or no amounts in reality to no more than this, to wit, whether we have reason to conclude, from what has been ob served by astronomers, that if we were placed in such and such circumstances, and such or such a position and distance both from the earth and sun, we should perceive the former to move among the choir of the planets, and appearing in all respects like one of them ; [ 73 ] and this, by the established rules of nature which we have no reason to mistrust, is reasonably collected from the phenomena. 59. We may, from the experience we have had of the train J 3 Hence the difficulty men have in recognising that the Divine Ideas f\nd Will, and the Laws of Nature, are coincident. But in fact the scientific discovery of laws in nature, instead of narrowing, extends the sphere of intelligible Divine agency. OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 227 and succession of ideas 14 in our minds, often make, I will not say uncertain conjectures, but sure and well-grounded predictions concerning the ideas 14 we shall be affected with pursuant to a great train of actions, and be enabled to pass a right judgment of what would have appeared to us, in case we were placed in circumstances very different from those we are in at present. Herein consists the knowledge of nature, which may preserve its use and certainty very consistently with what hath been said. It will be easy to apply this to whatever objections of the like sort may be drawn from the magnitude of the stars, or any other discoveries in astronomy or nature. [ 74 ] 60. In the eleventh place, it will be demanded to what purpose serves that curious organization of plants, and the animal me chanism in the parts of animals ; might not vegetables grow, and shoot forth leaves and blossoms, and animals perform all their motions as well without as with all that variety of internal parts so elegantly contrived and put together ; which, being ideas, have nothing powerful or operative in them, nor have any necessary 15 connexion with the effects ascribed to them ? If it be a Spirit that immediately produces every effect byajiator act of his will, we must think all that is fine and artificial in the works, whether of man or nature, to be made in vain. By this doctrine, though an artist has made the spring and wheels, and every movement of a watch, and adjusted them in such a manner as he knew would produce the motions he designed, yet he must think all this done to no purpose, and that it is an Intelligence which directs the index, and points to the hour of the day. If so, why may not the Intelligence do it, without his being at the pains of making the movements and putting them together? Why does not an empty case serve as well as another ? And how comes it to pass that whenever there is any fault in the going of a watch, there is some corresponding disorder to be found in *+ ' ideas,' i. e. sense-ideas or sensations. This ' experience' consists of the established association of sensations or percepts in the order of external nature, not mere ' association of ideas' — in the popular meaning of the word idea. *S Cf. sect. 25, and also various passages in Berkeley's writings in which he insists upon the arbitrariness of the so-called causal relations among sensible things, and the conse quent sense-symbolism of Nature. It is thus that he speaks of a language of Vision. Cf. Theory of Vision Vindicated, passim. 228 OF THE PRINCIPLES the movements, which being mended by a skilful hand all is right again ? The like may be said of all the clockwork of nature, great part whereof is so wonderfully fine and subtle as scarce to be discerned by the best microscope. In short, it will be asked, how, upon our principles, any tolerable account can be given, or any final cause assigned of an innumerable multitude of bodies and machines, framed with the most exquisite art, which in the common philosophy have very apposite uses assigned them, and serve to explain abundance of phenomena ? 61. To all which I answer, first, that though there were some difficulties relating to the administration of Providence, and the uses by it assigned to the several parts of nature, which I could not solve by the foregoing principles, yet this objection could be of small weight against the truth and certainty of those things which may be proved a priori, with the utmost evidence and rigour of demonstration 16 . [ 7S ] Secondly, but neither are the re ceived principles free from the like difficulties ; for, it may still be demanded to what end God should take those roundabout methods of effecting things by instruments and machines, which no one can deny might have been effected by the mere command of His will without all that apparatus: nay, if we narrowly consider it, we shall find the objection may be retorted with greater force on those who hold the existence of those machines without the mind ; for it has been made evident [ ?6 ] that solidity, bulk, figure, motion, and the like have no activity or efficacy in them, so as to be capable of producing any one effect in nature. See sect. 25. Whoever therefore supposes them 17 to exist (allowing the sup position possible) when they are not perceived does it mani festly to no purpose ; since the only use that is assigned to them 17 , as they exist unperceived, is that they produce those perceivable effects which in truth cannot be ascribed to anything but Spirit. 62. But, to come nigher the difficulty, it must be observed that though the fabrication of all those parts and organs be not ab- 16 Cf. sect. 3, 4, 22 — 24. x 7 ' them,' i. e. the solid and extended objects, which are supposed to exist unperceived and unpercipient — as distinguished from the Intelligent Cause to whom Berkeley attrib utes the orderly appearance, disappearance, and reappearance of ideas or objects in the senses. OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 229 solutely necessary to the producing any effect, yet it is necessary to the producing of things in a. constant regular way according to the laws of nature. [ 77 ] There are certain general laws that run through the whole chain of natural effects : these are learned by the observation and study of nature, and are by men applied as well to the framing artificial things for the use and ornament of life as to the explaining the various phenomena — which expli cation consists only in shewing the conformity any particular phe nomenon hath to the general laws of nature, or, which is the same thing, in discovering the uniformity there is in the production of natural effects ; as will be evident to whoever shall attend to the several instances wherein philosophers pretend to account for appearances. That there is a great and conspicuous use in these regular constant methods of working observed by the Supreme Agent hath been shewn in sect. 31. And it is no less visible that a particular size, figure, motion, and disposition of parts are neces sary, though not absolutely to the producing any effect, yet to the producing it according to the standing mechanical laws of nature. Thus, for instance, it cannot be denied that God, or the Intel ligence that sustains and rules the ordinary course of things, might if He were minded to produce a miracle, cause all the motions on the dial-plate of a watch, though nobody had ever made the movements and put them in it : but yet, if He will act agreeably to the rules of mechanism, by Him for wise ends established and maintained in the creation, it is necessary that those actions of the watchmaker, whereby he makes the movements and rightly adjusts them, precede the production of the aforesaid motions; as also that any disorder in them be attended with [ ?8 ] the per ception of some corresponding disorder in the movements, which being once corrected all is right again. 63. It may indeed on some occasions be necessary that the Author of nature display His overruling power in producing some appearance out of the ordinary series of things 18 . Such exceptions from the general rules of nature are proper to surprise and awe men into an acknowledgment of the Divine Being; but 18 So far as that series has been interpreted by us. The nature and moral office of miraculous or supernatural events, in a system of Universal Providence, is here touched upon. 230 OF THE PRINCIPLES then they are to be used but seldom, otherwise there is a plain reason why they should fail of that effect. [ 79 ] Besides, God seems to choose the convincing our reason of His attributes by the works of nature, which discover so much harmony and con trivance in their make, and are such plain indications of wisdom and beneficence in their Author, rather than to astonish us into a belief of His Being by anomalous and surprising events. 64. To set this matter in a yet clearer light, I shall observe that what has been objected in sect. 60 amounts in reality to no more than this : — ideas are not anyhow and at random produced, there being a certain order and connexion between them, like to that of cause and effect : there are also several combinations of them made in a very regular and artificial manner, which seem like so many instruments in the hand of nature that, being hid as it were behind the scenes, have a secret operation in producing those appearances which are seen on the theatre of the world, being themselves discernible only to the curious eye of the phi losopher. But, since one idea cannot be the cause of another, to what purpose is that connexion ? And, since those instruments, being barely inefficacious perceptions^ 9 in the mind, are not sub servient to the production of natural effects, it is demanded why they are made ; or, in other words, what reason can be assigned why God should make us, upon a close inspection into His works, behold so great variety of ideas so artfully laid together, and so much according to rule; it not being [ 2 ° credible] that He would be at the expense (if one may so speak) of all that art and regularity to no purpose. [ 8o ] 65. To all which my answer is, first, that the connexion of ideas does not imply the relation of cause and effect, but only of a mark or sign with the thing signified. The fire which I see is not the cause of the pain I suffer upon my approaching it, but the mark that forewarns me of it. In like manner the noise that I hear is not the effect of this or that motion or collision of the ambient bodies, but the sign thereof 21 . Secondly, the reason why ideas are formed into machines, that is, artificial and regular com- J 9 Cf. sect. 25. 20 ' imaginable' — in first edition. 21 According to Berkeley, Minds, Spirits, Persons are the only proper causes ; and it is only by an abuse of language that the term ' cause' is applied to the ideas or objects which OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 231 binations, is the same with that for combining letters into words 22 . That a few original ideas may be made to signify a great number of effects and actions, it is necessary they be variously combined together. And, to the end their use be permanent and universal, these combinations must be made by rule, and with wise con trivance. By this means abundance of information is conveyed unto us, concerning what we are to expect from such and such actions, and what methods are proper to be taken for the exciting such and such ideas — which in effect is all that I conceive to be distinctly meant when it is said 23 that, by discerning the figure, texture, and mechanism of the inward parts of bodies, whether natural or artificial, we may attain to know the several uses and properties depending thereon, or the nature of the thing. 66. Hence, it is evident that those things which, under the notion of a cause co-operating or concurring to the production of effects, are altogether inexplicable, and run us into great absurdities, may be very naturally explained, and have a proper and obvious use assigned to them, when they are considered only as marks or signs for our information. And it is the searching after and endeavouring to understand this Language (if I may so call it) of the Author of nature, that ought to be the employ ment of the natural philosopher; and not the pretending to ex plain things by corporeal causes, which doctrine seems to have too much estranged the minds of men from that active principle, that supreme and wise Spirit ' in whom we live, move, and have our being.' 6y. In the twelfth place, it may perhaps be objected that — though it be clear from what has been said that there can be no are invariable antecedents of other ideas or objects — the prior form of their objective or phenomenal existence. He contrasts so-called Physical with Spiritual Causation — the latter being implied in our conception of mind ; the former consisting in the observable relations of phenomena, in which causation proper is unperceived, and therefore non existent. Physical Science is the interpretation of natural signs, and is only confused (Berkeley would say) by reference to an unconscious agency which is inconceivable. 22 Berkeley, in meeting this objection, thus reverts to his favourite theory of a Universal Natural Symbolism as the true character of the sensible world. See next section, which describes the orderly co-existences and sequences of nature as not causally necessary, but arbitrarily constructed — in order to be a means of social intercourse, and for the use of man in his contemplation of the Supreme Mind. =>3 See Locke's Essay, B. IV. ch. 3, g 25—28, &c. 232 OF THE PRINCIPLES such thing as an inert, senseless, extended, solid, figured, move able substance existing without the mind, such as philosophers describe Matter — yet, if any man shall leave out of his idea of matter the positive ideas of extension, figure, solidity and motion, and say that he means only by that word an inert, senseless substance, that exists without the mind or unperceived, which is the occasion of our ideas, or at the presence whereof God is pleased to excite ideas in us — [ 8l ] it doth not appear but that Matter taken in this sense may possibly exist. In answer to which I say, first, that it seems no less absurd to suppose a sub stance without accidents, than it is to suppose accidents without a substance 24 . But secondly, though we should grant this un known substance may possibly exist, yet where can it be supposed to be? That it exists not in the mind 23 is agreed; and that it exists not in place is no less certain — since all place or extension exists only in the mind 26 , as hath been already proved. It re mains therefore that it exists nowhere at all. 68. Let us examine a little the description that is here given us of matter. It neither acts, nor perceives, nor is perceived ; for this is all that is meant by saying it is an inert, senseless, unknown substance; which is a definition entirely made up of negatives, excepting only the relative notion of its standing under or supporting. But then it must be observed that it supports nothing at all, and how nearly this comes to the description of a nonentity I desire may be considered. But, say you, it is the unknown occasion* 1 , at the presence of which ideas are excited in us by the will of God. Now, I would fain know how anything can be present to us, which is neither perceivable by sense nor reflection, nor capable of producing any idea in our minds, nor is at all extended, nor hath any form, nor exists in any place. z 4 With Berkeley, material substance is merely the complement of simple ideas or phenomena which arbitrarily constitute a particular thing. (Cf. sect. 37.) The Divine Will is, with him, the cause of phenomena being thus constituted, combined, or substan tiated. His substance-proper, i. e. mind, is necessary, because an object-perceived neces sarily implies a percipient. 2 5 i. e. that it is not perceived. 26 i. e. ' place ' exists only as perceived or conceived by an intelligence — sense-percep tion being its real, and conception its imagined existence. Mind is thus, with Berkeley, the place of locality and of space. Cf. Siris, sect. 285, &c. 27 He refers to the Cartesian theory of occasional causes. OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 233 The words ' to be present,' when thus applied, must needs be taken in some abstract and strange meaning, and which I am not able to comprehend. 69. Again, let us examine what is meant by occasion. So far as I can gather from the common use of language, that word signifies either the agent which produces any effect, or else some thing that is observed to accompany or go before it in the ordi nary course of things. [ 82 ] But, when it is applied to Matter as above described, it can be taken in neither of those senses ; for Matter is said to be passive and inert, and so cannot be an agent or efficient cause. It is also unperceivable, as being devoid of all sensible qualities, and so cannot be the occasion of our per ceptions in the latter sense — as when the burning my finger is said to be the occasion of the pain that attends it. What there fore can be meant by calling matter an occasion ? This term is either used in no sense at all, or else in some very distant from its received signification. 70. You will perhaps say that Matter, though it be not per ceived by us, is nevertheless perceived by God, to whom it is the occasion of exciting ideas in our minds 28 . For, say you, since we observe our sensations to be imprinted in an orderly and con stant manner, it is but reasonable to suppose there are certain constant and regular occasions of their being produced. That is to say, that there are certain permanent and distinct parcels of Matter, corresponding to our ideas, which, though they do not excite them in our minds, or anywise immediately affect us, as being altogether passive and unperceivable to us, they are never theless to God, by whom they are perceived 29 , as it were so many occasions to remind Him when and what ideas to imprint on our minds — that so things may go on in a constant uniform manner. 71. In answer to this, I observe that, as the notion of Matter is here stated, the question is no longer concerning the existence 28 So Geulinx and Malebranche. =9 As known by the Divine intelligence, they are accordingly ideas. And, if this means merely that the sensible system is the expression of Divine Ideas, which are its ultimate archetype — that the Ideas of God are symbolised in our senses, to be interpreted or mis interpreted by human minds, as reason in man is applied or misapplied — this theory allies itself with the Platonic. It is partly worked out in Siris. 234 OF THE PRINCIPLES of a thing distinct from Spirit and idea, from perceiving and being perceived ; but whether there are not certain ideas of I know not what sort, in the mind of God, [ 83 ] which are so many marks or notes that direct Him how to produce sensations in our minds in a constant and regular method — much after the same manner as a musician is directed by the notes of music to produce that harmonious train and composition of sound which is called a tune, though they who hear the music do not perceive the notes, and may be entirely ignorant of them. But, this notion of Matter (which after all is the only intelligible one that I can pick from what is said of unknown occasions) seems too extravagant to deserve a confutation. Besides, it is in effect no objection against what we have advanced, viz. that there is no senseless unper ceived substance. 72. If we follow the light of reason, we shall, from the constant uniform method of our sensations, collect the goodness and wis dom of the Spirit who excites them in our minds ; but this is all that I can see reasonably concluded from thence. To me, I say, it is evident that the being of a Spirit infinitely wise, good, and powerful is abundantly sufficient to explain all the appearances of nature 30 . But, as for inert, senseless Matter, nothing that I per ceive has any the least connexion with it, or leads to the thoughts of it. And I would fain see any one explain any the meanest phenomenon in nature by it, or shew any manner of reason, though in the lowest rank of probability, that he can have for its existence, or even make any tolerable sense or meaning of that supposition. For, as to its being an occasion, we have, I think, evidently shewn that with regard to us it is no occasion. It remains therefore that it must be, if at all, the occasion to God of exciting ideas in us ; and what this amounts to we have just now seen. 73. It is worth while to reflect a little on the motives which induced men to suppose the existence oi material substance ; that so having observed the gradual ceasing and expiration of those motives or reasons, we may proportionably withdraw the assent 3° ' It seems to me,' says Hume, ' that this theory of the universal energy and operation of the Supreme Being is too bold ever to carry conviction with it to a mind sufficiently apprised of the weakness of human reason, and the narrow limits to which it is confined in all its operations.' Inqniiy concerning Human Understanding, sect. VII. p. i. O F HUM A N KNO IV L EDGE. 235 that was grounded on them. First, therefore, it was thought that colour, figure, motion, and the rest of the sensible qualities or accidents, did really exist without the mind ; and for this reason it seemed needful to suppose some unthinking substratum or sub stance wherein they did exist — since they could not be conceived to exist by themselves 31 . Afterwards, in process of time, men being convinced that colours, sounds, and the rest of the sensible, secondary qualities had no existence without the mind, they stripped this substratum or material substance of those qualities 32 , leaving only the primary ones, figure, motion, and suchlike, which they still conceived to exist without the mind, and consequently to stand in need of a material support. But, it having been shewn that none even of these can possibly exist otherwise than in a Spirit or Mind which perceives them, it follows [ 84 ] that we have no longer any reason to suppose the being of Matter 33 ; nay, that it is utterly impossible there should be any such thing, so long as that word is taken to denote an unthinking substratum of quali ties or accidents wherein they exist without the mind. 74. But — though it be allowed by the materialists themselves that Matter was thought of only for the sake of supporting acci dents, and, the reason entirely ceasing 34 , one might expect the mind should naturally, and without any reluctance at all, quit the belief of what was solely grounded thereon — yet the prejudice is riveted so deeply in our thoughts, that we can scarce tell how to part with it, and are therefore inclined, since the tiling itself is indefensible, at least to retain the na7ne, which we apply to I know not what abstracted and indefinite notions of being, or occasion, though without any show of reason, at least so far as I can see. For, what is there on our part, [ 8s ] or what do we perceive, amongst all the ideas, sensations, notions which are imprinted on our minds, either by sense or reflection, from whence may be inferred the existence of an inert, thoughtless, unperceived oc- 3 1 Is the assumption of the need for substance of some sort, percipient if not corporeal, regarded by Berkeley as a truth of the absolute or common reason ? 3 2 e. g. Des Cartes, Malebranche, Locke, &c. 33 That is, if we mean by Matter, something existing unperceived and unperceiving. But ' matter,' in another and intelligible meaning of the word, according to Berkeley, may and does exist. 34 Seeing that sensible phenomena are sufficiently ' supported ' by mind. 236 OF THE PRINCIPLES casion ? and, on the other hand, on the part of an All-sufficient Spirit, what can there be that should make us believe or even suspect He is directed by an inert occasion 35 to excite ideas in our minds ? 75. It is a very extraordinary instance of the force of preju dice, and much to be lamented, that the mind of man retains so great a fondness, against all the evidence of reason, for a stupid thoughtless somewhat, [ 86 ] by the interposition whereof it would as it were screen itself from the Providence of God, and remove it farther off from the affairs of the world. But, though we do the utmost we can to secure the belief of Matter, though, when reason forsakes us, we endeavour to support our opinion on the bare possibility of the thing, and though we indulge our selves in the full scope of an imagination not regulated by reason to make out that poor possibility, yet the upshot of all is — that there are certain unknown Ideas in the mind of God ; for this, if anything, is all that I conceive to be meant by occasion with regard to God. And this at the bottom is no longer contending for the thing, but for the name. j6. Whether therefore there are such Ideas in the mind of God, and whether they may be called by the name Matter, I shall not dispute 36 . But, if you stick to the notion of an unthinking sub stance or support of extension, motion, and other sensible quali ties, then to me it is most evidently impossible there should be any such thing ; since it is a plain repugnancy that those qualities should exist in or be supported by an unperceiving substance 37 . yj. But, say you, though it be granted that there is no thought less support of extension and the other qualities or accidents which we perceive, yet there may perhaps be some inert, unper ceiving substance or substratum of some other qualities, as incom prehensible to us as colours are to a man born blind, because we 35 unless that ' occasion ' is only another term for His own Ideas. 3 6 Berkeley's philosophy seems to imply the existence of Divine Ideas, which receive expression in the laws of nature, and of which human science is the imperfect interpreta tion. In this view, the assertion of the existence of Matter, material substance, or occa sion is simply an assertion that the phenomenal universe into which we are born is a reasonable ®r interpretable universe ; and that it would be actually interpreted, if our conceptions were harmonized with the Divine or Absolute Conception which it expresses. The Divine Thought would thus be Absolute Truth or Being. Cf. Siris passim. 37 Cf. sect. 3 — 24. OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 237 have not a sense adapted to them. [ 87 ] But, if we had a new sense, we should possibly no more doubt of their existence than a blind man made to see does of the existence of light and colours. — I answer, first, if what you mean by the word Matter be only the unknown support of unknown qualities, it is no matter whether there is such a thing or no, since it no way concerns us ; and I do not see the advantage there is in disputing about what we know not what, and we know not why. 78. But, secondly, if we had a new sense it could only furnish us with new ideas or sensations ; and then we should have the same reason against their existing in an unperceiving substance that has been already offered with relation to figure, motion, colour, and the like. Qualities, as hath been shewn, are nothing else but sensations or ideas, which exist only in a mind perceiving them ; and this is true not only of the ideas we are acquainted with at present, but likewise of all possible ideas whatsoever. 79. But, you will insist, what if I have no reason to believe the existence of Matter ? what if I cannot assign any use to it or explain anything by it, or even conceive what is meant by that word ? yet still it is no contradiction to say that Matter exists, and that this Matter is in general a substance, or occasion of ideas ; though indeed to go about to unfold the meaning or adhere to any particular explication of those words may be attended with great difficulties. I answer, when words are used without a meaning, you may put them together as you please without danger of running into a contradiction. You may say, for exam ple, that twice two is equal to seven, so long as you declare you do not take the words of that proposition in their usual accepta tion but for marks of you know not what. And, by the same reason, you may say there is an inert thoughtless substance with out accidents which is the occasion of our ideas. And we shall understand just as much by one proposition as the other. 80. In the last place, you will say, what if we give up the cause of material Substance, and stand to it that Matter is an unknown somewhat — neither substance nor accident, spirit nor idea, inert, thoughtless, indivisible, immoveable, unextended, existing in no place ? For, say you, whatever may be urged against substance 238 OF THE PRINCIPLES or occasion, or any other positive or relative notion of Matter, hath no place at all, so long as this negative definition of Matter is adhered to. I answer, you may, if so it shall seem good, use the word ' Matter' in the same sense as other men use ' nothing,' and so make those terms convertible in your style. For, after all, this is what appears to me to be the result of that definition — the parts whereof when I consider with attention, either col lectively or separate from each other, I do not find that there is any kind of effect or impression made on my mind different from what is excited by the term nothing. 81. You will reply, perhaps, that in the foresaid definition is included what doth sufficiently distinguish it from nothing — the positive abstract idea of quiddity, entity, or existence. I own, in deed, that those who pretend to the faculty of framing abstract general ideas do talk as if they had such an idea, which is, say they, the most abstract and general notion of all ; that is, to me, the most incomprehensible of all others. That there are a great variety of spirits of different orders and capacities, whose facul ties both in number and extent are far exceeding those the Author of my being has bestowed on me, I see no reason to deny. And for me to pretend to determine by my own few, stinted, narrow inlets of perception, what ideas the inexhaustible power of the Supreme Spirit may imprint upon them were certainly the utmost folly and presumption — since there may be, for aught that I know, innumerable sorts of ideas or sensations, as different from one another, and from all that I have perceived, as colours are from sounds 38 . But, how ready soever I may be to acknowledge the scantiness of my comprehension with regard to the endless variety of spirits and ideas that may possibly exist, yet for any one to pretend to a notion of Entity or Existence, abstracted from spirit and idea, from perceiving and being perceived, is, I suspect, a downright repugnancy and trifling with words. — It remains that we consider the objections which may possibly be made on the part of Religion. 3 8 Matter and physical science is relative, inasmuch- as we may supppse an indefinite number of additional senses, affording corresponding varieties of sense-experience, of course at present inconceivable by man. Or, we may suppose an intelligence destitute of all j-£«.r£-perceptions, and having ideas or objects of another sort altogether. OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 239 82. Some there are who think that, though the arguments for the real existence of bodies which are drawn from Reason be allowed not to amount to demonstration, yet the Holy Scriptures are so clear in the point, as will sufficiently convince every good Christian that bodies do really exist, and are something more than mere ideas ; there being in Holy Writ innumerable facts related which evidently suppose the reality of timber and stone, mountains and rivers, and cities, and human bodies 39 . To which I answer that no sort of writings whatever, sacred or profane, which use those and the like words in the vulgar acceptation, or so as to have a meaning in them, are in danger of having their truth called in question by our doctrine. That all those things do really exist, that there are bodies, even corporeal substances, when taken in the vulgar sense, has been shewn to be agreeable to our principles : and the difference betwixt tilings and ideas, realities and chimeras, has been distinctly explained. See sect. 29, 30, 33, 36, &c. And I do not think that either what philoso phers call Matter, or the existence of objects without the mind 4 °, is anywhere mentioned in Scripture. 83. Again, whether there be or be not external things 41 , it is agreed on all hands that the proper use of words is the marking our conceptions, or things only as they are known and perceived by us ; whence it plainly follows that in the tenets we have laid down there is nothing inconsistent with the right use and sig nificancy of language, and that discourse, of what kind soever, so far as it is intelligible, remains undisturbed. But all this seems so very manifest, from what has been largely set forth in the premises, that it is needless to insist any farther on it. 84. But, it will be urged that miracles do, at least, lose much of their stress and import by our principles. What must we think of Moses' rod ? was it not really turned into a serpent, or 39 Holy Scripture, and the assumed possibility of its existence, added to our natural tendency to believe, are the grounds on which Malebranche and Norris infer the existence of a material world. Berkeley's material world needs no proof — unless of its permanent orderliness, which he rests on suggestion and custom. His aim is not to prove that the material world exists, but to explain what we should mean when we say that it exists. 4° i. e. existing uncognised by any intelligence — finite or Divine. 4 1 ' external things,' i. e. things existing absolutely, or out of all relation to any cognitive agent. 240 OF THE PRINCIPLES was there only a change of ideas in the minds of the spectators ? And, can it be supposed that our Saviour did no more at the marriage-feast in Cana than impose on the sight, and smell, and taste of the guests, so as to create in them the appearance or idea only of wine ? The same may be said of all other mira cles ; [ 88 ] which, in consequence of the foregoing principles, must be looked upon only as so many cheats, or illusions of fancy. — To this I reply, that the rod was changed into a real serpent, and the water into real wine. That this does not in the least con tradict what I have elsewhere said will be evident from sect. 34 and 35. But this business of real and imaginary has been already so plainly and fully explained, and so often referred to, and the difficulties about it are so easily answered from what has gone before, that it were an affront to the reader's understanding to resume the explication of it in this place. [ 89 ] I shall only observe that if at table all who were present should see, and smell, and taste, and drink wine, and find the effects of it, with me there could be no doubt of its reality 42 ; — so that at bottom the scruple concerning real miracles has no place at all on ours, but only on the received principles, and consequently makes rather for than against what has been said. 85. Having done with the Objections, which I endeavoured to propose in the clearest light, and gave them all the force and weight I could, we proceed in the next place to take a view of our tenets in their Consequences 43 . Some of these appear at first sight — as that several difficult and obscure questions, on which abundance of speculation has been thrown away, are entirely banished from philosophy. ' Whether corporeal substance can think,' ' whether Matter be infinitely divisible,' and ■ how it oper ates on spirit' — these and the like inquiries have given infinite amusement to philosophers in all ages; but, depending on the 4 s The simultaneous consciousness of, or participation in, the ' same ' sense-ideas, by different persons, as distinguished from the purely individual or personal consciousness of imaginary objects and emotions, is here referred to as a test of the reality of the former. 43 They are unfolded in the remaining sections of the Treatise, sect. 85 — 156 : those which apply to ideas and sensible things in sect. 86 — 134 ; what belongs to spirits, or sub jective substances and powers, in the remainder of the Treatise. OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 241 existence of Matter, they have no longer any place on our prin ciples. Many other advantages there are, as well with regard to religion as the sciences, which it is easy for any one to deduce from what has been premised ; but this will appear more plainly in the sequel. 86. From the principles we have laid down it follows human knowledge may naturally be reduced to two heads — that of ideas and that of spirits. Of each of these I shall treat in order. And first as to ideas or unthinking things. Our knowledge of these has been very much obscured and confounded, and we have been led into very dangerous errors, by supposing a two fold existence of the objects of sense 44 — the one intelligible or in the mind, the other mz/and without the mind; [ 9 °] whereby un thinking things are thought to have a natural subsistence of their own distinct from being perceived by spirits. This, which, if I mistake not, hath been shewn to be a most groundless and absurd notion, is the very root of Scepticism 4S ; for, so long as men thought that real things subsisted without the mind, and that their knowledge was only so far forth real as it was conformable to real tilings, it follows they could not be certain that they had any real knowledge at all. For how can it be known that the things which are perceived are conformable to those which are not perceived, or exist without the mind? [ 9I ] 87. Colour, figure, motion, extension, and the like, considered only as so many sensations in the mind, are perfectly known, there being nothing in them which is not perceived. But, if they are looked on as notes or images, referred to things or archetypes existing without the mind, then are we involved all in scepticism. We see only the appearances, and not the real qualities of things. What may be the extension, figure, or motion of anything really and absolutely, or in itself, it is impossible for us to know, but only the proportion or relation they bear to our senses. Things 44 Berkeley's 'principles' abo'ish this representative idea in perception, and recognise as the real object only what we are sensibly conscious of — not any uncognised archetype. 45 So Hume, Reid, and Hamilton, who see in the hypothesis of a representative per ception, implying ' a twofold existence of the objects of sense,' the germ of scepticism. Berkeley claims that under his interpretation of what reality, externality, and existence mean, an intuitive knowledge of the real existence of sensible things is given to us. 16 242 OF THE PRINCIPLES remaining the same, our ideas vary, and which of them, or even whether any of them at all, represent the true quality really exist ing in the thing, it is out of our reach to determine. So that, for aught we know, all we see, hear, and feel, may be only phantom and vain chimera, and not at all aoree with the real things exist ing in rerum natura. All this sceptical cant follows from our supposing a difference between things and ideas, and that the former have a subsistence without the mind or unperceived. It were easy to dilate on this subject, and shew how the arguments urged by sceptics in all ages depend on the supposition of exter nal objects. [ 46 But this is too obvious to need being insisted on.] 88. So long as we attribute a real existence to unthinking things, distinct from their being perceived, it is not only im possible for us to know with evidence the nature of any real unthinking being, but even that it exists. Hence it is that we see philosophers distrust their senses, and doubt of the existence of heaven and earth, of everything they see or feel, even of their own bodies. And, after all their labouring and struggle of thought, they are forced to own we cannot attain to any self-evident or demonstrative knowledge of the existence of sensible things 47 . But, all this doubtfulness, which so bewilders and confounds the mind and makes philosophy ridiculous in the eyes of the world, vanishes if we annex a meaning to our words, and do not amuse ourselves with the terms ' absolute,' 'external,' 'exist,' &c. — sig nifying we know not what. For my part, I can as well doubt of my own being as of the being of those things which I actually perceive by sense ; it being a manifest contradiction that any sensible object should be immediately perceived by sight or touch, and at the same time have no existence in nature, since the very existence of an unthinking being consists in being per ceived^. 4 6 This sentence is omitted in the second edition. 47 This is admitted by Des Cartes, Malebranche, and Locke. 4 8 On Berkeley's own principles, there is no contradiction in the non-existence in sense of these ' qualities' of a material substance which we are not at the moment sensibly per cipient of — which we merely infer we should be percipient of on certain conditions, e. g. the smell, &c. of an orange whilst we are only looking at it. Their non-existence in imagination, when they are suggested by what we are sensibly conscious of, is indeed, on his principles, contradictory. OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 243 89. Nothing seems of more importance towards erecting a firm system of sound and real knowledge, which may be proof against the assaults of Scepticism, than to lay the beginning in a distinct explication of what is meant by thing, reality, existence ; for in vain shall we dispute concerning the real existence of things, or pretend to any knowledge thereof, so long as we have not fixed the meaning of those words *$. Thing or Being is the most general name of all; it comprehends under it two kinds entirely distinct and heterogeneous, and which have nothing common but the name, viz. spirits and ideas. The former are active, indivisible, [ 3 ° incorruptible] substances : the latter are inert, fleeting, [ s ° perishable passions,] or dependent beings, which subsist not by themselves 51 , but are supported by, or exist in minds or spiritual substances. [ S2 We comprehend our own existence by inward feeling or reflection, and that of other spirits by reason 53 . We may be said to have some knowledge or notion of our own minds, of spirits and active beings, whereof in a strict sense we have not ideas 54 . In like manner, we know and have a notion of relations 55 between things or ideas — which relations are distinct from the ideas or things related, inasmuch as the latter may be perceived by us without our perceiving the former. To me it seems that ideas, spirits, and relations are all in their 49 The chief end of the Berkeleian philosophy is to reach an intelligible conception of Being, Existence, or Thing, (favourite terms with philosophers) ; which, according to Berkeley, are not, as Locke would have it, simple ideas, but general names. Being or Existence, as explained by Berkeley, may be viewed either in relation to its permanent or to its variable element. In the former aspect it is the spiritual sitbstance or self; in the latter, when manifested in the sense-given co-existences of simple ideas or objects, it is what we call material or sensible existence. Spirits and also syntheses of sense-given objects may be called ' things.' With Berkeley the word ' thing' stands, not for an arche type of the associated groups of phenomena of which a mind is percipient, but either for the groups themselves, or for the minds cognizant of them, and who cause the changes which they manifest. 5° Omitted in second edition. 5 1 But whilst ideas or objects depend on being perceived, do not spirits depend on ideas in order to be percipient? 5 2 What follows to the end of this section was added in the second edition. 53 'reason, 'i.e. reasoning or inference, from the changes in the sense-ideas or phenomena of which we are conscious. 54 Cf. sect. 139 — 142. 55 ' Notion' is thus applied by Berkeley to our knowledge of minds, and to our knowl edge of relations amonz ideas. 244 0F THE PRINCIPLES respective kinds the object of human knowledge and 56 subject of discourse ; and that the term idea would be improperly extended to signify everything we know or have any notion of] 90. Ideas imprinted on the senses are real things, or do really exist 57 ; this we do not deny, but we deny they can subsist with out the minds which perceive them, or that they are resemblances of any archetypes existing without the mind 58 : since the very being of a sensation or idea, consists in being perceived, and an idea can be like nothing but an idea. Again, the things perceived by sense may be termed external, with regard to their origin — in that they are not generated from within by the mind itself, but imprinted by a Spirit distinct from that which perceives them. Sensible objects may likewise be said to be 'without the mind' in another sense, namely when they exist in some other mind ; thus, when I shut my eyes, the things I saw may still exist, but it must be in another mind 59 . 91. It were a mistake to think that what is here said derogates in the least from the reality of things. It is acknowledged, on the received principles, that extension, motion, and in a word all sensible qualities, have need of a support, as not being able to subsist by themselves. But the objects perceived by sense are allowed to be nothing but combinations of those qualities, and consequently cannot subsist by themselves. 60 Thus far it is agreed on all hands. So that in denying the things perceived 5 s 'and' = or (?),— unless 'object' is used in a vague meaning, including more than idea. Cf. sect. 1; also New Theory of Vision Vindicated, sect. 11, 12; Siris, sect. 297, 308. 57 Cf. sect. 33, for the meaning of the term 'real.' t 5 8 i. e. without or unperceived by any mind, human or Divine ; which is quite consistent with their being ' external ' to a finite percipient, i. e. independent of his will, and deter mined by the conceptions of a higher mind than his— consistent also with the existence of archetypal Ideas in the Divine Mind. 59 Berkeley here explains what he regards as the legitimate meanings of the term exter nality. Men cannot act, cannot live, without assuming an external world — in some con ception of the term ' external.' It is the business of the philosopher to say what that conception ought to be. Berkeley here acknowledges (a) an externality in our own pos sible experience, past and future, as determined by natural laws, which are independent of the will of the percipient ; and (b) an externality to our own conscious experience, in the contemporaneous, as well as in the past or future, experience of other minds, finite or Divine. 60 i.e. they are not properly substances, though Berkeley sometimes speaks of them as such. Cf. sect. 37. OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 245 by sense an existence independent of a substance or support wherein they may exist [ 92 ], we detract nothing from the received opinion of their reality, and are guilty of no innovation in that respect. All the difference is that, according to us, the unthink ing beings perceived by sense have no existence distinct from being perceived, and cannot therefore exist in any other sub stance than those unextended indivisible substances or spirits which act and think and perceive them ; whereas philosophers vulgarly hold the sensible qualities do exist in an inert, ex tended, unperceiving substance which they call Matter — to which they attribute a natural subsistence, exterior to all thinking beings, or distinct from being perceived by any mind what soever, even the eternal mind of the Creator, wherein they sup pose only ideas of the corporeal substances 61 created by Him: if indeed they allow them to be at all created 62 . 92. For, as we have shewn the doctrine of Matter or corporeal substance to have been the main pillar and support of Scepti cism, so likewise upon the same foundation have been raised all the impious schemes of Atheism and Irreligion. Nay, so great a difficulty has it been thought to conceive Matter produced out of nothing, that the most celebrated among the ancient philoso phers, even of those who maintained the being of a God, have thought Matter 63 to be uncreated and coeternal with Him. How great a friend material substance has been to Atheists in all ages were needless to relate. All their monstrous systems have so visible and necessary a dependence on it that, when this corner stone is once removed, the whole fabric cannot choose but fall to the ground, insomuch that it is no longer worth while to bestow a particular consideration on the absurdities of every wretched sect of Atheists. 61 ' ideas of the corporeal substances' — whereas Berkeley might say real ideas which are themselves our world of sensible things. 6z On the scheme of intelligible Realism, ' creation' of matter is the production, in finite minds, of sense-objects or ideas, which are, as it were, letters of the alphabet, in a language which God employs for the expression of His Ideas, and of which human science is the partial interpretation. Cf. Siris, sect. 326. 6 3 'Matter,' i.e. an unperceiving and unperceived Substance and Cause — to which Atheists attribute our personal existence and that of the universe in which we find our selves. Such Matter once allowed, what proof that it is not Supreme or Absolute Being ? 246 OF THE PRINCIPLES 93. That impious and profane persons should readily fall in with those systems which favour their inclinations, by deriding immaterial substance, and supposing the soul to be divisible and subject to corruption as the body ; which exclude all freedom, intelligence, and design from the formation of things, and in stead thereof make a self-existent, stupid, unthinking substance the root and origin of all beings ; that they should hearken to those who deny a Providence, or inspection of a Superior Mind over the affairs of the world, attributing the whole series of events either to blind chance or fatal necessity arising from the impulse of one body on another — all this is very natural. And, on the other hand, when men of better principles observe the enemies of religion lay so great a stress on unthinking Matter, and all of them use so much industry and artifice to reduce everything to it, methinks they should rejoice to see them deprived of their grand support, and driven from that only fort ress, without which your Epicureans, Hobbists, and the like[ 93 ], have not even the shadow of a pretence, but become the most cheap and easy triumph in the world. 94. The existence of Matter, or bodies unperceived, has not only been the main support of Atheists and Fatalists, but on the same principle doth Idolatry likewise in all its various forms depend. Did men but consider that the sun, moon, and stars, and every other object of the senses, are only so many sensations in their minds, which have no other existence but barely being perceived, doubtless they would never fall down and worship their own ideas — but rather address their homage to that Eternal Invisible Mind which produces and sustains all things. 95. The same absurd principle, by mingling itself with the articles of our faith, has occasioned no small difficulties to Chris tians. For example, about the Resurrection, how many scruples and objections have been raised by Socinians and others ? But do not the most plausible of them depend on the supposition that a body is denominated the same, with regard not to the form or that which is perceived by sense 64 , but the material sub stance, which remains the same under several forms ? Take 6 4 Of which Berkeley does not predicate a numerical identity. Cf. Third Dialogue letween Hylas and Philonous, pp. 343 — 345. OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 247 away this material substance — about the identity whereof all the dispute is — and mean by body what every plain ordinary person means by that word, to wit, that which is immediately seen and felt, which is only a combination of sensible qualities or ideas, and then their most unanswerable objections come to nothing. 96. Matter 65 being once expelled out of nature drags with it so many sceptical and impious notions, such an incredible num ber of disputes and puzzling questions, which have been thorns in the sides of divines as well as philosophers, and made so much fruitless work for mankind, that if the arguments we have produced against it are not found equal to demonstration (as to me they evidently seem), yet I am sure all friends to knowledge, peace, and religion have reason to wish they were. 97. Beside the external 66 existence of the objects of percep tion, another great source of errors and difficulties with regard to ideal knowledge is the doctrine of abstract ideas, such as it hath been set forth in the Introduction. The plainest things in the world, those we are most intimately acquainted with and perfectly know, when they are considered in an abstract way, appear strangely difficult and incomprehensible. Time, place, and motion, taken in particular or concrete, are what everybody knows ; but, having passed through the hands of a metaphysi cian, they become too abstract and fine to be apprehended by men of ordinary sense. Bid -'our servant meet you at such a time in such a place, and he shall never stay to deliberate on the meaning of those words ; in conceiving that particular time and place, or the motion by which he is to get thither, he finds not the least difficulty. But if time be taken exclusive of all those particular actions and ideas that diversify the day, merely for the continuation of existence or duration in abstract, then it will perhaps gravel even a philosopher to comprehend it. 98. For my own part, whenever I attempt to frame a simple idea of time\y A ~\, abstracted from the succession of ideas in my mind, which flows uniformly and is participated by all beings, I 6 5 ' matter,' i. e. absolute Matter, unknowing, and unknown by any intelligence. 66 ' external,' i. e. in the philosophical, but not in Berkeley's meaning of externality. Cf. sect. 90, note. 248 OF THE PRINCIPLES am lost and embrangled in inextricable difficulties. I have no notion of it at all, only I hear others say it is infinitely divisible, and speak of it in such a manner as leads me to harbour odd thoughts of my existence 67 ; — since that doctrine lays one under an absolute necessity of thinking, either that he passes away innumerable ages without a thought, or else that he is annihi lated every moment of his life, both which seem equally absurd. Time therefore being nothing, abstracted from the succession of ideas in our minds, it follows that the duration of any finite spirit must be estimated by the number of ideas or actions succeeding each other in that same spirit or mind. Hence, it is a plain consequence that the soul always thinks ; and in truth whoever shall go about to divide in his thoughts, or abstract the existence of a spirit from its cogitation , will, I believe, find it no easy task 68 . 99. So likewise when we attempt to abstract extension and motion from all other qualities, and consider them by them selves, we presently lose sight of them, and run into great ex travagances. [ 6 9 Hence spring those odd paradoxes, that the ' fire is not hot,' nor ' the wall white,' &c, or that heat and colour are in the objects nothing but figure and motion.] All which depend on a twofold abstraction ; first, it is supposed that exten sion, for example, may be abstracted from all other sensible qualities ; and secondly, that the entity of extension may be abstracted from its being perceived. But, whoever shall reflect, and take care to understand what he says, will, if I mistake not, acknowledge that all sensible qualities are alike sensations and alike real ; that where the extension is, there is the colour too, i.e. in his mind 7 °, and that their archetypes can exist only in some other mind? 1 ; and that the objects of sense 72 are nothing 6 7 i.e. of what Mind, Self, the Ego means, of its relation to, time, and what personal identity consists in. Berkeley sometimes seems to imply that the existence of the Ego is independent of time or succession, in an eternal present (an / am), amid the changes of phenomena of which it is conscious. 68 As the esse of sense-ideas or sensible objects is percipi, according to Berkeley, so the esse of minds or persons is percipere. The existence of a Mind thus depends on con sciousness, and the sensible existence of Matter depends on a sense-percipient. ^9 This sentence is omitted in the second edition. 7° Cf. New Theory of Vision, sect. 43, &c. 7 1 i. e. as ideas, sensible or intelligible — human or Divine. 72 ' objects of sense,' i.e. sensible or external things. Cf. sect. 1, on the meaning of thing, as distinct from object-proper or simple idea. OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 249 but those sensations combined, blended, or (if one may so speak) concreted together ; none of all which can be supposed to exist unperceived. [? 3 And that consequently the wall is as truly white as it is extended, and in the same sense.] 100. What it is for a man to be happy, or an object good, every one may think he knows. But to frame an abstract idea of happi ness, prescinded from all particular pleasure, or of goodness from everything that is good, this is what few can pretend to. So like wise a man may be just and virtuous without having precise ideas of justice and virtue. The opinion that those and the like words stand for general notions, abstracted from all particular persons and actions, seems to have rendered morality very difficult, and the study thereof of small use to mankind. And in effect one may make a great progress in school-ethics without ever being the wiser or better man for it, or knowing how to behave him self in the affairs of life more to the advantage of himself or his neighbours than he did before. This hint may suffice to let any one see the doctrine of abstraction has not a little contributed towards spoiling the most useful parts of knowledge. [ 9S ] 101. The two great provinces of speculative science conversant about ideas received from sense, are Natural Philosophy and Mathematics ; with regard to each of these I shall make some observations. — And first I shall say somewhat of Natural Phil osophy. On this subject it is that the sceptics triumph. All that stock of arguments they produce to depreciate our faculties and make mankind appear ignorant and low, are drawn principally from this head, namely, that we are under an invincible blindness as to the true and real nature of things. This they exaggerate, and love to enlarge on. We are miserably bantered, say they, by our senses, and amused only with the outside and show of things. The real essence 74 , the internal qualities and constitution of every the meanest object, is hid from our view ; something 73 This sentence is omitted in the second edition. 74 With Berkeley, the nominal or logical essence is the real essence of things, in as far as things are in sense what they are conceived to be. But this is quite consistent with the fact that we may and do misinterpret the sensible symbols which constitute our material universe ; and thus our conceptions of their meaning are often misconceptions — so that their logical or nominal essence becomes different from their real essence. 250 OF THE PRINCIPLES there is in every drop of water, every grain of sand, which it is beyond the power of human understanding to fathom or com prehend. But, it is evident from what has been shewn that all this complaint is groundless, and that we are influenced by false principles to that degree as to mistrust our senses, and think we know nothing of those things which we perfectly compre hend. 102. One great inducement to our pronouncing ourselves ignorant of the nature of things is the current opinion that every thing includes within itself the cause of its properties ; or that there is in each object an inward essence which is the source whence its discernible qualities flow, and whereon they depend. [ 96 ] Some have pretended to account for appearances by occult qualities, but of late they are mostly resolved into mechanical causes, to wit, the figure, motion, weight, and suchlike qualities, of insensible particles 75 ; whereas, in truth, there is no other agent or efficient cause than spirit, it being evident that motion, as well as all other ideas, is perfectly inert. See sect. 25. Hence, to endeavour to explain the production of colours or sounds, by figure, motion, magnitude and the like, must needs be labour in vain. And accordingly we see the attempts of that kind are not at all satisfactory. Which may be said in general of those in stances wherein one idea or quality is assigned for the cause of another. I need not say how many hypotheses and speculations are left out, and how much the study of nature is abridged by this doctrine ?6 . 103. The great mechanical principle now in vogue is attraction. That a stone falls to the earth, or the sea swells towards the moon, may to some appear sufficiently explained thereby. But how are we enlightened by being told this is done by attraction? Is it that that word signifies the manner of the tendency, and that it is by the mutual drawing of bodies instead of their being impelled or protruded towards each other ? But, nothing is 75 e. g. Locke's Essay, IV. 3. 7 6 Berkeleyism is so far a Spiritual Positivism, which eliminates all causation from the objective world, concentrates it in Mind, and seeks among phenomena or ideas only for the laws of their constant co-existence and succession. But the modern Positivists deny that we may thus infer the ultimate causality of Mind, holding that the ultimate cause or power is incognisable — that the universe is a ' singular effect.' OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 25 I determined of the manner or action, and it may as truly (for aught we know) be termed ' impulse,' or ' protrusion,' as ' attrac tion.' [ 97 ] Again, the parts of steel we see cohere firmly together, and this also is accounted for by attraction ; but, in this as in the other instances, I do not perceive that anything is signified besides the effect itself; for as to the manner of the action whereby it is produced, or the cause which produces it, these are not so much as aimed at. 104. Indeed, if we take a view of the several phenomena, and compare them together, we may observe some likeness and con formity between them. For example, in the falling of a stone to the ground, in the rising of the sea towards the moon, in cohesion, crystallization, &c, there is something alike, namely, an union or mutual approach of bodies. So that any one of these or the like phenomena may not seem strange or surprising to a man who has nicely observed and compared the effects of nature. For that only is thought so which is uncommon, or a thing by itself, and out of the ordinary course of our observation. That bodies should tend towards the centre of the $arth is not thought strange, because it is what we perceive every moment of our lives. But, that they should have a like gravitation towards the centre of the moon may seem odd and unaccountable to most men, because it is discerned only in the tides. But a philosopher, whose thoughts take in a larger compass of nature, having observed a certain similitude of appearances, as well in the heavens as the earth, that argue innumerable bodies to have a mutual tendency towards each other, which he denotes by the general name ' attraction,' whatever can be reduced to that he thinks justly accounted for. Thus he explains the tides by the attraction of the terraqueous globe towards the moon, which to him does not appear odd or anomalous, but only a particular example of a general rule or law of nature. 105. If therefore we consider the difference there is betwixt natural philosophers and other men, with regard to their know ledge of the phenomena, we shall find it consists not in an exacter knowledge of the efficient cause that produces them — for that can be no other than the will of a spirit — but only in a greater large ness of comprehension, whereby analogies, harmonies, and agree- 252 OF THE PRINCIPLES ments are discovered in the works of nature, and the particular effects explained, that is, reduced to general rules, see sect. 62, which rules, grounded on the analogy and uniformness observed in the production of natural effects, are most agreeable and sought after by the mind ; for that they extend our prospect beyond what is present and near to us, and enable us to make very probable conjectures touching things that may have happened at very great distances of time and place, as well as to predict things to come ; which sort of endeavour towards omniscience is much affected by the mind. 106. But we should proceed warily in such things, for we are apt to lay too great a stress on analogies, and, to the prejudice of truth, humour that eagerness of the mind whereby it is carried to extend its knowledge into general theorems. For example, in the business of gravitation or mutual attraction, because it appears in many instances, some are straightway for pronouncing it uni versal ; and that to attract and be attracted by every other body is an essential quality inherent in all bodies whatsoever. Whereas it is evident the fixed stars have no such tendency towards each other; [9 8 ] and, so far is that gravitation from being essential to bodies that in some instances a quite contrary principle seems to shew itself; as in the perpendicular growth of plants, and the elasticity of the air. [ "] There is nothing necessary or essential in the case 77 , but it depends entirely on the will of the Governing Spirit ?8 , who causes certain bodies to cleave together or tend towards each other according to various laws, whilst He keeps others at a fixed distance ; and to some He gives a quite contrary tendency to fly asunder just as He sees convenient. 107. After what has been premised, I think we may lay down the following conclusions. First, it is plain philosophers amuse themselves in vain, when they enquire for any natural efficient cause, distinct from a mind or spirit. Secondly, considering the 77 According to Sir W. Hamilton, for example, we are intellectually necessitated to think that every new phenomenon must have previously existed in another form — but not necessarily in this, that, or the other particular form ; for a knowledge of which we are indebted to experience. 7 s In other words, what the preceding form of any new phenomena actually was, has been determined by the Supreme Will, and is, in that sense, arbitrary. God is the proper cause of the antecedent and consequent forms or phenomena of existence being what we actually find them to be. OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 253 whole creation is the workmanship of a wise and good Agent, it should seem to become philosophers to employ their thoughts (contrary to what some hold 79 ) about the final causes of things ; [ 8o for, besides that this would prove a very pleasing entertain ment to the mind, it might be of great advantage, in that it not only discovers to us the attributes of the Creator, but may also direct us in several instances to the proper uses and applications of things;] and I must confess I see no reason why pointing out the various ends to which natural things are adapted, and for which they were originally with unspeakable wisdom contrived, should not be thought one good way of accounting for them, and altogether worthy a philosopher. Thirdly, from what has been premised no reason can be drawn why the history of nature should not still be studied, and observations and experiments made — which, that they are of use to mankind, and enable us to draw any general conclusions, is not the result of any immutable habitudes or relations between things themselves, but only of God's goodness and kindness to men in the administration of the world. See sect. 30 and 31. Fourthly, by a diligent observation of the phenomena within our view, we may discover the general laws of nature, and from them deduce the other phenomena ; I do not say demonstrate, for all deductions of that kind depend on a supposition that the Author of nature always operates uni formly, and in a constant observance of those rules we take for principles 8l — which we cannot evidently know. 108. [ 82 It appears from sect. 66, &c. that the steady consistent methods of nature may not unfitly be styled the Language of its Author, whereby He discovers His attributes to our view and directs us how to act for the convenience and felicity of life. And to me] Those men who frame 83 general rules from the phenomena, and afterwards derive 84 the phenomena from those rules, seem 8s 79 He probably refers to Bacon. 80 Omitted in second edition. 81 Our assumed ' principles,' or supposed laws of nature, maybe subordinate or special, and therefore variable, associations of sensible signs which, in their ultimate meaning, express a perfect, and therefore necessary, Divine Idea. 82 Omitted in the second edition. 8 3 i. e. inductively. 8 4 i. e. deductively. 8 5 ' seem to consider signs rather than causes ' — ' seem to be grammarians, and their 254 OF THE PRINCIPLES to consider signs rather than causes. 86 A man may well under stand natural signs without knowing their analogy, or being able to say by what rule a thing is so or so. And, as it is very pos sible to write improperly, through too strict an observance of general grammar-rules ; so, in arguing from general laws of nature, it is not impossible we may extend 87 the analogy too far, and by that means run into mistakes. 109. [ 88 To carry on the resemblance.] As in reading other books a wise man will choose to fix his thoughts on the sense and apply it to use, rather than lay them out in grammatical remarks on the language ; so, in perusing the volume of nature, methinks it is beneath the dignity of the mind to affect an exact ness in reducing each particular phenomenon to general rules, or shewing how it follows from them. We should propose to our selves nobler views, namely, to recreate and exalt the mind with a prospect of the beauty, order, extent, and variety of natural things : hence, by proper inferences, to enlarge our notions of the grandeur, wisdom and beneficence of the Creator; and lastly, to make the several parts of the creation, so far as in us lies, sub servient to the ends they were designed for, God's glory, and the sustentation and comfort of ourselves and fellow-creatures. [ IOO J no. [ 89 The best key for the aforesaid analogy or natural Science will be easily acknowledged to be a certain celebrated Treatise of Mechanics^] [ IDI ] In the entrance of which justly admired treatise, Time, Space, and Motion are distinguished into absolute and relative, true and apparent, mathematical and vulgar ; art the grammar of nature. Two ways there are of learning a language — either by rule or by practice' — in first edition. 86 'A man may be well read in the language of nature without understanding the gram mar of it, or being able to say,' &c. — in first edition. 8 7 ' extend ' — ' stretch' — in first edition. 88 Omitted in second edition. 8 9 In the first edition, instead of this sentence, the section commences thus : ' The best grammar of the kind we are speaking of will be easily acknowledged to be a treatise of Mechanics , demonstrated and applied to nature by a philosopher of a neighbouring nation whom, all the world admire. I shall not take upon me to make remarks on the perform ance of that extraordinary person ; only some things he has advanced so directly opposite to the doctrine we have hitherto laid down, that we should be wanting in the regard due to the authority of so great a man did we not take some notice of them.' He refers, of course, to Newton. The first edition was published in Ireland — hence ' neighbouring nation.' — On absolute Space, cf. Sir is, sect. 270, &c. OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 255 — which distinction, as it is at large explained by the author, does suppose those quantities to have an existence without the mind ; and that they are ordinarily conceived with relation to sensible things, to which nevertheless in their own nature they bear no relation at all. in. As for Time, as it is there taken in an absolute or ab stracted sense, for the duration or perseverance of the existence of things, I have nothing more to add concerning it after what has been already said on that subject. Sect. 97 and 98. For the rest, this celebrated author holds there is an absolute Space, which, being unperceivable to sense, remains in itself similar and immoveable ; and relative space to be the measure thereof, which, being moveable and defined by its situation in respect of sensible bodies, is vulgarly taken for immoveable sp'ace. Place he defines to be that part of space which is occupied by any body; and according as the space is absolute or relative so also is the place. Absolute Motion is said to be the translation of a body from ab solute place to absolute place, as relative motion is from one re lative place to another. [ I02 ] And, because the parts of absolute space do not fall under our senses, instead of them we are obliged to use their sensible measures, and so define both place and motion with respect to bodies which we regard as immoveable. But, it is said in philosophical matters we must abstract from our senses, since it may be that none of those bodies which seem to be quiescent are truly so, and the same thing which is moved relatively may be really at rest ; as likewise one and the same body may be in relative rest and motion, or even moved with contrary relative motions at the same time, according as its place is variously defined. All which ambiguity is to be found in the apparent motions, but not at all in the true or absolute, which should therefore be alone regarded in philosophy. And the true we are told are distinguished from apparent or relative motions by the following properties. — First, in true or absolute motion all parts which preserve the same position with respect of the whole, partake of the motions of the whole. Secondly, the place being moved, that which is placed therein is also moved; so that a body moving in a place which is in motion doth participate the motion of its place. Thirdly, true motion is never generated or changed 256 OF THE PRINCIPLES otherwise than by force impressed on the body itself. Fourthly, true motion is always changed by force impressed on the body moved. Fifthly, in circular motion barely relative there is no centrifugal force, which nevertheless, in that which is true or absolute, is proportional to the quantity of motion. 112. But, notwithstanding what has been said, I must confess it does not appear to me that there can be any motion other than relative 90 ; so that to conceive motion there must be at least con ceived two bodies, whereof the distance or position in regard to each other is varied. Hence, if there was one only body in being it could not possibly be moved. This to me seems very evident, in that the idea I have of motion does necessarily include rela tion. — [ 9I Whether others can conceive it otherwise, a little atten tion may satisfy them.] 113. But, though in every motion it be necessary to conceive more bodies than one, yet it may be that one only is moved, namely, that on which the force causing the change in the dis tance or situation of the bodies, is impressed. For, however some may define relative motion, so as to term that body moved which changes its distance from some other body, whether the force [_ QZ or action] causing that change were impressed on it or no, yet as [ 93 I cannot assent to this ; for, since we are told] rela tive motion is that which is perceived by sense, and regarded in the ordinary affairs of life, it follows that every man of common sense knows what it is as well as the best philosopher. Now, I ask any one whether, in his sense of motion as he walks along the streets, the stones he passes over may be said to move, be cause they change distance with his feet ? To me it appears that though motion includes a relation of one thing to another, yet it is not necessary that each term of the relation be denominated from it. As a man may think of somewhat which does not think, so a body may be moved to or from another body which 9° On motion, cf. Analyst, qu. 12, and De Motn. See also Malebranche, Recherche, I. 8. All attempts to imagine space imply the thought, of locomotive sense-experience — an unimpeded, as distinguished from an impeded power of locomotion. Cf. sect. 116. 9 1 Omitted in second edition. 9 2 Added in second edition. 93 Omitted in second edition. OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 257 is not therefore itself in motion, [ 94 I mean relative motion, for other I am not able to conceive.] 1 14. As the place happens to be variously defined, the motion which is related to it varies 95 . A man in a ship may be said to be quiescent with relation to the sides of the vessel, and yet move with relation to the land. Or he may move eastward in respect of the one, and westward in respect of the other. In the common affairs of life men never go beyond the earth to define the place of any body ; and what is quiescent in respect of that is accounted absolutely to be so. But philosophers, who have a greater extent of thought, and juster notions of the system of things, discover even the earth itself to be moved. In order therefore to fix their notions they seem to conceive the corporeal world as finite, and the utmost unmoved walls or shell thereof to be the place whereby they estimate true motions. If we sound our own conceptions, I believe we may find all the absolute mo tion we can frame an idea of to be at bottom no other than rela tive motion thus defined. For, as has been already observed, absolute motion, exclusive of all external relation, is incompre hensible ; and to this kind of relative motion all the above-men tioned properties, causes, and effects ascribed to absolute motion will, if I mistake not, be found to agree. As to what is said of the centrifugal force, that it does not at all belong to circular relative motion, I do not see how this follows from the experi ment which is brought to prove it. See PJiilosopliiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica, in Schol. Def. VIII. For the water in the vessel [ io3 ] at that time wherein it is said to have the greatest relative circular motion, has, I think, no motion at all; as is plain from the foregoing section. 115. For, to denominate a body moved it is requisite, first, that it change its distance or situation with regard to some other body; secondly, that the force occasioning that change be im pressed on it. If either of these be wanting, I do not think that, agreeably to the sense of mankind, or the propriety of language, a body can be said to be in motion. I grant indeed that it is possible for us to think a body which we see change its distance 94 Omitted in second edition. 95 See Locke's Essay, B. II. 13. £ 7 — 10. 17 258 OF THE PRINCIPLES from some other to be moved, though it have no force 96 applied to it (in which sense there may be apparent motion), but then it is because the force causing the change of distance is imagined by us to be [ 97 applied or] impressed on that body thought to move ; which indeed shews we are capable of mistaking a thing to be in motion which is not, and that is all, [ 98 but does not prove that, in the common acceptation of motion, a body is moved merely because it changes distance from another; since as soon as we are undeceived, and find that the moving force was not communicated to it, we no longer hold it to be moved. So, on the other hand, when one only body (the parts whereof preserve a given position between themselves) is imagined to exist, some there are who think that it can be moved all manner of ways, though without any change of distance or situation to any other bodies; which we should not deny if they meant only that it might have an impressed force, which, upon the bare creation of other bodies, would produce a motion of some cer tain quantity and determination. But that an actual motion (distinct from the impressed force or power productive of change of place in case there were bodies present whereby to define it) can exist in such a single body, I must confess I am not able to comprehend.] 116. From what has been said it follows that the philosophic consideration of motion does not imply the being of an absolute Space, distinct from that which is perceived by sense and related to bodies ; which that it cannot exist without the mind is clear upon the same principles that demonstrate the like of all other objects of sense. And perhaps, if we enquire narrowly, we shall find we cannot even frame an idea of pure Space exclusive of all body. This I must confess seems impossible 99 , as being a most abstract idea. When I excite a motion in some part of my body, if it be free or without resistance, I say there is Space ; but if I find a resistance, then I say there is Body : and in proportion as the resistance to motion is lesser or greater, I say the space is more or less pure. So that when I speak of pure or empty space, 9 6 ' applied to' — ' impressed on' — in first edition. 97 Added in second edition. 9 s What follows to the end of this section is omitted in the second edition. 99 ' seems impossible' — ' is above my capacity' — in first edition. OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 259 it is not to be supposed that the word 'space' stands for an idea distinct from or conceivable without body and motion — though indeed we are apt to think every noun substantive stands for a distinct idea that may be separated from all others ; which has occasioned infinite mistakes. When, therefore, supposing all the world to be annihilated besides my own body, I say there still remains pure Space, thereby nothing else is meant but only that I conceive it possible for the limbs of my body to be moved on all sides without the least resistance ; but if that too were annihilated then there could be no motion, and consequently no Space 100 . Some, perhaps, may think the sense of seeing does furnish them with the idea of pure space; but it is plain from what we have elsewhere shewn, that the ideas of space and distance are not obtained by that sense. See the Essay concern ing Vision. 117. What is here laid down seems to put an end to all those disputes and difficulties that have sprung up amongst the learned concerning the nature oipitre Space. But the chief advantage aris ing from it is that we are freed from that dangerous dilemma, to which several who have employed their thoughts on that subject imagine themselves reduced, viz. of thinking either that Real Space is God, or else that there is something beside God which is eternal, uncreated, infinite, indivisible, immutable. Both which may justly be thought pernicious and absurd notions. It is cer tain that not a few divines, as well as philosophers of great note, have, from the difficulty they found in conceiving either limits or annihilation of space, concluded it must be divine. And some of late have set themselves particularly to shew the incommuni cable attributes of God agree to it 1 . Which doctrine, how un worthy soever it may seem of the Divine Nature, yet I must confess I do not see how we can get clear of it, so long as we adhere to the received opinions. 118. Hitherto of Natural Philosophy: we come now to make some enquiry concerning that other great branch of speculative 100 i.e. pure Space, as immediately perceived, is ultimately the sensation of an unresisted motion of the body, or of any of its organs. See this less fully developed in New Theory of Vision. 1 Clarke's Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God, which appeared in 1706, 2 6o OF THE PRINCIPLES knowledge, to wit, Mathematics 2 . These, how celebrated soever they may be for their clearness and certainty of demonstration, which is hardly anywhere else to be found, cannot nevertheless be supposed altogether free from mistakes, if so be that in their principles there lurks some secret error which is common to the professors of those sciences with the rest of mankind. Mathe maticians, though they deduce their theorems from a great height of evidence, yet their first principles are limited by the considera tion of quantity: and they do not ascend into any enquiry con cerning those transcendental maxims which influence all the particular sciences, each part whereof, Mathematics not excepted, does consequently participate of the errors involved in them. That the principles laid down by mathematicians are true, and their way of deduction from those principles clear and incon testable, we do not deny; but, we hold there may be certain erroneous maxims of greater extent than the object of Mathe matics, and for that reason not expressly mentioned, though tacitly supposed throughout the whole progress of that science ; and that the ill effects of those secret unexamined errors are dif fused through all the branches thereof. To be plain, we suspect the mathematicians are no less deeply concerned than other men in the errors arising from the doctrine of abstract general ideas, and the existence of objects without the mind. 119. Arithmetic has been thought to have for its object ab stract ideas of Number ; of which to understand the properties and mutual habitudes, is supposed no mean part of speculative knowledge. The opinion of the pure and intellectual nature of numbers in abstract has made them in esteem with those philos ophers who seem to have affected an uncommon fineness and elevation of thought. It hath set a price on the most trifling numerical speculations which in practice are of no use, but serve only for amusement; and hath heretofore so far infected the minds of some, that they have dreamed of mighty mysteries involved in numbers, and attempted the explication of natural things by them. But, if we narrowly inquire into our own thoughts, and consider what has been premised, we may perhaps entertain a low opinion of those high flights and abstractions, 2 Sect. 118 — 132. OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 2 6l and look on all inquiries about numbers only as so many difficiks ni(g<2, so far as they are not subservient to practice, and promote the benefit of life. [ io ^] 120. Unity in abstract we have before considered in sect. 13, from which and what has been said in the Introduction, it plainly follows there is not any such idea. But, number being defined a 'collection of units,' we may conclude that, if there be no such thing as unity or unit in abstract, there are no ideas of number in abstract denoted by the numeral names and figures. The theories therefore in Arithmetic, if they are abstracted from the names and figures, as likewise from all use and practice, as well as from the particular things numbered, can be supposed to have nothing at all for their object ; hence we may see how entirely the science of numbers is subordinate to practice, and how jejune and trifling it becomes when considered as a matter of mere speculation. 121. However, since there may be some who, deluded by the specious show of discovering abstracted verities, waste their time in arithmetical theorems and problems which have not any use, it will not be amiss if we more fully consider and expose the vanity of that pretence ; and this will plainly appear by taking a view of Arithmetic in its infancy, and observing what it was that originally put men on the study of that science, and to what scope they directed it. It is natural to think that at first, men, for ease of memory and help of computation, made use of count ers, or in writing of single strokes, points, or the like, each whereof was made to signify an unit, i.e. some one thing of what ever kind they had occasion to reckon. Afterwards they found out the more compendious ways of making one character stand in place of several strokes or points. And, lastly, the notation of the Arabians or Indians came into use, wherein, by the repe tition of a few characters or figures, and varying the signification of each figure according to the place it obtains, all numbers may be most aptly expressed ; which seems to have been done in imitation of language, so that an exact analogy is observed be twixt the notation by figures and names, the nine simple figures answering the nine first numeral names and places in the former, corresponding to denominations in the latter. And agreeably to 2 62 OF THE. PRINCIPLES those conditions of the simple and local value of figures, were contrived methods of finding, from the given figures or marks of the parts, what figures and how placed are proper to denote the whole, or vice versa. And having found the sought figures, the same rule or analogy being observed throughout, it is easy to read them into words; and so the number becomes perfectly known. For then the number of any particular things is said to be known, when we know the name or figures (with their due arrangement) that according to the standing analogy belong to them. For, these signs being known, we can by the operations of arithmetic know the signs of any part of the particular sums signified by them; and, thus computing in signs, (because of the connexion established betwixt them and the distinct multitudes of things whereof one is taken for an unit), we may be able rightly to sum up, divide, and proportion the things themselves that we intend to number. 122. In Arithmetic, therefore, we regard not the things but the signs, which nevertheless are not regarded for their Own sake, but because they direct us how to act with relation to things, and dispose rightly of them. Now, agreeeably to what we have before observed of words in general (sect. 19, Introd.) it happens here likewise that abstract ideas are thought to be signified by numeral names or characters, while they do not suggest ideas of particular things to our minds. I shall not at present enter into a more particular dissertation on this subject, but only observe that it is evident from what has been said, those things which pass for abstract truths and theorems concerning numbers, are in reality conversant about no object distinct from particular numer able things, except only names and characters, which originally came to be considered on no other account but their being signs, or capable to represent aptly whatever particular things men had need to compute. Whence it follows that to study them for their own sake would be just as wise, and to as good purpose as if a man, neglecting the true use or original intention and sub serviency of language, should spend his time in impertinent criticisms upon words, or reasonings and controversies purely verbal. [ io s] 3 Cf. New Theory of Vision, sect. 107, &c. OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 263 123. From numbers we proceed to speak oi Extension*, which is the object of Geometry. The infinite divisibility of finite ex tension, though it is not expressly laid down either as an axiom or theorem in the elements of that science, yet is throughout the same everywhere supposed and thought to have so inseparable and essential a connexion with the principles and demonstrations in Geometry, that mathematicians never admit it into doubt, or make the least question of it. And, as this notion is the source from whence do spring all those amusing geometrical paradoxes which have such a direct repugnancy to the plain common sense of mankind, and are admitted with so much reluctance into a mind not yet debauched by learning ; so is it the principal occa sion of all that nice and extreme subtilty which renders the study of Mathematics so very difficult and tedious. Hence, if we can make it appear that no finite extension contains innumer able parts, or is infinitely divisible, it follows that we shall at once clear the science of Geometry from a great number of diffi culties and contradictions which have ever been esteemed a reproach to human reason, and withal make the attainment thereof a business of much less time and pains than it hitherto has been. 124. Every particular finite extension which may possibly be the object of our thought is an idea existing only in the mind, and consequently each part thereof must be perceived. If, there fore, I cannot perceive innumerable parts in any finite extension that I consider, it is certain they are not contained in it ; but, it is evident that I cannot distinguish innumerable parts in any particular line, surface, or solid, which I either perceive by sense, or figure to myself in my mind : wherefore I conclude they are not contained in it. Nothing can be plainer to me than that the extensions I have in view are no other than my own ideas ; and it is no less plain that I cannot resolve any one of my ideas into an infinite number of other ideas, that is, that they are not in finitely divisible 5 . If by finite extension be meant something 4 Cf. New Theory of Vision, sect. 122 — 125, 149 — 160. s Infinitely divisible extension, being unperceived, must be non-existent — if existence necessarily depends on a percipient, and must be actually perceived. The only possible extension is then sensible extension, which cannot be infinitely divided, but only divided down to the point at which its parts become insensible or non-existent. 264 OF THE PRINCIPLES distinct from a finite idea, I declare I do not know what that is, and so cannot affirm or deny anything of it. [ Io6 ] But if the terms ' extension,' ' parts,' &c, are taken in any sense conceiv able, that is, for ideas, then to say a finite quantity or extension consists of parts infinite in number is so manifest and glaring a contradiction, that every one at first sight acknowledges it to be so;[ 107 ] and it is impossible it should ever gain the assent of any reasonable creature who is not brought to it by gentle and slow degrees, as a converted Gentile 6 to the belief of transubstan tiation. Ancient and rooted prejudices do often pass into prin ciples ; and those propositions which once obtain the force and credit of a principle, are not only themselves, but likewise what ever is deducible from them, thought privileged from all exami nation. And there is no absurdity so gross, which, by this means, the mind of man may not be prepared to swallow. 125. He whose understanding is prepossessed with the doc trine of abstract general ideas maybe [ 7 easily] persuaded that (whatever be thought of the ideas of sense) extension in abstract is infinitely divisible. And any one who thinks the objects of sense exist without the mind will perhaps in virtue thereof be brought to admit that 8 a line but an inch long may contain in numerable parts — really existing, though too small to be dis cerned. These errors are grafted as well in the minds of geo metricians as of other men, and have a like influence on their reasonings ; and it were no difficult thing to shew how the arguments from Geometry made use of to support the infinite divisibility of extension are bottomed on them. [ 9 But this, if it be thought necessary, we may hereafter find a proper place to treat of in a particular manner.] At present we shall only ob serve in general whence it is the mathematicians are all so fond and tenacious of that doctrine. 126. It has been observed in another place that the theorems and demonstrations in Geometry are conversant about universal ideas (sect. 15. Introd.) ; where it is explained in what sense this 6 ' converted Gentile' — ' pagan convert' — in first edition. 7 Omitted in second edition. 8 ' will perhaps in virtue thereof be brought to admit that,' &c. — 'will not stick to affirm that,' &c. — in first edition. 9 Omitted in second edition. OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 2 6$ ought to be understood, to wit, the particular lines and figures included in the diagram are supposed to stand for innumerable others of different sizes ; or, in other words, the geometer con siders them abstracting from their magnitude — which does not imply that he forms an abstract idea, but only that he cares not what the particular magnitude is, whether great or small, but looks on that as a thing indifferent to the demonstration. Hence it follows that a line in the scheme but an inch long must be spoken of as though it contained ten thousand parts, since it is regarded not in itself, but as it is universal ; and it is universal only in its signification, whereby it represents innumerable lines greater than itself, in which may be distinguished ten thousand parts or more, though there may not be above an inch in it. After this manner, the properties of the lines signified are (by a very usual figure) transferred to the sign, and thence, through mistake, thought to appertain to it considered in its own nature. 127. Because there is no number of parts so great but it is possible there may be a line containing more, the inch-line is said to contain parts more than any assignable number; which is true, not of the inch taken absolutely, but only for the things signified by it. But men, not retaining that distinction in their thoughts, slide into a belief that the small particular line described on paper contains in itself parts innumerable. There is no such thing as the ten thousandth part of an inch ; but there is of a mile or diameter of the earth, which may be signified by that inch. When therefore I delineate a triangle on paper, and take one side not above an inch, for example, in length to be the radius, this I consider as divided into 10,000 or 100,000 parts or more ; for, though the ten thousandth part of that line considered in itself is nothing at all, and consequently may be neglected without any error or inconveniency, yet these described lines, being only marks standing for greater quantities, whereof it may be the ten thousandth part is very considerable, it follows that, to prevent notable errors in practice, the radius must be taken of 10,000 parts or more. 128. From what has been said the reason is plain why, to the end any theorem become universal in its use, it is necessary we speak of the lines described on paper as though they contained 266 OF THE PRINCIPLES parts which really they do not. In doing of which, if we examine the matter throughly, we shall perhaps discover that we cannot conceive an inch itself as consisting of, or being divisible into, a thousand parts, but only some other line which is far greater than an inch, and represented by it ; and that when we say a line is infinitely divisible, we must mean a line which is infinitely great 10 . What we have here observed seems to be the chief cause why, to suppose the infinite divisibility of finite extension has been thought necessary in geometry. 129. The several absurdities and contradictions which flowed from this false principle might, one. would think, have been esteemed so many demonstrations against it. But, by I know not what logic, it is held that proofs a posteriori [ Io8 ] are not to be admitted against propositions relating to infinity — as though it were not impossible even for an infinite mind to reconcile contra dictions ; or as if anything absurd and repugnant could have a necessary connexion with truth or flow from it. But, whoever considers the weakness of this pretence will think it was contrived on purpose to humour the laziness of the mind which had rather acquiesce in an indolent scepticism than be at the pains to go through with a severe examination of those principles it has ever embraced for true. 130. Of late [ IOQ ] the speculations about Infinites have run so high, and grown to such strange notions, as have occasioned no small scruples and disputes among the geometers of the present age. Some there are of great note who, not content with holding that finite lines may be divided into an infinite number of parts, do yet farther maintain that each of those infinitesimals is itself subdivisible into an infinity of other parts or infinitesimals of a second order, and so on ad infinitum. These, I say, assert there are infinitesimals of infinitesimals of infinitesimals, &c, without ever coming to an end : so that according to them an inch does not barely contain an infinite number of parts, but an infinity of an infinity of an infinity ad infinitum of parts. Others there be who hold all orders of infinitesimals below the first to be nothing at all ; thinking it with good reason absurd to imagine there is 10 ' we must mean a line,' &c. — ' we mean (if we mean anything) a line,' &c. — in firsj: edition. OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 267 any positive quantity or part of extension which, though mul tiplied infinitely, can never equal the smallest given extension. [ IIQ ] And yet on the other hand it seems no less absurd to think the square, cube, or other power of a positive real root, should itself be nothing at all ; which they who hold infinitesimals of the first order, denying all of the subsequent orders, are obliged to maintain. 131. Have we not therefore reason to conclude they are both in the wrong, and that there is in effect no such thing as parts infinitely small, or an infinite number of parts contained in any finite quantity? But you will say that if this doctrine obtains it will follow the very foundations of Geometry are destroyed, and those great men who have raised that science to so astonishing a height, have been all the while building a castle in the air. To this it may be replied that whatever is useful in geometry, and promotes the benefit of human life, does still remain firm and unshaken on our principles — that science considered as practical will rather receive advantage than any prejudice from what has been said. But to set this in a due light, and shew how lines and figures may be measured, and their properties investigated, with out supposing finite extension to be infinitely divisible, may be the proper business of another place 11 . For the rest, though it should follow that some of the more intricate and subtle parts of Speculative Mathematics may be pared off without any pre judice to truth, yet I do not see what damage will be thence derived to mankind. On the contrary, I think it were highly to be wished that men of great abilities and obstinate application 12 would draw off their thoughts from those amusements, and employ them in the study of such things as lie nearer the concerns of life, or have a more direct influence on the manners. 132. If it be said that several theorems undoubtedly true are discovered by methods in which infinitesimals are made use of, which could never have been if their existence included a contra diction in it — I answer that upon a thorough examination it will not be found that in any instance it is necessary to make use of 11 See Analyst. 12 ' men of great abilities and obstinate application,' &c. — ' men of the greatest abilities and most obstinate application,' &c. — in first edition. 268 OF THE PRINCIPLES or conceive infinitesimal parts of finite lines, or even quantities less than the minimum sensibile ; nay, it will be evident this is never done, it being impossible. [ I3 And, whatever mathematicians may think of fluxions, or the differential calculus and the like, a little reflection will shew them that, in working by those methods, they do not conceive or imagine lines or surfaces less than what are perceivable to sense. They may indeed call those little and almost insensible quantities infinitesimals, or infinitesimals of in finitesimals, if they please ; but at bottom this is all, they being in truth finite — nor does the solution of problems require the supposing any other. But this will be more clearly made out hereafter.] 133. By what we have hitherto said, it is plain that very numerous and important errors have taken their rise from those false Principles which were impugned in the foregoing parts of this treatise ; and the opposites of those erroneous tenets at the same time appear to be most fruitful Principles, from whence do flow innumerable consequences highly advantageous to true philosophy, as well as to religion. Particularly Matter, or the ab solute^ existence of corporeal objects, hath been shewn to be that wherein the most avowed and pernicious enemies of all knowledge, whether human or divine, have ever placed their chief strength and confidence. And surely, if by distinguishing the real exist ence of unthinking things from their being perceived, and allow ing them a subsistence of their own out of the minds of spirits, no one thing is explained in nature, but on the contrary a great many inexplicable difficulties arise ; if the supposition of Matter 15 is barely precarious, as not being grounded on so much as one single reason ; if its consequences cannot endure the light of examination and free inquiry, but screen themselves under the dark and general pretence of ' infinites being incomprehensible ;' if withal the removal of this Matter** be not attended with the least evil consequence ; if it be not even missed in the world, *3 What follows to the end of this section is omitted in the second edition. z * ' absolute,' i. e. unperceived or irrelative existence — supposed to be either something extended, or something of which we have no positive conception at all. X S i. e. absolute or unperceived Matter, but not the relative or perceived material world of the senses. OF H UMA N KNO WL EDGE. 2 6g but everything as well, nay much easier conceived without it; if, lastly, both Sceptics and Atheists are for ever silenced upon supposing only spirits and ideas, and this scheme of things is perfectly agreeable both to Reason and Religion — methinks we may expect it should be admitted and firmly embraced, though it were proposed only as an hypothesis, and the existence of Matter 15 had been allowed possible, which yet I think we have evidently demonstrated that it is not. 134. True it is that, in consequence of the foregoing principles, several disputes and speculations which are esteemed no mean parts of learning, are rejected as useless [ l6 and in effect conversant about nothing at all]. But, how great a prejudice soever against our notions this may give to those who have already been deeply engaged, and made large advances in studies of that nature, yet by others we hope it will not be thought any just ground of dislike to the principles and tenets herein laid down — that they abridge the labour of study, and make human sciences far more clear, compendious, and attainable than they were before. 135. Having despatched what we intended to say concerning the knowledge of Ideas, the method we proposed leads us in the next place to treat of Spirits 17 — with regard to which, perhaps, human knowledge is not so deficient as is vulgarly imagined. The great reason that is assigned for our being thought ignorant of the nature of spirits is — our not having an idea of it. But, surely it ought not to be looked on as a defect in a human under standing that it does not perceive the idea of spirit, if it is mani festly impossible there should be any such idea. And this if I mistake not has been demonstrated in section 27; to which I shall here add — that a spirit has been shewn to be the only substance or support wherein unthinking beings or ideas can exist; but J S See note 15 on previous page. 16 Omitted in second edition. »7 Sect. 135 — 156 treat of the consequences of the new Principles of Human Knowl edge, in their application to Spirits or Minds — the second of the two correlatives in the dualism of Berkeley. This dualism Berkeley does not sufficiently explain. When he speaks of Mind as a Substance, and of minds in the plural, he cannot mean by ' substance' what Spinoza means — that which for its existence needs nothing beyond itself. Mind, with Berkeley, needs ideas, and must be conscious ; and finite minds are dependent on God, in a relation which he does not define. 270 OF THE PRINCIPLES that this substance which supports or perceives ideas should itself be an idea or like an idea is evidently absurd. 136. It will perhaps be said that we want a sense (as some have imagined 18 ) proper to know substances withal, which, if we had, we might know our own soul as we do a triangle. To this I answer, that, in case we had a new sense bestowed upon us, we could only receive thereby some new sensations or ideas £>f sense. But I believe nobody will say that what he means by the terms soul and substance is only some particular sort of idea or sensation. We may therefore infer that, all things duly con sidered, it is not more reasonable to think our faculties defective, in that they do not furnish us with an idea of spirit or active thinking substance, than it would be if we should blame them for not being able to comprehend a round square. 137. From the opinion that spirits are to be known after the manner of an idea or sensation have risen many absurd and heterodox tenets, and much scepticism about the nature of the soul. It is even probable that this opinion may have produced a doubt in some whether they had any soul at all distinct from their body, since upon inquiry they could not find they had an idea of it. That an idea which is inactive, and the -existence whereof consists in being perceived, should be the image or likeness of an agent subsisting by itself, seems to need no other refutation than barely attending to what is meant by those words. But, perhaps you will say that though an idea cannot resemble a spirit in its thinking, acting, or subsisting by itself, yet it may in some other respects ; and it is not necessary that an idea or image be in all respects like the original. 138. I answer, if it does not in those mentioned, it is impossible it should represent it in any other thing. Do but leave out the power of willing, thinking, and perceiving ideas, and there re mains nothing else wherein the idea can be like a spirit. For, by the word spirit we mean only that which thinks, wills, and perceives ; this, and this alone, constitutes the signification of that term. If therefore it is impossible that any degree of those powers should be represented in an idea [ I9 or notion], it is evident there can be no idea [ I9 or notion] of a spirit. 18 Locke. '9 Omitted in second edition. Cf. sect. 142. OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 27 1 139. But it will be objected that, if there is no idea signified by the terms soul, spirit, and substance, they are wholly insignificant, or have no meaning in them. I answer, those words do mean or signify a real thing — which is neither an idea nor like an idea, but that which perceives ideas, and wills, and reasons about them. What I am myself — that which I denote by the term / — is the same with what is meant by said or spiritual substance. [ 2 ° But if I should say that /was nothing, or that /was an idea or notion, nothing could be more evidently absurd than either of these pro positions.] If it be said that this is only quarrelling at a word, and that, since the immediate significations of other names are by common consent called ideas, no reason can be assigned why that which is signified by the name spirit or soul may not par take in the same appellation, I answer, all the unthinking objects of the mind agree in that they are entirely passive, and their existence consists only in being perceived ; whereas a soul or spirit is an active being, whose existence consists, not in being perceived, but in perceiving ideas and thinking 21 . It is therefore necessary, in order to prevent equivocation and confounding natures perfectly disagreeing and unlike, that we distinguish between spirit and idea. See sect. 2J. 140. In a large sense indeed, we may be said to have an idea [ 22 or rather a notion] of spirit; that is, we understand the mean ing of the word, otherwise we could not affirm or deny anything of it. Moreover, as we conceive the ideas that are in the minds of other spirits by means of our own, which we suppose to be resemblances of them ; so we know other spirits by means of our own soul — which in that sense is the image or idea of them; it having a like respect to other spirits that blueness or heat by me perceived has to those ideas perceived by another 23 . 20 Omitted in second edition. Cf. sect. 142. 21 If the existence of a mind consists in perceiving, it follows that mind is as dependent on ideas (of some sort) as ideas are on mind. 22 Introduced in second edition, in which he professes to apply the term notion exclu sively to our knowledge of the Ego, and to our knowledge of relations among our ideas. Sect. 142. =3 We know other minds or Egos phenomenally, i. e. through phenomena, or by infer ence from them, but not as ideas or phenomena of which we ourselves are conscious. Cf. sect. 148. It is thus a phenomenal knowledge that we have of other finite minds — of Ego viewed empirically and in plurality. The real meaning of Ego in the plural number, dis- 272 OF THE PRINCIPLES 141. [ 24 The natural immortality of the soulj] 111 ] is a neces sary consequence of the foregoing doctrine. But before we at tempt to prove this, it is fit that we explain the meaning of that tenet.] It must not be supposed that they who assert the natural immortality of the soul 25 are of opinion that it is absolutely in capable of annihilation even by the infinite power of the Creator who first gave it being, but only that it is not liable to be broken or dissolved by the ordinary laws of nature or motion. They indeed who hold the soul of man to be only a thin vital flame, or system of animal spirits, make it perishing and corruptible as the body ; since there is nothing more easily dissipated than such a being, which it is naturally impossible should survive the ruin of the tabernacle wherein it is inclosed. And this notion has been greedily embraced and cherished by the worst part of mankind, as the most effectual antidote against all impressions of virtue and religion. [ II2 ] But it has been made evident that bodies, of what frame or texture soever, are barely passive ideas in the mind — which is more distant and heterogeneous from them than light is from darkness 26 . We have shewn that the soul is indi visible, incorporeal, unextended, and it is consequently incorrupt ible. Nothing can be plainer than that the motions, changes, decays, and dissolutions which we hourly see befal natural bodies (and which is what we mean by the course of nature) can not possibly affect an active, simple, uncompounded substance : such a being therefore is indissoluble by the force of nature ; that is to say, ' the soul of man is naturally immortal 27 .' 142. After what has been said, it is, I suppose, plain that our souls are not to be known in the same manner as senseless, inac tive objects, or by way of idea. Spirits and ideas are things so wholly different, that when we say 'they exist,' 'they are known,' tinguished from the absolute or transcendental Ego, is a question which Berkeley has not discussed. 34 Omitted in second edition. 2 5 ' the soul,' i. e. the finite mind or empirical Ego. 26 This is an emphatic assertion of the dualism of Berkeley — Minds or Egos being dis tinguished from their ideas or objects. =7 Although minds are dependent on ideas, as well as ideas on minds, yet minds are not, by any abstract necessity, dependent on sense-ideas or physical organization. Hence, while pure materialism is, on Berkeley's principles, a contradiction, the continued exist ence of a disembodied spirit involves no necessary absurdity. OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 273 or the like, these words must not be thought to signify anything common to both natures 28 . There is nothing alike or common in them ; and to expect that by any multiplication or enlarge ment of our faculties we may be enabled to know a spirit as we do a triangle 29 , seems as absurd as if we should hope to see a sound. This is inculcated because I imagine it may be of mo ment towards clearing several important questions, and prevent ing some very dangerous errors concerning the nature of the soul. [ 3 °We may not, I think, strictly be said to have an idea of an active being, or of an action 31 , although we may be said to have a notion of them. I have some knowledge or notion of my mind, and its acts about ideas — inasmuch as I know or under stand what is meant by these words. What I know, that I have some notion of. I will not say that the terms idea and notion may not be used convertibly, if the world will have it so ; but yet it conduceth to clearness and propriety that we distinguish things very different by different names. It is also to be re marked that, all relations including an act of the mind 32 , we can not so properly be said to have an idea, but rather a notion of the relations and habitudes between things. But if, in the mod ern way, the word idea is extended to spirits, and relations, and acts, this is, after all, an affair of verbal concern.] 143. It will not be amiss to add, that the doctrine of abstract ideas has had no small share in rendering those sciences intricate and obscure which are particularly conversant about spiritual things. Men have imagined they could frame abstract notions 28 The objective essence of matter, or the sense-given non-ego, is, with Berkeley, purely phenomenal or ideal ; the essence of mind — the Ego — is substantial and causal. Sense ideas or phenomena are at once dependent on mind, and symbolical of the intentions of mind. Mind and its ideas are, in short, at the opposite poles of existence — being related as subject knowing and object known, as cause and effects, as substance and phenomenon. But he does not say that these poles, thus opposed, are numerically distinguishable as things independent of each other. 2 9 i. e. objectively — as an object or idea. 3° What follows was introduced in the second edition, in which the term notion is defined, and assists to express Berkeley's duality in things. 3 1 Yet he speaks elsewhere (sect. 1, &c.) of ideas formed by attending to the ' operations' of the mind. He probably refers to the effects of the operations, holding that the effects, but not their cause, are ideal. 3 2 Here is the germ of Kantism. But Berkeley has not analysed that activity of mind which constitutes relation, as distinguished from the personal acting of will. Cf. remarka ble passages in Siris, sect. 297, 308, &c. 18 274 0F THE PRINCIPLES of the powers and acts of the mind, and consider them prescinded as well from the mind or spirit itself, as from their respective objects and effects. [ II3 ] Hence a great number of dark and am biguous terms, presumed to stand for abstract notions, have been introduced into metaphysics and morality, and from these have grown infinite distractions and disputes amongst the learned. 144. But, nothing seems more to have contributed towards engaging men in controversies and mistakes with regard to the nature and operations of the mind, than the being used to speak of those things in terms borrowed from sensible ideas. For ex ample, the will is termed the motion of the soul : this infuses a belief that the mind of man is as a ball in motion, impelled and determined by the objects of sense, as necessarily as that is by the stroke of a racket. Hence arise endless scruples and errors of dangerous consequence in morality. All which, I doubt not, may be cleared, and truth appear plain, uniform, and consistent, could but philosophers be prevailed on to f_ 33 depart from some received prejudices and modes of speech, and] retire into them selves, and attentively consider their own meaning. [ 33 But the difficulties arising on this head demand a more particular disqui sition than suits with the design of this treatise.] 145. From what has been said, it is plain that we cannot know the existence of other spirits otherwise than by their operations, or the ideas by them excited in us. I perceive several motions, changes, and combinations of ideas, that inform me there are cer tain particular agents, like myself, which accompany them and concur in their production. [ II4 ] Hence, the knowledge I have of other spirits is not immediate, as is the knowledge of my ideas ; but depending on the intervention of ideas, by me referred to agents or spirits distinct from myself, as effects or concomitant signs 34 . 33 Omitted in second edition. 34 This is one of the most important sections in the book. It has been common (see Reid's Essays, VI. 5, &c.) to allege that, on Berkeley's principles, I have no reason to be lieve in the existence of other minds or wills — a plurality of Egos, or at any rate in other Egos than my own, and the Supreme or Absolute. I can design or intend ; all the rest is God's — my volitions and His determine the phenomenal universe. Now, Berkeley holds that we have the same sort of reason to believe in the existence of other human minds that we have to believe in the existence of God, viz. the sense-symbolism which implies the existence of other finite minds, embodied like our own, as its only reasonable interpreta- OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 275 146. But, though there be some things which convince us human agents are concerned in producing them, yet it is evident to every one that those things which are called the Works of Nature, that is, the far greater part of the ideas or sensations perceived by us, are not produced by, or dependent on, the wills of men. There is therefore some other Spirit that causes them ; since it is repugnant that they should subsist by themselves. See sect. 29. But, if we attentively consider the constant re gularity, order, and concatenation of natural things, the surprising magnificence, beauty and perfection of the larger, and the exqui site contrivance of the smaller parts of the creation, together with the exact harmony and correspondence of the whole, but above all the never-enough-admired laws of pain and pleasure, and the instincts or natural inclinations, appetites, and passions of animals — I say if we consider all these things, and at the same time attend to the meaning and import of the attributes One, Eternal, Infinitely Wise, Good, and Perfect, we shall clearly per ceive that they belong to the aforesaid Spirit, 'who works all in all,' and 'by whom all things consist.' 147. Hence, it is evident that God is known as certainly and immediately as any other mind or spirit whatsoever distinct from ourselves. We may even assert that the existence of God is far more evidently perceived than the existence of men ; because the effects of nature are infinitely more numerous and considerable than those ascribed to human agents 35 . There is not any one mark that denotes a man, or effect produced by him, which does not more strongly evince the being of that Spirit who is the Author of Nature. For, it is evident that in affecting other per sons the will of man has no other object than barely the motion of the limbs of his body; but that such a motion should be tion. Cf. sect. 147, 148. Both are beliefs gathered from the suggestions of experience. This enables us to infer the existence not merely of other, and by us, at present, unper ceived phenomena, in our own past or future experience ; and phenomena in the present, past, or future experience of other minds ; but also, as implied in the latter, the existence of other minds — other selfs. His mode of looking at the universe leaves the evidence for the existence of other men as it was before (although our ideas and those of other men are with him not numerically identical, but only in a harmony of similarity) ; while his theory was believed by him to intensify the evidence of Divine Presence and Providence. See Alciphron, Dial. IV., and Vindication of New Theory of Vision, sect. 8, 38, &c. 35 Cf. Alciphron, Dial. IV. 8 — 14; Vindication of New Theory of Vision, sect. 8. 2j6 OF THE PRINCIPLES attended by, or excite any idea in the mind of another, depends wholly on the will of the Creator. He alone it is who, ' uphold ing all things by the word of His power,' maintains that inter course between spirits whereby they are able to perceive the existence of each other 36 . And yet this pure and clear light which enlightens every one is itself invisible [ 37 to the greatest part of mankind], 148. It seems to be a general pretence of the unthinking herd that they cannot see God. Could we but see Him, say they, as we see' a man, we should believe that He is, and believing obey His commands. But alas, we need only open our eyes to see the Sovereign Lord of all things, with a more full and clear view than we do any one of our fellow-creatures. Not that I imagine we see God (as some will have it) by a direct and immediate view ; or see corporeal things, not by themselves, but by seeing that which represents them in the essence of God, which doctrine 1s 38 , I must confess, to me incomprehensible. [ II5 ] But I shall explain my meaning : — -A human spirit or person is not perceived by sense, as not being an idea ; when therefore we see the colour, size, figure, and motions of a man, we perceive only certain sensations or ideas excited in our own minds ; and these being exhibited to our view in sundry distinct collections, serve to mark out unto us the existence of finite and created spirits like our selves. Hence it is plain we do not see a man — if by man is meant that which lives, moves, perceives, and thinks as we do — but only such a certain collection of ideas as directs us to think there is a distinct principle of thought and motion, like to our- 36 God so regulates the sense-given phenomena or ideas of which spirits are individually conscious, as that these phenomena, while numerically different in each mind, are never theless a practical medium of intercourse between minds. Egoism is seen not to be a ne cessary result of the fact that no one but myself can be conscious of my own experience, when we recognise that persons only are powers, and that /am not the cause of all the changes which my ideas or phenomena exhibit. Without being themselves conscious of my consciousness, we may infer that other persons or minds are at work to modify it. In short, our experience of power or volition, and of our own limited power, is essential to Berkeley's recognition of a plurality of minds or substances — to his escape from the unity of Absolute Egoism, and to his scientific recognition of his external world. 37 Omitted in second edition. 38 Malebranche, as understood by Berkeley. According to Malebranche we see mate rial or sensible things in God, who transcends, and in transcending unites the substantial antithesis of Mind and Matter. See Recherche, liv. III. p. ii. ch. 6, &c. OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 277 selves, accompanying and represented by it. And after the same manner we see God ; all the difference is that, whereas some one finite and narrow assemblage of ideas denotes a particular human mind, whithersoever we direct our view, we do at all times and in all places perceive manifest tokens of the Divinity — everything we see, hear, feel, or anywise perceive by sense, being a sign or effect of the power of God ; as is our perception of those very motions which are produced by men 39 . 149. It is therefore plain that nothing can be more evident to any one that is capable of the least reflection than the existence of God, or a Spirit who is intimately present to our minds, producing in them all that variety of ideas or sensations which continually affect us, on whom we have an absolute and entire dependence, in short ' in whom we live, and move, and have our being.' That the discovery of this great truth, which lies so near and obvious to the mind, should be attained to by the reason of so very few, is a sad instance of the stupidity and inattention of men, who, though they are surrounded with such clear manifest ations of the Deity, are yet so little affected by them that they seem, as it were, blinded with excess of light. 150. But you will say, Hath Nature no share in the production of natural things, and must they be all ascribed to the immediate and sole operation of God ? I answer, if by Nature is meant only the visible series of effects or sensations imprinted on our minds, according to certain fixed and general laws, then it is plain that Nature, taken in this sense, cannot produce anything at all 4 °. But, if by Nature is meant some being distinct from God, as well as from the laws of nature, and things perceived by sense, I must confess that word is to me an empty sound without any intelli gible meaning annexed to it. Nature, in this acceptation, is a vain chimera, introduced by those heathens who had not just notions of the omnipresence and infinite perfection of God. But, it is more unaccountable that it should be received among Chris- 39 Cf. Alciphron, Dial. IV. and Vindication of New Theory of Vision, sect. 8, 38, &c. The eternal existence of conscious Mind, and the present existence of other finite minds than my own, are both inferences, according to Berkeley. The former, however, follows from the assumption that something must be eternal, because something now exists ; seeing that this ' something,' as existing, must be a mind conscious of ideas or objects. 4° Cf. sect. 25, 51 — 53, 60 — 66, &c. 2 ;8 OF THE PRINCIPLES tians, professing belief in the Holy Scriptures, which constantly ascribe those effects to the immediate hand of God that heathen philosophers are wont to impute to Nature. ' The Lord He causeth the vapours to ascend ; He maketh lightnings with rain ; He bringeth forth the wind out of his treasures.' Jerem. x. 13. ' He turneth the shadow of death into the morning, and maketh the day dark with night' Amos v. 8. ' He visiteth the earth, and maketh it soft with showers : He blesseth the springing thereof, and crowneth the year with His goodness ; so that the pastures are clothed with flocks, and the valleys are covered over with corn.' See Psal. lxv. But, notwithstanding that this is the constant language of Scripture, yet we have I know not what aversion from believing that God concerns Himself so nearly in our affairs. Fain would we suppose Him at a great distance off, and substitute some blind unthinking deputy in His stead, though (if we may believe Saint Paul) ' He be not far from every one of us.' 151. It will, I doubt not, be objected, that the slow, gradual, and roundabout methods observed in the production of natural things do not seem to have for their cause the immediate hand of an Almighty Agent 41 . Besides, monsters, untimely births, fruits blasted in the blossom, rains falling in desert places, mis eries incident to human life, and the like, are so many arguments that the whole frame of nature is not immediately actuated and superintended by a Spirit of infinite wisdom and goodness. But the answer to this objection is in a good measure plain from sect. 62 ; it being visible that the aforesaid methods of nature are absolutely necessary, in order to working by the most simple and general rules, and after a steady and consistent manner; which argues both the wisdom and goodness of God. [ 42 For, it doth hence follow that the finger of God is not so conspicuous to the resolved and careless sinner, which gives him an opportunity to harden in his impiety and grow ripe for vengeance. (Vid. sect. 57.)] Such is the artificial contrivance of this mighty machine of nature that, whilst its motions and various phenomena strike on our senses, the hand which actuates the whole is itself unper ceivable to men of flesh and blood. 'Verily' (saith the prophet) 1 thou art a God that hidest thyself.' Isaiah xlv. 15. But, though 4 1 Cf. sect. 60 — 66. 42 Omitted in second edition. OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 279 the Lord conceal Himself from the eyes of the sensual and lazy, who will not be at the least expense of thought, yet to an un biassed and attentive mind nothing can be more plainly legible than the intimate presence of an All-wise Spirit, who fashions, regu lates, and sustains the whole system of beings 43 , H 44 Secondly.] It is clear, from what we have elsewhere observed, that the operating according to general and stated laws is so necessary for our guidance in the affairs of life, and letting us into the secret of nature, that without it all reach and compass of thought, all human sagacity and design, could serve to no manner of purpose; it were even impossible there should be any such faculties or powers in the mind. See sect. 31. Which one consideration abundantly outbalances whatever particular inconveniences may thence arise. 152. But, we should further consider that the very blemishes and defects of nature are not without their use, in that they make an agreeable sort of variety, and augment the beauty of the rest of the creation, as shades in a picture serve to set off the brighter and more enlightened parts. We would likewise do well to ex amine whether our taxing the waste of seeds and embryos, and accidental destruction of plants and animals, before they come to full maturity, as an imprudence in the Author of nature, be not the effect of prejudice contracted by our familiarity with impotent and saving mortals 45 . In man indeed a thrifty management of those things which he cannot procure without much pains and industry may be esteemed wisdom. But, we must not imagine that the inexplicably fine machine of an animal or vegetable costs the great Creator any more pains or trouble in its production than a pebble does ; nothing being more evident than that an Omnipotent Spirit can indifferently produce everything by a mere fiat or act of his will. Hence, it is plain that the splendid pro fusion of natural things should not be interpreted weakness or prodigality in the agent who produces them, but rather be looked on as an argument of the riches of his power. 153. As for the mixture of pain or uneasiness which is in the world pursuant to the general laws of nature, and the actions of 43 So Pascal in the Pensies. 44 Omitted in second edition. 45 So Butler, in his Analogy. Also cf. sect. 60 — 66. 280 OF THE PRINCIPLES finite, imperfect spirits, this, in the state we are in at present, is indispensably necessary to our well-being. But our prospects are too narrow. We take, for instance, the idea of some one particular pain into our thoughts, and account it evil ; whereas, if we enlarge our view, so as to comprehend the various ends, connexions, and dependencies of things, on what occasions and in what proportions we are affected with pain and pleasure, the nature of human freedom, and the design with which we are put into the world ; we shall be forced to acknowledge that those particular things which, considered in themselves, appear to be evil, have the nature of good, when considered as linked with the whole system of beings 45 . 154. From what has been said, it will be manifest to any con sidering person, that it is merely for want of attention and com prehensiveness of mind that there are any favourers of Atheism or the Manichean Heresy to be found. Little and unreflecting souls may indeed burlesque the works of Providence 46 — [ II6 ] the beauty and order whereof they have not capacity, or will not be at the pains, to comprehend ; but those who are masters of any justness and extent of thought, and are withal used to reflect, can never sufficiently admire the divine traces of Wisdom and Goodness that shine throughout the Economy of Nature. But what truth is there which glares so strongly on the mind that by an aversion of thought, a wilful shutting of the eyes, we may not escape seeing it, at least with a full and direct view ? Is it there fore to be wondered at, if the generality of men, who are ever intent on business or pleasure, and little used to fix or open the eye of their mind, should not have all that conviction and evi dence of the Being of God which might be expected in reason able creatures ? 155. We should rather wonder that men can be found so stupid as to neglect, than that neglecting they should be unconvinced of such an evident and momentous truth. And yet it is to be feared that too many of parts and leisure, who live in Christian 45 So Butler, in his Analogy. 4 s A constant Divine Thought and Providence in the changes of the phenomenal world, rather than the original creation of finite minds and of their ideas or phenomena, is the conception which runs through Berkeley's philosophy, conspicuously in Siris. OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 2 8l countries, are, merely through a supine and dreadful negligence, sunk into [ 47 a sort of Demy-] Atheism. [ 4S They cannot say there is not a God, but neither are they convinced that there is. For what else can it be but some lurking infidelity, some secret mis givings of mind with regard to the existence and attributes of God, which permits sinners to grow and harden in impiety ?] Since it is downright impossible that a soul pierced and enlight ened with a thorough sense of the omnipresence, holiness, and justice of that Almighty Spirit should persist in a remorseless violation of His laws. We ought, therefore, earnestly to meditate and dwell on those important points ; that so we may attain con viction without all scruple 'that the eyes of the Lord are in every place beholding the evil and the good ; that He is with us and keepeth us in all places whither we go, and giveth us bread to eat and raiment to put on ;' that He is present and conscious to our innermost thoughts; in fine, that we have a most absolute and immediate dependence on Him. A clear view of which great truths cannot choose but fill our hearts with an awful circum spection and holy fear, which is the strongest incentive to Virtue, and the best guard against Vice. 156. For, after all, what deserves the first place in our studies is the consideration of God and our Duty; which to promote, as it was the main drift and design of my labours, so shall I esteem them altogether useless and ineffectual if, by what I have said, I cannot inspire my readers with a pious sense of the Presence of God ; and, having shewn the falseness or vanity of those barren speculations which make the chief employment of learned men, the better dispose them to reverence and embrace the salutary truths of the Gospel, which to know and to practise is the highest perfection of human nature. 47 Omitted in second edition. Our alleged necessary ignorance of the ultimate cause and meaning of the Universe in which we find ourselves is, in the present day, a common objection to the assumption that its phenomena may be interpreted as significant of Su preme or Absolute Mind. As Hume or Comte would have it, the Universe is a singular effect or complement of phenomena, which we can interpret only so far as our secular wants and duties are concerned. They look to the physical or phenomenal, and not to the moral and spiritual evidence. 4 8 Omitted in second edition. APPENDIX. A. BERKELEY'S ROUGH DRAFT OF THE INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. [After the Principles of Human Knowledge had passed through the press, I found Berkeley's autograph of a rough draft of the Introduction, in the manuscript department of the Library of Trinity College, Dublin. It seems to have been written in November and December, 1708. I here present it to the reader, who will find that it varies considerably from the published version, besides containing erasures and interlinea tions which have a biographical and literary, as well as a philosophical interest. As this Introduction forms Berkeley's early attack upon metaphysical abstractions, and his reasoned exposition of what has since been called his Nominalism, it may be well 'to have so important a part of his philosophy placed before us in various verbal forms which it successively assumed when it was struggling into the final expression. The student of his mind may like also to compare these with still earlier illustrative fragments in the Commonplace Book, appended to his Life and Lette?'s, as well as with the theory of universals in Alciphron and especially in Sin's. What Berkeley here means to deny is the ex istence of any physical reality, corresponding to general names, apart from actual or imagined sensible phenomena. In this early attack upon 'abstract ideas,' his characteristic ardour carried him in appear ance to the extreme of rejecting the universalizing element, by which Mind constitutes and gives objectivity to things, and of resting knowl edge on the shifting foundation of phenomena or ideas — particular, contingent, and subjective. But if he seems to do this in the Intro duction, he virtually proceeds in the body of the Principles upon the assumption that personal substantiality and efficient or voluntary cau sality are universal and uncreated necessities of Being — axiomatic truths involved in all concrete consciousness of phenomena. This assumption (along with the assumed general fact of established cosmical order) redeems his philosophy from subjectivity, and gives cohesion and fixed ness to knowledge. This stable intellectuality is more manifest in Sin's. But he everywhere leans on living acts, not verbal formulas. A. C. F.] 285 286 APPENDIX A. Philosophy being nothing else but the study of wisdom and truth, it may seem strange that they who have spent much time and pains in it, do usually find themselves embarrass'd with more doubts and difficulties than they were before they pcame to that study. There is nothing these men can [ 2 touch] with their hands or behold with their eyes but has its inaccessible and dark sides. Something] they imagine to be in every drop of water, every grain of sand which can puzzle [ 3 and confound] the most clear and [ 4 elevated] understanding, and are often by their principles led into a necessity of admitting the most irreconcilable opinions for true, or (which is worse) of sitting down in a forlorn scepticism. The cause of this is thought to be the obscurity of things, together with the natural weakness and imperfection of our under standing. It is said the senses we have are few, and these design'd by nature only for the support of life, and not to penetrate into the constitution and inward essence of things. Besides, the mind of man being finite when it treats of things which partake of infinity, it is not to be wonder'd at if it run into absurdities 5 and contradictions, out of which it is [ 3 absolutely] impossible it should ever extricate itself, it being of the nature of Infinite not to be comprehended by that which is finite 6 . But I cannot think our faculties are so weak and inadequate in respect of things, as these men would make us believe. I cannot be brought to suppose that right deductions from true principles should ever end 7 in consequences which cannot be maintain'd or made consistent. We should believe that God has dealt more bountifully with the sons of men than to give them a strong desire for that which he had placed quite out of their reach, and so made it impossible for them to obtain. Surely our wise and good Creatour would never have made us so eager in the search 1 On the opposite page of the MS., instead of what follows within brackets — ' meddled with that study. To them the most common and familiar things appear intricate and perplex'd, there's nothing but has its dark sides. Somewhat' 2 'handle.' 3 Erased. 4 ' comprehensive.' 5 ' absurdities' instead of ' inconsistency's' erased. 6 on the margin of this paragraph is written — ' Nov. 15, 1708.' 7 ' end' instead of ' terminate' erased. PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 287 of truth meerly to baulk and perplex us, to make us blame our faculties, and bewail our inevitable ignorance. This were not agreeable to the wonted indulgent methods of Providence, which, whatever appetites it may have implanted in the creatures, doth usually furnish them with such means as, if rightly made use of, will not fail to satisfy them. Upon the whole my opinion is, that the far greatest part, if not all, of those difficultys which have hitherto amus'd philosophers, and block'd up the way to knowl edge, are entirely owing to themselves. That they have first rais'd a dust, and then complain they cannot see. My purpose therefore is, to [ 8 try if I can] discover [ 9 and point out] what those principles are which have introduc'd all that doubtfulness and uncertainty, those absurditys and contradictions into the several sects of philosophy, insomuch that the wisest men have thought our ignorance incurable, conceiving it to arise from the natural dulness and limitation of our faculties. And at the same time to establish such principles in their stead, as shall be free from the like consequences, and lead the mind into a clear view of truth. And surely it is a work well deserving of our pains, to try to extend the limits of our knowledge, and [ IO do right to] human understanding, by making it to appear that those lets and difficultys which stay and embarrass the mind in its enquirys [ " after truth] do not spring from any darkness and intricacy in the objects, or [ I2 natural] defect in the intellectual powers, so much as from false principles which have been insisted on, and might have been avoided. How difficult and discouraging soever this attempt may seem, when I consider what a number of men of very great and extra ordinary abilitys have gone before me, [ 9 and miscarry'd] in the like [ I3 designs, yet] I am not without some hopes, upon the con sideration that the largest views are not always the clearest, and that he who is shortsighted will be apt to draw the object nearer, and by a close and narrow survey may perhaps discern that which had escaped far better eyes. 8 Instead of ' endeavour to.' 9 Erased. 10 Instead of ' beat down those mounds and barriers that have been put to.' 11 Within brackets in the MS. 13 Instead of ' incurable' erased. »3 Instead of ' undertakings.' 288 APPENDIX A. [ I4 In my entrance upon this work] I think it necessary to take notice of [ IS that w ch seems to have been the source of a great many errours, and to have made the way to knowledge very intricate and perplex'd, that w ch seems to have had a chiefe part in ren dering speculation intricate and perplex'd, and to have been the source of innumerable errours and difficulties in almost all parts of knowledge] — and that is the opinion that there are Abstract Ideas or General Conceptions of Things. He who is not a per fect stranger to the writings and [ l6 notions] of philosophers must needs acknowledge that [ I7 no small] part of [ l8 them] are spent 19 about Abstract Ideas. These are, in a more special manner, thought to be the objects of those sciences that go by the name of logic and metaphysics, and of all that which passes under the notion of the most abstracted and sublime philosophy. In all which [ 2 ° speculative sciences] you shall scarce find any question handled [ 2 °by the philosophers] in such a manner as does not suppose their existence in the mind, and that it is very well acquainted with them; [ 2 °so that these parts of learning must of necessity be overrun with [very much] useles wrangling and jargon, [innumerable] absurdities and contradictions [opinions], if so be that Abstract General Ideas are perfectly inconceivable, as I am well assur'd they [never were — cannot be] conceived by me, [ 2I nor do I think it possible they should be conceiv'd by any one else].] By abstract idea, genera, species, universal notions, all which amount to the same thing, as I find these terms explain'd by the best and clearest writers, we are to understand ideas which equally *4 Instead of ' But here in the entrance, before I proceed any further.' On the blank page opposite we have — ' In my entrance upon this work [before I descend to more par ticular subjects] [and] [to more particular enquirys].' *5 Instead of — ' y l w h seem to me [one] very powerful and universal cause of error and confusion throughout the philosophy of all sects and ages' — and the opposite page, * that which seems to me a wide-spread [in philosophical enquirys] throughout the philosophy of all sects and ages.' 16 Brackets in the MS. 1 7 Instead of ' very great. " 18 Instead of their disputes and contemplations [speculations].' 19 ' concerning' instead of ' about' erased. 20 Erased. 21 On opposite page — ' and I very much question whether they ever were or can rje by any one else.' PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 289 represent the particulars of any sort, and are made by the mind which, observing that the individuals of each kind agree in some things and differ in others, takes out and singles from the rest that which is common to all, making thereof one abstract general idea; which [ 22 general idea] contains all those ideas wherein the particulars of that kind agree [ 22 and partake], separated from and exclusive of all those other concomitant ideas whereby they [ 22 individuals] are distinguished [ 22 from each other] one from another. [ 22 To this abstract general idea thus framed the mind gives a general name, and lays it up and uses it as a standard whereby to judge what particulars are and what are not to be accounted of that sort, those onely which contain every part of the general idea having a right to be admitted into that sort and by that name.] For example, the mind having observed that Peter, James, and John, &c, resemble each other in certain common agreements of shape and other quality, leaves out of the complex idea it has of Peter, James, &c, that which is peculiar to each, retaining onely that which is common to all. And so it makes one [ 23 abstract] complex idea, wherein all the particulars partake, abstracting entirely from and cutting off all those circumstances and differ ences which might determine it to any particular existence : and after this manner you come by [ 24 the] precise abstract idea of [ 22 a] man. In which [ 22 idea] it is true there is included colour because there is no man but hath some colour, but then it can be neither white [ 22 colour] nor black [ 22 colour] nor any particular colour, but colour in general, because, there is no one particular colour wherein all men partake. In like manner you will tell me there is included stature, but it is neither tall stature nor low stature, nor yet middling stature, but stature in general. And so of the rest. [ 25 Suppose now I should ask whether you compre hended, in this your abstract idea of man, the ideas of eyes, or ears, or nose, or legs, or arms [this might perhaps put you to a stand for an answer, for] you will own it to be an odd and mu- 82 Erased. 23 Instead of ' general.' z4 Instead of ' a clear.' =5 Erased. On opposite page, but erased, are the words — ' an odd and mutilated idea, that of man without all these.' And on the same page — ' it must needs [make an odd and frightful figure the idea] of [a] man without all these,' also erased. 19 290 APPENDIX A. tilated idea of a man w ch is without all these. Yet it must be so to make it consistent with the doctrine of abstract ideas, there being particular men that want, some arms, some legs [some noses, &c.]] f_ 27 But supposing the abstract idea of men to be very conceiv able, let us proceed to see [ 26 how] it comes to be enlarg'd into the more general and comprehensive idea of animal.] There being a great variety of other creatures [ 27 as birds] that partake in some parts, but not all, of the complex idea of man, the mind leaving out those parts which are peculiar to men, and retaining those onely which are common to all the living creatures, frames the idea of animal, [ 2? which is more general than that of man, it comprehending not only all particular men, but also all birds, beasts, fishes, and insects.] The constituent parts whereof [ 2? of the complex idea of animal] are body, life, sense, and spontaneous motion. By body is meant body [ 27 in general], without any par ticular shape or figure, there being no one shape or figure common to all animals, without covering either of hair, or feathers, or [ 28 scales], and yet it is not naked. Hair, feathers [ 28 scales], and nakedness being peculiar distinguishing properties of [ 27 the] par ticular animals, and for that reason left out of the [ 29 abstract] idea. Upon the same account, the spontaneous motion must be neither walking nor flying nor creeping, it is nevertheless a motion, but what that motion is it is not easy to say. In like manner a man [ 27 having seen several lines] by leaving out of his idea of a line [ 3 °the particular colour and length] comes by the idea of a line which is neither black, nor white, nor red, &c, nor long nor short, which he calls the abstract idea of a line, and which, for ought that: I can see, is just nothing. [ 27 For I ask whether a line has any more than one particular colour and one particular length, which [when they are] being left out, I beseech any 3I one to consider what it is that remains.] Whether others have this [ 32 wonderful] faculty of abstracting their ideas, they can [ 33 best] tell. For myself, I dare be con- 26 Instead of ' by what steps and abstractions.' =7 Erased. 28 Instead of ' fins.' =9 Instead of ' general.' 3° Instead of ' all particular colour, and all particular length.' 31 'one' instead of ' man.' 32 Instead of ' marvellous.' 33 Instead of better.' PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 29 1 fident I have it not; [ 36 and I am apt to think that some of those who fancy themselves to enjoy that privilege, would, upon look ing narrowly into their own thoughts, find they wanted it as much as I. For there was a time when, being banter'd and abus'd by words, I did not in the least doubt my having it. But upon a strict survey of my abilitys, I not only discover my own deficiency in that point, but also cannot conceive it possible that such a person should be even in the most perfect and exalted under standing.] I find I have a faculty of imagining, conceiving, or representing to myself the ideas of those particular things I have perceiv'd, and of variously compounding and dividing them. I can imagine a man with two heads, or the upper parts of a man joyn'd to the body of a horse. I can consider the hand, the eye, the nose each by itself [ 34 abstracted or] separated from the rest of the body. But then whatever eye or nose I imagine, they must have some particular shape and colour. The idea of man that I frame to myself must be either of a white, or a black, or a tawny, a straight or a crooked, a tall or a low or a middling sized man. I cannot by any effort of [ 35 thought] frame to myself an idea of man [ 36 prescinding from all particulars] that shall have nothing particular in it. [ s6 For my life I cannot comprehend abstract ideas 37 .] And there are grounds to think [ 38 most] men will acknowledge themselves to be in my case. The generality of men, which are simple and illiterate, never pretend to abstract notions. It is said they are difficult and not to be attained without much study and speculation, we may therefore reasonably conclude that, if such there be, they are altogether confin'd to the learned. But it must be confess'd, I do not see what great advantage they give them above the rest of mankind. He who considers that whatever has any existence in nature and can anywise affect or concern [ 3f5 is] him is particular, will not find great cause to be discontent with his facultys, if [ 3 nhey] cannot reach a piece of knowledge as useless as it is refin'd ; [ 3<5 and] which whether it 34 Instead of ' singled out and.' 35 Instead of ' imagination.' 36 Erased. 37 On opposite page the words — ' I can conceive well enough what is meant by ade quate and inadequate, clear and obscure, distinct and confus'd [ideas], but' — are written and erased. 3 s Instead of ' the far greatest part of.' » Instead of ' he.' 292 APPENDIX A. be to be found even in those deep thinkers may well be made a question. For besides the [ 4 °incomprehensibleness] of abstract ideas to my understanding (which may pass for an argument, since those gentlemen do not pretend to any new facultys distinct from those of ordinary men), there are not wanting other proofs against them. [ 4I It is, I think, a receiv'd axiom that an impossibility cannot be conceiv'd. For what created intelligence will pretend to conceive that which God cannot cause to be ? Now it is on all hands agreed, that nothing abstract or general can be made really to exist ; whence it should seem to follow, that it cannot have so much as an ideal existence in the understanding.] [ 42 1 do not think it necessary to insist on any more proofs, against the doctrine of abstraction in this place, especially for that the absurditys, which in the progress of this work I shall observe to have sprung from that doctrine, will yield plenty of arguments a posteriori against it.] I proceed [ 42 therefore] to examine what can be alleged in defence [ 43 of the doctrine of abstraction], and try if I can discover what it is that [ 44 inclines] the men of specu lation to embrace an opinion so pregnant of absurditys, and so remote from common sense as that seems to be. There has been a late excellent and deservedly esteem'd phi losopher, to whose judgment, so far as authority is of any weight with me, I would pay the utmost deference. This great man, no doubt, has very much countenanc'd the doctrine of abstraction by seeming to think [ 43 it] is that which puts the widest difference in point of understanding betwixt man and beast. Thus speaks he : ' The having of general ideas is that which puts a perfect distinction betwixt man and brutes, and is an excellency which the facultys of brutes do by no means attain unto. For it is evi dent we observe no footsteps in them of making use of general signs for [ 46 making] universal ideas ; from which we have reason 4° Instead of ' incomprehensibility,' and on opposite page, but erased — ' incomprehen sibleness to my understanding by any [intellect — understanding] whatsoever.' 4* Erased. On opposite page — ' That a contradiction cannot be conceiv'd by any human understanding whatsoever is, I think, agreed on all hands. And to me it is no less clear that the description of an abstract idea doth include a contradiction in it.' 42 Erased. 43 Instead of ' thereof.' 44 Instead of ' has inclined.' 43 Instead of ' the having abstract ideas.' & Within brackets in the MS. PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 293 to imagine that they have not the faculty of abstracting, or making general ideas, since they have no use of words or any other gen eral signs.' And a little lower : ' Therefore I think we may sup pose that 'tis in this that the species of brutes are discriminated from men, and 'tis that proper difference wherein they are wholly separated, and which at last widens to so wide a distance. For if they have any ideas at all and are not bare machines (as some would have them), we cannot deny them to have some reason. It seems as evident to me, that they do some of them in certain instances reason, as that they have sense, but it is only in partic ular ideas, just as they receiv'd them from their senses. They are the best of them tied up within those narrow bounds, and have not (as I think) the faculty to enlarge them by any kind of abstraction.' [Essay on Human Understaiiding , Book 2, chap II. s. 10, 11.) I readily agree with this authour that the faculties of brutes can by no means attain to the making of abstract general ideas. But then if that inability to abstract be made the distin guishing property of that sort of animals, I fear a great many of those that now pass for men must be reckon'd into their number. The reason which is here assign'd why we have no grounds to think that brutes have general ideas, is that we observe in them no use of words or any other general signs — which is built on this supposition — that the making use of words implys the having of general ideas, and that [ 47 on the other hand] those who have general ideas fail not to make use of words, or other universal signs, [ 48 whereby] to express [ 48 and signify them]. [ 4g That this is the] From which it must follow, that men who use language are able to abstract and generalize their ideas, but brutes [ 49 that] use it not are destitute of that faculty. That this is the sense and arguing of the authour of the Essay, will farther appear, by his answering the question he in another place puts. Since all things that exist are only particulars, how come we by general terms ? His answer is — ' Words become general by being made the signs of general ideas.' [Essay on Human Understanding, b. 3. c. 3. s. 6.) From which assertion I must crave leave to dissent, being of opinion that a word becomes general by being [ 5 °the] 47 Instead of ' reciprocally.' 4 s Erased. 49 Instead of ' who.' 5° Within brackets in the MS. 294 APPENDIX A. made the sign, not of a general idea, but of many particular ideas. Sure I am, as to what concerns myself, when I say the word Socrates is a proper [ 52 or particular] name, and the word man an appellative or general name, I mean no more than this, viz. that the one is peculiar and appropriated to one particular person, the other common to a great many particular persons, each [ 5I of which] has an equall right in propriety of language to be called by the name man. [ 52 This, I say, is the whole truth of the matter, and not that I make any incomprehensible abstract idea where-unto I annex the name man. That were to [make] my words stand for I know not what.] That great man seems to think the necessary ends of language could not be attain'd [ 52 to] without the use of abstract ideas. B. 3. c. 6. s. 39 [ 52 he shews it] and elsewhere he shews it to be his opinion that they are made in order to naming. B. 3. c. I. s. 3 he has these words : ' It is not enough for the perfection of lan guage that sounds can be made signs of ideas, unless those signs can be so made use of as to comprehend several particular things : for the multiplication of words would have perplex'd their use, had every particular thing need of a distinct name to be signified by. To remedy this inconvenience language had yet a farther improvement in the use of general terms whereby one word was made to mark a number of particular existences, which advan tageous use of sounds was obtained only by the difference of the ideas they were made signs of. Those names becoming general which are made to stand for general ideas, and those remaining particular where the ideas they are used for are particular.' Now I would fain know why a word may not be made to comprehend a great number of particular things in its signification, without the [ 53 help] of a general idea? Is it not possible to give the name [ S4 colour to black, white,- and red, &c] without having first made that strange and to me incomprehensible idea of [ 55 colour in abstract] ? Or must we imagine that a child upon sight of a par ticular body, and being told it is called an apple, must first frame to himself an abstract general idea [ s6 exclusive of] all particular S 1 Instead of ' whereof.' 5 2 Erased. 53 Instead of ' interposition.' 54 Instead of ' man to Peter, James, and John.' 55 Instead of ' man which shall have nothing particular in it.' 5 6 Instead of ' thereof, abstracting from.' PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 295 colour, tast, and figure before he can attain to the use of the word apple, and apply it to all the particulars of that sort of fruit that come in his way? [ s8 This surely is a task too hard and meta physical to be perform'd by an infant just beginning to speak.] Nay, I appeal to the experience of any grown man, whether this be the course he takes in acquainting himself with the [ S7 right] use and signification of any word ? Let any man take a fair and impartial view of his own thoughts, and then determine whether his general words do not become so only by being made to mark a number of particular existences, without any the least thought of abstraction. For what, I pray, are words but signs of our thoughts ? and how are signs of any sort render'd universal other wise than by being made to signify, or represent indifferently, a multitude of particular things ? The ideas that are in every man's mind ly hid [ s8 den], and cannot of themselves be brought into the view of another. It was therefore necessary, for discourse and communication, that men should institute sounds to be signs of their ideas, which being [ 59 excited] in the mind of the hearer [ 6o might] bring along with them [ 58 into his understanding] such ideas as in the propriety of any language were annex'd to them. But because of the almost infinite number and variety of our [ 6l ideas], it is impossible, and if it were possible would yet be a useless thing, to appropriate a particular [ 58 word to a] sign or name to every one of them. From which it must necessarily follow, that one word be made the sign of a great number of particular ideas, between which there is some likeness and which are said to be of the same sort. [ 62 But then these sorts are not determin'd and set out by nature, as was thought by most philosophers. Nor yet are they limited by any precise abstract ideas settl'd in the mind, with the general name annexed to them, as is the opinion of the authour of the Essay, nor do they in truth seem to me to have any precise bounds or limits at all. For if [there were] they had I 57 Instead of ' proper.' S 8 Erased. 59 Instead of ' raised.' 60 Instead of ' shall.' 61 Instead of ' thoughts.' 62 Erased. On the opposite page we have — ' Every one's experience may convince him that this is all that's meant by general names, and that they do not stand either for universal natures distinct from our conceptions as was held by the Peripatetics and generality of the Schoolmen, nor yet for universal notions or ideas as is the opinion of that sort of School men called Nominals and of the authour of the Essay.' 296 APPENDIX A. do not see how there could be those doubts and scruples about the sorting of particular beings which [that authour insists on as a good proof] are observ'd sometimes to have happen'd. Neither do I think it necessary the kinds or species of things should be so very accurately bounded and marked out, language being made by and for the common use of men, who do not ordinarily take notice of the minuter and less considerable differences of things.] From [ 63 all] which to me it seems evident that the having of general names does not imply the having of general ideas, but barely the marking by them a number of particular ideas, and that all the ends of language may be and are attain'd without the help of any such faculty as abstraction. Which will be made yet more manifest if we consider the different manners wherein words [ 63 and ideas [are] do stand for and represent things] represent ideas, and ideas things. There is no similitude or resemblance betwixt words and the ideas that are marked by them. Any name may be used indifferently for the sign of any idea, or any number of ideas, it not being deter min'd by any likeness to represent one more than another. But it is not so with ideas in respect of things, of which they are suppos'd to be the copies and images. They are not thought to represent them [ 63 any] otherwise than as they resemble them. Whence it follows that an idea is not capable of representing indifferently anything [^whatsoever], it being limited by the likeness it beares to some particular [ 6s thing] to represent it rather than any other. The word man may equally be put to signify any particular man I can think of. But I cannot frame an idea of man which shall equally represent and correspond to each particular of that sort of creatures that may possibly exist. I shall [ 6s only] add one more passage out of the Essay on Human Understanding, which is as follows : ' Abstract ideas are not so obvious or easy to children or the yet unexercised mind as particular ones. If they seem so to grown men 'tis only because by constant and familiar use they are made so. For when we nicely reflect upon them we shall find that general ideas are fictions and contrivances of the mind that carry diffi culty with them and do not so easily offer themselves as we are 6 3 Erased. 6 4 Instead of ' or number of things. " 6 S Instead of ' existence.' PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 297 apt to imagine. For example, does it not require some pains and skill to form the general idea of a triangle (which is yet none of the most abstract, comprehensive and difficult), for it must be neither oblique nor rectangle, neither equilateral, equicrural, nor scalenon, but all and none of these at once ? In effect, it is some thing imperfect, that cannot exist; an idea wherein some parts of several different and inconsistent ideas are put together. Tis true the mind in this imperfect state has need of such ideas, and makes all the hast to them it can, for the conveniency of communication and enlargement of knowledge, to both which it is naturally very much enclin'd ; but yet one has reason to suspect such ideas are marks of our imperfection. At least this is enough to shew that the most abstract and general ideas are not those that the mind is first and most easily acquainted with, nor such as its earlyest knowledge is conversant about.' B. 4. c. 7. s. 9. If any man has the faculty of framing in his mind such an idea of a triangle as is here describ'd, it is in vain to pretend to dispute him out of it, nor would I go about it. All I desire is that every one would fully and certainly inform himself whether he has such an idea or no. And this, methinks, can be no hard task for any one to perform. What more easy than for any one to look a little into his own understanding, and there try whether he has, or can attain to have, an idea that shall correspond with the description here given of the general idea of a triangle which is neither oblique nor rectangle, neither equilateral, equicrural, nor scalenon, but all and none of these at once ? He that can conceive such manifest contradictions and inconsistencys, 'tis fit he enjoy his privilege. For my part [ 66 I am well assur'd] 6? I have not the power of so doing, nor consequently of making to myself these general ideas ; neither do I find that I have any need of them either for the conveniency of communication or the enlargement of knowledge [ 66 for the conveniency of communi cation and enlargement of knowledge. For which I am not sorry, because it is here said one has reason to suspect such ideas are marks of our imperfection. Tho', I must own, I do not 66 Erased. 6 7 On opposite page — erased — ' I must own I have so much ot the brute in my under standing, that.' 298 APPENDIX A. see how this agrees with what has been above quoted [out of the same authour], viz. the having of general ideas is that which puts a perfect distinction betwixt man and brutes, and is an excellency which the faculties of brutes do by no means attain unto.] It is observable [ 68 what it is here said] of the difficulty that abstract ideas carry with them, and the pains and skill that, is requisite to the forming [ 66 of] them. To the same purpose Aristotle (who was certainly a great admirer and promoter of the doctrine of abstraction) has these words : %£§ov ok xai ^aXe-curara yvmpiZeiv rolq rhOpaj-ocq J ar\ rd (idXiara za.66J.ou ~oppiora.ru) yap rwv alq 6-jffecbv 'art. There is scarce anything so incomprehensible to men as the most universal notions, because they are most remote from sense. Metaph. lib. i. cap. 2 69 . It is on all hands agreed, that there is need of great pains and toil and labour of the mind, to emancipate [ 7 ° our thoughts] from particular ideas such as are taken in by the senses, and raise [ 7 °them] to those lofty specu lations [ ?I which] are conversant about abstract and universal ones. From all which the natural consequence should seem to be, that so difficult a thing as the forming of abstract ideas is not necessary for communication, which is so easy and familiar to all sorts of men, even the most barbarous and unreflecting. But we are told, if they seem obvious and easy to grown men, 'tis only because by constant and familiar use they are made so. Now I would fain know at what time it is men are employ'd in surmounting that difficulty, and furnishing themselves with those necessary [^ma terials] of discourse. It cannot be when they are grown up, for then they are not conscious of any such pains-taking. It re mains therefore to be the business of their childhood. And surely the great and multiply'd labour of framing general no tions will be found a hard task for that tender age. Is it not a hard thing to imagine that a couple of children cannot commune one with another of their sugar-plumbs and rattles, and the rest of their little trinkets, till they have first tack'd together number- 68 Instead of ' that which is [here] said by that authour on this occasion.' 6 9 Text as in Schwegler — oxedbv dc ml ^'a/lsTrwrara ravra yvupiCpiv rolg avdpuiroig, rd liakiGTa tcadolov "oppuraru yup tuv aladijaeuv eotlv. 7° Instead of ' it.' n Instead of ' that.' 7 2 Instead of ' praeliminarys.' PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 299 less inconsistencys, and so framed in their minds general abstract ideas, and annex'd them to every common name they make use of? Nor do I think they are a whit more needful for enlargement of knowledge, than for communication. For tho' it be a point much insisted on in the Schools that all knowledge is about uni versals, yet I [ 73 can by no means see the necessity of] this doc trine. It is acknowledg'd that nothing has a fairer title to the name of knowledge or science than geometry. Now I appeal to any man's thoughts whether, upon the entrance into that study, the first thing to be done is to try to conceive a circle that is neither great nor small, nor of any determinate radius, or to make ideas of triangles and parallelograms that are neither rectangular nor obliquangular, &c. ? It is [ 74 true] one thing for a proposition to be universally true, and another for it to be about universal natures or notions. [ 75 Because] that the three angles of a tri angle are equal to two right ones is granted to be a proposition universally true, it will not therefore follow that we are to under stand it of universal triangles, or universal angles. It will suffice that it be true of [ 74 any particular tri] the particular angles of any particular triangle whatsoever. But here it will be demanded, how we can know any proposition to be true of all particular triangles, except we have first seen it demonstrated of the general idea of a triangle, which equally agrees to and represents them all ? For because a property may be demonstrated to belong to some one particular triangle, it will not thence follow that it equally belongs to [ 74 some] any other triangle which in all respects is not the same with the former. For instance, having demonstrated that the three angles of an isosceles, rectangular triangle are equal to two right ones, I can not therefore conclude this affection agrees to all other triangles which have neither a right angle nor two equal sides. It seems therefore, that to be certain this proposition is universally true, we must either make a particular demonstration for every partic ular triangle, which is impossible, or else we must, once for all, demonstrate it of the general idea of a triangle in which all the 73 Instead of [could never] bring myself to comprehend.' 1* Erased. 75 Instead of ' Thus [notwithstanding].' 300 APPENDIX A. particulars do indifferently partake, and by which they are all equally represented. To which I answer, that notwithstanding the idea I have in my mind, whilst I make the demonstration, be that of some partic ular triangle, e. g. an isosceles, rectangular one whose sides are of a determinate length, I may nevertheless be certain that it extends to all other rectilinear triangles of what sort or bigness soever. And that because neither the right angle, nor the equality, nor determinate length of the legs are at all concern'd in the demonstration. 'Tis true the diagram I have in my view does include these particulars, but then there is not the least men tion made of them in the proof of the proposition. It is not said the three angles are equal to two right ones, because one of them is a right angle, or because the legs comprehending it are [ 7<5 equal] of the same length ; which sufficiently shews that the right angle might have been oblique and the sides unequal, and yet the dem onstration have held good. And for this reason it is that I con clude that to be true of any obliquangular or scalenon which I had demonstrated of a particular right angled equicrural triangle ; and not because I demonstrated the proposition of the general idea of a triangle which was all and none, it not being possible for me to conceive any triangle whereof I cannot delineate the like on paper. But I believe no man, whatever he may conceive, will pretend to describe a general triangle with his pencill. This being rightly consider'd, I believe we shall not be found to have any great [ 76 want] need of those eternal, immutable, universal ideas about which the philosophers keep such a stir, and without which they think there can be no silence at all. But what becomes of these general maxims, these first principles of knowledge, [ 77 so frequently in the mouths] of [ 7<5 the] meta physicians, all w ch are suppos'd to be about abstract and universal ideas ? To which all the answer I can make is, that whatsoever proposition is made up of terms standing for general notions or ideas, the same is to me, so far forth, [ ?6 absolutely] unintelligible : and whether it be that those speculative gentlemen have by earnest and profound study attain'd to an elevation of thought above the reach of ordinary capacities and endeavours, or whatever else be 7 6 Erased. 77 Instead of ' these curious speculations.' PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 301 the cause, sure I am there are in their writings many things which I now find myself unable to understand. Tho' being accustom'd to those forms of speech, I once thought there was no difficulty in them. But this One thing seems [ 8l to me] pretty plain and certain. How high soever that goodly fabrick of metaphysics might have been rais'd, and by what venerable names soever it maybe supported, yet if [ 8l withall] it be built on [ ?8 no other] foundation [ 79 than] inconsistency and contradictions, it is after all but a castle in the air 8 °. It were an endless as well as an useless thing to trace the Schoolmen, those great masters of abstraction,, and all others whether ancient or modern logicians and metaphysicians, thro' those numerous inextricable labyrinths of errour and dispute, which their doctrine of abstract natures and notions seems to have led them into. What bickerings and controversys, and what a learned dust has been rais'd about those matters, and what [ 8l great] mighty advantage has been from thence deriv'd to mankind, are things at this day too clearly known to need to be insisted on by me. Nor has that doctrine been confin'd to those two sciences, that make the most avowed profession of it. The contagion thereof has spread through [ 8l out] all the parts of philosophy. It has invaded and overrun those usefull studys of physic and divinity, and even the mathematicians themselves have had their full share of it. When men consider the great pain, industry and parts that have [ 8l in] for so many ages been lay'd out on the cultivation and advancement of the sciences, and that [^notwithstanding] all this, the far greatest part of them remain full of doubts and uncertainties, and disputes that are like never to have an end, and even those that are thought to be supported by the most clear and cogent demonstrations do contain in them paradoxes that are perfectly irreconcilable to the understandings of men, and that taking all together a very small portion of them does supply any real benefit to mankind, otherwise than by being an innocent diversion and amusement — I say upon the consideration of all this, men are wont to be cast into an amazement and despondency, 78 Instead of ' the sandy.' 79 Instead of ' of.' 80 On margin, ' Dec. 1.' 8l Erased. 82 Instead of ' for.' 302 APPENDIX A. and perfect contempt of all study. But that wonder and despair may perhaps cease upon a view of the false principles and wrong foundations of science [ 86 which] that have been made use of. Amongst all which there is none, methinks; of a more wide and universal sway over the thoughts of studious men than that we have been endeavouring to detect and overthrow. [ 86 To me certainly it does not seem strange that unprofitable debates and absurd and extravagant opinions should abound in the writings of those men who, disdaining the vulgar and obvious informations of sense, do in the depth of their understanding contemplate abstract ideas 83 .] I come now to consider the [ 84 source] of this prevailing. [ 8s notion], and that seems to me most evidently to be language. And surely nothing of less extent than reason itself could have been the source of an opinion, as epidemical as it is absurd. That [ 86 words are] the conceit of abstract idea ows its birth and origine to words, will appear, as from other reasons, so also from the plain confession of the ablest patrons of y £ doctrine, who [ 86 do] acknowledge that they are made in order to naming ; from which it is a clear consequence that there had been no such thing as speech, or universal signs, there never had been [ 86 ab stract ideas] any thought of abstract ideas. I find it also declared in express terms that general truths can never be well made known, and are very seldom apprehended but as conceived and expressed in words ; all which doth plainly set forth the inseparable con nexion and mutual dependence [ 86 on each other] that is thought to be between words and abstract ideas. For whereas it is else where said [ 86 there could be no communication by general names [ 87 without there being] also general ideas of which they were to be signs ; we are here, on the other hand, told that] that general ideas [ 88 are] necessary for communication by general names; here, on the other hand, we are told that names are needfull for the understanding of [ 86 abstract notions] general truths. Now by the bye, I would fain know how it is possible for words to make a man apprehend that which he cannot apprehend without 8 3 On margin — ' Dec. 2.' 8 4 Instead of ' cause.' 8 5 Instead of ' imagination in the minds of men.' . 8fi Erased. 8 7 Instead of ' except there were.' s 8 Instead of ' were.' PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 303 them. I do not deny they are necessary for communication, and so making me know the ideas that are in the mind of another. But when any truth, whether [ 89 about general or part] about general or particular ideas, is once made known to me by words, [ 89 I cannot see any manner of] so that I rightly apprehend the ideas contained in it, I see no manner of reason why I may not omit the words, and yet retain as full and clear a conception of the ideas themselves, as I had [ 89 of them] while they were cloathed with words. Words being, so far as I can see, of use only for recording and communicating, but not absolutely appre hending [ 8 9 of] ideas. [ 89 1 know there be some things which pass for truths that will not bear this [stripping — being stript] of the attire of words, but this I always took for a sure and certain sign that there were no clear and determinate ideas underneath.] I proceed to show the manner wherein words have contributed to the growth and origine of that mistake. That which seems [ 89 to me principally] in a great measure to have drove men into the conceit of [ 9 ° abstract] ideas, is the opinion, that every name has, or ought to have, one only precise and settl'd signification: which inclines [ 89 men] them to think there are certain abstract, determinate, general ideas that make the true and only immediate signification of each general name, and that it is by the mediation of these abstract ideas that a gen eral name comes to signify any particular thing. Whereas there is in truth [ 9I a] diversity of significations, in every general name whatsoever [ 89 except only the proper names]. Nor is there any such thing as one precise and definite signification annexed to each [ 89 appellative] name. All which does evidently follow from what has been already said, and will [ 89 be] clearly appear to any one by a little reflexion. But [ 89 here] to this, I doubt not, it will be objected that every name that has a definition is thereby tied down and restrain'd to [ 92 one certain] signification, e. g. a triangle is defin'd to be a plain surface comprehended by three right lines, by which that name is limited to denote one certain idea, and no other. To which I answer, that in the definition it is not said, whether the surface 89 Erased. 9° Instead of ' general.' 9 1 Instead of ' an homonomy or.' 92 Instead of ' a particular. " 304 APPENDIX A. be great or small, black or white or transparent, or whether the sides are long or short, equal or unequal, or with what angles they are inclin'd to each other. In all which there may be great variety, and consequently there is no one settled idea which limits the signification of the word triangle. 'Tis one thing for to keep a word [^everywhere] constantly to the same definition, and another to make it stand everywhere for the same idea: [ 93 that] is necessary, but [ 94 this] is useless and impracticable. [ 89 Nor does it avail to say the abstract idea of a triangle, which bounds the signification of that name, is itself determin'd, tho' the angles, sides, &c. are not. For besides the absurdity of such an idea, which has been already shown, it is evident that if the simple ideas or parts, i. e. the lines, angles, and surface, are themselves various and undetermin'd, the complex idea or whole triangle cannot be one settled determinate idea.] [ 9S But to give a farther account, how words came to introduce the doctrine of universal ideas, it will be necessary to observe there is a notion current among those that pass for the deepest thinkers, that every significant name stands for an idea. It is 93 Instead of ' the former.' 94 Instead of ' the latter,' 95 On the opposite page, we have, instead of this paragraph, the following : — ' But to give a farther account how words came to introduce the doctrine of general ideas, it ['must be observ'd] that [ 2 it is a receiv'd opinion] that language hath no other end than the communicating our ideas, and that every significant name stands for an idea. This being so, and it being withall certain that names which yet are not thought altogether insignificant, do not always mark out particular ideas, it is straightway concluded that they stand for general ones. ' That there are many names in use amongst speculative men, which do not always sug gest to others determinate, particular ideas, or in truth anything at all, is what nobody will deny. [3 And that there are significant names denoting things, whereof it is a direct repug nancy that any idea should be form'd by any understanding whatsoever, I shall in its due place endeavour to demonstrate that it is] not necessary (even in the strictest reasonings) that significant names which [3 are marks of ideas] stand for ideas shou'd every time they are used excite in the understanding the ideas they are made to [3 signify] stand for. In reading and discoursing names are for the [3 thinking on] most part us'd as [3 figures in casting up a sum in which to compute exactly is not necessary] letters are in Algebra, in which, tho' a particular quantity be mark'd by each letter, yet to proceed right it is not requisite that in every step [3 you have these particular quantitys in yr view. Tho' you regard only the letters themselves without ever thinking on what was denoted by them, yet if you work according to rule, you will come to a true solution of the question] each letter suggest to your thoughts that particular quantity [4 which] it was appointed to [s stand for]. i Instead of ' is necessary to observe.' 2 Instead of ' the common opinion of philosophers is.' 3 Erased. 4 Instead of ' whereof. " 5 Instead of ' be the figure to make— denote.' PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 305 said by them that a proposition cannot otherwise be understood than by perceiving [ 9<5 the agreement or disagreement of] the ideas marked by the terms [ 97 thereof] of it. Whence it follows, that according to those men every proposition that is not jargon must consist of terms or names that carry along with them each a determinate idea. This being so, and it being [certain] withall certain that names which yet are not thought altogether insig nificant do not always mark out particular ideas, it is straightway concluded that they stand for general ones. In answer to this I say, that names, significant names, do not always stand for ideas, but that they may be and are often used to good purpose [tho' they are] without being suppos'd to stand for or represent any idea at all. And as to what we are told of understanding propositions by [perceiving] the agreement or dis agreement of the ideas marked by their terms, this to me in many cases seems absolutely false. For the better clearing and demon strating of all which I shall make use of some particular instances. Suppose I have the idea of some one particular dog to which I give the name Melampus, and then frame this proposition — Melampus is an animal. Where 'tis evident the name Melampus denotes one particular idea. And as for the other name or term of the proposition, there are a sort of philosophers will tell you thereby is meant not only a universal conception, but also [cor responding thereto] a universal nature or essence really existing without the mind, whereof Melampus doth partake, as tho' it were possible that even things themselves could be universal. And [But] this with reason is exploded as nonsensical and ab surd. But then those men who have so clearly and fully detected the emptyness and insignificancy of that wretched jargon [of S.G.W.(?)], are themselves to me equally unintelligible. For they will have it that if I understand what I say I must make the name animal stand for an abstract general idea which agrees to and corresponds with the particular idea marked by the name Melam pus. But if a man may be allow'd to know his own meaning, I do declare that in my thoughts the word animal is neither sup pos'd to stand for an universal nature, nor yet for an abstract idea, which to me is at least as absurd and incomprehensible as the other. 96 Erased. 97 This and some words that follow are within brackets in the MS. 20 306 APPENDIX A. Nor does it indeed in that proposition stand for any idea [at all] at all. All that I intend to signify thereby being only this — that the particular [creature] thing I call Melampus has a right to be called by the name animal. And I do intreat any one to make this easy tryal. Let him but cast out of his [thoughts] the words of the proposition, and then see whether two clear and determi nate ideas remain [j> s in his understanding] whereof he finds one to be conformable to the other. I perceive it evidently in myself that upon laying aside all thought of the words ' Melampus is an animal,' I have remaining in my mind one only naked and bare idea, viz. that particular one to which I gave the name Melampus. Tho' some there be that pretend they have also a general idea signified by the word animal, which they perceive to agree with the particular idea signified by the word Melampus, [which idea is made up of inconsistencys and contradictions, as has been already shown.] Whether this or that be the truth of the matter, I desire every particular person to consider and conclude for himself] And this methinks may pretty clearly inform us how men might first have come to think there was a general idea of animal. For in the proposition we have instanc'd in, it is plain the word animal is not suppos'd to stand for the idea of any one particular [anima] [creature] animal. For if it be made stand for another different from that is marked by the name Melampus, the proposition is false and includes a contradiction ; and if it be made signify the very same individual that Melampus doth, it is a tautology. But it is presumed that every name stands for an idea. It remains therefore that the word animal stands for [the] general abstract idea [of animal]. In like manner we may be able with a little attention to discover how other general ideas [of all sorts] might at first have stolen into the thoughts of man. But farther to make it evident that words may be used to good purpose without bringing into the mind determinate ideas, I shall add this instance. We are told [that] the good things which God hath prepared for them that love him are such as eye hath not seen nor ear heard, nor hath it enter'd into the heart of man to conceive. What man will pretend to say these words of the 9 8 Erased. PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 307 inspir'd writer are empty and [ses(?)] insignificant ? And yet who is there that can say they bring into his mind [determi] clear and determinate ideas, or in truth any ideas at all [ideas] of the good things [pre] in store for them that love God ? It may per haps be said that those words lay before us the clear and deter minate abstract ideas of good in general and thing in general ; but I am afraid it will be found that those very abstract ideas are every whit as remote from the comprehension of men as the particular pleasures of the saints in heaven. But, say you, those words of the Apostle must have some import. They cannot be suppos'd to have been utter'd without all meaning and design whatsoever. I answer, the saying is very weighty, and carrys with it a great design, but it is not to raise in the minds of men the abstract ideas of thing or good, nor yet the particular ideas of the joys of the blessed. The design is to make them more chearfull and fervent in their duty ; and how this may be cora pass'd without making the words good things [to be] stand for and mark out to our understandings any ideas either general or particular, I proceed to show. Upon mention of a reward to a man for 'his pains and perse verance in any occupation whatsoever, it seems to me that divers things do ordinarily ensue. For there may be excited in his understanding an idea of the particular good thing to him pro posed for a reward. There may also ensue thereupon an alacrity and steddiness in fulfilling those conditions on which it is to be obtain'd, together with a zealous desire of serving and pleasing the person in whose power it is to bestow that good thing. All these things, I say, may and often do follow upon the pronuncia tion of those words that declare the recompence. Now I do not see any reason why the latter may not happen without the former. What is it that hinders why a man may not be stirr'd up to dili gence and zeal in his duty, by being told he shall have a good thing for his reward, tho' at the same time there be excited in his mind no other idea than barely those of sounds or characters? When he was a child he had frequently heard those words used to him to create in him an obedience to the commands of those that spoke them, and as he grew up he has found by experience that upon the mentioning of those words by an honest man it has 3 o8 APPENDIX A. been his interest to have doubled his zeal and activity for the service of that person. Thus there having grown up in his mind a customary connexion betwixt the hearing that proposition and being disposed to obey with cheerfulness the injunctions that accompany it, methinks it might be made use of, tho' not to intro duce into his mind any idea marked by the words good thing, yet to excite in him a willingness to perform that which is requir'd of him. And this seems to me all that is design'd by the speaker, except only when he intends those words shall [be the mark of] signifie the idea of some particular thing : e. g. in the case I men tion'd 'tis evident the Apostle never intended the words [good things] should [mark out to] our understandings the ideas of those particular things our faculties never attain'd to. And yet I cannot think that he used them at random and without design ; on the contrary, it is my opinion that he used them to very good purpose, namely, to beget in us a cheerfulness and zeal and per severance in well-doing, without any thought of introducing into our minds the abstract idea of a good thing. If any one will joyn ever so little reflexion of his own to what has been said, I doubt not it will evidently appear to him that general names are often used in the propriety of language without the speaker's designing them for marks of ideas in his own which he would [them] have them raise in the understanding of the hearer. [99 Even] proper names themselves are not always spoken with a design to bring into our view the ideas of those particular things that are suppos'd to be annex'd to them. For example, when a Schoolman tells you that Aristotle hath said it, think you that he intends [ x thereby] to [ra] excite in your imagination the idea of that particular man ? All he means by it is only to dis pose you to receive his opinion with that deference and submis sion that custom has annex'd to that name. When a man that has been accustom'd to resign his judgment [of] to the authority of that philosopher [shall] [upon] in reading of a book meet with the letters that compose his name, he forthwith yields his assent to the doctrine it was brought to support, and that with such a quick and sudden [ 2 glance of thought] as it is impossible any 99 ' Nor is it less certain that' erased. * Erased. • s ' action of the mind' — on opposite page. PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 309 idea either of the person or writings of that man should go before — so close and immediate a connexion has long custom establish'd betwixt the very word Aristotle and the motions of assent and reverence in the minds of some men. I intreat the reader to reflect with himself, and see if it does not oft happen, either in hearing, or reading a discourse, that the passions of delight, love, hatred, admiration, disdain, &c. [ "do not] arise immediately in his mind upon the perception of certain words without any ideas coming between. At first, indeed, the words might have occasion'd ideas that may be apt to produce those emotions of mind. But if I mistake not, it will be found that when language is once grown familiar, 3 to a man the hearing of the sound or sight of the characters is oft immediately attended with those passions which at first were wont to be produc'd by the intervention of ideas that are now quite omitted. [ 4 Further], the communicating of ideas marked by words is not the chief and only end of language, as is commonly suppos'd. There are other ends, as the raising of some passion, the exciting to or deterring from an action. 5 To which the former is in many cases barely subservient, and sometimes 6 entirely omitted when these can be obtain'd without it, as I think does not infrequently happen in the familiar use of language. I ask any man whether [ 7 every time] he tells another that such an action is honourable and vertuous, with an 8 intention to excite him to the performance of it, he has at that instant ideas of honour and virtue 9 in his [thoug] view, and whether in reality his inten tion be to raise [ I0 that] idea, together with their agreement to the [ "particular] idea of that particular action, in the understanding of him he speaks to [ "or rather whether this be not his full pur pose, namely, that those words should excite in the mind of the hearer an esteem of that particular action, and stir him up to the performance of it]. 3 ' to a man' erased. 4 ' From which it follows, that' erased. 5 On opposite page — ' the putting the mind in some particular disposition. Hence we may conceive how it is possible for the promise that is made us of the good things of another life excite in us suitable dispositions, tho' the words good things do not bring into our minds particular ideas of the pleasures of heaven, nor yet the ideas of good in general or things in general.' 6 ' entirely' erased. 7 ' when' erased. 8 'vertuous, with an' substituted for 'vertuous.' 9 'virtue' substituted for 'vertue.' 10 ' those abstract' erased. " Erased. 3io APPENDIX A. [ I5 Upon hearing the words lie [&] rascal, indignation, revenge, and the suddain motions of anger do instantly [ensue] in the minds of some men, without our attending to the definition of those names or concerning the ideas they are suppos'd to stand for — all that passion and resentment having been by custom con nected to those very sounds themselves and the manner of their utterance 12 .] It is plain therefore that a man may understand what is said to him without having a clear and determinate idea annexed to and marked by every particular [ I3 word] in the discourse he hears. Nay, he may perfectly understand it. For what is it, I pray, to understand perfectly, but only to understand all that is meant by the person that speaks ? which very oft is nothing more than barely to excite in [ I4 his mind] certain emotions without any thought of those ideas so much talk'd of and so little understood. For the truth whereof I appeal to every [man's] one's experi ence. I know not how this doctrine will go down with those [philos ophers] who may be apt to give the titles of gibberish and jargon to all discourse whatsoever so far forth as the words contained in it are not made the signs of clear and determinate ideas, who think it nonsense for a man to assent to any proposition each term whereof doth not bring into his mind a clear and distinct idea, and tell us [ 15 over and over] that every pertinent [ l6 word] [ I7 hath an idea annexed unto] which never fails to accompany it where 'tis rightly understood. Which opinion of theirs, how plausibly soever it might have been maintain'd by some, seems to me to have introduced a great deal of difficulty and nonsense into the reasonings of men. Certainly nothing could be fitter to bring forth and cherish the doctrine of abstract ideas. For when men were indubitably conscious to themselves that many [ l8 words] they used did not denote any particular ideas, lest they should 12 On opposite page — ' Innumerable instances of this kind may be given — arise. But why should I be tedious in enumerating these things, which every one's observation will, I doubt not, plentifully suggest unto him ?' J 3 ' name' — on opposite page. »4 ' the hearer' — on opposite page. *5 Erased. l6 ' name' — on opposite page. '7 ' is the mark of an idea' — on opposite page. 18 ' names' — on opposite page. PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 311 be thought altogether insignificant, they were of necessity driven into the opinion that they stood for [ I9 general ones]. But more effectually to show the absurdity of an opinion that carrys with it so great an appearance of [clearness and strength of] reason, but is [ 2 °in fact] most dangerous and destructive both to reason and religion, I shall, if I mistake not, in the progress of this work demonstrate there be names well known and familiar to men, which tho' they mark and [stand] and signify things, cannot be suppos'd to signifie ideas of any sort, either general or particular, without the greatest nonsense and contradiction ; it being absolutely impossible, and a direct repugnancy, that any intellect, how exalted and comprehensive soever, should frame ideas of these things. • We have, I think, shown the impossibility of abstract ideas. We have consider'd what has been said in behalf of them by their ablest patrons, and endeavour'd to demonstrate they are of no use for those ends to which they 2I are thought necessary. And, lastly, we have traced them to the source from whence they flow, which appears evidently to be language. Since therefore words have been discover'd to be so very apt to impose on the understandings of men, I am resolv'd in my [ 22 inquiries] to make as little use of them as possibly I can. Whatever ideas I consider, I shall endeavour to take them bare and naked into my view, keeping out of my thoughts, so far as I am able, those names which long and constant use hath so strictly united to them. Let us conceive a solitary man, one born and bred in such a place of the world, and in such circumstances, as he shall never have had occasion to make use of universal signs for his ideas. That man shall have a constant train of particular ideas passing in his mind. Whatever he sees, hears, imagines, or anywise con ceives, is on all hands, even by the patrons of abstract ideas, granted to be particular. Let us withall suppose him under no necessity of labouring to secure himself from hunger and cold, but at full ease, naturally of good facultys, [ 23 and] contemplative. Such a one I should take to be nearer the discovery of certain z 9 ' good sense and sound' — on opposite page. » Instead of ' withall.' 21 ' are' instead of ' were.' " Instead of ' reasonings.' 2 3 ' but' erased. 312 APPENDIX A. great and excellent truths yet unknown, than he that has had the education of schools, [ 24 has been instructed in the ancient and modern philosophy], and by much reading and conversation has [furnish'd his head] attain'd to the knowledge of those arts and sciences that make so great a noise in the [ 24 learned] world. It is true, the knowledge of our solitary philosopher is' not like to be so very wide and extended, it being confin'd to those few particulars that come within his own observation. But then, if he is like to have less knowledge, he is withall like to have fewer mistakes than other men. It cannot be deny'd that words are of excellent use, in that by their means all that stock of knowledge, which has been pur chas'd by the joynt labours of inquisitive men in all ages and na tions, may be drawn into the view, and made the possession of one [ 24 particular] single person. But there [ 2S are some] parts of learning which contain the knowledge of things the most noble and important of any within the reach of human reason, that have had the ill fate to be so signally perplex'd and darken'd by the abuse of words and general ways of speech wherein they are deliver'd, that in the study [ 26 of them] a man cannot be too much upo.n his guard, [ 2? whether] in his private meditations, or in reading the writings or hearing the discourses of other men, to prevent his being cheated [ 24 by the glibness and familiarity of speech] into a belief that those words stand for ideas which, in truth, stand for none at all : which grand mistake it is almost incredible what a mist and darkness it has cast over the under standings of men, otherwise the most rational and clear-sighted. I shall therefore endeavour, so far as I am able, [ 28 to put myself in the posture of the solitary philosopher. I will confine my thoughts and enquiries to the naked scene of my own par ticular ideas,] from which I may expect to derive the following advantages. First. I shall be sure to get clear of all [ 29 verbal] controversies purely verbal. The [ 3 ° springing up of] which weeds in almost all the sciences has, been [ 2 9 the] a most fatal obstruction to the 2 4 Erased. 2 5 Instead of ' is one.' 26 Instead of ' thereof.' ^ Instead of ' either.' 28 Erased. On the opposite page — ' to take off the mask of words, and obtain a naked view of my own particular ideas.' "9 Erased. 3 ° Instead of ' insisting on.' PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 313 growth of true and sound knowledge: and accordingly is at this day esteem'd as such, and made the great and just complaint of the wisest men. Secondly. Tis reasonable to expect that [ 3I by this] the trouble of sounding, or examining, or comprehending any notion may be very much abridg'd. For it oft happens that a notion, when it is cloathed with words, seems tedious and operose, and hard to be conceiv'd, which yet being stript of that garniture, the ideas shrink into a narrow compass, and are view'd almost by one glance of thought. Thirdly. I shall have fewer objects to consider than other men seem to have had. [ 32 Because] I find myself to want several of those supposed ideas, in contemplating of which the philoso phers do usually spend much pains and study. [ 29 nay, even of those (which without doubt will appear very surprising) that pass for simple, particular ideas. It [is inconceivable what] can not be believ'd what a wonderfull emptyness and scarcity of ideas that man shall descry who will lay aside all use of words in his meditations. Fourthly. Having remov'd the veil of words, I may expect to have a clearer prospect of the ideas that remain in my under standing. To behold the deformity of errour we need only un dress it.] Fifthly. This seemeth to be a sure [ 33 way] to extricate myself out of that fine and subtile net of abstract ideas ; which has so miserably perplex'd and entangled the minds of men, and that with this peculiar circumstance, that by how much the finer and the more curious was the wit of any man, by so much the deeper was he like to be ensnar'd and faster held therein. Sixthly. So long as I confine my [ 34 thoughts] to my own ideas divested of words, I do not see how I can easily be mistaken. The objects I consider I [ 35 clearly] and adequately know. I can not be deceiv'd in thinking I have an idea which I have not. Nor, on the other hand, can I be ignorant of any idea that I have. It is not possible for me to think any of my own ideas are 3 1 Instead of ' hereby.' 32 Instead of ' For that.' 33 Instead of ' means whereby.' 34 Instead of ' contemplations.' 35 Instead of ' perfectly. " 14 APPENDIX A. alike or unlike which are not truly so. To discern the agree ments and disagreements there are between my ideas, to see what simple ideas are included in any [ 3<5 compound] idea, and what not, [ 37 there is nothing requisite but] an attentive perception of what passes in my own understanding. But the attainment of all these advantages does presuppose an entire deliverance from the deception of words, which I dare scarce promise myself. So difficult a thing it is to dissolve a union so early begun, and confirm'd by so long a habit, as that betwixt words and ideas. Which difficulty seems to have been very much encreas'd by the [ s8 doctrine of abstraction]. For so long as men thought abstract ideas were annex'd to their words, it does not seem strange they should use words for ideas. It being found an im practicable thing to lay aside the word and retain the abstract idea in the mind, which in itself was perfectly inconceivable. This made it necessary for them to reason and meditate about words, to which they suppos'd abstract ideas were connected, and by means whereof they thought those ideas could be con ceiv'd, tho' they could not without them. [ 39 But surely those ideas ought to be suspected that cannot endure the light without a covering.] Another thing which makes words and ideas thought much [ 4 ° harder to separate] than in truth they are, is the opinion that every name stands for an idea. [ 4I For] it is no wonder that men should fatigue themselves in vain, and find it a very difficult undertaking, when they- endeavour'd to [ 42 obtain a clear and naked] view of [ 43 those] the ideas marked by those words, which in truth mark none at all; [ 43 as I have already shown many names often do not, even when they are not altogether [insignifi cant], and I shall more fully show it hereafter]. [ 44 This] seems to me the principal cause why those men that 3 6 Instead of ' complex.' 37 Erased here — ' all this I can do without being taught by [another], there being requi site thereto nothing more than.' Also — ['the writings and discoveries of other men or without having any great parts of my own] there is nothing more requisite.' 3 s Instead of ' opinion of abstract ideas.' 39 Erased. 4° Instead of ' more inseparable.' 4* Instead of ' Now.' 42 Instead of ' strip and take a.' 43 Erased. 44 Instead of ' These.' PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNO WLEDGE. 315 have so emphatically recommended to others the laying aside the use of words in their meditations, and contemplating their bare ideas, have yet been so little able to perform it themselves. Of late many have been very sensible of the absurd opinions, and insignificant disputes, that grow out of the abuse of words. In order to redress these evils, they advise well that we attend to the ideas that are signified, and draw off our attention from the words that signify them. But how good soever this advice may be that they have given others 4S men, it is plain they little regarded it themselves, so long as they thought the only imme diate use of words was to signifie ideas, and that the immediate signification of every general name was a determinate abstract idea. Which having been shown to be mistakes, a man may now, with much greater ease, deliver himself from the imposture of words. He that knows he hath no other than particular ideas, will not puzzle himself in vain to find out and conceive the ab stract idea annexed to any name. And he that knows names [ 5 °when made use of in the propriety of language] do not always stand for ideas, will spare himself the labour of looking for ideas where there are none to be had. Those obstacles being now remov'd, I earnestly desire that every one would use his utmost endeavour to attain a clear and naked view of [ 46 the] ideas he would consider [ 47 by separating] from them all that varnish and mist of words, which so fatally blinds the judgment and dissi pates the attention of men. This is, I am confident, the shortest way to knowledge, and cannot cost too much pains in coming at. In vain do we extend our views into the heavens, and rake into the entrails of the earth. In vain do we consult the writings and discourses of learned men, and trace the dark footsteps of antiquity. We need only draw the curtain of words, to behold the fairest tree of knowledge, whose fruit is excellent and within the reach of [ 48 our hand]. Unless we take care to clear the first principles of knowledge from the [ 49 incumbrance and delusion] of words, [ 5 ° the conse quences we draw from them] we may make infinite reasonings *5 ' men' erased. * 6 Instead of ' his own.' *n Instead of having separated.' & Instead of ' [any man] to pluck it.' 49 Instead of ' cheat.' so Erased. 3i6 APPENDIX A. upon them to no purpose. We may [ 5I deduce consequences from] consequences, and be never the wiser. The farther we go, we shall only lose ourselves ,the more irrecoverably, and be the deeper entangled in difficulties and mistakes. I do therefore intreat whoever designs to read the following sheets, that he would make^my words the occasion of his own thinking, and endeavour to attain the same train of thoughts in reading that I had in writing them. By this means it will be easy for him [ 52 to discover the truth or falsity of what I say]. He will be out of all danger of being deceiv'd by my words. And I do not see what inducement he can have to err in consid ering his own naked, undisguised ideas. That I may contribute, so far as in me lies, to expose my thoughts [ 5 °to the] fairly to the understanding of the reader, I shall throughout endeavour to express myself in the clearest, plainest, and most familiar 53 manner, abstaining from [ 5 °all flourish and pomp of words], all hard and unusual terms which are [ 5 ° commonly] pretended by those that use them to cover a sense [ 5 °intricate and] abstracted and sublime. [ 5 °I pretend not to treat of anything but what is obvious and [ 5 °accommodated to] the understanding of every reasonable man.] S° Erased. 5* Instead of ' lose ourselves in.' 5 2 Instead of ' whatever mistakes I might have committed. " 53 After ' manner' ' I shall' erased. B. ARTHUR COLLIER. The simultaneous publication of a conception of the nature of sensi ble reality so far accordant as that of Berkeley and Collier has been considered by historians of philosophy so curious that I am induced here to reprint the Introduction to Collier's Clavis Universalis : or, a new Inquiry after Truth, being a Demonstration of the Non-existence, or Impossibility, of an External World x . The reader of Berkeley may thus conveniently compare, with what Berkeley taught, Collier's thesis regarding the inexistence of the material world. Arthur Collier was born on the 12th of October, 1680 — more than four years before Berkeley — at the rectory of Langford Magna in Wilt shire.' He entered Pembroke College, Oxford, in July 1697. He succeeded his father as rector of Langford Magna in 1704, and continued to hold that living till his death in 1732. One of his near neighbours, during the first years of his incumbency, was John Norris, the English Malebranche, rector of Bemerton, author of An Essay towards the Theory of the Ideal or Intelligible World (1701 — 4), who died in 1711. From his own account, Collier seems to have adopted his new thought regarding the meaning of sensible existence or reality about 1703, though he did not publish it till 1713, in the early part of which year the Clavis Universalis appeared. Five interesting letters of Collier, in exposition and defence of his notion of Matter, are given in Benson's Memoirs. Two of them were written in 1714, and the others in 1715, 1720, and 1722. That written in 1 715 is addressed to Dr. Samuel Clarke. Two of the others are to Samuel Low, a grammarian ; another was sent to Dr. Waterland ; and the last is addressed to Mr. Shepherd, Fellow of Trinity College, Oxford. Collier seems to have been more disposed than Berkeley to apply philosophical speculation directly to Christian theology. His theologi- 1 The motto of this work, taken from Malebranche, is Vulgi assensus et approiatio, circa materiam difficilem, est cerium argumentum falsitatis istius opinionis cui asscntitur. «— De Inquir. Verit. Lib. III. p. 194. 317 318 APPENDIX B. cal speculations occupied a considerable share of his life, and involved a subtle modification of Arianism — according to which the sensible world exists in the mind of man ; the mind of man exists in Christ ; and Christ exists in God — all exemplifying what he calls 'in-existence,' or dependent existence. This chain of inexistent being he deduces from speculative reason, and also from the words of Scripture. Collier was a friend and correspondent of Whiston, whose theory of ' Primitive Christianity' was discussed about that time. Collier was a Tory and High Churchman, and curiously, like Berke ley, he published a sermon on the Christian obligation of submission to the higher powers, founded on Romans xiii. i. It does not appear that Berkeley and Collier ever met, nor is he once named by Berkeley, though Berkeley is more than once named by him. THE INTRODUCTION TO THE CLAVIS UNIVERSALIS, ' Wherein the Question in General is explained and stated, and the whole subject divided into two particular heads. Though I am verily persuaded that, in the whole course of the following treatise, I shall or can have no other adversary but prejudice ; yet, having by me no mechanical engine proper to remove it ; nor being able to invent any other method of attacking it, besides that of fair reason and argument ; rather than the world should finish its course without once offering to enquire in what manner it exists, (and for one reason more, which I need not name, unless the end desired were more hopeful) ; I am at last, after a ten years pause and deliber ation, content to put myself upon the trial of the common reader, without pretending to any better art of gaining him on my side, than that of dry reason and metaphysical demonstration. The Question I am concerned about is in general this — "Whether there be any such thing as an External World. And my title will suffice to inform my reader, that the negative of this question is the point I am to demonstrate. In order to which, let us first explain the terms. Accordingly, by World, I mean whatsoever is usually understood by the terms body, extension, space, matter, quantity, &c, if there be any other word in our English tongue which is synonymous with all or any of these terms. And now nothing remains but the explication of the word External. ARTHUR COLLIER. 319 By this, in general, I understand the same as is usually understood by the words, absolute, self-existent, independent, &c. ; and this is what I deny of all matter, body, extension, &c. If this, you will say, be all that I mean by the word external, I am like to meet with no adversary at all, for who has ever affirmed, that matter is self- existent, absolute, or independent? To this I answer, What others hold, or have held in times past, I shall not here inquire. On the contrary, I should be glad to find by the event, that all mankind were agreed in that which I contend for as the truth, viz. that matter is not, cannot be, independent, absolute, or self-existent. In the mean time, whether they are so or no, will be tried by this. Secondly, and more particularly, That by not independent, not absolutely existent, not external, I mean and contend for nothing less than that all matter, body, extension, &c. exists in, or in dependence on, mind, thought, or perception ; and that it is not capable of an existence, which is not thus dependent. This perhaps may awaken another to demand of me, How? to which I as readily answer — just how my reader pleases, provided it be some how. As for instance, we usually say, An accident exists in, or in dependence on, its proper subject; and that its very essence, or reality of its existence, is so to exist. Will this pass for an explication of my assertion ? If so, I am content to stand by it, in this sense of the words. Again, we usually say (and fancy too we know what we mean in saying,) that a body exists in, and also in dependence on, its proper place, so as to exist necessarily in some place or other. Will this description of dependence please my inquisitive reader? If so, I am content to join issue with him, and contend that all matter exists in, or as much dependency on, mind, thought, or perception, to the full, as any body exists in place. Nay, I hold the description to be so just and apposite as if a man should say, A thing is like itself: for, I sup pose I need not tell my reader that when I affirm that all matter exists in mind, after the same manner as body exists in place, I mean the very same as if I had said, that mind itself is the place of body, and so its place, as that it is not capable of existing in any other place, or in place after any other manner. Again, lastly, it is a common saying, that an object of perception exists in, or in dependence on, its respect ive faculty. And of these objects there are many who will reckon with me, light, sounds, colours, and even some material things, such as trees, houses, &c, which are seen, as we say, in a looking-glass, but which are, or ought to be, owned to have no existence but in, or respectively on, the minds or faculties of those who perceive them. But, to please all parties at once, I affirm that I know of no manner in which an object of perception exists in, or on, its respective faculty, which I will not admit in this place to be a just description of that manner of in-existence after which all matter that exists is affirmed by me to exist in mind. Nevertheless, were I to speak my mind freely I should choose to compare it to the in-existence of some, rather than some other objects of perception — particularly such as are objects of the 320 APPENDIX B. sense of vision ; and of these, those more especially which are allowed by others to exist wholly in the mind or visive faculty; such as objects seen in a looking-glass, by men distempered, light-headed, ecstatic, &c, where not only colours, but entire bodies, are perceived or seen. For these cases are exactly parallel with that existence which I affirm of all matter, body, or extension whatsoever. Having endeavoured, in as distinct terms as I can, to give my reader notice of what I mean by the proposition I have undertaken the defence of, it will be requisite in the next place, to declare in as plain terms, what I do not mean by it. Accordingly, I declare in the Jirst place, That in affirming that there is no external world, I make no doubt or question of the existence of bodies, or whether the bodies which are seen exist or not. It is with me a first principle, that whatsoever is seen, is. To deny or doubt of this is errant scepticism, and at once unqualifies a man for any part or office of a disputant, or philosopher ; so that it will be remembered from this time, that my enquiry is not concerning the existence, but altogether concerning the extra-existence of certain things or objects ; or, in other words, what I affirm and contend for, is not that bodies do not exist, or that the external world does not exist, but that such and such bodies, which are supposed to exist, do not exist externally ; or in universal terms, that there is no such thing as an external world. Secondly, I profess and declare that, notwithstanding this my asser tion, I am persuaded that I see all bodies just as other folks do ; that is, the visible world is seen by me, or, which is the same, seems to me, to be as much external or independent, as to its existence, on my mind, self, or visive faculty, as any visible object does, or can be pre tended to do or be, to any other person. I have neither, as I know of, another nature, nor another knack of seeing objects, different from other persons, suitable to the hypothesis of their existence which I here contend for. So far from this, that I believe, and am very sure, that this seeming, or (as I shall desire leave to call it) quasi externeity of visible objects, is not only the effect of the Will of God, (as it is his Will that light and colours should seem to be without the soul, that heat should seem to be in the fire, pain in the hand, &c.) but also that it is. a natural and necessary condition of their visibility : I would say that though God should be supposed to make a world, or any one visible object, which is granted to be not external, yet, by the condition of its being seen, it would, and must be, quasi external to the percep tive faculty ; as much so to the full, as is any material object usually seen in this visible world. Moreover, thirdly, When I affirm that all matter exists dependently on mind, I am sure my reader will allow me to say, I do not mean by this — that matter or bodies exist in bodies. As for instance, when I affirm or say, that the world, which I see, exists in my mind, I cannot be supposed to mean that one body exists in another, or that all the bodies which I see exist in that which common use has taught me to call my body. I must needs desire to have this remembered, because ARTHUR COLLIER. 321 experience has taught me how apt persons are, or will be, to mistake me in this particular. Fourthly, When I affirm that this or that visible object exists in, or dependently on, my mind, or perceptive faculty, I must desire to be understood to mean no more than I say, by the words mind and per ceptive faculty. In like manner I would be understood, when I affirm in general, that all matter or body exists in, or dependently on, mind. I say this to acquit myself from the imputation of holding that the mind causes its own ideas, or objects of perception ; or, lest any one by a mistake should fancy that I affirm — that matter depends for its existence on the will of man, or any creature whatsoever. But now, if any such mistake should arise in another's mind, he has wherewith to rectify it ; in as much as I assure him, that by mind, I mean that part, or act 5> or faculty of the soul which is distinguished by the name intellective or perceptive ; as in exclusion of that other part which is distinguished by the term will. Fifthly, When I affirm that all matter exists in mind, or that no matter is external, I do not mean that the world, or any visible object of it, which I (for instance) see, is dependent on the mind of any other person besides myself; or that the world, or matter, which any other person sees, is dependent on mine, or any other person's mind, or faculty of perception. On the contrary, I contend as well as grant, that the world which John sees is external to Peter, and the world which Peter sees is external to John. That is, I hold the thing to be the same in this as in any other case of sensation ; for instance, that of sound. Here two or more persons, who are present at a concert of music, may indeed in some sense be said to hear the same notes or melody ; but yet the truth is, that the sound which one hears, is not the very same with the sound which another hears — because the souls or persons are supposed to be different ; and therefore, the sound which Peter hears is external to, or independent on, the soul of John, and that which John hears is external to the soul or person of Peter. Lastly, When I affirm that no matter is altogether external, but necessarily exists in some mind or other, exemplified and distinguished by the proper names of John, Peter, &c, I have no design to affirm that every part or particle of matter, which does or can exist, must needs exist in some created mind or other. On the contrary, I believe that infinite worlds might exist, though not one single created, (or rather merely created,) mind were ever in being. And, as in fact there are thousands and ten thousands, I believe, and I even contend, that there is an Universe, or Material World in being, which is, at least, numeri cally different from every material world perceived by mere creatures. By this, I mean the great Mundane Idea of created (or rather twice created) matter, by which all things are produced ; or rather, (as my present subject leads me to speak,) by which the great God gives sen sations to all his thinking creatures, and by which things that are not are preserved and ordered in the same manner as if they were. And now I presume and hope, that my meaning is sufficiently 21 322 APPENDIX B. understood, when I affirm, That all matter which exists, exists in, or dependently on, mind ; or, that there is no such thing as an External World. Nevertheless, after all the simplicity to which this question seems already to be reduced, I find myself necessitated to divide it into two. For, in order to prove that there is no External World, it must needs be one article to shew that the visible world is not external ; and when this is done, though in this all be indeed done which relates to any opinion yet entertained by men, yet something still is wanting towards a full demonstration of the point at large, and to come up to the universal terms in which the question is expressed. Accordingly, I shall proceed in this order. First, to shew that the visible world is not external. Secondly, to demonstrate more at large, or simply, that an external world is a being utterly impossible. Which two shall be the subjects of two distinct Parts or Books.' Collier in the end resolves the difference between sense-perception and imagination into a difference in degree merely. To imagine an object is to perceive it less vividly than we perceive it in the senses. ' I can no more,' he says, 'understand how we can create the objects we imagine than the objects we are said to see.' What is imagined 'exists as much, to all appearance, without, or external to, the mind which perceives it as any of those objects usually called visible — but not so vividly ; and this is that whereby I distinguish the act which we call imagination from the act which we call vision : but why is this, but because the common cause of both, viz. God, does not, in the former act, impress or act so strongly upon my mind as in the latter. If He did, both acts would become one, or require the same name; and there would be no difference between seeing and imagining 2 .' So Hume afterwards. Berkeley's position in relation to the difference between sense-perception and mere imagination I have elsewhere noted. The difference is surely more than one of degree. There is a differ ence in kind between real existence in place, and a subjective imagi nation, peculiar to an individual mind. Is not this difference consistent with the real things present in sense, and also the space or place in which they exist, being alike dependent for their actual existence on Mind — in short, with their being grounded on Knowing, and not on an abstracted Unknown? May not space be the uncreated or necessary condition of the possibility of all sense-experience like ours, but yet dependent for its actual existence upon the existence of the sense experience ? This is not to make it the abstract space against which Berkeley argues, nor need it involve quantitative infinity. a See Benson's Memoirs of Collier, pp. 26, 27. c. THE THEORY OF VISION VINDICATED. Experience of Persons born blind. In the last Section of the Vindication (p. 299), Berkeley refers to the now well-known experiment of Cheselden, in which sight was given to a boy born blind. As this case is described imperfectly in the Vindication, and as it is often referred to in the controversy as to whether our power of interpreting the tactual, muscular, and locomo tive meaning of visual signs is, on the one hand, original and instinct ive, or, on the other hand, the acquired result of mental association and habit, I here reprint the entire Communication, given in the Philos. Trans., No. 402 : — ' An accotmt of some observations made by a young gentleman, who was born blind, or who lost his sight so early, that he had no remembrance of ever having seen, and was couched between 1 3 and 1 4 years of age. By Mr. Will. Chesselden, F.R.S., Surgeon to Her Majesty, and to St. Thomas's Hospital. Tho' we say of the gentleman that he was blind, as we do of all people who have ripe cataracts, yet they are never so blind from that cause but that they can discern day from night ; and for the most part in a strong light distinguish black, white, and scarlet ; but they can not perceive the shape of anything ; — for the light by which these perceptions are made, being let in obliquely through the aqueous humour, or the anterior surface of the chrystalline (by which the rays cannot be brought into a focus upon the retina), they can discern in no other manner, than a sound eye can thro' a glass of broken jelly, where a great variety of surfaces so differently refract the light that the several distinct pencils of rays cannot be collected by the eye into their proper foci ; wherefore the shape of an object in such a case, cannot be at all discern' d, tho' the colour may. And thus it was with this young gentleman, who though he knew these colours asunder in a good light, yet when he saw them after he was couch' d, the faint ideas he had of them before were not sufficient for him to know them by after- 323 324 APPENDIX C. wards ; and therefore he did not think them the same, which he had before known by those names. Now scarlet he thought the most beautiful of all colours, and of others the most gay were the most pleasing, whereas the first time he saw black, it gave him great uneasi ness, yet after a little time he was reconcil'd to it ; but some months after, seeing by accident a Negroe woman, he was struck with great horror at the sight. When he first saw, he was so far from making any judgment about distances, that he thought all objects whatever touched his eyes (as he express' d it) as what he felt did his skin ; and thought no objects so agreeable as those which were smooth and regular, tho' he could form no judgment of their shape, or guess what it was in any object that was pleasing to him : he knew not the shape of anything, nor any one thing from another, however different in shape or magnitude ; but upon being told what things were, whose form he knew before from feeling, he would carefully observe, that he might know them again ; but, having too many objects to learn at once, he forgot many of them ; and (as he said) at first he learn' d to know, and again forgot a thousand things in a day. One particular only (tho' it may appear trifling) I will relate : — having forgot which was the cat and which the dog, he was asham'd to ask ; but catching the cat (which he knew by feeling) he was observ'd to look at her steadfastly, and then setting her down, said, ' So, Puss ! I shall know you another time. ' He was very much surpris'd that those things which he had lik'd best did not appear most agreeable to his eyes, expecting those persons would appear most beautiful that he lov'd most, and such things to be most agreeable to his sight that were so to his taste. We thought he soon knew what pictures represented which were shew'd to him, but we found after wards we were mistaken; for about two months after he was couch'd, he discovered at once, they represented solid bodies ; when to that time he consider' d them only as party-colour' d planes or surfaces diver sified with variety of paint ; but even then he was no less surpris'd, expecting the pictures would feel like the things they represented, and was amaz'd when he found those parts, which by their light and shadow appear'd now round and uneven, felt only flat like the rest; and ask'd which was the lying sense, — feeling or seeing ? Being shewn his father's picture in a locket at his mother's watch, and told what it was, he acknowledged a likeness, but was vastly sur pris'd ; asking how it could be that a large face could be express' d in so little room, saying, it should have seem'd as impossible to him as to put a bushel of anything into a pint. At first he could bear but very little sight, and the things he saw he thought extreamly large ; but upon seeing things larger, those first seen he conceiv'd less, never being able to imagine any lines beyond the bounds he saw; the room he was in, he said, he knew to be but part, of the house, yet he could not conceive that the whole house could look bigger. Before he was couch'd he expected little advantage from seeing, worth undergoing an operation for, except reading and writing; for he said he thought he could have no more pleasure in walking THE THEORY OF VISION VINDICATED. 325 abroad than he had in the garden, which he could do safely and readily-. And even blindness, he observ'd, had this advantage, that he could go anywhere in the dark much better than those who can see ; and after he had seen, he did not soon lose this quality, nor desire a light to go about the house in the night. He said every new object was a new delight, and the pleasure was so great that he wanted ways to express it ; but his gratitude to his operator he could not conceal, never seeing him for some time without tears of joy in his eyes, and other marks of affection ; and if he did not happen to come at any time when he was expected, he would be so griev'd that he could not forbear crying at his disappointment. A year after first seeing, being carried upon Epsom Downs, and observing a large prospect, he was exceedingly delighted with it, and called it a new kind of seeing. And now being lately couch' d of his other eye, he says that objects at first appeared large to this eye, but not so large as they did at first to the other ; and looking upon the same object with both eyes, he thought it look'd about twice as large as with the first couch' d eye only, but not double, that we can anyways discover.' No very satisfactory inference can be drawn from a narrative so deficient in the refinement of thought and expression which the subject requires. The question is too subtle for experiments conducted in this fashion. Nor can more be said in favour of a succession of somewhat similar experiments recorded in the Philosophical Transactions. The most important are the following : — 1. Case described by Mr. Ware, Surgeon, in the Philos. Trans. (1801). 2. Two cases described by Mr. Home, in the Philos. Trans. (1807). 3. Case of the lady described by Mr. Wardrop, Surgeon, in the Philos. Trans. (1826). To these may be added Stewart's 'Account of James Mitchell, a boy born deaf and blind,' in the seventh volume of the Transactions of the Royal Society of Edinburgh. See Hamilton's Edition of Stewart's Works, Vol. III. Appendix, pp. 300 — 370; also p. 388. As I have quoted one of the earliest described cases — that of Ches elden, I shall end by giving the following, which is one of the last and most philosophically described of any I have met with. It is con tained in Mr. Nunnely's valuable scientific treatise on The Organs of Vision : their Anatomy and Physiology (1858) : — ' The case was that of a fine and most intelligent boy, nine years of age, who had congenital cataract of both eyes, in whom the retina was 326 APPENDIX C. more perfect than it commonly is at so advanced an age, as shown by the excellent sight he subsequently acquired. He had always lived in a very large manufacturing village, about sixteen miles from Leeds. He could find his way all about this place. Walking along the middle of the road, when he heard any object approaching, he at once stopped, groped his way to the side of the road, and remained perfectly still until it had passed. Any one whom he knew he was able to recognise by the sound of the voice, and by passing his hands over the face and body of the person. He could perceive the difference between a bright, sunny, and a dark, cloudy day, and could follow the motions of a candle without discerning what it was. He had been sent to school for some time, and by means of models and a raised alphabet, could by touch alone arrange the different letters into short words. I presented to him in succession a great number of different Objects, each one of which he took into both hands, felt it most carefully over with both, then with equal minuteness with one, turning the object over and over again, in every direction ; the tongue was next applied to it ; and lastly, he applied it so near to the eye as to touch the eyelids, when he pronounced his opinion upon it, and generally with correctness, as to the nature and form of the object, when these were distinct. Thus he recognised books, stones, small boxes, pieces of wood and bone of different shapes, a broken piece of hard biscuit. A cube and a sphere he could readily recognise, saying the one was square and the other round, and that both were made of wood ; but a sphere which was made of perfectly smooth, hard wood, he was very confident was bone. In an object where the angles were not very distinct, he made con stant mistakes in the shape, first saying that it was square, then that it was round. Very bright light colours, when touching the eyelids, he could at once recognise, calling them all white ; all dull and dark colours he said were black. Between a thin circle of wood and a sphere or a cube he instantly decided by the hand alone. On putting half-a-crown piece into his hands he immediately said it was money ; but for long was undecided whether it was half-a-crown or a penny ; however, after carefully turning it over for some time, so as frequently to bring every part into contact with the hand, then putting it to the tongue, and afterwards so close to the eye that it touched the eyeball itself, he said decidedly, " It is half-a-crown. " The lenses were very large, milky, with caseous particles, quite white and opaque, the capsules being clear and transparent. As is well known, in most cases, before this period of life, the lens itself has been absorbed, leaving only a leathery, opaque capsule, and, of course, not nearly so favourable for such observations as this one. After keeping him in a dark room for a few days, until the opaque particles of lenses were nearly absorbed, and the eyes clear, the same objects, which had been kept carefully from him, were again presented to his notice. He could at once perceive a difference in their shapes ; though he could not in the least say which was the cube and which the sphere, he saw they were not of the same figure. It was not until they had many times been placed in his hands that he learnt to distinguish by the eye the THE THEORY OF VISION VINDICATED. 327 one which he had just had in his hands, from the other placed beside it. He gradually became more correct in his perception, but it was only after several days that he could or would tell by the eyes alone, which was the sphere and which the cube ; when asked, he always, before answering, wished to take both into his hands ; even when this was allowed, when immediately afterwards the objects were placed before the eyes, he was not certain of the figure. Of distance he had not the least conception. He said everything touched his eyes,, and walked most carefully about, with his hands held out before him, to prevent things hurting his eyes by touching them. Great care was requisite to prevent him falling over objects, or walking against them. Im provement gradually went on, and his subsequent sight was, and now is, comparatively perfect.' ' x None of these experiments, taken by themselves, unequivocally de termine the question — Whether the power of interpreting the visual signs of real or tangible extension is inspired, or is, on the contrary, acquired by association and constructive activity of intellect. But they confirm the conclusion, that visible signs are not less indispensable to an imagination of trinal extension than the artificial signs of lan guage are necessary to abstract thought and reasoning — that one born blind can have only a vague perception of an external world. More over, when once we are experimentally acquainted with distances, a mathematical analysis of the perspective lines leading from any object to the eye is possible, with an involved sense of necessity, which seems to presuppose relations common to the visible signs and the felt reality. The difficulty which confronts Berkeley is, that on his theory space and its mathematical relations are relative to sensations which, per se, are contingent and phenomenal, and thus wanting in the element which alone gives absolute stability to mathematical science : quanti tative infinity disappears, and space and its relations are the real but arbitrary results of creation or the voluntary activity of God. ANNOTATIONS ON BERKELEY'S PRINCIPLES, CONTAINING UEBERWEG'S NOTES ENTIRE, WITH ADDITIONS, TRANSLATED, SELECTED, AND ORIGINAL. 329 ANNOTATIONS. [i] Idea. — Abstract ideas. Berkeley, Intr., § 6 : 'the opinion that the mind (Geist) hath a power (Vermogen) of framing abstract ideas or notions (Begriffe) of things.' Ueberweg: ' "Idea " was used by Plato in the objective sense, as designation of the pure, archetypal essence of homogeneous things. In the course of time, mainly because of the Aristotelian Scholastic doc trine that the human mind, in the act of perceiving things, receives into itself the form or shape (Idia, eldoq) without the matter of them, the word came to have a subjective force as well as an objective one. In the subjective sense it denotes the psychical image of the objective form, and consequently came to be more and more limited to the sub jective sense. It thus came in Descartes, and still more in Spinoza and Locke, to have the meaning ' psychical image' or conception (Vorstellung), in the wide sense of that word which embraces the image in sense-perception. In this sense some recent psychologists have employed it. ' In Berkeley, who did not regard the subjective forms as images of objective forms, "idea " has exclusively the sense "psychical image. " As he uses the term, "ideas " exist partly through sense-perception, partly through reflection on the psychical antecedents, partly through the reproduction, decompounding, and combining of the conceptions which have risen. ' In the translation of Berkeley's work we retain the term " idea. " In this use of it we must guard against the mistake of supposing that the word refers merely to reproduced images, or to mere images of the fancy at all. 'This mistake would be most effectually guarded against, if, as has been suggested by T. Collyns Simon, one of Berkeley's adherents, the term phenomenon (Erscheinung) were used. 331 332 ANNO TA TIONS. ' The objections to this rendering are : ' i. That " Erscheinung " is a translation of phenomenon rather than of idea, and would consequently be a displacement of the word "idea " rather than a rendering of it. ' 2. That exactly the opposite mistake would be encouraged, as if the conceptions of the imagination were not included. '3. That "Erscheinung " rather denotes a complex of sense-ideas than the separate constituents of this complex. ' 4. That the being in the subject, or that "esse, " which is the same as "percipi, " indubitably presents itself in the word "idea, " not in the word "Erscheinung " (phenomenon). '5. That "Erscheinung " (phenomenon) either presupposes a "thing in itself, " of which it is the phenomenon (a supposition which Berkeley rejects), or, as Berkeley himself uses the word phenomenon, stands in antithesis to the "essence " or "law, " whose cognoscibility Berkeley does not deny.' Editor-: i : Berkeley discusses abstract ideas in the New Theory of Vision : § 122 : 'I find it proper to take into my thoughts extension in ab stract.' 123 : ' I do not find that I can perceive, imagine, or anywise frame in my mind such an abstract idea as is here spoken of.'. . . 124 : 'It is commonly said that the object of geometry is abstract extension.' 125 : 'After reiterated endeavours to apprehend the general idea of a triangle, I have found it altogether incomprehensible.' Alciphron, Dial. vii. 5-7 : ' May not words become general by being made to stand indiscriminately for all particular ideas, which, from a mutual resemblance, belong to the same kind, without the in tervention of any abstract general idea? May we not admit general ideas though we should not admit them to be made by abstraction, or though we should not allow of general abstract ideas? . . . A particular idea may become general by being used to stand for or represent other ideas, and that general knowledge is conversant about signs or general ideas made such by their signification.' A Defence of Free-thinking in Mathematics (§ 45-48): 'I hold that there are general ideas, but not formed by abstraction in the manner set forth by Mr. Locke. . . . According to Locke, the general name colour stands for an idea which is neither blue, red, green, nor any other particular colour, but somewhat distinct and abstracted from them all. To me it seems the word colour is only a more general name applicable to all and each of the particular colours ; while the other specific names, as blue, . . . and the like, are each restrained to a ABSTRACTION. 333 more limited signification. . . . Nothing is easier than to define in terms or words that which is incomprehensible in idea; forasmuch as any words can be either separated or joined as you please, but ideas always cannot. It is as easy to say a round square as an oblong square, though the former be inconceivable.' 2 : Berkeley has noted the difference between Plato's use of 'idea' and his own (Siris, § 335): 'In Plato's style the term idea doth not merely signify an inert inactive object of the understanding, but is used as synonymous with ainov and dp^yj, cause and principle.' [2] Locke. Berkeley, Intr., § 11 : 'There has been a late excellent and de servedly esteemed philosopher.' Ueberweg: John Locke, b. 1632, d. 1704. His chief work is 'An Essay concerning Human Understanding,' in four books. First edit., London : 1690. [3] Brutes. Berkeley, Intr., § 11 (quoting Locke): 'For if they (the brutes) have any ideas (Vorstellungen), and are not bare machines (as some would have them).' Ueberweg : ' The reference is to the Cartesians, followers of the system of Rene Descartes, b. 1596, d. 1650. ' The bold separation which Descartes made between spirit and matter, which allowed of their having nothing in common, led to the alternative either of ascribing to brutes souls, which like those of men are spiritual in kind, and consequently independent of the body and separable from it, or the entire denial of their possessing souls, and the conceding that they had nothing more than "vital spirits, " which were capable of none of the psychical functions, no sensation, no per ception, or the like. Descartes accepted the second horn of the dilemma. He also ascribed to man material vital spirits, which he supposed to be the medium of the relation between the soul and the grosser parts of the body.' [4] Berkeley, § 13: 'The Essay on the Human Understanding.' Ueberweg : See Note 2. [5] Abstraction. Berkeley, §16: 'And here it must be acknowledged that a man may consider a figure merely as triangular, without attending to the' particular qualities of the angles or relations of the sides.' 334 4 NN TA TIONS. Ueberweg : ' This admission on the part of Berkeley is sufficient to secure for abstraction rightly understood its full value in scientific in vestigation. His discussion of abstraction at this point is of great value. ' No contradiction arises unless it be maintained that an idea can be entirely definite and at the same time be abstract ; for universal defini tiveness, as the Leibnitzians correctly maintained, is the distinguishing character of the individual conceptions. By abstraction is to be under stood no more than the exclusive consideration of that in which the entire ideas of a particular group coincide with one another. ' In a certain measure the process of abstraction is completed inde pendently of our conscious concurrence, because of the predominance which the concurrent marks, in consequence of their frequent occur rence, have over the marks which differ and which are presented singly. Abstraction is aided by the use of the common term which is associated with every idea of the group involved ; it comes to completeness by means of the conscious logical formation of definitions, in which the common element is brought to consciousness in a complete and well arranged order, and is distinguished from the differing elements. ' Abstraction involves the power of attributing common predicates to all the objects of a group, in such a way that through what is defined, and by means of the highest development of the defmitory conscious ness in regard to the common marks of this group, it is accurately bounded. Such, for example, is the power of making assertions in regard to conic sections which hold good of every particular figure of this kind, so that by means of the consciousness we have of the marks of a conic section, all figures which are conic sections are accu rately distinguished from all others. 'This capacity is in fact a prerogative of man, and in its highest degree a prerogative of the man of scientific culture. Without it there would be no scientific knowledge.' [6] Tricks of phrase. Berkeley, Intr., § 20: 'those things which every one's experience will, I doubt not, plentifully suggest unto him?' (ins Bewusstsein ruft ?) Ueberweg : ' Berkeley here admirably characterizes the mystery of phrase, of that false rhetoric, the aim of which is to produce great effects upon the minds of the uneducated and half-educated, at the expense of truth and rectitude. ' Where reasons are wanting, the Shibboleth is still mighty. The commonplace, the formulary, still stirs men like the roll of the drum OBJECTS OF KNOWLEDGE: IDEAS. 335 or the ensnaring tinkling of the lute. The feelings carry away the judgment.' [7] Words. Berkeley, Intr., § 23: 'they advise well that we attend to the ideas signified, and draw off our attention from the words which signify them.' Ueberweg: 'Locke says: "I endeavour as much as I can to deliver myself from those fallacies which we are apt to put upon ourselves by taking words for things. It helps not our ignorance to feign a knowl edge where we have none, by making a noise with sounds without clear and distinct significations. " (Ess. of Human Underst., 11. xiii. 18.) ' " Men who abstract their thoughts and do well examine the ideas of their own minds, cannot much differ in thinking, however they may perplex themselves with words, according to the way of speaking of the several schools or sects they have been bred up in. " (lb. 28.)' [8] Objects of knowledge : ideas. Berkeley, Principles, § 1 : ' It is evident to any one who takes a survey of the objects (Gegenstande) of human knowledge.' Ueberweg : 'As Berkeley here designates " ideas " as the objects of human knowledge, he assumes the very thing he ought first to prove, and, without this, is guilty of begging the question. ' By ideas he means phenomena which exist in our consciousness, sensations, and the complex of perceptions, and that which proceeds from them. 'Any one disposed to dispute the truth of Berkeley's assertion might reply that ideas are not the objects of our knowledge, but the means of it. We have cognition by means of our ideas. Our ideas have actual existence in our souls, or are something subjectively real or psychically real. By means of our ideas we have cognition of the objectively real external world standing over against us, inasmuch as a primitive think ing (primitives Denken) coalesces with sensation (sinnlichen Empfin dung) and in conjunction with it forms the sense-perception (seeing, hearing, etc.). See Ueberweg's System der Logik, § 41, seq. 45-47, etc. (tr. by Lindsay, London). ' This primitive thinking, not reflecting upon its separate elements (Momente), but bringing only the results to consciousness, interprets the image furnished in perception, and has the power to give it shape, — for example, to bear its part in determining the form of the firmament, a power not possessed by the subsequent reflective thinking, which meets shapes already fixed. 336 A NNO TA TIONS. ' The complexes of sensations or ideas co-determined or shaped by the primary thinking are subjective images, or at least subjective signs, of the external world. 'But to these complexes of sensations Berkeley assigns names, such as apple, tree, mountain, house, which, according to the usage of lan guage and the popular consciousness on which that usage rests, desig nate external objects, by which apparently, but only apparently, it is proven that the so-called "external objects " exist in the spirit, for "ideas " (phenomena) have no other existence than in the percipient spirit. ' The fixing on the complexes of sensations the names which pertain to the external objects wears an appearance of truth, because of an error in which the common view is involved. ' The common view is that what is in fact our sensation, that is our psychical reaction toward the operation proceeding ffom the external thing, the operation exercised directly or by certain media upon our senses, that this is an attribute of the outer thing as such ; as, for ex ample, it supposes the green colour to be a quality of the leaf as such, the warmth a quality of the fire as such. ' Now as Berkeley considers and treats this error as if it were a truth, in accepting the inseparableness of the object from these qualities, and consequently, in accordance with the popular consciousness, refers the names of the things to those objects to which these qualities pertain, and as he then goes on to show that these qualities consist of sensa tions of the subject, in Berkeley's view those objects (as the apple, etc.) are identified with these sensations as something existing in the subject. ' The popular apprehension considers these sensations as outward, inasmuch as it considers our sensations as qualities of objects, and not our own sensations, which are only possible in the subject. 'Berkeley considers the objects as internal, that is, in the subject, in asmuch as he considers our sensations as qualities of the objects (to wit, ideas), but at the same time apprehends these (qualities) as our own sensations. ' But the argument of Berkeley presents the fittest occasion to sepa rate in the distinctest manner the correct and incorrect in the popular opinion as regards the existence and qualities of external objects, and not simply to claim concession for what is really scientifically justified, but over against Berkeley's very thorough and acute negation to seek proofs of it. In this lie the suggestiveness and the abiding scientific value of the paradox of Berkeley. Cf. notes 10 and 90.' OBJECTS OF KNOWLEDGE: IDEAS. 337 Editor: i : Ueberweg, in his Logic, treating of the ' Combination of Internal and External Perceptions,' says, § 41 : ' The knowledge of the otiter world depends upon the combination of external with internal perceptions. Our corporeal circumstances, sensibly perceived by our selves, are in orderly coherence with circumstances belonging to our internal perceptions.' § 42 : ' Extending his consideration of the ex ternal world, man recognizes the internal characters of other things chiefly by means of the related sides of his own inner existence.' § 43 : ' Every phenomenon objectively founded, as this very act of becoming a phenomenon testifies, and as the scientific investigation of the laws of nature makes evident, is to be traced back to some active power as its real basis.' § 44: 'The order in space and time belonging to real objects mirrors itself in the order in space and time of external and internal perception. Sense-qualities, however, colours, sounds, etc. are as such subjective only. They are not copies of motions, but are regularly and connectedly related to determinate motions as their sym bols.' § 45 : 'The individual conception, or intuition, is the mental image of the individual existence, which is objective or at least is imagined to be.' § 46 : i Individual intuitions gradually arise out of the original confused aggregate image of perception, when man first begins to recognize himself an individual being in antithesis to the outer world.' §47: 'As the individual conception corresponds generally to the individual existence, so its different kinds or forms correspond to the different kinds ox forms of individual existence.'' 2 : By ' objects of knowledge ' Berkeley means the objects of un mediated cognition. For the objector to say that the ideas are not the objects but the means of knowing the objects, is to admit that the objects, in the objector's sense, are not known except through a medium, to wit, the ideas. This means that the medium is itself known directly, and that the object whose medium it is is known mediately. But it is immediate knowledge of which alone Berkeley is speaking, so that the opponent meets him by repeating his affirmation with a change of phrase. 3 : The Cartesian and post-Cartesian definitions of ' idea ' illustrate both the usage and the argument of Berkeley. Syrbius (d. 1738) defines idea : exemplar rei in cogitante, — the copy of the thing in the thinker. Locke (1. i. 8) defines it ' whatsoever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks; whatever is meant by phantasm, notion, species, or whatever it is which the mind can be employed about in thinking.' In the Letter to the Bishop of Worcester: 'the things signified by ideas are nothing but the immediate objects of our 22 338 ANN OTA TIONS. minds in thinking. Me that thinks must have some immediate object of his mind in thinking, /. e, must have ideas. ' Le Clerc defines idea ' the immediate object of the mind.' Schubert : ' Representation in the soul is that operation by which the characters of any object are expressed in the soul. That state of soul which arises from this operation is called idea, and if the object of representation be a universal entity it is called notion.'' 4: Kant regarded the fixing of the proper sense of the word ' idea' as of great importance. ' I beseech those who have the in terests of philosophy at heart, — and this involves more than is com monly imagined, — . . . to protect the term idea in its original sense, so that it be not confused among the words with which, in careless disorder, all kinds of mental representations (Vorstellungen) are ordinarily designated, to the great detriment of science. There is no want of appellations adapted to every species of mental representa tion, completely obviating any necessity of encroaching on the proper province of others.' 1 Kant then gives these terms in a graduated list, which Mellin 2 has reduced to a very convenient tabular form : GRADUATED LIST OF THE MENTAL REPRESENTATIONS (Vorstellungen). without Consciousness. .r Subjective, Sensation, Empfmdung. with Consciousness. Pevception. Objective, Cognition, Erkenntniss. immediate, Intuition, Anschauung, Empirical, mediate, Concept, Besriff. Pure, proceeding from Pure Sense, reiner Sinnlichkeit. The Understanding, Verstande, Notion. The Reason, Verriunft, Idea. 1 Krit. d. rein. Vern., II. Th. ii. Abt. 1. Buch. 2 Marginalien (1794), 87. OBJECTS OF KNOWLEDGE: IDEAS. 339 5. Among the most serious difficulties which the English reader and translator of German metaphysics encounters is the perplexity he finds in the use of the terms Vorstellung, Begriff, and Idee. The perplexity arises from the shifting senses attached to these words by the various schools of philosophy. In ordinary life a German will say, ' I can form no Begriff, no Idee, no Vorstellung of it,' just as we say in English, 'I can form no notion, no idea, no conception of it.' The three terms have this in common, that they involve the activity of a thinking being. Each of them is sometimes used to translate idea, notion, and concep tion, and those three terms are used in translating each one of the German words. Vorstellung is generally used as equivalent to Reprgesentatio and Perceptio, and covers everything which is wrought by the activity of the mind. It is a generic term for mental operation, mental presenta tion, and representation, external and internal perception. It is often best rendered in a translation by Conception. ' Under the term Vor stellung,' says Krug, 'may be embraced everything which we call Intuition, Sensation, Notion, Thought, and Idea. Consequently, all our Cognitions rest on Vorstellungen.' Begriff is an element of a judgment. Kant and his school depart from the common usage by confining Begriff to the allgemeinen Begriffe, the universal Notions. They give the name Begriff simply to the Verstandes Begriff, the Concept of the Understanding, the Notion. Those who call the Vorstellung of individual things a Begriff do so on the ground that there are also single judgments, which present a logical relation between individual things. 1 The most generally available English representative of Begriff is Notion. Hamilton says, 'The distinction of ideas, strictly so called, and notions, under the contrast of Anschauicngen and Begriffe, has long been . . . established with the philosophers of Germany. ' ' No longer Begriffe, but Anschauungen ; no longer Notions or Concepts, but images.'' 'The terms Begriffe (Conceptions), etc.' 2 The term Representation as a translation of Vorstellung does not correspond with Hamilton's usage. 'The term Representation I employ always strictly as in contrast to Presentation, and, therefore, with exclusive reference to individual objects, and not in the vague generality of Representatio, or Vorstellung, in the Leibnitzian and sub- 1 Synonymik : Eberhard, Maas und Gruber, 1826, vi. 168. 3 Reid's Works, 291, 365, 407. 340 A NNO TA TIONS. sequent philosophies of Germany, where it is used for any cognitive act, considered, not in relation to what it knows, but to what is known ; that is, as the genus including under it Intuitions, Perceptions, Sensa tions, Conceptions, Notions, Thoughts proper, etc. as species.' 1 See Schubert's definition under 3 in this note. As a rule the translator of Ueberweg's notes represents Begriff by 'Notion,' Vorstellung by 'Conception,' Idee by 'Idea.' See Index. [9] Esse — percipi. Berkeley, § 3 : ' Their esse is percipi. Nor is it possible they should have any existence out of the minds or thinking things which perceive them.' Ueberweg: 'Beyond question the being (esse) of ideas (phenom ena) is identical with their being perceived (percipi) ; but it does not follow from this that there are not other things, "unthinking things, " which condition the existence of ideas (phenomena), things whose existence is independent of the percipient subject, an existence in itself, and not a mere being perceived. 'Such "things in themselves " must be accepted, if a connection of natural phenomena in accordance with natural laws is not merely to be asserted but actually demonstrated.' (See further in notes which follow.) Editor : If the esse is percipi, the percipi is also esse ; that is, the thing perceived is the thing that is, and the thing as it is. Then arises the difficulty in regard to the mistakes in sense-perception. The one percipi in which a bush is taken for a man is corrected by a second percipi, in which the man is cognized. Is each percipi in this case the esse? [10] Things perceived. Berkeley, § 4: 'And is it not plainly repugnant that any one of these, or any combination of them, should exist unperceived ?' Ueberweg : ' The first thing necessary in the investigation is clearly to fix what is meant by the expression "things perceived " (as an apple, tree, etc.). In popular language, by such terms are meant things which exist outside of our mind, and which yet have qualities, such as greenness, warmth, and such like, which can only be sensations of the percipient subject. ' If it be acknowledged that there is a contradiction in this, it is only possible to retain one of the two elements which are united in popular language in the same expression. 1 Reid's Works, 805, n. ABSTRA CTION. 341 'As essential to this we must avoid the paralogism into which Berke ley himself has fallen, of accepting as truths in this old and common sense of the word what can be established only in the new sense of the word. ' Either one sense or the other must be taken, to the exclusion of the other in the argument. If, on the one hand, we take the "things per ceived' ' as meaning the complexes of sensation, images in perception, we do what Berkeley does. In this case it is not only true, but it is a truism, that these are in our consciousness only; but it is false to hold this as proven in regard to what is understood in popular language by the "thing perceived; " for example, the apple which I see, feel, and eat; in this usage "the thing perceived " means a real thing external to my mind, and that this thing is in fact reducible to a mere complex of sensation is what Berkeley has not proved. Or if, on the other hand, we must, as in correspondence with the general tendency of language, understand by the " things perceived " external things, in this must also be conceded that in perception is involved a primary thinking, which blends with sensation, through which we infer (schliessen) (cf. Obs. 8) the external things ; but from this would follow no more than this, that the external things do not exist wholly as we perceive them, but not that they do not exist at all. ' As we do not call the knowledge which we have of the intellectual life of our friend his intellectual life itself which is known, just as little do we call the image in our perception of an object the object per ceived. ' By the object perceived we understand the external thing itself, whose non-existence has been demonstrated by no proof.' [11] Abstraction. Berkeley, § 5 : 'So as to conceive them existing unperceived.' Ueberweg : ' Not to them, but to those external things, is directed the supposition of existence in itself. ' The error designated by Berkeley lies not in abstraction as such, but in the supposition that by means of abstraction distinct things (such as the existence of the idea, and its being perceived) can really be sep arated. Abstraction (ayaipemi), rightly understood and properly applied, is thoroughly proper and indispensable. (See Obs. 5.) The fault which has most commonly characterized its use (the fault which Aristotle calls ywpt.ciij.6q, separation) has no necessary connection with it.' 342 ANNOTA TIONS. [12] Abstraction. Berkeley, 5: 'But my conceiving or imagining power (Fahigkeit zu denken oder vorzustellen) does not extend beyond the possibility of real existence or perception.' Ueberweg : ' The possibility of Absfraction stretches itself, however, in fact beyond this, for we are able to consider separately what in every act of perception is united with something else. This takes place, for example, in forming the notion (Begriff) of a mathematical body.' [13] Being and Perception. Berkeley, § 6 : 'To be convinced of which, the reader need only reflect, and try to separate in his own thoughts the being (Sein) of a sensible (sinnlich wahrnehmbaren) thing from its being perceived.' Ueberweg : ' Correct as is that which Berkeley says in reference to our complexes of sensation or images in perception, he has not proven that there are not things existing in themselves which operate in such a way upon our senses that, in consequence of the excitation thus received, the psychical principle dwelling within our organism begets the sensations and their regular complexes (the images in perception) ; and to those things existing in themselves — which, as the correlates of our perceptions, maybe called the " objects perceived, " so far as in the course of investigation sufficient grounds for accepting them are fur nished — is to be ascribed an existence independent of the act of per ception itself. ' This independence of the act of perception does not, however, ex clude the supposition that between the things existing in themselves and perceptible, and the mind capable of perception, there exists a primitive affinity and correlation. Those things are the fore-steps of the mind ; they condition it genetically, as on their side they are con ditioned by it teleologically ; by means of them the mind has intel lectual existence and perceives : they exist, at the most, for the sake of the mind. By no means, however, do they exist in our mind. ' [14] Spirit the only Substance. • Berkeley, § 7 : ' From what has been said, it is evident there is not any other substance than spirit, or that which perceives.' Ueberweg : ' This would only follow if the things in themselves were identical with the images in perception, which they are not.' THE PERCEIVABLE. 343 [15] An Idea like an Idea. Berkeley, § 8 : 'An idea can be like nothing but an idea.' Ueberweg : ' This proposition is not proven, and is false. There is nothing to prevent our supposing that the figure of an image in per ception — for example, the image we get of the course of a stream, or of the path of a planet — is like the figure of the course or path itself, although the one figure exists in the mind, the other outside of it. ' Not every figure is an "idea, " although every colour is an " idea " (something purely subjective). See Obser. 17.' [16] The Perceivable. Berkeley, § 8 : 'I appeal to any one whether it be sense to assert a colour is like something which is invisible ; hard or soft, like some thing which is intangible; and so of the rest.' Ueberweg : ' Only the double use of the word perceivable (to which we have already alluded) leads to this dilemma. ' The originals are not perceivable in such sense that they can them selves be perceptions, but in this sense that they by means of our perception come to our consciousness. 'When, through touch and the eye, with the co-operation of the primitive mental action (Denken), which consists of involuntary asso ciations, we obtain a perceptive image of the stream, we call this result "perceiving the stream. " ' I see, feel, perceive, not the image, and not the constituents of the image (the ideas), but the external object by means of the image. ' On the other side, it must be conceded that usage does not designate exclusively the external things, — what is seen, heard, perceived, — but also the particular qualities, as, for example, redness, sound (as we say, I see the redness of the cheeks, I hear a sound), which are, in fact, purely subjective. ' This language is used, however, only on the erroneous supposition that they are objective, so that the tendency of the language here also remains unchanged ; that is, to conjoin the objective as grammatical object with the verb "perceive. " What is manifestly subjective, as, for example, a " pain, " is not perceived, but is felt — is not the object " of sense-perception, but of sensation (nicht " sinnlich wahrgenommen, " sondern "empfunden ").' 344 ANNOTA TIONS. [17] Primary and Secondary. Berkeley, § 9 : ' Some there are who make a distinction betwixt primary and secondary qualities.' Ueberweg : ' This distinction, which is drawn by Locke, is a cor rect one; only it would be better to style them Qualities in the pri mary sense (inhering in the object itself), and Qualities in the second ary sense (operations of the things on us ; qualities of sensation, which they, the things, excite in us). ' The Geometrical is both objective and subjective. Everything else in the sense-perception is purely subjective, but linked with the object ive, in conformity with laws : for example, every separate sound and every separate colour is linked with -vibrations of a separate kind.' Editor: See Hylas and Philonous. First Dialogue. Works (Fraser), i. 279. Locke's Essay, B. II. ch. viii. Hamilton's Reid, pp. 313-318, and Note D, pp. 825-875. [18] Matter. Berkeley, § 9 : 'By Matter, therefore, we are to understand an inert (trage), senseless (empfindungslose) substance, in which exten sion, figure, and motion do actually subsist.' Ueberweg : ' It is entirely unnecessary to conceive of matter as purely " inert, " without force. Something internal, on which rest its motions (its forces, the analogues of our conceptions), may and must be conceded to matter.' Editor : Leibnitz was the first thoroughly to bring to scientific consciousness ' force ' or power as an essential element of matter. [19] Only Ideas. Berkeley, § 9 : ' Are only ideas. ' Ueberweg : ' The " only " is not proven.' [20] Matter or Corporeal Substance. Berkeley, § 9 : ' Hence it is plain (offenbar) that the very notion (der Begriff) of what is called matter or corporeal substance involves a contradiction in it.' Ueberweg : ' This would be plain (offenbar) only in case the un proved assertion were true, that a figure can be 07tly an " idea. " 'The true proposition — that those figures which are in our perceptive images are something psychical — Berkeley has incorrectly converted into the proposition that figures exist only in the mind.' QUALITIES OF MATTER. 345 [21] Extension and Movement. Berkeley, § 10: 'to reflect (nachzudenken), . . try (erproben), . . abstraction of thought (Vorstellungszerlegung), . . without all other sensible (sinnlichen) qualities.' Ueberweg : ' That extension and movement which is in the per ceptive image (Wahrnehmungsbilde) can certainly not exist outside of the mind sundered from the other constituents of the perceptive image. This requires no argument. The real question is, Is there anything eke ? — to wit, is there an objective extension existing outside the mind, with figures and movements which are similar to the subjective ? That this is impossible Berkeley has affirmed, but has not proved.' Editor : Much of the difficulty of this question has arisen from the loose and conflicting senses in which the terms ' similar ' and ' like ' are used. Strictly or materially taken, the external objective cannot be Mike' the subjective, — matter cannot be 'like' a condition of mind, — but the differences between the mental states produced by different objects really correspond with, have real analogues in, the objects differing. With reference to each other, objects have a relative likeness to the subjective state they produce. A real lion has this sort of likeness to the mental image of a lion, — it is like the mental lion in a sense in which an ox or a flower is not. So, too, the picture of a lion is materially neither like a real lion nor the mental image of a lion, but it has a relative likeness to both — such a likeness as the picture of an ox has not. [22] Qualities of Matter. Berkeley, § 10 : ' which is acknowledged to exist only in the mind (Geiste).' Ueberweg : ' It has already been observed that matter to which the objectively real extension, figure, and motion belong is not to be con ceived of as having no other qualities. ' But the nature of these other qualities is not as readily and as surely known as the nature of the geometrical qualities of matter. ' If they are analogues of our conceptions, they are nevertheless cer tainly not in our mind, and are not identical with its sensations (sinn lichen Empfindungen). The questions bearing on this point will not come up in a methodical discussion until the problems relating to the primary qualities are solved.' 346 A NN OTATIO NS. [23] Great and Small. Berkeley, §11: 'The extension, therefore, which exists without the mind is neither great nor small, the motion neither swift nor slow; that is, they are nothing at all.' Ueberweg : ' This false inference is reached by confounding the position of scientific observation with that of the popular view. Scien tific observation shows that great and little are relative conceptions ; that consequently where no relation exists we can no longer, in the strict sense, speak of greatness or littleness; from the fact that what only in this strict sense can be called neither great nor little is to be taken for something which is neither large nor small in the popular sense (and consequently where the comparison is complete), the infer ence is drawn that an extension which is neither great nor little is "nothing at all. " ' The fallacy is the same as in the Thesis (which has often been adduced, and may be justified by the relativity of the notion of poison), "Aut omnia aut nulla venena, " with which is linked the inference that it makes no difference whether we eat bread or arsenic. 'Every real extension is one distinct extension and no other (not at all, however, as Berkeley immediately after imputes it to the defend ers of the objectivity, "extension in general "). But the notion of greatness or littleness cannot be applied to it without a comparison which we ourselves make. ' The same is true of motion. A planet moves around the centre of its system in a certain path, which, by means of a particular motion (not "motion in general "), can be measured. Whether the motion is to be called swift or slow depends upon the comparison which we make. ' The motion of Mars, for example, is slow in comparison with the motion of the earth, but swift in comparison with the motion of 'Uranus ; in itself, not compared with other motions, it is neither swift nor slow. But this would not justify us in saying "that as it is in itself neither swift motion nor slow motion "// is nothing at all. " ' The setting aside of antithetical predicates, which apart from com parison have no meaning, does not set aside the thing itself. N01 indeed is the comparison always a purely subjective one, but in many cases, and those of the highest scientific importance, it is brought out in objective connections.' [24] Unity. Berkeley, § 12: 'in each instance, it is plain, the unit relates to some particular combination of ideas arbitrarily (willkiirlich) put to gether by the mind.' ' COLD AND WARM. 347 Ueberweg : ' The mind proceeds not arbitrarily, but in conformity with objective relations, when it considers three persons or three trees as three entities, and not as ten or twenty cubic unities, the size of each of which is taken into consideration. ' Number as number is a structure of the mind which summarizes what is homogeneous ; but the unity of measure is only in certain cases and in a certain degree arbitrary. So far as individuals exist it is object ively grounded.' [25] Unity: Locke. Berkeley, § 13: 'all the ways of sensation and reflection (der sinn lichen und inneren Wahrnehmung).' Ueberweg : ' Locke says (Ess. on H. U., n. xiii. 26), "There is not any object of sensation or reflection (sinnlichen und inneren Wahrneh mung) which does not carry with it the idea of one. " He maintains (do., 11. xvi. 1) that no idea is so simple as that of unity, and that it is most intimately interwoven with all our thoughts. This proposition of Locke is here controverted by Berkeley.' [26] Cold and Warm. Berkeley, § 14: 'the same body which appears cold to one hand seems warm to another.' Ueberweg : ' This argument (as Berkeley himself grants) is not in itself sufficient to prove that there is no particular grade of caloric in the external object itself, — a grade which may be ascertained objectively by the thermometer. The argument does no more than bring before us the obvious fact that the expressions "hot " and "cold, " as they involve a comparison with the grades of warmth in parts of our body, cannot be used without a subjective reference. We cannot, therefore, just "as well, " but rather can just " as little " infer that there is no particular figure and no particular extension belonging in every case to the external object involved. The conclusion, however, that the sensation of warmth cannot be an image of an objective quality of caloric, while yet the perception of a form can be an image of the perceived form of the external object, rests upon different premises. ' All the qualities of sensation can be excited by processes of motion. These latter must as such be objective, for otherwise the presupposition of an objective causal (nexus), a thing established by all the results of physical investigation, falls away with them. See (45).' 348 A NN OTATIO NS. [27] Substance. Berkeley, § 17 : 'but the idea of being (Wesens, eines Etwas, eines Seienden) in general (iiberhaupt), together with the relative notion (Begriff) of its supporting (Tragens) accidents.' Ueberweg: 'Locke (H. Und.,n. xii. 3-6) reduces complex ideas (zusammengesetzten Vorstellungen) to three classes: 1. Modes (Acci dentien), 2. Substances, 3. Relations (Verhaltnisse). Under modes or accidents he understands ' ' complex ideas which contain not in them the supposition of subsisting by themselves (fiir sich bestehend), but are considered as dependencies on or affections of substances " inhering in certain substances. ' " The ideas of substances , " says Locke, "are such combinations of simple ideas (Vorstellungen) as are taken to represent distinct particular things subsisting by themselves " (fiir sich bestehende). The "relation consists in the comparing one idea (Vorstellung) with another. " ' "Under accidents,' 1 '' says Locke (H. U., 11. xiii. 19), " is understood a sort of real beings that needed something to inhere in, " — something real, which of necessity presupposes some other thing in which it sub sists. ' ' Substance is that which supports accidents, ' ' — their substratum. He adds, " Of substance we have no idea what it is, but only a con fused, obscure one of what it does. ' ' "The idea of substance we neither have nor can have by sensation or reflection (aussere innere Wahrneh mung) (1. iv. 18); it is furnished to us only by the constant association of certain simple ideas. As we are unable to conceive how these can subsist in themselves, we are accustomed to suppose some certain substratum wherein they do subsist and from which they do result ; which, therefore, we call substance' (H. U., 11. xxiii. 1). ' Only the constant combination of properties is given to us; the nature of substance is hidden from us (do. do., 3-6). ' " He has the perfectest idea of any of the particular sorts of sub stances who has gathered and put together most of the simple ideas which do exist in it " (do. do., 7). ' It is true Locke would have been more logical, without, however, on that account by any means reaching Berkeleyanism, if he had rejected as an empty fiction the conception of substance as a something distinct from qualities, and had acknowledged only the reciprocal combination of qualities as real. As he, however, regarded this inference (sub sequently drawn by Hume) as doubtful, he confined himself to charac terizing as dark and of little use the idea of substance as something distinct from all qualities. IDEAS AS OBJECTS. 349 ' In the Platonic Aristotelian view of material substance extension is embraced. ' By Berkeley's negation of the existence of extension extra mentem the notion of material substance is, as he justly says, also taken away ; but the converse is by no means true, that the negation of that dark something necessarily involves the negation of the objective reality of extension.' [28] Ideas as Objects. Berkeley, § 18: 'Reason (Denken), Sensations (Sinnesempfind ungen), immediately perceived by sense (unmittelbar sinnlich wahr genommen werden) : but they do not inform us that things exist without the mind, or unperceived, like to those which are perceived.' Ueberweg: 'We have here again a return to the terminology which has already been objected to, in which "ideas " are designated as the objects of knowledge and of sense-perception; indeed, as "the objects immediately perceived. ' ' ' In fact, ideas are only objects of contemplation in internal percep tion ; that is, in reflection on an internal psychical image. ' Berkeley is indeed so far entirely right that it is actually only these complexes of sensation (perception) which are immediately in our consciousness ; the reference of them to the corresponding external objects takes place by means of an accessory primitive thinking, which presupposes partly nearer, partly more remote analogues of our own existence, of which we know by internal perception on occasion of those complexes of sensation, and indeed as the external causes of them ; the perception (sight, touch, etc.), to the extent to which it is more than mere sensation, already involves that primitive act of thinking. ' But the complexes of sensation, though alone immediately in our consciousness, are not therefore necessarily the immediate object of sense-perception, to wit, if they be at all not the object but the means of it; our attention, in the case of the complexes of sensation, is directed entirely to the external things manifested to us through them ; the external thing is that which I see, handle, perceive. ' The complexes of sensation are, as such, late in becoming the object of psychological reflection. ' The act of thinking which enters into the sense-perception itself, and forms a constituent part of it, is an elementary one, through which, it is true, the existence of external objects is known ; but the distinction is by no means yet consummated, which shows what constituents of the complex of sensation correspond in a fuller and what in a more 3 50 A NNO TA TI O NS. restricted measure with the particular nature of their objects; this dis tinction (which Descartes and Locke have in the main correctly carried through) only takes place as the product of a far-advanced scientific penetration.' [29] Materialists. Berkeley, § 18: 'The Materialists.' Ueberweg : ' That is, those who hold to the existence of a matter external to the mind, — defenders of the doctrine of matter.' [30] Dreams. Berkeley, § 18 : ' With all the ideas.' Ueberweg : ' With all ? In accordance with the order of natural laws, assuredly not ! ' Consequently no more follows than what is beyond doubt, aside from the facts here urged by Berkeley, that the inference as to the existence of external objects is in certain cases deceptive, and that the condi tions under which the inference holds good must be ascertained. The images in dreams and visions would not be possible without antecedent affections made through actual external objects ; they are the result of a reproduction and metamorphosis of the presentations furnished by memory. If Berkeley's argument held good, the existence of other persons — which can also be dreamed of — would, equally with the ex istence of "unthinking objects, " be taken away. The weakness of the argument is shown in its proving too much. ' [31] Materialists. Berkeley, §19: 'The Materialists.' Ueberweg : ' Here appears yet more clearly than above (29) that Berkeley uses the term "Materialist " in a sense different from the received one. 'The ordinary meaning of " Materialist " is one who believes that nothing exists but material substance. Berkeley applies it to all who hold that material substances exist, although at the same time they may hold to the existence of spiritual substances.' [32] Intercourse. Berkeley, § 19 : 'And serve to no manner of purpose.' Ueberweg : ' They serve at least to render possible, in a manner conformed to natural laws, the intercourse between intellectual beings, if indeed the very possibility of the existence of conscious being be not conditioned through them. A POSTERIORI. 351 'Language is the medium through which thought is imparted. Grant that the word spoken by me can exist only in certain ideas linked to my thoughts, which ideas, like the word itself, exist purely in the mind ; and grant that the air itself exists only as the complex of ideas in illocal essence or spirits, yet it would still be inconceivable why similar ideas should be aroused by that word in the mind of another who is near me (the nearness itself cannot be one of a local kind, on this system), and still less would it be intelligible how a writing, long after the death of its author, could continue to produce the same kind of effects. 'All conformity to law would be the mere association of ideas in the individual subject ; for all relations between persons we must have recourse to the immediate or miraculous working of the divine Omnipo tence. But if outside of the mind of the person who speaks or who writes, and of the mind of the hearer or reader, the air and other material media have an existence, the intermediation can be explained by physics and the other natural sciences in a manner which cannot be contemptuously set aside. 'It is true that something still remains unexplained; but the path to the explanation is broken, and the difficulty made so prominent by Berkeley is diminished, if we do not regard matter and spirit as so utterly heterogeneous as Descartes and even Locke, and their cotem poraries, have done. ' The view of Berkeley, on the other hand, removes all possibility of an explanation based upon natural science.' [33] Dreaming. Berkeley, § 20: 'That you can possibly have for believing the same thing. ' Ueberweg : ' Undoubtedly ; and in dreaming we actually have the very belief without any grounds for it. But the supposition that waking is but dreaming with open eyes can only be carried through by the removal of all objective order of nature, of everything which goes beyond the bare association of ideas in the individual subject.' [34] A Posteriori. Berkeley, § 21 : 'Arguments a posteriori.' Ueberweg: ' "Arguments a posteriori " in the old Aristotelian Scho lastic sense of the term, according to which the argumentation a priori (to wit, ad posterius) implies the inference from the cause, as that which in its nature is earlier (tpvvei -porepov) to the operation or effect, 352 ANNOTATIONS. or that which in nature is later (<puau Zaxspov), while the argument a posteriori (to wit, ad prius natura) implies the inference from the opera tions or effects to the cause, — the inference from the <poaei uarepov to the <fUft£l TipOTtpOV. ' In the inference a posteriori, the later (the operations) is, according to natural sequence, the nearer to us (nporepov npbq ^/Jtac), or that which is earlier and more easily recognizable by us, — yvcupt/jLcurepov 7j/mv, — from whence we go back to the earlier, — the Causes ; we argue in this case regressively, while in the a priori (ad posterius) we argue progress ively. For the use of the terms a priori and a posteriori which has reference to the Course of Argumentation, Kant, partly following Hume and others, has substituted a completely heterogeneous use. According to Kant's use the distinction of a priori and a posteriori is referred to the judgment as such ; by knowledge a posteriori he means the knowledge derived from experience, empirical ; by knowledge a priori, the knowledge (erroneously assumed by him as possible and actual) which we have apart from experience.' [35] Extended Substance. Berkeley, §22: 'If you can but conceive it possible for one ex tended moveable substance, or, in general, for any one idea.' Ueberweg : ' The subsumption of " extended moveable substance, " under the term " idea, " already implies the Berkeleyan doctrine. The opponent of the view must consequently challenge this questionable position itself, and must refuse to concede what it tacitly assumes. Nego suppositum. As Berkeley here, however, simply repeats his former positions, we could do no more than repeat our former objec tions, which is unnecessary.' [36] External Things. Berkeley, § 23 : 'Which is a manifest repugnancy.' Ueberweg : ' The existence of external things without my thinking of them can very well be granted, but my consciousness that external things can exist is not possible, unless I am thinking of these very things. The periods of the formation of the earth, during which there were no living creatures, have existed without being perceived by men ; but we can know or conjecture that they existed, in no other way than by having them in our thought. Berkeley does not separate the two things. While the Opponent, whom he supposes to present himself, directs his reflection only to the existence of the external object, Berkeley makes this very reflection of the thinking subject upon the THINGS IN THEMSELVES. 353 object the starting-point of his argument, and in the abstraction of the object from the subject, made by the Opponent, does not follow him. Berkeley is undoubtedly right in maintaining that the possibility of performing this abstraction does not in itself demonstrate that things in themselves exist ; but he is not justified in maintaining that this possibility does not exist, because we, when we reflect upon it, do then certainly (in addition) think about the Things.' [37] Representation. Berkeley, § 23 : ' Though at the same time they are apprehended by (vorgestellt) or exist in itself?' Ueberweg : • Not the things, but only a representation (Vorstellung) of them, exists in me, just as, when I think of a psychical being dis tinct from myself, it is not this being, but a representation of it, which exists in me.' [38] Things in themselves. Berkeley, § 24 : ' Those words mark out either a direct contradic tion or else nothing at all.' Ueberweg : ' The alleged contradiction, as we have before shown, does not exist. 'Were there such contradiction, there would be equally a contra diction in supposing that there was a time previous to my own exist ence. For to suppose this I must think of that time ; it is consequently in me ; consequently it does not exist without me, or outside of me ; consequently not before my existence : for that anything should be in me, without myself being, is a palpable contradiction. ' The solution of Berkeley's argument is the same as that of the paral ogism just given. I think of the past now as I now generate an image of it in me, — not the past itself, but an image of it, is now in me ; but the past itself has existed without me. I cannot know that it has existed without me without (now in addition) thinking of it ; but it can have existed, and has existed, without this thinking of mine. ' In the same way, things which exist in themselves are thought of by me when I generate in me an image, more or less accurate, of them : the things themselves are not in me, but this image of them is in me ; but they themselves exist independently of my image. I cannot know that they exist in themselves without thinking of them, but they can exist, and many of them do, in fact, exist, indubitably, without this thinking of mine. The objection made by Berkeley is brought up again by Fichte, who denies Kant's assumption of ''Things in themselves " (Dingen an sich). The same thing is done by Reinhold 23 354 A NN0 TA TIONS. Hoppe. In his work on the Sufficiency of the Empirical Method in Philosophy ( " Zulanglichkeit des Empirismus in der Philosophic, " Berlin, 1852), he argues for a doctrine allied to that of Berkeley. Hoppe shapes his statement in this form, — that the opposition be tween Actuality and Cognition involves a contradiction, for in as far as Actuality is discussed, investigated, brought into contrast, so far is it thought of; from which he infers that everything we affirm of it relates, in fact, only to our own thinking. ' The objection, however, in this mode of conception, is that it involves a mingling of two grades of thinking, — to wit, that in which thinking is simply concerned with the truth (meaning that there is a harmony of our subjective apprehension with the objective Actuality ; as, for example, the harmony of our apprehension of the assassination of Caesar with the assassination as it actually occurred), and that in which it is concerned with our insight into the essence of the truth. Our notion of objective actuality belongs only to the second grade (in its antithesis to the subjective apprehension). To this grade, too, exclusively belongs the notion of cognition, and it is a matter of course that we cannot have these notions without thinking them. It is the first grade, indeed, which alone enables us to account for the second ; and in connection with this first grade we have to do merely with the existence of that harmony, not with our knowing of its existence ; and in this it is not our thinking of the Actuality, but the Actuality itself, which is determinative, — that is to say, the thing which exists or which has happened, which is not dependent on my knowledge of it (or is, in other words, " the thing in itself " — " an sich ist "), but which conditions my knowing.' Editor : It can exist without my knowing it, but I cannot know it without its existing. [39] Incitement of Ideas. Berkeley, § 25: 'or pattern of any active being, as is evident from § 8.' Ueberweg : ' The argument in § 8 has already been met. The inactivity of ideas is by no means established by self-observation : the association of ideas testifies to exactly the opposite. The supposition that our ideas are incited by external objects has not been proven false by Berkeley. ' It is indeed false to suppose such a relation between mind and the external world as imputes all the activity to the external world and considers the mind as a passive substratum, like a writing-tablet or a SOLIPSISM. 355 piece of wax ; but just as false is the opposite theory, which claims all activity for the mind exclusively. The expression " incitement " (Anre gung) or "affection " marks the actual relation most accurately [40] Substance. Berkeley, § 27: 'only by the effects which it produceth.' Ueberweg : 'Locke says (Hum. Und., 11. xxiii. 5), " the operations of the mind, viz., thinking, reasoning, fearing, etc., ... we concluding not to subsist- of themselves, nor apprehending how they can belong to body, or be produced by it, are apt to think them the actions of some other substance, which we call Spirit. " ' According to Locke, we think of Spirit as the substratum of activi ties which we perceive in our own (psychical) internal nature, as we conceive of bodies as the substratum of qualities which affect our senses. ' We have, according to Locke, no distinct idea either of corporeal or of spiritual substance, but can on this account no more deny the existence of one than of the other. ' Berkeley denies corporeal substance in behalf of spiritual substance ; but at a later period Hume denied both, or, at least, declared them equally doubtful, and adopted a self-dependent subsistence of concep tions in their reciprocal connection. ' Kant explained the notion of substance as an original notion of the understanding, which, just because of this its subjective origin, is applicable only to phenomenal objects, which are in our consciousness. By this view the skepticism is not confuted, but rather strengthened. In fact, we form the notion of substance on the ground of the knowl edge of ourself (in virtue of internal perception), as of an individual, by transferring the notion thus formed to personal and impersonal objects.' [41] Subject. Berkeley, § 27 : 'of its supporting or being the subject (zu tragen oder ihr Substrat zu sein).' Ueberweg : ' "Subject " in the ancient Aristotelian Scholastic sense (d-nozeifxtvov, substratum).' [42] Solipsism. Berkeley, § 27 : 'Though it must be owned at the same time that we have some notion (Begriff ) of soul, spirit, and the operations of the mind (den psychischen Thatigkeiten), such as willing, loving, hating, inasmuch as we know or understand the meaning of these words.' Ueberweg : ' Whether our consciousness of the psychical should be 356 A NNO TA TIONS. designated by the term "idea " or "notion, " is rather a question of verbal than of practical interest. It is worthy of remark, however, that if we propose to designate the " notions " of the mind in regard to other minds and their operations, as objects of cognition, in the manner in which Berkeley in the case of sense-perception designates "ideas " as the objects perceived, using in part the same arguments on which he has grounded the conclusion that we know only our own ideas, and not bodies, which are external to our mind, it would warrant the inference that we know only our own "notions " of spirits, and not spirits them selves, which have an existence outside of our own. Berkeley's argu ments would lead to the acceptance of the sole existence of the person arguing, — to what is called "theoretic Egoism, " or "Solipsism, " — and as it proves too much must be faulty.' [43] Senses. Berkeley, § 29 : ' But whatever power I may have over my own thoughts, I find the ideas actually perceived by Sense have not a like dependence on my will.' Ueberweg : 'Locke, in his "Essay concerning Human Under standing, " treats in Book iv. chap. xi. "of our knowledge of the ex istence of other things, " external to us. He supposes that we are compelled to trust our senses, which give us notice of the existence of other things, by which the senses are affected. No man can be so skep tical as to doubt of the existence of these things (do., § 3). Among the grounds of conviction he reckons also the circumstance which Berkeley here mentions, that when our eyes are open we cannot avert the entrance of the ideas (Vorstellungen) which sun and light occasion in us. Locke draws the inference (§5) that the thing which evokes in me ideas of this or that kind must be the impression of an external object affecting my senses. In place of this cause Berkeley substitutes the immediate operation of Deity on our souls.' [44] Activity and Passivity. Berkeley, § 28 : 'When in broad daylight I open my eyes — ' ' There is, therefore, some other Will or Spirit that produces them.' Ueberweg : ' If our spirit is susceptible of an operation, through which another being calls forth ideas in it, it follows that it is not in its own nature a perpetually active being, but is also capable of pas sivity. It is worth giving prominence here to the fact that by this view the distinction between Activity and Passivity is shown to be a relative one.' CAUSALITY. 357 [45] Laws of Nature. Berkeley, § 30 : ' Now the set rules or established methods wherein the mind we depend on excites in us the ideas of sense, are called the laws of nature.' Ueberweg : ' From the position of Berkeley, an order conformable to the laws of nature, inasmuch as he interprets this as the order of our own ideas, may be maintained ; but no laws of nature can be actually demonstrated, so that by them we can explain the natural phenomena. If, for example, the course of the planets is to be explained, that is, re ferred to laws universally holding good, it is impossible to do so by merely taking into account our own perceptions in their mutual rela tions. For in these perceptions, if they be regarded in themselves, a precise fixed order does not reveal itself. Such an order can only be found if we suppose a causality which limits the subject (in the act of seeing) with material objects external to the subject, to wit, the heavenly bodies, which carry on their movements in consonance with the laws of gravitation, the laws which Newton discovered. They carry them on, not within our consciousness, but independently of it, and did carry them on probably long before human consciousness existed, though we are able to develop our consciousness supplementally concerning them. It is not this supplemental consciousness which works upon our eyes, but the real external course of the planets.' [46] Causality. Berkeley, §31: 'This gives us a sort of foresight, . . . and a grown man no more know how to manage himself in the affairs of life than an infant just born.' Ueberweg : ' Locke says (Hum. Und., B. 11. xxvi. 1) : "In the notice that our senses take of the constant vicissitude of things, we cannot but observe that several particular, both qualities and substances, begin to exist, and that they receive this their existence from the due application and operation of some other being. From this observation we get our ideas of cause and effect. ' ' He gives as an example that in the sub stance we call wax, fluidity is constantly produced by the application of a certain degree of heat ; we call fluidity therefore the effect and heat the cause. Locke concedes that, in this, the manner in which cause brings forth effect remains unknown. 'Berkeley's theory of cause and effect is an application, in the most subjective shape, of this doctrine of Locke. Hume's sceptical Reflec tions on the Notion of Cause, which he traces to our habitually finding 358 A NNO TA TIONS. certain perceptions linked with certain others, found here a point of connection, as his sceptical reflections found their point of attachment in sections xvi., xvii., and xxvii. In the internal perception of our will and of the effort we make in overcoming obstacles, Reid and some others of the Scotch school found the solution of our notion of causality, and among French thinkers Maine de Biran adopted this view. Kant on the contrary regarded this notion and that of substance as a primary notion, originally immanent in the mind, "a category. " With this view he imagined that he had vanquished the scepticism of Hume, while in fact he had only promoted the extremest subjectivism, — a subjectivism which soon emerged in Fichte's doctrine of the Ego, but shifted round into the objectivism of Schelling, which objectivism in turn has led to new attempts at solution. Adhuc sub judice lis est.' [47] Causal Connection. Berkeley, § 32: 'Perceiving (wenn wir wahrnehmen) the motion (die Bewegung) and collision (Zusammenstoss) of bodies to be attended with sound, we are inclined to think the latter the effect (Wirkung) of the former.' Ueberweg : ' Here again holds good what was observed before, that the Causal Connection, if it be apprehended as merely the order estab lished by God in the ideas which are in the subject, can merely be asserted, not actually demonstrated and formulated. But if the Causal Connection be associated with the external things, it is explained in conformity with mathematical mechanical laws. For example, the union of collision with sound is explained by the displacement con nected with the visible motion of bodies in the motions of the minute parts of body.' [48] Prejudice. Berkeley, § 34 : 'It will be objected that by the foregoing princi ples all that is real and substantial in nature is banished out of the world, and instead thereof a chimerical scheme of ideas takes place.' Ueberweg : 'Berkeley has only too much to justify him in believing that the first objections urged against a theory which departs from the current opinion will be of the kind he here describes. As children are wont to say No, when anything is demanded of them which they have not themselves imagined or desired, so adults thrust away what is strange to them, simply because it is strange. They cry out that it is odd and absurd, while the only real question is whether it is asserted EATING AND DRINKING IDEAS. 359 on sufficient grounds. Berkeley's task is easy enough with this class of objections; there is another class which has more weight.' [49] Reality'. Berkeley, § 36: 'If any man thinks this detracts from the existence or reality of things, he is very far from understanding what hath been premised in the plainest terms I could think of.' Ueberweg: 'As Locke, who (iv. xi. 8) characterizes the negation of the corporeal world as a view according to which "all we see and hear, feel and taste, think and do, during our whole being, is but the series and deluding appearances of a long dream, whereof there is no reality. ' ' ' [50] Substance. Berkeley, § 37: 'If it (substance) be taken in a philosophic sense for the support (Trager) of accidents or qualities (Eigenschaften) with out the mind, then indeed I acknowledge that we take it away, if one may be said to take that away which never had any existence, not even in the imagination (blossen Vorstellung).' Ueberweg : ' The two questions are not identical, whether there be extended things without our minds, and whether there be substance which is the support of qualities. It is not true that Berkeley simply contests the second supposition, and is on other points in unison with the common view. The existence of extension, figure, magnitude, and impenetrability, and also of gravitation and of forces in general, with out the percipient mind, is the very essence of the question. Locke's notion of substance can be denied without denying that existence without the percipient mind. He who denies this existence denies indeed of necessity, at the same time, the notion of corporeal sub stances, but not merely this. To this add that Berkeley himself acknowledges spiritual substances as the supports of the inherent.' [51] Eating and Drinking Ideas. Berkeley, § 38: 'It sounds very harsh to say, we eat and drink ideas, and are clothed with ideas. I acknowledge it does so, — the word idea not being used in common discourse to signify the several combinations of sensible qualities which are called things. 1 Ueberweg : ' Were this the only ground, it would sound less harsh to say that we eat and drink sense-perceptions. The true ground is that the things we eat and drink are things existing without our con sciousness (in themselves), and are not ideas in the mind of the per cipient subject, and are regarded as such by the non-philosophic also. 360 A NN OTATIO NS. The theory of Berkeley does not deviate from the ordinary use of language merely, but from the conviction which lies at the root of this usage. To be sure, this is no proof that Berkeley's theory is not right; but the deviation is unmistakable. ' Berkeley himself not only acknowledges that he deviates from the ordinary use of language, but subsequently (§ 39, with which compare the beginning of § 56) acknowledges his deviation from the common supposition on which the usage of language rests. With this is not in consonance the assertion made in § 35, and frequently elsewhere, "the only thing whose existence we deny is that which philosophers call matter or corporeal substance. " Berkeley's assertion, moreover, that we eat and drink ideas, is not only opposed to the usage of language and the common presuppositions on which that usage rests, but to Berkeley's own position, which is at once necessary on the one side and untenable on the other. Nothing of the colour and taste of the apple or of wine enters into the stomach, — the stomach neither sees nor tastes ; the processes of assimilation run through their normal course with scarcely any recognition on the part of consciousness. How, consequently, can "ideas, " or sensations, or sensible qualities, be eaten ? The chemical processes which science has gradually, in part, discovered, are known only in their effects. So long as they are unperceived, they are upon the one side, according to Berkeley's principles, nothing, and on the other side, as they are associated with operations, they are something, — which is a complete contradiction. Consequently, the negation of things which exist without the con sciousness (and of whose existence we can only gradually attain a con sciousness) is untenable. See the note on § 52.' Editor: Schulze, 1 who rejects Berkeley's view, says, 'The system seems ludicrous only because our modes of speech and of thought are not in conformity with it.' It may be said, however, that the language which Berkeley uses is not self-consistent, for the eating is as ideal as the thing eaten. We have the eating-idea of the apple-idea, the dressing-idea of the raiment-idea. The relation in Berkeley is not that of an objective act brought to bear on an ideal thing, but of ideal on ideal. On the other hand, if the idea is the thing, the idea is the apple, the idea is the eating. Strictly speaking, the apple of Berkeley is not the idea of an apple, but is an idea-apple ; the eating is not the idea of eating, but is the idea-eating. Berkeley himself falls into the trap of the every-day formulary in the first part of the phrase. As he defines reality, the idea-eating of the idea-apple is a real eating 1 Grundr. d. philosoph. Wissenschaft, 2 v., 1788, i. 23. THE SENSORIUM. 361 of a real apple ; but this makes our psychical activity depend on God as much as our psychical passivity, and overthrows the infallibility of cur consciousness to our own mental acts. My idea that I am eating is not a mere sense-impression, but a consciousness of will. [52] Testimony of the Senses. Berkeley, § 40 : ' But, say what we can, some one perhaps may be apt to reply, he will still believe his senses, and never suffer any arguments, how plausible soever, to prevail over the certainty of them.' Ueberweg : 'Compare Locke, iv. xi. 3: "This is certain, the confidence that our faculties do not herein deceive us is the greatest assurance we are capable of concerning the existence of material beings. . . . Our senses do not err in the information they give us of the existence of things without us, when they are affected by them. " ' He says further (§8), "the certainty of things existing in rerum natura, when we have the testimony of our senses for it, is not only as great as our frame can attain to, but as our condition needs. " ' [53] Fire and the Idea of Fire : Locke. Berkeley, § 41 : 'if you suspect it to be only the idea of fire which you see, do but put your hand into it and you will be convinced with a witness.' Ueberweg: 'Locke (iv. xi. 7): "He that sees a fire may, if he doubt whether it be anything more than a bare fancy, feel it too " ; (§ 8) : " if our dreamer pleases to try whether the glowing heat of a glass furnace be barely a wandering imagination in a drowsy man's fancy, by putting his hand into it he may perhaps be wakened into a certainty greater than he could wish. " ' [54] The Sensorium. Berkeley, § 42 : 'In a dream we do oft perceive things as existing at a great distance off, and yet, for all that, those things are acknowl edged to have their existence only in the mind.' Ueberweg : ' It must undoubtedly be acknowledged that all the perception-images which are outside the perception-image of our own body are by no means on that account without our mind. But this does not forbid that there should be without the entire sphere of the perception-images those real objects which affect our senses, and that there should be organs of sense which are affected, from which organs, by means of the sensible nerves, the affections are conveyed to the central parts, in which we are to look for the seat of the sensorium 362 ANN OTA TIONS. commune, and the seat consequently, also, of the perception-images themselves. The following figure may be of service in elucidating the statement just made : ' AB is the external object ; ba is the image of AB in the right and in the left eye ; b'a! is the image of AB in the sensorium commune ; Od is the right eye ; Os is the left eye ; C is the brain (linear, half the natural size) ; od, os, c, the represented (vorgestellten) places of the right and left eye and of the brain. ' The sensorium lies within the real brain C, but within the sensorium, in addition to images of the rest of objects, lie the images of our eyes, of our head, of our retina, of our optic nerves, and of the brain itself, so far as we know them by anatomy; it is a mistake to seek the objects here.' [55] 'New Theory of Vision.' Berkeley, § 43 : ' The consideration (Erwagung) of this difficulty it was that gave birth to my Essay towards a New Theory of Vision (Sehens), which was published not long since.' Ueberweg : ' "An Essay towards a New Theory of Vision' ' appeared 1709. In this Essay Berkeley maintained that we do not estimate the remoteness of the object by the "optic axes, " or the lines from the two eyes to the object seen, and the angle which they form with each other by their concurring at the object. ' In defence of this opinion he advanced three arguments : '1, We do not perceive these lines and angles, and yet our estima tion of distance can only rest on what is perceived. 1 2. These lines and angles have no real existence in nature, but are merely a geometrical hypothesis (Voraussetzung). 'NEW THEORY OF VISION: 363 '.3. Though we should grant their real existence, and that it is possible for the mind to perceive them, they would yet be insufficient to explain the phenomena of distance. ' In accordance with the clearness or confusion of the perceptions of colours, and in accordance with other changes which associate them selves with certain sensations of touch (Tastempfindungen), the person seeing judges in regard to distances, judges, consequently, on the ground of experience. ' From this Berkeley draws the conclusion that if a person born blind should recover his sight by an operation, he would at first have no idea of distance, and that sun and stars, and all the remotest objects, equally with the nearest, "would all seem to be in his eye, or rather in his mind. " (Essay, § 41.) This supposition of Berkeley's has been confirmed by the fact that persons born blind who have obtained sight by an operation do not at first know how to estimate distances, but are obliged to learn to do it gradually. Such persons, also, while they can distinguish forms from each other, as, for example, a dog from a cat; are not able at once to connect with them the shapes which had pre viously become familiar by touch. Berkeley is undoubtedly right in maintaining that we judge of the third dimension — Depth — only accord ing to certain signs, though many other signs are to be added to those which he makes prominent. This judging takes place through that primary thinking which is performed by virtue of associations involun tarily arising, a thinking which exercises an essential influence in shaping the perception-image, — for example, in producing the form of the firmament. There is another question, however, Whether the shaping in vision in general rests only in this primary thinking, or whether a beginning of the shaping already lies in the original sensa tion (Empfindung) itself. The great physiologist John Muller ( 1 801-185 8) adopted the latter view, as he grants that the superficial shape of the image on the retina (or of a representation of it within the sensorium ?) immediately, as such, reaches the consciousness. ' Others, for example Lotze, suppose that no shape as such enters immediately into the consciousness, but that all apprehension of form fashions itself in us out of qualitative distinctions ; the theory of the punctual existence of the soul necessitates this latter assumption ; and this assumption seems also on its part necessarily to presuppose that punctual position of the soul, inasmuch as in a soul not punctual there must of necessity already be some grouping in the Sensations (Empfind ungen) themselves. ' The ' ' Empiristic (Empiristische) theory' ' represented by Helm- 3 64 A NN OTA TIO NS. holtz, which aims at reducing all apprehension of form to uncon scious inferences, must either advance to the doctrine of punctual position or return to Muller's doctrine. The controversy is still undecided.' Editor : Berkeley's New Theory is generally regarded as a discovery. Such it is in the only sense in which anything intellectual is a discovery: it is the actualizing and culmination of a series of efforts. There are hints of the theory in Descartes, dim anticipations of it in Malebranche (Rech. d. 1. Verite, i., ch. 9), and in Glanville's Scepsis Scientifica (ch. 5), and a nearer approach in Molyneux's Dioptrics (1690), and in Locke's Essay (4th ed., 1694), B. 11., ch. ix. § 8. [56] Constant Creation. Berkeley, § 45: 'Fourthly, it will be objected (eingewandt) that from the foregoing principles it follows things are every moment anni hilated (vernichtet) and created anew.' Ueberweg : ' This objection to Berkeley's doctrine is well grounded : the objection is but a special form of the more general one, that the actual existence of any causality of nature is not compatible with Berkeley's view. The opening and shutting of the eyes produces in the same person, at the same place, and at the same time, and accord ingly under the same psychical conditions, entirely different results according as long ago a gardener or a carpenter has or has not bestowed a certain activity on the place which lies before his eyes, according as a storm or a fire has or has not destroyed the results of that activity. This can only be explained in conformity with natural laws, if the results of that activity relate to objects, which exist in themselves with out the consciousness, experience changes by the labours of certain persons, or by the operations of external circumstances, and in con formity with these operate on the senses of other persons. If such objects are wanting, then there is wanting between the earlier and later processes the connection established by the laws of nature, and the sequence of our ideas, which in dreaming is explained by the images stored in memory and by subjective laws of association, can in our waking time be explained only by an interference of divine Omnipo tence at once immediate and without order.' [57] Existence of an Idea. Berkeley, § 45 : ' I . . . desire he (the reader) will consider whether he means anything by the actual existence of an idea distinct from its being perceived.' INFINITE DIVISIBILITY. 365 Ueberweg: 'By the actual existence of an idea (perception, or representation of imagination) certainly not, but by the existence of the object, through whose operation on us the idea is excited in us.' [58.] Berkeley, § 46 : ' Philosophers . . . agree on all hands that light and colours, which alone are the proper and immediate objects of sight, are mere sensations (sinnliche Empfindungen), that exist no longer than they are perceived.' Ueberweg : ' But that which can excite these sensations continues, according to the common doctrine, to exist.' [59.] Berkeley, do. : ' that things should be every moment creating ... is very commonly taught in the schools. ' Ueberweg : ' This is taught only so far as the subsistence of matter is regarded as a preservation of it by God, and this — as Augustine had taught — is compared to a constant creation ; but not in such sense as to involve an interruption of existence.' [6o.] Berkeley, § 48 : ' Though we allow the existence of Matter or Cor poreal Substance, yet it will follow from the principles which are now generally admitted that the particular bodies of what kind soever do none of them exist whilst they are not perceived.' Ueberweg : ' If, to wit, these bodies be connected with the Berke leyan subjectivating of magnitude, form, and motion.' [61.] Berkeley, do. : ' Hence (from the infinite divisibility of matter) it follows that there is an infinite number of parts in each particle of matter which are not perceived by sense. ' Ueberweg: 'To wit, potentially, not actually; that is, matter is infinitely divisible, but not actually infinitely divided. It lies in the very nature of infinite division that it shall never be completed, and that every actual division can be carried yet further.' [62] Infinite Divisibility. Berkeley, do. : ' but because the sense is not acute enough to dis cern them.' Ueberweg : ■ And because the parts are not actually sundered one 366 A NNO TA TIO NS. from another into an infinite number, — for even on the Atomistic theory they are divided only into a very great number, — that rather only the divisibility is unlimited.' [63] Sense infinitely acute. Berkeley, do. : 'that is, the object appears greater.' Ueberweg : 'This does not necessarily follow, if the parts as they grow in number diminish in bulk in the same ratio. A "sense in finitely acute " would know the "infinitely small parts " as infinitely small, while our senses cannot pass beyond the ' ' sensible minima. ' ' The eye, for example, can perceive two points separated, only by means of a certain extremely minute angle of vision. The microscope does not change this angle of vision at all, but only allows other points of the object to form it with our eye.' [64] Sense infinitely acute. Berkeley, do. : ' When the sense becomes infinitely acute the body shall seem infinite.' Ueberweg : ' Entirely wrong ; because it wholly leaves out of con sideration the diminution in the size of the parts, which takes place in inverse proportion to the increase of their number.' [65] Infinite Extension. Berkeley, do. : 'is infinitely extended.' Ueberweg : ' For this assertion not even a show of proof is adduced.' [66] Intervals of Perception. Berkeley, § 58: 'or exist not at all during the intervals between our perception of them.' Ueberweg : ' This reply to the objection involves the supposition that one uniform object subsists. But in fact if the being of the object in itself be set aside, and no existence be ascribed to it beyond that which it has in individual percipient spirits, what we call a house is rather a number of houses, each one of which exists in a single percip ient spirit. Each single one of this multitude is certainly annihilated and created anew with the closing and re-opening of the eyes. Add to this that there are frequently intervals during which no one perceives particular objects. Are we, for instance, to say that the Herculanean Manuscripts did not exist during the centuries through which they remained buried, and that God at a later period created them anew ? The restoration is certainly not to be explained by an order established SUBSTANCE AND ESSENCE. 367 by natural laws. This order subsists only in case that there is an ex istence without all (finite) minds during the interval. The existence in the divine mind cannot explain the permanence of the object, inas much as this supposition would involve too much, to wit, an eternal existence of the object, which nevertheless has a beginning and an end in time ; there must, consequently, be an object distinct from God's idea of the object, which subsists during the interval in which no finite spirit perceives it.' [67] Subject. Berkeley, § 49 : ' Since extension is a mode or attribute which (to speak with the schools) is predicated of the subject (Substrat) in which it exists.' Ueberweg : 'The term "subject " is not used here in the special sense given it in modern philosophy, as designating merely the sub stratum of the psychical phenomena. Berkeley uses it in the older sense, in which it corresponds with the Greek v1zo7.eiiJ.zvov, designating the substratum in general. It is a term which can also be employed to designate the grammatical subject in a sentence. This paragraph shows very clearly how, out of the original use of the word, has grown on the one side the grammatical sense, and on the other the prevalent philosophical one.' [68] Extended Idea. Berkeley, do. : ' but only by way of idea.' Ueberweg : 'How an extended "idea " can be in an unextended being is absolutely inconceivable, and is not in the least explained by Berkeley, or even made plausible. An object may have in it objects which are red or blue, without at the same time being itself as a whole red or blue ; but it cannot have extended objects in it without itself being extended. If the meaning is that the idea of a thing extended is not itself extended, that would be in part false, in part in conflict with Berkeley's principles, according to which there is no extended different from the idea of the extended, but that idea is itself the ex tended.' [69] Substance and Essence. Berkeley, do. : ' but only an explication of the meaning of the word die.' Ueberweg : ' The Aristotelians understand by the subject or sub stratum (vnoy.siiJ.evov) the support of the qualities. By substance (obaia or zi iffzcv), they meant in addition to this substratum the complex of 368 A NN OTATIO NS. the essential ; that in virtue of which the thing is what it is, and which is consequently stated in its definition (6ptaiJ.6q). This essential with out the substratum is essence abstractly conceived, what Aristotle calls to ti rjv shat. To the constituents of this essence— the essentialia — are yet to be added, according to Aristotle and his followers, the <ru/ij3s/37]x6Ta, the accidentia or modi. These definitions Berkeley rejects.' [70] Natural Science. Berkeley, § 50 : 'as might easily be made appear by an induction of particulars.' Ueberweg : ' This is an assertion unproven and false. Not a solitary fact is adduced to support it, and it is in conflict with the entire con dition of the physical sciences. The mathematico-physical explanation of the mechanical operations in the stricter sense, of the acoustic and optical processes, of electricity and of magnetism, rests entirely upon the supposition that certain movements exist without our minds, which stand partly in a causal connection with each other, partly so operate upon our senses as to affect the optic, the auditory, and other nerves ; and in consequence of these affections there rises in us a consciousness partly of shapes and movements as such, partly of colours, sounds, et cetera. And here come in, in a pre-eminent sense, what Berkeley could not know, as they belong to the most recent scientific discoveries, the facts that mechanical movements can be transmuted into heat and the converse, by virtue of the transposition of the movement of entire bodies into the movement of molecules, and the converse, and in general the explanation of the transposition of one group of physical phenomena into another group, in conformity with the laws of the conservation of force. In what manner the movements result has been differently ex plained by the physicists in the time of Berkeley and of a later period ; as, for example, whether the ray of light is to be regarded as the recti linear progress of a material object or as the transmission of undulatory movements, in which the material particles have a vibratory motion. The next assertion of Berkeley is certainly correct, that the operation of matter on spirit has remained unexplained. The Cartesian theory of a complete heterogeneousness between the two substances rendered im possible any attempt at an explanation of the matter which rested upon the connection of the processes of nature. But the true inference from this was that the Cartesian philosophy needed a reshaping of principles, and not that the results of natural science reached by mathematico mechanical investigations should be despised, or that a new path which no one had actually struck out should be entered on.' ASTR ONOMI CAL MO VEMENTS. 369 [71] Occasionalists. Berkeley, § 53 : ' These men.' Ueberweg: 'The "Occasionalists " Geulinx and Malebranche, who, proceeding from the Cartesian view of the complete heterogeneousness of soul and body, denied that a reciprocal operation exists between the two, and supposed that on occasion of the one process God wrought the other ; for example, that God takes the occasion of an affection of my senses to call forth the corresponding perception, and takes the occa sion of my desire and moves my arm. Bodies can only operate on bodies, and conceptions can only operate on conceptions (Vorstel lungen). From occasionalism, and especially from the doctrine of Malebranche, that we know objects by means of the representation of their essence in the divine mind, and that we behold, in general, all things in God, the transition was easy to the Berkeleyan view.' [72] The Ninth Objection. Berkeley, § 58: 'Tenthly.' Ueberweg : 'What has become of the ninth objection? It must lie in § 56, and §54 should begin, "In the eighth and ninth place. " ' Editor: The ninth objection is stated and answered in §§ 56, 57. [73] Astronomical Movements. Berkeley, § 58 : 'and appearing in all respects like one of them.' Ueberweg : ' Berkeley here seems in two respects to lower the sig nificance of the question. First, with respect to the processes of movement as such ; secondly, with respect to the forces on which these processes depend. In the first respect, and still more in the second, the actual view, taken by the artificial aids which astronomy calls into its service, the view from a fixed position, has an advantage of completer truth, as compared with the view from a second position. This better view Berkeley has not touched. The advantage it presents is of the same kind as the view that the dancer moves round the room, has over the view that the room moves round the dancer. The first theory can only be maintained under distinctly subjective determina tions ; the second is not bound in the same way to such determinate conditions, and does not offer itself, therefore, in the same isolated way, but holds equally good in the main under an infinite diversity of conditions, and in this very way demonstrates its objective superiority. If, however, we consider the movements with respect also to the forces by which they are produced, in conformity with the Newtonian law of 24 370 A NNO TA riO A T S. gravity, we reach the certainty that only the one view holds good object ively, that is, is in harmony with the process as it takes place in itself, in the material world apart from our consciousness of it; for the earth has not the force to move daily the universe around it, and in addition give to the sun its annual course. The other conception, on the con trary, solves the processes by the mathematical mechanical explanation. See Note 103.' [74] Order of Nature. Berkeley, § 59 : 'or any other discoveries in astronomy or nature.' Ueberweg : ' We can reply to this in a similar manner. The pos sibility of forming well-grounded anticipations cannot be explained merely by the laws of the association of ideas, but requires the refer ence of the Subject to \ normal order of nature, an order which com prehends objects existent without the Subject.' [75] Proofs untenable. Berkeley, § 61 : ' which may be proved a priori.'' Ueberweg : 'Were it not that the "proofs, " as we have seen, are entirely untenable.' [76] Begging the Question. Berkeley, do. : ' for it has been made evident.' Ueberweg : 'As if this proof (given in § 25) did not rest upon the very supposition which his opponent contests, that figure, etc., can exist only as an idea in the mind of the Subject.' [77] Order of Nature. Berkeley, § 62 : 'the laws of nature.' Ueberweg: 'This answer of Berkeley's is in itself admirable; it is the very one which must also be given from the point of view opposed to his own. But this very answer, run out into its consequences, can be turned against Berkeley himself. If he made no appeal to an order conformed to the laws of nature, and if he ascribed to his God an operation without order, a thing of freak, as it were (as if He were like Setebos, the god of Caliban's dam, in Shakspeare's Tempest), his view might perhaps be beyond confutation, though it would be com pletely unproven and totally destitute of probability. But the moment he concedes the order of nature his position becomes untenable, as from it the conformity with natural laws, as we have seen, may indeed be asserted, but cannot be carried out. If I take my watch to be put in order, and when I get it back find that it keeps good time, the pro- THE WA TCH. 371 cesses in my consciousness have been taken for themselves alone, and manifestly not in connection with the result fixed by the laws of nature. For, instead of the perception that my watch goes right, which followed taking it away and returning it, there might just as readily have been the exactly opposite result ; if, for instance, the watchmaker had been unskilful or had put the watch into the hands of a bungling workman. With the conceptions and operations of this workman, however, my ideas stand in no normal connection, unless this connection be brought about by an external object, which, from the consciousness of the one (the workman), experiences effects, and which, when it is afterwards brought to the other (the owner), produces effects on his consciousness. But this is the very thing which Berkeley denies. His negation is consequently untenable.' [78] The Watch. Berkeley, § 62 : 'As, also, that any disorder in them be attended with the perception (Wahrnehmung) of some corresponding disorder in the movements, which being once corrected all is right again.' Ueberweg : ' According to this, the irregularity we perceive in the movement of the hands seems to be the prior and conditioning thing, and the derangement in the interior of the watch, which, on Berkeley's principles, does not exist until it is perceived, is the subsequent and conditional thing; the natural mechanical connection, however, is exactly the reverse. By what antecedent perceptions or "signs " is the irregularity of the whole conditioned? If, for example, a little dust, which no one has perceived, has got into the watch and put it out of order, the result is linked with something unperceived in the in terior of the watch. This thoroughly unperceived something, of which not even a dim suspicion exists, is, according to Berkeley, a nothing, and out of the nothing comes the change in the running of the watch. But that this, as a thing self-contradictory, is not possible, must, to adopt Berkeley's way of speaking, be clear to any one who will reflect even a little. The recognition of the fact, therefore, that nature is regulated by law, draws with it irresistibly the inference that material objects exist without the mind. What we see to be true in the com paratively simple relations of the parts of a watch holds good in a yet stronger degree in complex organisms, where none of the subtler pro cesses are perceived, and where they yet are the conditions of processes which are palpable. Between the perceptions we have, for example, of the taking of food and drink, and those we have of the growth of the body, there lie not only certain sensations, but a multitude of pro- 372 A NNO TA TIO NS. cesses also, which, though not perceived, are not nothing, but must be acknowledged to be processes which go on without all finite conscious ness. Of existence in the consciousness of God, we have spoken in Note 66.' [79] Miracles. Berkeley, § 63 : ' otherwise there is a plain reason why they should fail of that effect.' Ueberweg : ' It cannot be denied that Berkeley succeeds, by this reflection, in harmonizing the recognition both of the laws of nature and of miracles; but it is manifest that in attaining this end he presses the analogy of the divine education of our race, so as to bring it very close to the style of thinking natural to a schoolmaster.' [80] Sign and Link. Berkeley, § 64 : ' it not (being credible) that He would be at the expense (Aufwand) (if one may so speak) of all that art and regu larity to no purpose.' Ueberweg : ' The difficulty does not lie in the fact that these groups of ideas come forth at a later period, and that we consequently are also able to base anticipations on them, but rather in this fact, that they did not come forth at an earlier period, were not in our consciousness, when they must yet have served as intermediate links between our earlier and our later ideas, so that they consequently must have existed before they existed. This is the contradiction involved, and the solution of it can hardly be any other than this, that what becomes by degrees better known — as, for example, the chemical process connected with the act of digestion — must have previously existed, and consequently have existed without the consciousness ; in which case it could not have served as a sign, for that which is unknown to us cannot be a sign to us, but must have been a link in the chain of mechanical causes. ' [81] Analogues. Berkeley, § 67 : ' or at the presence whereof God is pleased to ex cite ideas in us.' Ueberweg : ' It would have been more correct to proceed in exactly the opposite way, to drop the negative determinations and to hold fast to the positive mark extension (by which the question as to the where is decided ; a question which, from the Berkeleyan position, also exists in reference to other minds), and at the same time to ascribe to substances, by whose movements our senses are affected, operativeness, power, and, indeed (unconscious), analogues of our conscious concep- THINGS IN THEMSELVES. 373 tions. In a certain respect Leibnitz had struck into this path ; but Leibnitz supposes each of his " monads " to have merely representations (Vorstellungen) and forces, a place also, but not extension and form. The view of Herbart is in affinity with that of Leibnitz. Nor is the view of Spinoza remote from it, so far as with this philosopher we have in view less the uniform substance than the individual as imma nent modes of it down to the minutest corpuscles ; in all of which, according to the fundamental doctrine of Spinoza, in virtue of the inseparable union of the attributes extension and cogitation, there must exist, at the same time with size and form, an internal something, a mode of " cogitation, " consequently an analogue of our conceptions. To the method of Berkeley, which proposed the aggregation of mere negations, lies nearest that which Kant struck out in his doctrine of the "thing in itself. " The difference is this, that Kant denies exten sion to the "things in themselves, " but does not expressly mention the existence of the sensitive faculty, though he is inclined to recog nize it. Kant's view rests on his a priori method, which has been disputed by Beneke, Ueberweg, v. Kirchmann and others, and in certain respects by Herbart and his school. Fichte's rejection of the "thing in itself " brings his doctrine very close to Berkeley's; but Fichte considers the Ego itself as the Producer of the Non-Ego. The philosophy of Schelling and Hegel throws out the problem en tirely by objectivating the subjective, etc. ; as, for example, in optics, by adopting Goethe's theory of colours, in this respect returning to the simple hypotheses.' [82] Occasion. Berkeley, § 69 : ' what is meant by occasion (Veranlassung),— the agent which produces any effect (Erfolg), or else something that is ob served to accompany or go before it in the ordinary course of things.' Ueberweg : ' Not the being observed as accompanying the effect or as going before it, but the presence of it as the condition of the effect, is its characteristic. That which is to God the occasion need not in every case fall into the sphere of our observation. We may also venture to speak of an occasion where we cannot directly observe it, but can only in some way reach it by inference.' [83] Things in themselves and Ideas of God. Berkeley, § 71 : 'as the notion (Begriff) of matter is here stated (gefasst) ... in the mind (Geiste) of God, which are so many marks (Merkmale) or notes (Zeichen) . . . sensations (Sinnesemphndungen) 374 A NN 0TAT10 NS. . . . tune (Tonstiick) . . . perceive (wahrnehmen) . . . extravagant (ausschweiffend) . . . senseless (empfindungslose).' Ueberweg : ' This is the shape which the question assumes on Berkeley's principles, while those whom he supposes to combat his views by no means, from their own position, regard of necessity the "things in themselves " as ideas of God. The aim of the assumption is, in fact, rather the very reverse : its aim is to restore between our earlier and later perceptions a normal causal connection by means of natural media which exist in themselves, without our mind. The ideas of God are eternal, the objects of nature are temporal. But even the doctrine which concedes that the things in themselves are ideas of God, is by no means as extravagant and baseless as Berkeley would represent it. The comparison with the musician suggests the idea that God needs some mnemonic aid, an idea whose inadequacy is instantly felt by every one ; but it does not follow that the same is true of a hypoth esis which is built upon a speculation not in regard to God's power, but in regard to his will, his volition to act in accordance with a natural order or normal regularity. This order, however, demands those intermediate links which, as they do not exist in our conscious ness, must either exist in themselves or in the mind of God. So much, however, is to be conceded, that as this hypothesis in both forms, in regard to the "things in themselves " or "ideas of God, " either dis regards or explicitly denies order in space, it loses the best part of its force. For the actual conceivableness of an order of nature links itself with special tenacity to the order in space reached by mathematical study. This arrangement, in view of the affections experienced by our senses, is not merely valid as an order within our consciousness, but must be recognized as reaching beyond it ; as an order common to our consciousness and to the things which exist without it.' [84] Existence external to the Mind. Berkeley, § 73 : 'to stand in need of a material support (Tragers) ... it follows that we have no longer any occasion to suppose the being of matter.' Ueberweg : ' This inference is false. Were it granted that none of the qualities known to us had an existence without the mind, yet on the basis of the normal order of nature we would still be justified in in ferring from the incitation of our sensations that something external to the mind, some "thing in itself, " exists; and the only inference justi fied on this supposition would be that attributes pertained to it of which we were ignorant.' A SOMEWHAT. 375 [85] Consciousness, its External Stimulations. Berkeley, § 74 : ' being (seienden) . . . What is there on our part (was fur einen Anhalt haben wir) . . . sensations (Sinneswahrneh mungen) . . . notions (Begriffen) . . . reflection (Selbst-betrachtung) inert (tragen) . . . directed (geleitet).' Ueberweg : 'In Notes 32, 45, 54, 77, and elsewhere, it has been sh<5wn that our consciousness, in its empirical determination, is not without distinct external stimulations. In this lies what there is "on our part " to induce us to suppose that there is an "occasion, " though it is not necessarily to be regarded as something absolutely "inert " and heterogeneous to the mind.' [86] A Somewhat. Berkeley, § 75 : 'a stupid thoughtless somewhat (JEtwas) ... in terposition (Einschiebung) . . . forsakes us (uns im Stich lassen) . . . if anything (wenn iiberhaupt irgend etwas).' Ueberweg: ' "The things in themselves, " says Herbart, "are not to be banished by reproaches. " Herbart is right; and this fact is a proof, not of the power of prejudice, but of the power of sound reason. But it is not necessary to conceive of "the things in them selves " as a mere incognizable "somewhat. " ' [87.] Berkeley, § 77: ' support (Trager) . . . inert (trage) . . . because we have not a sense adapted to them (weil wir keinen auf sie einge ri elite ten Sinn haben).' Ueberweg : ' The point here made puts into the mouth of the op ponent a false turn. It is out of place at this point to take refuge in other possible senses. The right way would be to mark that it would be hard for us to refer the sensations (sinnlichen Empfindungen) to their two co-operative causes, the subjective or psychical force and the external excitant (Reiz), and to apprehend the external purely in ac cordance with its own nature (Beschaffenheit). He who regards this as impossible must regard the nature of "matter, " or, still better, of "things in themselves, " as something completely unknown, and may yet have good ground, in conformity with the laws of causality, to infer the existence of this thing unknown. It is, nevertheless, to be noted, in conformity with what was before said, that the inference is robbed of some of its force if it be denied that the extension, with the forms and movements in our sense-perceptions (Sinneswahrnehmungen), is the 376 A AW OTATIO NS. representation, for the most part faithful and capable of increasing fidelity, of a homogeneous extension, with its various shapes and movements, situate without our mind.' [88] Miracles. Berkeley, § 84 : ' The same may be said of all other miracles. ' Ueberweg: 'That is, of all the biblical miracles, which alone Berke ley has in view, and for which his solution is adequate. It is doubtful, however, whether it would suffice for the miracle of transubstantiation, maintained by the Catholics, which Berkeley indeed did not believe. In that miracle substance as such comes directly into consideration, and is said to be transubstantiated, though the accidents, especially the taste of bread and wine, remain. This assertion does not seem capa ble of ready harmonizing with a view according to which we could only give the designation of substance of bread and wine either to the mind of the participant or to the unity of the accidents, that is, to their connection with one another. Yet the difficulty may be met perhaps if we might understand by substance, not the substratum or support, but the sum or complex (Inbegriff ) of the essential (Wesentlichen), and might then say that in the religious act there was an access of Christ's body and blood, and a union of them with bread and wine, and that the qualities of the bread and wine as bodily food ceased to be essential and sank into mere accidents ; so that instead of the earlier substance there was now another substance present. This explanation would also allow of a harmony of the Catholic and of the Lutheran doctrine.' Editor: Ueberweg's harmony of transubstantiation with idealism turns upon a mere verbal play. Transubstantiation in its own nature denies that esse is percipi. It has an esse which it is impossible percipi by the natural powers. What is perceived is not the esse, and the real esse is entirely unperceived. Berkeley's doctrine is in conflict, also, with the church doctrine of the incarnation and of the resurrection. [89] Miracles of two classes. Berkeley, §84: 'it were an affront to the reader's understanding to resume the explication of it in this place.' Ueberweg : ' The objection, so far as the wine is concerned, is certainly met, in the sense of Berkeley's doctrine and use of words, by what has been said before ; but Berkeley is not entirely justified in assuming that the difficulty in regard to the serpent is equally met, for in the case of the serpent the question involves more than its being perceived in the vicinity of the spectators, and more than the concep- OBJECTS OF SENSE. 377 tion of these persons that the snake is possessed of animation. The question involves the actual animation of the serpent, an animation existing outside of the consciousness of these persons. The change of water into wine involves, according to Berkeley, merely the change of one set of perceptions into another set. But the change of a staff into a serpent involves this also in part, but in addition to this the trans mutation of the staff into the soul of the animal, a soul which is also furnished with perceptions. It is, consequently, a potentiated miracle, whose special features deserved a separate consideration.- A well grounded objection to the Berkeleyan principles is nevertheless just as little to be deduced from this as from the rest of the miracles. In spite of the judgment of some recent writers to the contrary, it must be conceded that these principles are in as good harmony with the mira cles, as they are irreconcilable with a recognition, severely carried through, of the conformity of nature to law.' [go] Objects of Sense. Berkeley, § 86 : ' the one intelligible, or in the mind, the other real and without the mind.' Ueberweg : ' It is worthy of note that Kant applies this very term " intelligible' 1 '' to the "things in themselves, " which exist without the mind of the percipient and thinking subject ; while he holds that the phenomena, which are in our consciousness merely, are to be accepted as the things or objects which are empirically real in us. Those phi losophers, however, who accept a real existence of material things with out the mind, may very well grant that the forms {IbiaC) of them exist representatively (abbildlich) in the mind also, — and this is explicitly taught by the Aristotelians, — but they can only metaphorically give the title objects of sense to those sense-images which they suppose to have an existence in the mind, and to " be immediately perceived. ' ' The use of this expression readily misleads ; and to speak of a twofold existence of the " objects of sense " would be as preposterous (verkehrt) as if I were to call my conception (Vorstellung) of the spirit of Csesar the immediately presented Csesar, and the spirit of Caesar himself the mediately presented Caesar, and should consistently with this speak of a twofold existence of Caesar. The objects of sense exist only extra mentem — without the mind. See Notes 8, 12, 28.' 3/8 A NNO TA TIONS. [gi] Conformity of the Perceived to the Unperceived. Berkeley, § 86 : ' How can it be known that the things which are perceived are conformable (conform) to those which are not perceived, or exist without the mind (Geistes) ?' Ueberweg : ' Berkeley here touches upon a real, though by no means insoluble, difficulty. But, besides this, he need not oppose it in the exclusive manner in which he has here done it, to the represent atives of the views which conflict with his own ; for the same difficulty, though in a narrower compass, also exists if we accept his position, to wit, in so far as the knowledge of other spirits, outside of the mind of the cognizant subject himself, is concerned. In the history of states, of culture, of religions, of the sciences, and similar departments, the main object is the intellectual life of the time antecedent to our own. This life may, in fact, have passed completely outside the conscious ness of the historical investigator, who, as a rule, was not living in the era in which occurred the events with which he desires to make himself familiar. His knowledge is true, or has validity in reference to the reality to be known, so far as it is conformed to that reality. Our historical apprehension of the Homeric religion, of the Platonic phi losophy, or of the Arabian astronomy, is true or has objective reality (or, to speak more accurately, has validity in respect to the reality to be known, which in this case is an intellectual reality) in as far as it is conformed to Homer's mode of religious thought, to Plato's specu lation, to the astronomical conceptions of the Arabians. Here, too, the question arises, How can I know that my knowledge which is in my consciousness is conformed to such (intellectual) objects as are not in my consciousness, but have been in the consciousness of other per sons centuries ago ? But we must not press these questions here, nor in reference to the external things which are without our consciousness, as if they were unanswerable, and as if the theory on which they rest is absurd. They are to be pressed solely for the purpose of finding an answer. The assurance of the harmony of my knowledge with the thing to be known, if this thing lies without my consciousness, can never be reached directly, by comparison, as I can never pass beyond the bounds of my own consciousness ; but I can reach it indirectly, by inferences, which rest upon the presupposition that there is a' causal nexus linking itself in with my consciousness. See Ueberweg, System of Logic, §§ 41-44.' Editor: See additions from Ueberweg's Logic to Note 8. As the question here raised is perhaps on the whole the greatest which arises CONFORMITY OF THE PERCEIVED, ETC. 379 in metaphysical speculation, it may be well worth while to give a synopsis of the entire view of Ueberweg, as presented in his ' System der Logik :' ' 1. Perception is the immediate cognition of things existing in juxta position and in succession. External or sense-perception is directed to the external world ; internal or psychological perception to the psychical life. ' 2. The immediateness of the cognition in perception is, however, always merely relative, since in it there are fused, even with the very activity of the sense, many operations of the mind. These operations, though they do not enter separately into consciousness, conjointly condition the total result. ' 3. Perception (Wahrnehmung) is distinguished from simple sensa tion (Empfmdung) by this, that in sensation consciousness is fixed upon the subjective condition only, while in perception is involved a refer ence to something perceived. This percept, whether it*belongs to the external world or the subject himself, is opposed to the act of percep tion, as in some respect objective. ' 4. Perception is distinguished from thought (Denken) by its rela tive immediateness. Thought may, however, be used with a latitude which makes it embrace perception. '5. To logic, as the doctrine of cognition, belongs the question, Whether in sense-perception (sinnlichen Wahrnehmung) things appear to us as they exist in actziality, that is, as they are in themselves ? To returning an affirmative answer to this question, is opposed, first of all, the sceptical argument that the consonance of Perception with Being would not, even if such a consonance existed, be cognizable ; as the sense-perception can never be compared with its object, but only with another perception. The doubt is confirmed when we reflect upon the essential nature of sense-perception. For as an act of our mind the perception must either be of purely subjective origin, or in any case contain in it a subjective element : on either supposition, the theory that it renders the proper real being of the percept undisturbed and ex haustively can be sustained only by artificial hypotheses, which it is difficult to justify. The character of the phenomenal world is, in any case, conditioned by the subjective nature of our senses. The senses may be differently constructed in other beings, and may, consequently, lead to a different sort of sense7intuition of the world. From all these the actuality as such, as, apart from every particular mode of appre hending it, it is in itself, that is, the " Ding an Sich, " is different. ' 6. Not only can we adjust, on the basis of sense-perception alone, 3 80 A NN OTATIONS. the proportion in which it is conditioned by what is objective, but we cannot even at all cognize the existence of the affecting objects. For, as the perceptions are acts of our own minds, they cannot as such lead us beyond ourselves. The conviction of the existence of external ob jects, which affect us, is grounded on the hypothesis of causal relations, a hypothesis which does not rest upon sense-perception alone. ' 7. The doctrine of the Scotch School (Reid, Beattie, and others), that " Common Sense " reveals immediately the existence of an external world, and the affiliated doctrine of Jacobi, who claims the same power for Feeling or Belief, is a fiction, which dispenses with a scientific foundation. ' 8. Internal or psychological perception, or the immediate cognition of the psychical acts and images, can apprehend, with material truth, its objects as they are in themselves. ' Logik, Dritte AufL, §§ 36-41. Ueberweg's development from this point is given m [8], [92] Substance. Berkeley, § 91 : 'an existence independent of a substance, or sup port (Trager), wherein they may exist.' Ueberweg : 'Berkeley argues as if the difficulty he urges (§ 16) against the notion of substance as a "support " (Trager) of accidents involved exclusively the notion of material substance, and were not of equal and perhaps of higher force against the notion of a spiritual sub stance. Berkeley says rightfully that in regard to spirit he harmonizes with the dominant view of substance as a support (Tragerin) of acci dents ; but he shows neither here nor elsewhere that he rightfully holds fast to this supposition, and that in this respect his argumentatio ex concessis is an argumentatio ex concedendis, that his argument from things conceded is an argument from things that ought to be conceded. ' [g3] Epicureans and Hobbists. Berkeley, § 93 : ' and supposing (voraussetzen) . . . fatal (verhang nissvollen) . . . impulse (Einwirkung) . . . without which your Epicureans, Hobbists, and the like have not even the shadow of a pre tence (Vorwands).' Ueberweg: 'Epicurus (341-270 B.C.), following Democritus, taught that the universe came into being by the concourse of atoms without the co-operation of a Deity. Similar views were taught by Hobbes (1588-1679), who is more generally known by his political absolutism than by his philosophy of nature. He maintains that matter can have sensation and thought. ' ABSTRACTION. 381 [94] Time. Berkeley, § 98 : ' Whenever I attempt to frame a simple idea of time . . . cogitation (Denken).' Ueeerweg : 'According to Aristotle (Phys., IV. ii.), time is the number of movements (of change) in relation to earlier or later. Ac cording to him (Phys., vi. ii.), time and space are equally infinitely divisible. According to the doctrine of Locke (Hum. Und., B. 11., ch. xiv., §§ 3, 5, 17), reflection on the train of ideas, which appear one after another in our minds, is that which furnishes us with the notion of succession ; the distance between any parts of that succession, or between the appearance of any two ideas in our mind, is that we call duration; and duration, set out by certain periods and marked by certain measures or epochs, is time — duration designated by a definite measure. Though the notion of duration has arisen from reflection on the sequence and number of ideas, it is yet applicable to things which exist while we do not think, as the notion of the extension of bodies, though it has been derived from the impressions of sight and touch, can be applied to distances where no body is seen or felt.' [95] Abstraction. Berkeley, § 100 : ' the doctrine of Abstraction has not a little con tributed towards spoiling the most useful parts of knowledge.' Ueberweg: 'The definite demarcation of the groups of conceptions, of which each can be represented by a definite word, by means of com plete and well-arranged specification of the material constituents which come into the consideration of those conceptions, in other words, by means of definition, is an indisputable demand of all scientific reflection. There is great merit in Berkeley's denial, on principle, of the false substantializing of abstracts, and in his own striving to give a complete basis to general notions and judgments in the corresponding concrete conceptions. Yet we cannot approve of his polemic against the effort to form and define the most general notions. In the ethical sphere the expressions of Berkeley are in complete opposition to the Socratic basing of all ethical action on the notional cognition of the ethical. There is a justifiable polemic against a one-sided over-estimate of the notion and of the rule. This polemic has been directed, in the sphere of ethics, against Kantianism, especially by F. H. Jacobi, who, in his polemic, gives prominence to the moral tact, and who lays stress on the ethical right of the individual, as Schleiermacher also does. But this polemic is exposed to the peril of falling into a one-sidedness of 382 A NNO TA TIONS. an opposite kind, when it arrays itself not simply against an over estimate of the general notion, but against the thing itself. Scholastic and sceptical errors are to be overcome by genuine science, not by returning to a pre-scientific position. This latter, however, though it was not Berkeley's design, seems to be a very easy result of the assault which, without the proper restrictions, he makes upon the attempts to define certain very general notions.' [96] Essence. Berkeley, § 102 : 'that everything includes within itself the cause of its properties, or that there is in each object (Dinge) an inward essence (inneres Wesen), which is the source whence its discernible (unterscheidbaren) qualities flow, and whereon they depend. ' Ueberweg : ' This is the view of Aristotle and of the Scholastics, by whom essence (ovaia), that is, the sum of the essential or of that which is involved in the definition, is regarded as the cause of the qualities (jzoid).' [97] Gravitation. Berkeley, § 103: 'and it may as truly (for aught we know) be termed "impulse, " or "protrusion, " as "attraction. "' Ueberweg : ' Undoubtedly Newton himself has left this possibility open ; but the majority of those who adopt his views have found in at traction an essential property of matter. The Cartesians, on the contrary, denied the doctrine of attraction, and endeavoured to ex plain the turning aside of the celestial bodies from a rectilinear course, as also the falling of the terrestrial bodies, on the theory of an impulse imparted by cether. This hypothesis of Descartes was held by French scholars as late as the middle of the eighteenth century, but more and more lost its hold as the conviction grew more general that every por tion of matter in the universe attracts every other, in conformity with the Newtonian law of gravitation [/.<?., with a force proportional directly to the quantity of matter they contain, and inversely to the squares of their distances]. The comets especially, whose course it is impossible to co-ordinate with that of the aether, furnish a powerful argument, in fact, an unanswerable one, for the Newtonian school. There has been a growing tendency to consider attraction as an immanent prop erty of all matter. Yet the mooted question has remained and yet remains undecided, whether there can be an. "actio in distans. " Such an "actio " seems demanded by attraction, yet leaves it incon ceivable, what the former is while it traverses the space intervening between the masses, whether it be a substance or a property. And if GRAVITATION UNIVERSAL. 383 we suppose — as it seems thoroughly necessary we should — that there is a substantial continuity filling all space, within which the corporeal atoms exist, still the question as to the mode of the extension of power or force remains unsolved. Kant's Dynamic, but still more Herbart's doctrine that the approximation rests on modifications of the "internal conditions, " Schiller's comparison of attraction with love, and Schopenhauer's Doctrine of the Will, seem to shed some light on the darkness.' [98] The Fixed Stars. Berkeley, § 106: 'Whereas it is evident the fixed stars have no such tendency towards each other.' Ueberweg : ' That Berkeley is mistaken in this assertion is, in our day, placed beyond all dispute. The error into which he falls was a pardonable one in his day, for astronomy at that time very properly concentrated itself on the investigation of our planetary system, and the question in regard to the movement of the fixed stars had not yet been seriously looked at. In our day the movement of the fixed stars is no longer a matter of doubt. It is known that all the bodies belong ing to the system of our Milky Way move around a common centre of gravitation. Madler maintains that this centre is in or near the Pleia des; but the question is not settled.' [99] Gravitation universal. Berkeley, § 106: 'as in the perpendicular growth of plants, and the elasticity of the air.' Ueberweg: 'These errors also of Berkeley no longer need a con futation. Every part of the growing plant and of the elastic air has gravity. The gravity itself does not cease, though its operation be paralyzed by counter-operations and be transmuted into its counter part. But, throughout, where several forces co-operate with each other, and in part compensate one another, it is impossible, in accord ance with Berkeley's principles, to trace and acknowledge the efficacy of the very laws of nature which clearly reveal themselves in the more simple, uncomplicated cases; for, on Berkeley's principle, the results follow the immediate operation of God. ' These laws appear as if they were not of universal validity, though they really are so, and only seem to yield to other laws, to which we can, therefore, ascribe no more than a very limited validity. The principle of Berkeley, as we again see, though it may be harmonized with a sort of general recognition of the laws of nature as rules of the 3 84 A NN0 TA TIONS. divine activity, cannot be brought to unison with an acknowledgment of the laws of nature, scientifically carried through.' [ioo] The Practical. Berkeley, § 109 : ' God's glory, and the sustentation and comfort of ourselves and fellow-creatures.' Ueberweg : ' If Berkeley's advice were acted on, the result would be a zealous striving after material good, and a comfortable enjoyment of life on work-days, and a striving equally zealous, on Sundays and church-festivals, after heavenly blessedness. Another result would be a theology in correspondence with these practical tendencies, and with both we should have the sort of science and art which is wont to fall very short in the striving after the true and the beautiful without regard to subordinate aims, either mundane or supramundane. Though this result is not that at which Berkeley aims, yet in this way what he here recommends does in fact most commonly take shape.' Editor : Berkeley's advice, interpreted by his intellectual and prac tical life, hardly justifies Ueberweg' s stricture. [101] Newton. Berkeley, §110: 'The best key for the aforesaid analogy or natural Science will be easily acknowledged to be a certain celebrated Treatise of Mechanics. ' Ueberweg : ' In § 114 Berkeley gives the full title of this Treatise. It is Newton's Philosophise Naturalis Principia Mathematica, first pub lished 1687. The distinctions which Berkeley here cites and contro verts are presented in the Scholion to the Eighth Definition in the Introduction to his Principia (edit, of 1687, p. 5, seq.).' [102] Motion Absolute and Relative. Berkeley, § in : 'Absolute Motion is said to be the translation of a body from absolute place to absolute place, as relative motion is from one relative place to another.' Ueberweg: 'According to this, in the figure given in Note 54 a movement in the external object AB would be an absolute movement, a movement of the image a'b' among the other images in the space of consciousness would be a relative movement. Yet this determination is not exactly correct, inasmuch as the movement of the external object AB may be referred in part to absolute space, in part to particular ex ternal objects. This latter relation, also, is not merely brought into consideration by us, but is grounded in the real co-operation of the NUMBERS. 385 powers of nature itself. Thus, for example, the double motion of the moon, the one motion around the earth, the other, with the earth, around the sun, is the result of a twofold attraction, an attraction to the earth and an attraction to the sun. Our subjective relative notions in general rest upon objective relations : for example, the subjective relative notion of number rests upon the objectively real existence, one with another, of individual things with like natures; the sub jective relative notion embodied in the word "and " rests upon an objective connection; and so in other cases.' [103] Movement. Berkeley, § 114 : ' For the water in the vessel at that time wherein it is said to have the greatest relative circular motion has, I think, no motion at all.' Ueberweg : ' The water is supposed to be in a vessel which is attached to a cord and suddenly whirled round. The water is gradually drawn into the movement of the vessel. — If Berkeley's theory be correct, that in every movement the power of God operates directly, or without "secondary causes, " it is not very clear what is meant by saying that God directs his power, not to our ideas of the heavens, but to our ideas of the earth, and in our apprehension of what seems to be offered to the senses there may be an error in this direction.' [104] Numbers. Berkeley, § 119 : 'so far as they are not subservient to practice, and promote the benefit of life.' Ueberweg: 'This utilitarian view of Berkeley's, like various others which he expresses in depreciation of the pure mathematics, reminds us greatly of Bacon of Verulam. We may regard it as an illustration of what was said in Note 100. There have been various fantastic specula tions in numbers, which rest upon a spurious attributing of substantial character to the results of abstraction. There have been mystic dream ings, such as the definition which Xenocrates, the Platonist, gives of the soul, that "it is a self-moving number, " or the Pythagorean defi nition of rectitude as a square number. But Berkeley makes a mistake in placing in a line with these fancies the serious, strictly scientific theory of numbers. We admit that this theory is not directly "sub servient to practice, " and that it rests on very broad and compre hensive abstractions. But these abstractions are of the class which are scientifically justifiable ; they are abstractions which concentrate the 25 386 A NNO TA TIO NS. observation on particular aspects of the total object, and do not involve the vice of a false substantializing of that which is viewed abstractly.' [105] Number. Berkeley, § 122 : 'or reasonings and controversies purely verbal.' Ueberweg : ' It would be far more correct than this to compare the theory of numbers with the investigation of the laws of language. That which in a certain respect is a sign may yet have in it a certain con formity with law, which makes it worth while to estimate it, not as a mere auxiliary, but as itself an object of investigation.' [106] Extension. Berkeley, § 124: ' If by finite extension be meant something dis tinct from a finite idea, I declare I do not know what that is, and so cannot affirm or deny anything of it.' Ueberweg : ' Though Berkeley cannot, from his point of view, accept any extension subsisting outside of the mind, yet this, as has been shown, by no means proves that the supposition he rejects is false. In extension in itself there is no minimum. In our subjective perception as such there are minima, the minutest separations, in which two tactual impressions on the end of the finger, the back of the hand, the tip of the tongue, the lips, and other parts of the body, two exci tations of the retina, the distance of which from each other is con ditioned by the visual angle, call forth two separate or distinguishable sensations. 'As, however, any external object, say, for example, an inch line drawn on paper, at different degrees of closeness, and especially when we call the microscope to our aid, allows us to see a different number of parts, restricted in fact to no precise limits, it follows that we cannot fix any minutest perceptible part of an object, — at least any minutest part perceptible by sight. The microscope shows us even the ten thousandth part of an inch.' [107] Sum and Members of a Series. Berkeley, § 124: 'to say a finite quantity or extension consists of parts infinite in number, is so manifest and glaring a contradiction that every one at first sight acknowledges it to be so.' Ueberweg: 'Berkeley has simply asserted this "contradiction; " he has not proved it. A contradiction is the affirmation and denial of the same thing. It would be a contradiction to call the sum of a series both finite and infinite, or to call at the same time the number THE CALCULUS. 387 of the members of that series both finite and infinite ; but to call the sitm finite and the number of the members infinite is not a contradiction, either on the supposition that the magnitude of the collective members is an infinitely little one, or that the magnitude of the individual mem bers diminishes, in a definite manner, infinitely. Locke, however (Hum. Und., ir. xxiii. 31), holds that "the divisibility in infinitum of any finite extension involves us, whether we grant or deny it, in consequences impossible to be explicated or made in our apprehensions consistent. " ' [108] A posteriori. Berkeley, § 129 : ' it is held that proofs a posteriori are not to be admitted against propositions relating to infinity.' Ueberweg : ' Berkeley here uses the term " proofs a posteriori " in the good old sense — proofs which are drawn from the effects (the uarepov <puau, natura posterius). He knew nothing of the Kantian abuse of terms, in which a priori implies an independence of what is empirically given, an independence which has in fact no existence whatever, and, in harmony with that definition, makes a posteriori completely synony mous with empirical.' [103] The Calculus. Berkeley, § 130 : 'Of late the speculations about infinites have run so high.' Ueberweg : ' Especially after Newton had discovered the method of computation by fluxions. With this method essentially coincides the differential and integral calculus, brought forward by Leibnitz soon after, and in fact before Newton had made his own discovery public. Both come together under the notion of the "infinitesimal calculus. " The difference is only in form ; but the notation and mode of operation presented by Leibnitz must be acknowledged to be preferable. New ton began in 1665 to develop the "Arithmetic of Fluxions, " and up to 1672 had communicated it to particular friends, rather, however, by way of hints than of complete statement. He first presented it to the world in his Principia Philosophise Naturalis, 1687. Leibnitz, perhaps not entirely without some knowledge of Newton's hints, sustained, however, by his own earlier investigations of series, had, with at least a relative independence, reached the new calculus in 1676, and first gave it to the public in the "Acta Eruditorum, " 1684.' 388 A NNO TA TIONS. [no] Infinitesimals. Berkeley, § 130 : ' thinking it with good reason absurd to imagine there is any positive quantity or part of extension which, though multi plied infinitely, can never equal the smallest given extension.' Ueberweg : 'Not "with good reason, " but simply because of a pure misunderstanding of the notion of infinitesimal quantities, this idea of Berkeley's has been maintained by some. Such a misunder standing is only possible when the representatives of the opposite view foster the error that the infinitesimal can be a fixed quantity. By an "infinitesimal " is not to be understood a fixed quantity, but a quan tity which, by a fixed law, takes diverse values which have zero as the ultimate value. The ultimate value is that value which a variable quantity constantly approximates without ever reaching it, and so that the distance from it may be less than any particular fixed quantity you may name. In a series which has zero as the final value it must con sequently always be, name what fixed quantity you please, that a mem ber can be found which, in common also with all that follow it, is less than that fixed quantity named. Thus, the infinite quantity in the mathematical sense — or the reciprocal value of an infinitesimal — is not a fixed quantity, but one which in accordance with the series takes diverse values, and may because of that fact be greater than any fixed quantity which can be named. ' Two quantities which are infinitely small or infinitely large may be compared with one another by comparing with one another the corresponding members of the two series, from which arises a series of relations. The ultimate value of this series makes the relation of the one infinitely little or infinitely great quantity to the other. ' The augmentation of a quantity simply by infinitesimals is continu ous. The series in which a single infinitesimal is represented need by no means, however, consist of members which differ from one another simply by infinitesimals, yet.it can become continuous by the unlimited insertion of members. ' Let, for example, the first series be as follows : < 1 1 1 1 2» 4' ~B> 16' * * * ' Let the other series be the following : < A _9_ 17. 33 4' 16' 64' 256' * * * ' These series are so formed that the common member of the first is 1 l , r , 1 ■ 2 J 2 n +I-fl — , the common member of the second is — + — = . 2 n 2 n 2 2n 2 zn INF IN I TESIMA LS. 3 89 1 If we call the first infinitesimal a, the second is = 2a + <?• On the dependence of n rests the association of the members. 'If we now compare with one another the corresponding members of both series, we obtain the series of relations : .1 oi 2 1 '8' z 16> 2i, 2i I 2 n -}- I + I whose common member is 2 -i- — = . Now, the members 2 n 2 n of the third series have an ultimate value, which they approximate be yond every difference however minute, yet without ever wholly reach ing it. This ultimate value is = 2, because the ultimate value of the fraction yet to be added to 2 (which fraction coincides with a, as given before) is = o. The ultimate value 2 is not the relation of any two members to one another. If we should consider it as the relation of the last members, or of the members in process of vanishing, we should involve ourselves in a contradiction, for there are no last or vanishing members. As long as we remain within the first two series, and com pare two corresponding members with each other, the relation is not = 2, but >■ 2 ; but if we go beyond to the ultimate values of the first two series, both of these are = o, their relation to one another is con sequently = -§-, which, again, is not = 2, but is something wholly in determinate. But we are involved in no contradiction if we seek neither a relation of the last members, nor a relation of the ultimate values, but the ultimate value of the relation of the entire members. This answers for all applications, as in them we have also to do with ultimate values. Thus, for example, the tangent has the position to which, as the ultimate position, the chords protracted from the point of contact, constantly, by continuous diminution, approximate, beyond every angular difference however minute. As upon both sides, in the arithmetical consideration and in the geometrical application, the ulti mate values are regarded, an absolutely accurate result may be attained ; the mistake would be to identify an ultimate value with one member of the series. ' It may, however, happen that the members of the series of relation itself increase or diminish infinitely. In this case the one infinitesimal is considered as an infinitely small portion of the other, that is, as an infinitesimal of the second order. If, for example, we take the first series we have given, and make the second \, y^, -^-j, ^ii "' • • • ( or » make the first quantity = a, the second = a 2 ), the series of relation is identical with the first series, and consequently diminishes infinitely; the quantity therefore which runs through the values in the second 390 ANNOTATIONS. series is an infinitesimal of the second order. With this determination of the notion, which coincides with that of Eisenstein, R. Hoppe, and others, all the contradictions which Berkeley and others have urged against the doctrine of Infinitesimals fall away. They are contradic tions, which in fact have no existence, unless the infinite be regarded as & fixed quantity.' Editor: Playfair (Prel. Dissert., Enc. Brit., 650) says of the Con troversy on Fluxions, ' Though the defenders of the calculus had the advantage, it must be acknowledged that they did not always argue the matter quite fairly, nor exactly meet the reasoning of their adversary. The true answer to Berkeley was that what he conceived to be an acci dental compensation of errors was not at all accidental, but that the two sets of quantities that seemed to him neglected in the reasoning were in all cases njecessarily equal, and an exact balance for one an other. ... If the author of the Analyst has had the misfortune to enroll his name on the side of error, he has also had the credit of pro posing difficulties of which the complete solution is only to be derived from the highest improvements of the calculus.' [111] Immortality of the Soul. Berkeley, § 140 : - The natural immortality of the soul is a neces sary consequence of the foregoing doctrine.' Ueberweg : ' The soul consequently has not merely an immortality conferred on it by the grace of God, as Justin and some others of the early fathers maintained in express opposition to Platonism. At a later period, mainly through the mighty influence of Augustine, the Platonic doctrine of the natural immortality of the soul, an immortality grounded in its very essence, became the predominating doctrine of the Christian Church.' Editor: On hardly any point did Christianity find a completer chaos of human thought than on the doctrine of the future state. The confusion yielded very slowly. [112] Opinion and Character. Berkeley, § 141: 'And this notion (Vorstellung) has been greedily embraced and cherished by the worst part of mankind, as the most effectual antidote against all impressions of virtue and religion.' Ueberweg : ' This position of Berkeley involves a support of the argument by the moral degradation of the opponent. Its confirmation in experience is not without exceptions. There has been faith in im- HOW CAN MIND COMMUNICA TE WITH MIND? 391 mortality which has not been conditioned by character, and character not conditioned by this faith.' Editor : Berkeley simply speaks of a class, and, thus qualified, his remark is true. Opinion is not the sole shaper of the external life, but it is the mightiest of moral forces ; but it often requires a long time and a multitude of examples to determine what is the influence of opinions. Centuries of experience have left some questions of this class still in doubt. [113] Sundering of the Faculties. Berkeley, § 143: 'Men have imagined (sich vorgestellt) they could frame abstract notions (Begriffe) of the powers and acts of the mind, and consider them prescinded (abgelost) as well from the mind (Seele) or spirit (Geiste) itself, as from their respective (beziiglichen) objects and effects (Wirkungen).' Ueberweg : ' This attack of Berkeley's on the abstractive sundering or hypostasizing of the "faculties of the soul " has great merit ; it would require, however, to be carried much farther to lead to the results which long after followed upon Herbart's resumption of it.' [114] How can Mind communicate with Mind? Berkeley, § 145 : 'I perceive (nehme . . . wahr) several motions, changes, and combinations of ideas, that inform (bekunden) me there are certain particular agents (bestimmte einzelne thatige Wesen) like myself, which accompany them and concur (Theil haben) in their pro duction (Hervorbringung).' Ueberweg : ' How this concurrence (Antheil) is to be conceived of, is obscure. The concurrence of the mind in the evoking of its own ideas has been defined by Berkeley, § 28-30; but how, in any ordinary manner, can my mind operate on other minds, or in any way whatever concur in their operation ? According to the doctrine of Berkeley I cannot evoke thoughts in others immediately, but only by means of my own "ideas. " My "ideas, " however, and their changes, as, for example, in the complex of ideas which I call my body, can, according to this very doctrine, produce no operations in another person, nor evoke ideas in him. How do the complexes of ideas in different persons come into relation to one another? The answer " by the will of God " of course helps out in every case ; but a cogni zable order of nature falls before such a view. Without the supposition of a connection conformed to the laws of nature, I can only infer the existence of God, not the existence of finite beings beside myself. On 392 A NN O TA TIONS. the supposition of this connection, however, words, writing, and other signs can only be the means of producing a relation between different thinking beings, in as far as they are not mere ideas, but are changes in certain objects existing in themselves ; on which objects the one mind produces operations, and these thereby modified operate in their way on the mind of the other person.' [Ueberweg has alluded to this argument against Berkeleyanism in his Sketch of the History of Philosophy, vol. iii., 2d edit., Berlin, 1868, p. 331: ' the relations between thinking beings must be mediated by real unthinking beings.'] He has developed the argument in the Zeitschrift fur Philosophic, Ed. 54, Heft 2. Halle, 1869. [115] Berkeley and Malebranche. Berkeley, § 148: 'Not that I imagine (stelle mir. . . vor) we see God (as some will have it) by a direct and immediate view, or see cor poreal things, not by themselves, but by seeing that which represents them in the essence of God, which doctrine is, I must confess, to me incomprehensible. ' Ueberweg : ' The doctrine referred to is that of the Cartesian, Malebranche (1638-1715), that we see all things in God. Berkeley expresses himself more at large on this point in his " Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, " a little before the middle of the Second Dia logue (Works, Fraser, i. 308). Berkeley does not say, as Malebranche does, that we see the things by perceiving that by which they are represented in the infinite substance of the Godhead, but only that the things which we perceive, that is, our ideas, are known in virtue of the will of an infinite Spirit. According to Berkeley, our ideas, which are purely passive, cannot be like the divine substance, which is wholly active, nor even like a part of this substance, which is wholly indivisible. In the system of Malebranche, moreover, the existence of a material universe, whose "perfections " are embraced in the spiritual essence of the Godhead, is accepted in a completely purposeless way, and involves Malebranche's theory in all the contradictions to it, which are derived from the supposition that material things exist out side the mind.' [116] Providence. Berkeley, § 154: 'Little and unreflecting souls may indeed bur lesque the works of Providence.' Ueberweg : £ But not as such. Berkeley from his own point of view, not that of the supposed antagonist, regards the phenomena in question CONSCIOUSNESS DEFINED. 393 as the works of Providence. If he did take that view, he would involve himself in gross self-contradiction; as he does not, it would greatly aid in establishing his own view if he would enter thoroughly into the antag onistic position to evince its untenableness. It is admitted that among modern thinkers this has been done most thoroughly by Leibnitz (1646-17 1 6). In his Theodicee, which appeared in the same year as Berkeley's Principles (17 10), he examines the problems here touched upon.' [117] General Recognition of the Basis of Idealism. Definitions of Consciousness. Definitions of Realism. Editor : It is an element of strength in Idealism that beyond other systems it seems at least to have these elements : 1. It sharply defines consciousness ; 2. It separates the primary and unmistakable acts of consciousness from the inferences made from those acts; 3. It maintains the absolute infallibility of consciousness; 4. It denies, or puts on a lower plane of evidence, whatever is not thus infallibly testified to. That its position here is a strong one will be apparent from the definitions generally given of Consciousness. 'Consciousness is the perception of what passes in a man's own mind.' x ' To the mind is attributed apperception, as it is conscious to itself of its own perception. Leibnitz uses the term apperception, as synony mous with consciousness in the writings of Descartes.' 2 Consciousness, self-consciousness ; Apperceptio (Leibnitz), Consci entia (Descartes) ; Bewusstseyn, Selbstbewusstseyn ; perception, con science, sentiment interieur. This word is used by' Kant in two senses: 1 . It means consciousness of self, that is, the simple conception of the Ego. When a subject capable of conceptions has conceptions, there is constantly linked with them the further conception that it (the subject) has them. The second conception, that I, the concipient subject, have these conceptions, is called consciousness of myself, or apperception. 2. Kant understands by the term ihefacutty (Vermogen) of conscious ness the faculty of accompanying the conception with the conception of the Ego. 3 ' Those changes in the mind by which it is made possible to it to conceive things external to itself are called in the Leibnitzo-Wolfian system perceptions. If with these is united the consciousness of self, 1 Locke, Hum. Und., II., i. 19. 2 Wolff, Psychol. Empir., $ 25 (1732), Verona, 1779. 3 Mellin, Worterbuch d. kritischen Philosophic, 1797. 394 ANN OTA TIONS. as well as of the things perceived, we have apperception. ' ' Conscious ness is that condition in which we distinguish from each other, and from ourselves, the conceptions of things as changes in us, and with them their objects. ' J Stewart : ' Consciousness denotes the immediate knowledge which the mind has of its sensations and thoughts, and, in general, of all its present operations.' 2 Krug : ' Consciousness is knowledge of being, an immediate linking of both.' 3 Reid : ' Consciousness is . . . used ... to signify that immediate knowledge which we have of our present thoughts and purposes, and, in general, of all the present operations of our minds.' 4 Hamilton: 'This knowing that I know or desire or feel, this common condition of self-knowledge, is . . . consciousness.' ' Consciousness is . . . the recognition by the mind or Ego of its acts and affections.' Regis : 'We obtain this knowledge [of our own minds] by a simple and internal intimation, which precedes all acquired knowledge, and which I call consciousness {conscience).' ' 5 Brown : ' Consciousness ... is only a general term for all our feel ings, of whatever species these may be, — sensations, thoughts, desires; in short, all those states or affections of mind in which the phenomena of mind consist.' 6 Porter : ' Consciousness is . . . the power by which the soul knows its own acts and states.' 7 ' Consciousness is the term applied to the internal perception of that which is presented and takes place in us as determination of the mental life.' 8 Fraser: 'By being conscious I mean knowing phenomena, whether extended or unextended, which are immediately and actually present to the conscious mind, — with all the conditions or relations implied in this.' 9 Morell : 'Locke's fundamental principle that all our knowledge consists in ideas as the immediate objects of consciousness (is) a principle 1 Lossius, Real-Lexicon, 1803. a Dugald Stewart, Outlines of Moral Philosophy, 1793, 1801. Works (Hamilton), 1854, i. 13- 3 Krug, Handwort, 1832. 4 Reid, Int. Powers, Ess. I. 5 Syst. de la Philosoph., quoted by Blakey, Hist, of Philos., ii. 297. 6 Philos. of Human Mind., Lect. XL 7 Human Intellect, New York, 1869, 83. 8 Brockhaus, Convers. Lex., Elft. AufL, 1864, iii. 189. 9 Life and Letters of Berkeley, Works, iv. 389. CONSCIOUSNESS DEFINED. 395 which had never been questioned from the time when it was asserted by Plato and Aristotle to the time when it was put into so clear a light by the great author of the "Essay on the Human Understanding. " " To this may be added that few out of the entire body of metaphysicians have doubted it since. It may be useful to have some of the definitions of Realism before us. (For definitions of Idealism, see Prolegomena, VII.) ' Realism as opposed to Idealism is the dogmatic affirmation that the things in themselves are as we perceive them in our conception.' 2 'The reality of mind and the reality of matter, — Natural Realism.' 'A scheme which endeavours, on the one hand, not to give up the reality of an unknown material universe, and, on the other, to explain the 'ideal illusion of its cognition, may be called the doctrine of . . . Hypothetic Realism.' 3 ' Realism has different meanings, according to the different antitheses which it involves. In antithesis to Idealism it is the system which maintains that the existent, that which constitutes the foundation of the phenomena, is independent of the thinking subject, and of thought in general.' 4 ' Realism, as opposed to Idealism, is the doctrine that in perception there is an immediate or intuitive cognition of the external object, while, according to Idealism, our knowledge of an external world is mediate and representative, i.e. by means of ideas.' 5 'Realism, . . . the system which maintains that what is exists external to and independently of the concipient subject.' 6 'Realism, the philosophical doctrine which ascribes to external things an actual being independent of our conceptions.' 7 The reader can hardly fail to be struck at some of the approximating points of the definitions of Idealism and Realism, with the illustrations of Iordano Bruno's principle of the 'Coincidence of Opposites.' He can understand how some thinkers have hesitated between the two, how some have defended the one system on the principles of the other, how some have passed from one to the other, how some have declared for both, and some have refused either, and some again are claimed on both sides, and some have left their relations to the two theories wholly insoluble. 1 Historical and Critical View of the Speculative Philosophy of Europe in the Nineteenth Century, New York, 1851. 2 Lossius, Real-Lexicon : Realisrnus. 3 Hamilton, Reid's Works, 748, 749. 4 Pierer, Realisrnus. 5 Fleming, Vocabulary, — edited by C. P. Krauth, Philad., Smith, English & Co., 1S60. 6 Brockhaus, Convers. Lex. : Realisrnus. 7 Heyse, Fremdworterbuch, 12th ed., 1859. 396 A NNO TA TIONS. Hamann said that ' only the scholastic reason separates Idealism and Realism, — genuine philosophy knows nothing of such a separation.' The point at which the modern tendencies divided is, according to Erdmann, a point at which philosophy was neither Realism nor Ideal ism. The attempt to prove the existence of the things of sense, says Jacobi, leads to the denial of them, — that is, to Idealism. The most that can be reached in that way is an empty thing of the understanding, a non-entity, — chaos, in fact. He says that Kant's position was that of a chameleon shifting between the hues of Idealism and Realism ; had he been consistent with his position that the transcendental object is but an x, an unknown quantity posited by consciousness, he would have been an idealist. Fichte was the true Messiah of speculation, Kant was no more than its John the Baptist, Reinhold its Nathariael. There are only two logical systems, the Material-Idealism of Spinoza, or the inverted Spinozism, the Ideal-Materialism of the moderns, especially of Fichte. All this connects itself with what Hamilton calls 'the startling' 'general approximation of thorough-going Realism and thorough-going Idealism. ' * It is hoped, however, that the definitions will at the same time be an aid to the reader in determining the precise question involved in these controverted cases. [118J Idealism — what is not and what is its Question. Editor : Consciousness in its direct attestation, according to the general judgment of thinkers of all schools, absolutely demonstrates no more than the mind's own states or acts. (See [117].) It cannot then directly attest the external causes of those acts or states. The proof of the external world, in every philosophy, on this basis, is therefore an inference from the facts of consciousness proper. The inference may be justified, may be regarded as necessary and intuitive, but it is an inference, and is not, in any case, in the precise grade of certainty that the act of consciousness itself is. When Sir William Hamilton says that the object non-Ego is given in consciousness, he can only with propriety mean that it is logically or mediately given, or necessarily involved logically in the consciousness of the Ego : it is given in the idea of consciousness, not in its act : it is implied, not expressed. In other words, Ego and non-Ego are intuitional logical correlates in consciousness. Both, as more than empirical, are involved in the 1 See Prolegomena, V. 20. IDEALISM— ITS QUESTION. 397 inferences of a Logic which is intuitional, or, at least, ^indistinguishable from the intuitional. But the Ego is no more conscious of itself in consciousness than the eye sees itself va. seeing. Self-consciousness, as the consciousness of intellectual acts and states, is directly and infalli bly known ; but if it means that we have consciousness of a self apart from acts and states, or distinct from the acts and states while it is in them, it is not true that we have .sr^-consciousness. Consciousness itself is a specifically conditioned state ; and to know ourselves apart from or distinct from a conditioned state would imply two absurdities : one, that mind, as known, is unconscious ; the other, that the mind knowing, which in this case is the same mind which is known, is unconscious. Furthermore, unconsciousness itself is a state. To be conscious of absolute self is a contradiction in terms. To be conscious of self in its states and acts, or through its states and acts, is to be conscious of the acts and states, that is, to have an immediate cognition of them, while our judgment of the essence or substance acted upon and acting is mediate. We can make a dialectic separation of a mind ( from its states, but there can be no real separation. And in the dia lectic separation there would be left to the mind nothing but dialectic being. So far as conceivable reality is concerned, its being would be equivalent to non-being. There is no absolute to man's cognition. He does not knozv substance, either matter or spirit. The Ego itself we know then only in and by its acts and states, not apart from them. Mental acts and states are alone the objects of immediate or strictly philosophical cognition.' The real primary question hinges on this point only. The sole and consequently infallible utterance of con sciousness is on the mind's own states and acts. Out of the facts thus testified to, and acknowledged in general, alike by every school of philosophy, everything else is to be built up. On this general ground, the ground of the phenomenal facts, there is no controversy whatever between Berkeley and the extremest of his opposers. That the thing to which consciousness testifies, as the act of putting the finger into the fire, is followed by what consciousness testifies to as the sensation of pain, is as certain on Berkeley's view as on Locke's and Reid's. The world of the phenomenal, both as regards causes and effects, is left untouched by Idealism. Body and spirit remain phenomenally as dis tinct as ever ; our fellow-men stand in every phenomenal relation as before. Our own bodies are known as they were known before. The divergence belongs to the sphere of the supersensuous. The question is, What is that something to which consciousness does not immediately testify, which is the cause on which are conditioned those mental acts 398 A NNO TA TIONS. or states to which consciousness does immediately testify by being their inseparable condition ? There are then two distinct questions. The first is,— What is it to which consciousness immediately testifies ? The second question is, — What is involved mediately in that testimony ? There is a question of testimony and a question of judgment. On the first question, Idealism, as we have seen, accepts the com mon answer of philosophy, past and present, — the mind is conscious not of what is not in it, but of what is in it, and nothing can be in it but its own acts and states. Nothing is known immediately but what is known to consciousness, and whatever is known to consciousness is known immediately. The worlds of immediate knowledge and of consciousness are conterminal; each is in each. The mental state associated with the sense-perception of a tree is immediately known, because there is no medium between the state and the consciousness, — the mental state is consciousness itself. The tree itself is mediately known, if it be known at all ; though Idealism and other schools of thought concur in the principle that mediate knowledge is no knowledge. The tree is known through a medium, or rather through a series of media, terminating in the final excitant of the perceptive act, which excitant may be called the medium of the media. Nearly all thinkers agree that there is no consciousness of this excitant ; we only know the state which results from it. Sir William Hamilton's 'Natural Realism' assumes that there is a consciousness of it, — it is the only non-Ego of which we are conscious; but as the great non-Ego, the external empirical world, is as clearly external to our bodies as it is to our minds, Sir William defies the 'common sense' to which he appeals. Nor would the race be better satisfied with a universe which is confined to Sir William's optic nerve, or to his thalami, than with one which would be shut up in his mind. At the risk of being thought a blasphemer by some of Sir William's admirers, we are com pelled to confess that his 'Natural Realism' seems to us virtually a restoration of the clumsy and exploded theory of 'a representative entity present to the mind.' The hypothesis on which the Scotch school combated Idealism had reached a point at which ' there is no escape from confession but in suicide;' and Hamilton's Natural Realism is the proof that 'suicide is confession.' But neither on the ordinary view, nor on Hamilton's, can the mind be. conscious of the tree. On either theory it can only be conscious of a state, for which it supposes, or does not suppose, the existence of a material, substantial tree, external to the mind and the body, as a IDEALISM— ITS QUESTION. 399 necessary cause ; for the state itself and the act of reference of that state, or the refusal to refer, are both in itself. It cannot indeed shake off the empirical reference. The world of an idealist's experience is precisely that of every other man. He sees a tree as a Materialist sees it. Fichte, born idealist as he was, acknowledges that Idealism cannot be a way of thinking, — can only be speculation, though he none the less held that it was the veritable truth in speculation. It is the specu lative reference on which the question hinges. It is time thrown away, therefore, to attempt to settle the question with an idealist by the mere urging of the empirical phenomena as in themselves decisive. As empirical, Nature puts them more emphatically than Beattie and Reid can put them. No idealist ever, in this respect, doubted them, or could doubt them, or pretended to doubt them, and no realist ever felt himself in any degree strengthened by an argument at this point. So far as the direct reaching of the empirical facts is concerned, nearly all philosophy is idealistic, and hence going so far only does not constitute what is pre-eminently and by antithesis Idealism. It is simply generic, not specific, Idealism. Generic Idealism has been the predominant viewof thinkers in all ages. Specific Idealism has by no means shared so largely in the philosophic confidence. When we come, therefore, to the second question, we come to the dividing point. The phenomenal or empirical being conceded, the great facts being, in general estimation, beyond dispute, how are we to account for them ? Through the whole range of the perceptive acts of all educated consciousness there rises a phenomenal external world, whose normal features are generically the same to the masses of men of all lands and of all time. How are we to account for that phenomenal world ? The first answer is, The phenomenal, empirical, external world involves, as its concause, the existence of a real, substantial, material world, which is brought into mediated relations to the mind through the organs of sense, or by the act of God to which they furnish occa sion, or by a pre-established harmony, or in some unknown way. The world is substantially real, the mind is substantially real ; phenomena are the results, in some sense, of the existence of both. This is the answer of Realism. [117.] The second answer is, either : The phenomenal world involves no more than the existence of mind, real, substantial spirit, which, by the action of another mind or other minds on it, or by the laws of its own self-originated conditions, attains its various states and acts ; or, That world involves no more than ideas, conscious states and acts,— 400 A NN 0TATI0 NS. the question, What is conscious? being thrown out, as beyond the reach of knowledge. The systems involved in these answers, and pre eminently the second (and, if logic be laid to the line, only the second), are Idealism. But as the generally received Realism of philosophy is idealistic in the recognition of the first principles of human knowledge, so a great deal of Idealism, and especially that of Berkeley and his school, has been realistic, in acknowledging real spirit, and in real spirits real phenomena (that is, phenomena objectively produced, by object-spirit, not by the subject-mind). It is not true that Berkeley maintains that all is mere 'show,' or 'illusion,' or 'idea.' In Berkeley's view neither that which receives nor that which imparts ideas is an idea. Both the giver and the recipient are substantial realities, and the 'ideas' themselves, either directly or by succession, spring from God. They are not illusions, but divine verities. The objection is not that they are incredibly unreal, but that they are incredibly real ; they are not revelations through media, but revelations direct. In an overwhelming sense, in Berkeley's view of man, 'the inspiration of the Almighty giveth him understanding.' The theophany of nature is one in which God speaks to man face to face. Berkeley's world is one in which a Peniel is never far off. Our realities are indeed subjective, for they are ours; but our subjectivities are realities, for their cause, their objective base, is a substantial personal God. In this aspect Berkeley claimed to be the true realist, — his opponents were charged with unrealism. The philosophical division between the generally accepted Realism and the various forms of Idealism turns entirely upon the answers given to the second question. There is an unmixed Realism which acknowledges nothing but the objectively real, and makes the seemingly subjective real no more than a phenomenon of the objective. There is an absolute subjective Idealism which acknowledges nothing but the idea, and makes the seemingly real in both matter and mind mere conditional ideas. But the mass of philosophers are idealistic realists, holding to direct consciousness of the idea alone, but regarding the realistic inference as valid. On the other hand, Berkeley is a realistic idealist; holding that the realistic inference is invalid as regards matter, but conceding it as regards mind. He holds to real substantial spirits, God and man. Hence, too, his monism is only generic. He holds to a monism of genus, — to spirit alone ; but he concedes a dualism of species, — infinite Spirit, the Cause of ideas, and finite spirits, the recipients of them. But this his strength is also his weakness. Every MIND AND MATTER. 40 1 moral advantage of his Idealism over its successors is secured at the expense of its development and of its logical consistency. [119] Mind and Matter. Spirit and Body. Editor : No Physics can ever be worthy of its name which excludes Metaphysics ; no Metaphysics is entitled to attention which does not accept and attempt to harmonize the facts of Physics. Both by the law of its genesis, and of its intellectual supremacy, Tfcfetephysics must be after Physics, and Physics has no intellectual value except as it prepares the path and the materials for Metaphysics. Metaphysics is after Physics, but Mind is before both, and by Mind both consist. The great weakness of psychology has been that it has not done justice to the personal unity of man. Receding, as it ought, from the monism which annihilates either mind or matter, spirit or body, it has run into the dualism which hopelessly antagonizes them. Man is a unit, beyond* all the ordinary concessions of his unity. Up to the last point at which human philosophy can trace him he is an inseparable unity. When the bond of that unity is broken, philosophy knows him no more. He has passed out of the world whose best souls can only love wisdom, to that world whose pure intelligences possess it. Philosophy must not be a philosophy of mind apart ; she must not emphasize the and, and be a philosophy of mind and body, but, taking what God offers her, become a philosophy of man. Except as man she knows not soul ; except as man she knows not the human body, for when matter is severed from the knitting soul which made it body, it no longer is for her ; philosophy surrenders it to the dissecting-table or the grave. No theory of the body of man is worthy of attention which does not acknowledge the soul as the controlling force of the body. No theory of the soul, as we know the soul in philosophy, is entitled to respect, which ignores or diminishes the reality of the personal union into which it has taken the body with itself, — a union the most consummate and absolute of which we know, or of which we can conceive, infinitely transcending the completeness of the most perfect mechanical and chemical unions, — a union so complete that, though two distinct substances are involved in it, it makes them, through a wide range of observations, as completely one to us as if they were one substance ; so that we can say the human body does nothing proper to it without the soul, the human soul does nothing proper to it without the body. As the soul operates through the body, the body operates by the soul. The soul cannot perform the most exquisite act of abstract thinking without a co-operation of the body which can be distinctly demon- 26 402 A NNO TA TIONS. strated, and the most involuntary and trifling acts distinctive of the body involve and demonstrate the presence of the soul. So much is this the case that, if the body gave no other evidence of the presence of the soul than the distinctive tremulousness of the smallest muscle, or the slightest conceivable act involving true muscular movement, it would constitute ample evidence that the soul was still there. The best modern science accepts, practically at least, these principles. The extremest spiritualist in philosophy, though he may talk the old jargon which treats the body as, if not a prison, at least a mere mechanical and chemical appendage of the soul, cannot think or write without showing the extravagance and hollowness of his view. To nothing does the common, as well as the educated, consciousness more positively testify than to the personal unity of man ; his body is not an append age to himself, but it is a part of himself. He is not, as he has been # called, an 'intelligence served by organs,' but he is a being in whom two natures constitute one indivisible person, — that is, so constitute the person that if divided from each other, absolutely and forever, the personality itself, as it now exists, would lose its completeness : there would remain after such a dissolution, not man, but at most the spirit of man, a higher and nobler part, and yet but a part. The soul of man is but a part of man. The dualism of the current speculation, most commonly allied with what passes for orthodoxy, is so shallow that it has been the great pro moter of the monism of Materialism. Over against the dualism which persists in yoking together two heterogeneous ihcompatibles, on the one side, and the spurious monism which ignores or perverts the most important and well-grounded half of the facts, on the other, Idealism comes in to reach a higher Monism by throwing out utterly the false everything of Materialism, and the disturbing, helpless, useless one thing — matter — of dualism. Materialism abuses matter, and the re ceived dualism cannot use it ; and Idealism comes in to take out of the way what is either not used or misused. To this hour Berkeley's sarcasm retains its point. The mass of sticklers for substantial matter do not know what to do with it when they have it, and if it could be quietly taken away from them they would never miss it. It is true that over against even this poor dualism, Idealism demonstrates nothing. So far it has no advantage over the other view. It is guess against guess. But it has the charm of simplicity. It offers one great absorbing mystery, instead of a thousand frittering, irritating difficulties. Instead of the perplexity of tracing, and of attempting in vain to trace, the manifold streams to their obscure springs, it brings MIND AND MATTER. 403 before the mind an all-embracing ocean of speculative mystery. It goes forth ' dread, fathomless, alone. " It is at least deep enough for a despairing man to drown himself in. Some of the systems spread out great shallow morasses on bottoms of mud. You may be stifled in them, but you cannot be drowned. Idealism is like the old Church of the West, resting on one idea, the idea of the One, building all conclusions on a solitary premise, giving you all, to the last, if you grant but the first. Not without a mighty charm for the active mind in the proud independence it offers him, Idealism also has its fascinations for souls weary of the many and of the much, ready to cry, — ' The world is too much with us.' It is the cloister of the system-worn thinker. Relatively it meets some great tendency of the human mind. Many of the greatest minds have been tempted by it, — some of the greatest have yielded, others have resisted it ; some have dreaded ; but no real metaphysician has despised — no real metaphysican can despise — it. If it be an error, it is the error most difficult to sound; if it rest on sophisms, they are the most perplexing of sophisms. Herbart, the greatest of its direct assailants in recent time, says, ' Idealism is an opponent we dare not despise ; it plants itself in our way, and we must arm ourselves for the battle. ' r It is on grounds of great importance then that able works on 'Body and Mind,' even though written with a prevailingly physical or medical aim, have a great attraction to the true metaphysician. Metaphysics shall be perfect in all its theories so soon as physics shall be perfect in its collection of all its facts. The contempt which ignorant or arrogant physicists heap on metaphysics is really the disgrace or the misfortune of the physical sciences. Reach the demonstrably absolute in physics, and we shall not demand in vain that the thinkers of the race shall give us a demonstrably absolute philosophy. On the general theme, Mind and Matter, Spirit and Body, the ages have pondered. A great body of literature exists in connection, in various aspects, with their relations. Tuke, one of the most recent writers on Body and Mind, enumerates ninety works among the principal authorities to which he refers. Nearly all of these are English, or translations into English ; a few are French. Not one, except through translations, is German, 1 Metaphysik, Werke, iv. 265. 3 See a review of his ' Illustrations of the Influence of the Mind upon the Body,' Penn Monthly, Oct. 1873, 722-728. 404 A NN 0TATI0NS. though the German possesses, beyond all other languages combined, a fund of books bearing on this theme. In addition to the ample treat ment of the topic in the systems, and the more general psychological, anthropological, practical, and religious works, there are special treatises by Erdmann (1837, 1849), Ennemoser (1825), Beneke (1826), Beraz (1836), Hilgers (1834), Messerschmidt (1837), and by others of more recent date, devoted to the discussion of the essential conception of body and soul, their relation to each other, their distinctness, their intimate reciprocal action, and the connection between just views of them and of man's moral freedom and accountability, the question whether the phenomena of intellectual activity are mere operations of a high organization, or of an essence, united intimately indeed with it, but distinct, spiritual, immortal. The whole body of evidence in regard to mind and matter justifies certain conclusions in regard to soul and body. First, they prove that soul and body are distinct. Their laws of action on each other belong neither in species nor in genus to any of the departments of physical power. No analogies exist to them, even in the subtlest forms in which matter is operative. Matter is operative on mind, but under laws wholly distinct from those by which it operates on unpsychical matter. Light operates on the mind in awakening consciousness, perception, certain sensations of pleasure, but not as it operates in the whole sphere of the unpsychical. The operation of light and of all matter on the body is accompanied by entirely distinct sets of results, when the body is possessed of the soul, and again when it is destitute of it. Fire will not burn a living body in precisely the same manner in which it burns a dead one, and the vast array of forces which dissolve the dead body are the elements of the life and power of the living body. Oxygen consumes the dead body : the living body consumes oxygen and converts it into force. Second, the facts show that though body and soul are distinct, their unity is very close, so close and peculiar that out of it arises what is so transcendently wonderful that up to this hour it has failed of due recognition, though the evidences of it have such overwhelming force that glimpses of it exist from the earliest time and through all time. This great ignored or imperfectly recognized principle is the principle of the personal 'fellowship of attributes ; that is, that in the unity of the person, by it, and in consequence of it, the two essences really share each other's properties, so that we have a personally corporeal soul and a personally psychical body. In consequence of this the body receives, in its personal union with the soul, real attributes which it cannot have MIND AND MATTER. 405 outside of that union, and which, within it, give to it capacities which mere impersonal matter cannot possess. The 'seeing eye' and 'hearing ear' are not mere forms of phrase, but the eye does really see by the soul, as the soul sees through the eye. The nerve which thrills with the pain feels pain by the soul, as the soul feels pain through the nerve. There is one real, indivisible, personal act. Every sensation, perception, cognition, imagination, involves a real conjoint affection or action of the personal soul, and of the personalized organ. The soul is not a spider in the centre of a cobweb of nerves, but is an essence, which has evolved organism by taking matter into personal union with itself, and which gives to the nerves power to feel by it, as it uses the nerves in turn to receive influence through them, neither ever acting apart from the other. The two sets of acts are, in a certain sense, distinct as the essences themselves are; in some cases the intervals can be marked by time, but their coalescence is the act of consciousness, the act of their complete unity. The separate action of touch upon the nerves is conveyed with an ascertainable interval to the soul, but the perceived touch is that in which the separation ceases, and the one indivisible act of consciousness, in the personal mind and the personalized body, takes place. There is no interval in perception. It takes place indivisibly, in the mind through the nerve, and in the nerve by the mind. The motion which becomes a co-factor in percep tion takes time, but the perception takes none. Meanwhile, the nerve has not acted apart from the mind ; the soul has not been separated from it in the interval of unconsciousness; the soul has given the nerve its nerve-power. The power of the nerve to transmit depends upon its personal organic union with the soul. The nerve of a dead body carries no force from a touch. The nerve receives real attributes from the soul in the union, and in this personal connection, and because of it, though real matter, does what matter, as such, cannot do, — it feels ; feels none the less really because it feels by the soul. The people and the philosophers here, as in many cases, divide the truth between them. The illiterate man thinks that the pain is in his toe, and not in his mind ; the philosopher thinks the pain is in his mind, and not in his toe. The fact is, it is in both. The nerve has real pain by the mind, the mind real pain through the nerve. The pain is in both, indivisibly, — not two pains, but one pain ; not two parts of one pain, but a pain without parts in one person ; in the mind as person, in the body as personalized by the mind. It can exist in neither without the personal co-operation of the other. Take away the nerve from the organism, and neither nerve nor mind can feel pain; abstract the mind by an 406 A NN OTATIO NS. intense interest, and neither mind nor nerve feels pain. We can hold a burning coal within our hand by thinking on the frosty Caucasus, — on a simple condition, — that we think of nothing else. We assert that there is no cure for the spurious monism of Materialism and Idealism on the one side, and for the hopeless dualism which reigns in the current philosophy and the popular thinking on the other, except in the recognition of the personal unity of man, — the monism of person harmonizing the duality of natures. Man is not two persons, or a jumble of person and non-person, — a muddle of spirit resenting matter, and of matter clogging and embarrassing spirit. Man is a personal unity. Man is a unity of two parts. In this is implied that the parts are not co-ordinate and independent. Two, as two, cannot be one. One must be first, the other second; one must be higher, the other lower ; one must depend, the other sustain ; one must have personality, the other must receive it. Physics and Metaphysics, the former negatively, the latter positively, demonstrate that the psychical is the first, the higher, the sustainer, the personal; the physical is the second, the lower, the dependent, the personalized. The entire world of the conscious, taking the term conscious in its widest reach, shows that the psychical in the organism is that for which the physical in it exists. The reason why the matter of an oyster's organism is not left inorganic is found in the psychical element of the oyster. The matter in his organism is all arranged in adaptation to his little circle of sensations and perceptions. Taking it for granted that all conscious being is in part an object for itself, the conscious element is that to which the material element is adjusted. All nature illustrates this. The inorganic is for the organic. The organic is for the psychical in it. The psychical, then, is first. It is the conditioning power of the material. It is the organizing force which lifts the organic out of the inorganic. The reason why that which grows from the germ of an oyster differs from that which grows from the germ of a man, is not in the material, as physical science knows it. The difference in the material is already conditioned with reference to the character and purpose of the psychical. The chemical and all the physical differences between the two germs shed no light on the differences of the result. The psychic is not a mere undis covered material force, — it is a force generically different from matter. The elementary psychical is as multiform and varied as the element ary physical, and out of its varieties, assimilating the varieties of the material, each to its own wants, arises the organic world. What are the psychical and the organic? They are the embodiment MIND AND MATTER. 407 of two great ideas, — creator and creature, artificer and workmanship, the plastic power and the moulded matter. The universe is the out thought of God, and God's out-thought can be nothing other than the revelations of his own mind and activity. He is conscious, free Cre ator, Artificer, Moulder. His work is creation, the Divine Art of Nature, the shape through which the finite shifts in the eternal and infinite line of grace, power, and mystery. In the psychical, God posits the forces which are shadows and remembrancers of his own creative, plastic power, and puts it into nature for its work of sub creation. The psychical is, in a larger or smaller sphere, a Vice Creator, in which a determinate set of forces is divinely immanent. The psychical enfolds the plan, the material submits to plan, and the organic is the result. The organic is the harmony of the psychical and material in plan. As the psychical is a little sub-creator, the organic is a little sub-creation, in which the psychical remains imma nent, as the sub-cause. Each organism is the rising of a new world of order out of the chaos of the inorganic. On each little deep, minia ture of the vast whole, hovers and broods the psychic spirit, with the less or greater measure of embodied force appointed to it. This power of the psychic on the physical is followed, as God pleases, by the feeble glimmer of mere sensation, never growing, or by the day-spring of a light whose noon is the resplendent glory of reason and immortality. INDEX. The leading topics of the Prolegomena are indexed by the divisions and paragraphs. The pages are given where a minuter subdivision is necessary. The Prefaces of Fraser and Berkeley are indexed by the page. The Introduction and the Principles of Berkeley are indexed by paragraphs, and this Index answers for every edition of them. The Appendixes are indicated by Letters. The Annotations are indexed by their Numbers in brackets [ ]. ABBREVIATIONS. introduction) of Berkeley. I*ref (aces) of Fraser and Berkeley. J y /in(cip\es). -/Vtf/(egomena). #(otes) by Fraser, at the foot of the page. Abbild (image), Prin. \ 140. Absolute dependence, Prin. \ 88, 155. " matter, 18. " space, no. " truth, 76. Absoluteness of primary qualities, Prin. \ 12, n. Abstract existence, Prin. § 4. Abstract ideas, In. \ 6, 10, n., II, 12, 14, 15, 18; Prin. \ 5, 11, 17, 97, 143. Abstract ideas, Ueberweg on, [n]. Abstraction, Pref. 154; In. \ 8, 10, n, 17, 19, «., 23; Prin. I 5, [11, 12,] 100, [95] ; App. A. Abstraction, Ueberweg on, [5, II, 12]. Accidents, Prin. \ 73. Activity, Prin. \ 61. Advantages of considering ideas apart from names, In. \ 21-24, [7]; -App. A. Alciphron, Prol. I. \ 8. Algebra, names like the letters in, In. \ 19. America, Berkeley visits, Prol. I. \ 6. " lines on, 6. " returns from, 7. " adherents of Berkeley in, Prol. IV. I 15. Analogies, caution in, Prin. \ 106-108. Analyst, on motion, Prin. \ 112, n. " on infinite divisibility, 130, n., [no]. Annihilation and creation every moment, Prin. \ 45, 56, [57], 48, [66]. 'An sich,' existence, things, [9, 81, 86, 90]. 409 4io INDEX. Antipodes, Prin. \ 55. A posteriori arguments, Prin. \ 21, [34, 108], 129. Apparatus, Prin. § 61. Appendixes to Principles, Prol. XV. \ 3. " A. Rough draft of Principles, 283. " B. Arthur Collier, 317. " C. Theory of Vision vindi- cated, 323. Apperception defined, [117] Apple, Prin. \ 1. A priori arguments, Prin. \ 2i,.[34, 108], 129. Arbitrary character of laws of nature, Prin. \ 31, [46]. Archetype of sensible system, the divine idea the ultimate, Prin. $ 71, [83]. Archetypes, external, Prin. \ 87; Pref. 158; Prin. \ 9, 41, n., 99. Aristotelian scholastic definition of idea, Aristotle, materia prima, Prin. \ n. Arithmetic, its object, Prin. \ 119, 121. " regards signs, not things, 122. Arrogance, fostered by Idealism, Prol. XIV. \ 13. Atheism, atheists, Prin. \ 35, 92, 94, [116], 154, 155 Attraction, Prin. \ 103, 104, [97]. Attribute defined, Prin. \ 49. Attributes, personal, fellowship of in man, [119], Augustine, existence of an external world not demonstrable, Prol. III. \ 15. Bacon and Berkeley, Prol. II. § 1. " In. I 17; Prin. \ 107. Baxter, Andrew, opponent of Berkeley, Prol. V. § 3. Beasley, F., Dr., opposes Berkeley, Prol. V. \ 16. (See Princeton.') Beattie, opponent of Berkeley, Prol. V. \ 8. " defines ' common sense,' \ 8. Beck shows that the critical system is • Idealistic, 87. Begriff, -e, a notion, Prin. \ 74, 140, 142. notions, 143 ; In. \ 6. Begriff, -e, ideas, [46]. Being (Wesens, eines Etwas, eines Seien den), incomprehensible, abstract idea of, Prin. \ 17, 74. Being, conception of intelligible, Prin. § 99, n. Being, and being perceived, Prin. \ 6. " Ueberweg on, [13]. Beneke disputes Kant's method, [81]. " ' on body and soul, [119]. Beraz, on body and soul, [119]. Berkeley, Life and Writings, Prol. I. : early life, works, travels, \ 1-3, 6, 7 ; bishop, 8 ; controversies, mathematical, 9; death, at Oxford, II; works, 12, 13; translations of, 14. Berkeley, precursors of, Prol. II. " System, summaries of, Prol. III. " estimates of character, writings, and influence, Prol. VI. (See Berkeleyanism.) " Principles, present edition, char acteristics of, Prol. XV. " a student of Locke's Essay, Pref. 153. " influenced by Malebranche, 153. " combats Locke, 154. " Idealism and Realism, 155, n. " follows Locke, In. \ 6, n. " proof of his doctrine, Prin. \ 3, 4, n. " held unity of substance, 7. " assumes causality, 26, n. " connects cause and substance, 37, »• " what meant by his potential ex istence, 45, n. " on continual creation, 46, n. " on miracles, 84. " abolishes representative idea in perception, 86, n. " holds a sort of spiritual positiv ism, 102, n. " a true realist, [118]. " his monism only generic, [118]. " his dualism, [118]. Berkeleyanism, its friends, affinities, and influence, Prol. IV.; influence of, § I; INDEX. 411 first reception, 2 ; opponents and objec tions to, V.; ridicule of, 1. Bewusstseyn, consciousness, [117]. Blackwell, estimate of Berkeley, Prol. VI. §3- Bodies, external, useless, Prin. \ 18, 19, 20; denied by Ueberweg, [32]. " exist in the mind, 23 ; denied by Ueberweg, [37]. " do not exist when not perceived, 47, [60]. Body, spirit and, [118]. Bolingbroke on abstract ideas, In. \ 10, n. Brahm, Brahma, and Schelling's God, Prol. XL 98-100. Brain, Schopenhauer on, Prol. XIII. 114. Brockhaus (Real-Encyclop.) : " summary of Berkeley, Prol. III. \ 11. " Idealism defined, VII. § 11. " Realism defined, [117]. Brown, Thomas, Dr., on Idealism, and Reid, Prol. V. \ 15. " on power in ideas, Prin. $ 25, n. " eliminates all power from material world, 32, 11. " definition of consciousness, [117] Browne, Peter, Bishop, controversy with Berkeley, Prol. I. \ 7. " on abstract ideas, In. \ 10, n. Bruno and Schelling, Prol. XI. 97. " and Spinoza, 118. " coincidence of opposites, [117]. Buddhism, Schopenhauer on, Prol. XIII. 116, 117. Buhle, arguments against Berkeley, Prol. V.? 11. Burthogge, Prol. II. \ 7. Butler, Bishop, on atheism, Prin. \ 145, n. Calculus, differential, Prin. § 132. " infinitesimal, 130, [109]. Cartesian theory of occasional causes, Prin. § 69. " " of nature, 102. " " of brutes, Ueberweg, [3]. Causality, Schopenhauer on, Prol. XIII. 109. Causality and Idealism, Prol. XIV. \ 7. " principles of, assumed and inter preted by Berkeley, Prin. \ 26, n. " notion of, 31, 32. " views of Locke, Hume, Reid, Maine de Biran, Kant, Fichte, Schelling, [46,47]. Causation, physical, contrasted with spirit ual, Prin. \ 65, n. Cause, final, Schopenhauer on, Prol. XIII. 109. " and Idealism, XIV. \ 7. " free voluntary activity, Pref. 165. " substance connected with, Prin. \ 27, n. " corporeal, 53, [71]. " and effect, 65. " spirit the only efficient, 102. Che-;elden's account of the blind boy, App. C, 323 ; Prol. XV. \ 3. Chimeras, difference between real things and, Prin. $. 34. Clarke, S., opposed to Berkeley, Prol.V.| 2. " approaches his views, V. 2. " on continual creation, Prin. \ 46, n. " on the being and attributes of God, 117, n. Coexistent qualities, idea of, In. \ 9. Collier, theory of matter, Prin. \ 49, n. " incidents of his life, App. B. P theoiy of inexistence, App. B. " his philosophy applied to Chris tian theology, App. B. " introduction to his Clavis, App. B. " makes sense-perception and im agination differ only in degree, App. B. " and Berkeley, Prol. I. $ 5 ; App. B. Colour and extension, In. §7,8; Prin. § 99. Colours, secondary qualities, Prin. \ 9, 10. " exist no longer than perceived, 46; [58]. Commonplace Book, Pref. 17 1, n. Common sense, argument from, Prin. § 54. «• Communication, abstract ideas not neces sary for, In. \ 14. 412 INDEX. Comte, on power in ideas, Prin. \ 25, n. " eliminates all power from material world, 32, n. " on the universe, 155, n. Conceive, we cannot, of things existing unconceived, Prin. \ 23 ; Ueberweg on, [36]. Conform, [91]. Conformable, the perceived, to the unper- ceived, Prin. \ 86; [91]. Conscious experience, objects of, what, Pref. 157. Consciousness, generally recognized prin ciples in regard to, Ideal ism rests on, Prol. XIV. " definitions of, [117]. Consequences of Principles of Human Knowledge, Pref. 157 ; Prin. \ 86. Copernican system, Prin. § 51. Corporeal causes, Prin. \ 53. " substances, 19. Creation, continual, advocated by school men, Prin. I 46, [59]. Creative act continuous, Prin. § 152. Cudworth on abstract ideas, In. \ 10, n. ' Darstellen ' — present themselves, Prin. §29. Day, our own, Berkeleyanism in, Prol. IV. Death and life, Schopenhauer on, Prol. XIII. g 24. Deception of words, In. \ 23, 24. Definition, [95]. Demi-atheism, Prin. \ 155. Demonstration, Berkeley claims, Prin. \ 61, [75] Derodon on abstract ideas, In. § 10, n. Descartes and Berkeley, Prol. II. \ 3. " theory of matter, Pref. 154; Prin- \ 73. «• " on man's finite mind, In. \ 2, n. " on principles of knowledge, 5, n. " on causality in sensible things, Prin. \ 52, n. " on the existence of sensible things, 88, n. Descartes on idea, [1]. " on animals, In. \ II, [3]. " on consciousness, [117]. Dictionnaire des Sciences Philosophiques, objections to Berkeley, Prol. V. \ 17. Diderot opposed to Berkeley, Prol. V. I 7 Distance, Prin. \ 42, 43, [54]. Distrust of senses by philosophers, Prin. §88. Divine ideas and will coincident with laws of nature, Prin. \ 57> »• " " ultimate archetype of sen- sible system, 72, n. Divine thought, absolute truth, Prin. § 76, n. Divisibility, infinite, Prin. § 47, [61, 62, 63, 64, 65], 124, [107]. Divisible, infinitely, Prin. \ 128, 129, 130, [110]. Douval, Jouve, Idealism defined, Prol. VII. I 9 Dreams, ideas in, Prin. \ 18, [30]. Dualism, Berkeley's, Pref. 155, [118]. " or intelligible Realism, Prin. \ 3. «• " spurious, [119]. Duality of existence held by Berkeley, Prin. \ 7, n. Dublin University and Berkeley, Prol. IV. I 12. Durandus, the world a machine, Prin. \ 46, n. Duty, Prin. \ 156. Edinburgh Review on Berkeley, Prol. VI. Editor, American, Prolegomena, 1-148. " translation of Ueberweg's notes on Berkeley, 329-407. " additional notes: idea, abstract idea, [1]. " on objects of knowledge, ideas, [8]. 337-34C " on esse, percipi, [9]. " on primary and secondary, [17]. " on matter, [18]. INDEX. 413 Editor, American, on similar and like, [21]. " on things in themselves, [38]. " on 'eating and drinking ideas,' [5 1 ] . " on New Theory of Vision, [55]. " on transubstantiation, [88]. " on Ueberweg's view of the con formity of the perceived to the unperceived, [91]. " on infinitesimals, [no]. " on immortality of the soul, [m]. " on opinion and character, [112]. " Idealism, basis of; consciousness; Realism, [117]. " Idealism, its question, [118]. " body and mind, matter and spirit, C "9]. Edwards, Jon., views in consonance with Berkeley's, Prol. IV. $ 4. " said to be in affinity with Spi noza's, 4. Efficient cause none but spirit, Prin. § 102. Ego is substantial and causal, Prin. \ 142, n. the non-Ego given in, [118]. Eleati, Pantheists, Prol. XIII. 117. Ennemoser, body and soul, [119]. Entity, abstract idea of, Prin. § 81. Epicureans, Prin. \ 93, [93]. Erdmann, objections to Berkeley's sys tem, Prol. V. \ 14. " point of modern division, [»7]. " on body and mind, [119]. Esse is percipi in unthinking things, Prin. I 3 Ueberweg on, [9]. Essence nominal, Prin. \ 102. " ovala, [96]. Exist (existiren), existence, Prin. § 3, [9], 35 Existence, abstract idea of, Prin. § Si. " of an idea consists in its being perceived, 2. " intelligible conception of, 89, n. Experience, conscious objects of, what, Pref. 157. Experience, presentative and representa tive, Pref. 159. Extension (ausdehnung), &c, only ideas, Prin. \ 9 ; denied by Ueber weg, [19]. " neither great nor small, is no- thing, 1 1 ; denied by Ueber weg, [23]. " and colour, 99. " and figure, 49, [68]. " abstraction frames the idea of colour exclusive of, In. § 8. " a primary quality, Prin. \ 9. " and motion, 10, 161. " Ueberweg on, [21]. " the characteristic of the mate- rial world, 11, n. " an accident of matter, 16. " an object of geometry, 123. " finite, 124, [106, 107]. External bodies, supposition of, Prin. § 19, 20. " " their existence within our knowledge im possible, 20. External things (aussere) are perceived by sense, Prin. § 90. Externality, how seen, Pref. 156; Prin. § 90, n. Eyes, Prin. \ 29, [43]. Fall, dogma of, Schopenhauer on, Prol. XIII. 119. Ferrier, Prof., on perception and matter, Prin. § 50, n. " friend of Berkeleyanism, Prol. IV. §6. Fichte, system of, Prol. X. " compared with Schelling, 97, 98. " his trilogie, Hegel adopts, 102. " and Hegel, 103. " illustration of the arrogance of Idealism, Prol. XIV. g 13. " 'thing in itself,' Prol. X., [81]. " 'Messiah of Idealism,' [117]. Figure, a primary quality, Prin. $ 9. Fire, idea of, and real fire, Prin. \ 41. " Locke on, [53]. 4H INDEX. Fleming, Realism defined, [117]. Fraser, summary of Berkeley, Prol. III. In- " on Berkeleyanism in our day, Prol. IV. I 5 friendly to Berkeleyanism, 13. opinion of Baxter, Andrew, Prol. V. §3 on Hamilton's natural Realism, 20. estimate of Berkeley, Prol. VI. §18. edition of Berkeley's works, Prol. XV. I 1 ; XVI. \ 1, 2. notes to Principles, Prol. XV. \ 2. definition of consciousness, ['117]. Freedom, Prin. \ 57, 93. Gassendi, on abstract ideas, In. \ 10, n. General, how idea becomes, In. \ 12. General ideas not denied, In. $ 12. Generalization, Locke on, In. \\\. Geometry, objects of, Prin. \ 123. German metaphysical terms, Prol. XV. \ 8. Germany, Berkeley in, Prol. IV. \ 14. Geulinx, on causality in sensible things, Prin. \ 53, n. " on matter, 70, n., [71]. God, natura naturans is, Prin. § 147, 148, 152. " his existence known like that of men, 145, n. " is known certainly, 164, 174. " ideas of, 71, [83]. " seeing things in, Malebranche's view, 148, [115]. (See Nature, author of, language of.) Gravitation. (See Attraction.') " not essential to bodies, Prin. \ 106. " denied by Ueberweg, [99]. Grote, Prof. John, tends to Berkeley anism, Prol. IV. \ 7. Hamann, Berkeley and Hume, Prol. VI. §17. " Idealism and Realism, [117]. Hamilton, Sir William, on Reid, Stewart, Idealism, Prol. V. \ 20. Hamilton, Sir William, natural Realism of, Fraser's estimate of, Prol. V. I 20. " on Berkeley, Prol. VI. \ 14. " Idealism defined, Prol.VII. §13. " consciousness defined, [117]. " Realism defined, [117]. " Idealism and Realism, [117]. " his ' natural Realism,' [118]. " ideas of sense exist without the mind, Prin. \ 8, n. " on representative perception, 86, n. " on previous existence of every new phenomenon, 106, n. Happiness, Prin. \ 100. Heat and cold, Prin. \ 14, 32. " " Ueberweg on, [26]. Hegel, summary of Berkeley, Prol. III. " objections to Berkeley, Prol. V. I 13. " system of, Prol. XII. Hegel, [Si]. Hegelian schools, Prol. XII. 104. Herbart and Schopenhauer, Prol. XIII. 106, 121; [81, 86]. Herder, on Kant, Prol. IX. 86. Heyse, Realism defined, [117]. Hilgers, on soul and body, [119]. Hillebrand, summary of Berkeley, Prol. HI. \ 5 Hobbes and Berkeley, Prol. II. 2. " referred to, In. \ 6, [93]. Hobbists, Prin. \ 93, [93]. Home, Henry, of Karnes, opposed to Berkeley, Prol. V. \ 5. Hume, on Berkeley's philosophy, Prol. VI. 4. " Idealism of, Prol. VIII. " refers to Berkeley as a nominalist, In. \ 6, n. " on power in ideas, Prin. | 25, «., 30, n. " eliminates all power from material world, 32, n. " on theory of universal energy of Supreme Being, 72, n. INDEX. 415 Hume, on representative perception, Prin. \ 86, n. " on the universe, 155, n. " as pessimist, 1 1 9. Idea. (See Ideas.) " defined, Prin. § 5, n., 49, «., 89. " none of substance, In. \ 14, n. " nor of spirit, Prin. § 135. " its esse is percipi, 2. " implies passiveness, 25. " denied by Uebervveg, [39]. " in contradistinction to thing, 39. " history of the word : how should it be expressed in German in trans lating Berkeley, Ueberweg on, [1] . " can be like nothing but an idea, 8. " Ueberweg denies it, [15]. " distinct from its being perceived, 45. [57]. Ideal and real not identical, Prol. XIII. US Idealism defined, Prol. VII. " definitions of, diversity, \ 15. " development of, from Berkeley to the present, Prol. VIII.- XIII. " sceptical, Prol. VIII. " critical, Prol. IX. " subjective, Prol. X. " objective, Prol. XI. " absolute, Prol. XII. " theoretical, Prol. XIII. " ancient, Schopenhauer on, 107. " modern development, history of, by Schopenhauer, 108. " systems of, contemporary with Schopenhauer, contrasted, 108. " strength and weakness of, Prol. XIV. 122-142. " received in the East, rejected in the West, \ 14. " versatility of, 15. " not ripest result of speculation, 16. " logical issues of, 19. " Fichte's description of, 20. Idealism and Realism, Berkeley's, Pref. 155 " basis of, general recognition of, [ "7]. " what is not and what is its question, [118]. " leaves the phenomenal un- touched, [118]. " its advantage over the current dualism, [119]. Ideas, phenomena, sensible things, Pref. 154 " archetypes of, 157. " advantages of considering them apart from names, In. § 22. " relations of to principles of knowl edge, Prin. \ 1-8. " visibly inactive, 25. " cause of, 26, 27. " succession, 26, 28. " of sense and imagination, 33. " and things, 38, 39. " divine, ultimate archetype of sensi ble system, 70, n. " and spirits make up the whole of knowledge, 86. " are real things, 90. " scheme of, not chimerical, 34, [48]. " succession of, 59, [74]. " abstract, In. \ 6-16. " (vorstellung, -en), 21, 22; Prin. \ 5-11, 13,97, 125, 143. " occasion of, Prin. § 69. " sensible, 144. « train of, 59, 71,77. " universal, 126. Idolatry (gotzendienst), Prin. \ 94. Images of things, ideas, Prin. $ t>Z' Imagination, its power, Pref. 160. " confounded with sense, Prin. § 23, n. " ideas o ", 30. " Colli r and Hume on, App. B. Imagining, faculty of, In. § 10. Immortality of the soul, Prin. \ 141, [in, 112 1 . " proved by Berkeley's Princi- ples, Pref. 165. 416 INDEX. Impenetrability a secondary quality, Prin. Inch, Prin. \ 127. Inexistence of sensible things, Collier's, App. B. Infinite divisibility of finite extension, Prin. \ 124. Infinites, speculations about, Prin. \ 124, [109]. Infinitesimals, Prin. \ 130, [no]. Infinity, difficulties about, In. % 2^ " quantitative, App. B. In itself (in sich), In. § 102. Intelligence, an, without help of external bodies, Prin. \ 20, [33]. Intelligible Realism and dualism, Prin. \ 39, n., 91, n. " existence of sense-objects, 86. " meaning of, [90]. Jacobi, F. H., on Fichte's doctrine, Prol. X. 92. " system of, 100, 101. " on ethics, [95]. " the world as free act of will, 118. " on Fichte, Kant, Reinhold, and Spinoza, [117]. Jamieson, George, opposes Berkeley, Prol. V. § 18. Jean Paul (Richter), picture of Idealism, Prol. XIV. I 17. Johnson, Samuel, of Stratford and New York, a Berkeleyan, his works, Prol. III. § 3. " Berkeley addresses him on his essays, Pref. 152. " addressed by Berkeley on con- tinual creation, Prin. \ 46, n. Johnson, Dr. Samuel, on Berkeley, Prol. V. $ 1 ; VI. 5. Kant, summary of Berkeley, Prol. III. \ 3. " system of, Prol. IX. " compared with Schelling, Prol. XI. 97 " and Hegel, Prol. XII. 103. " and Schopenhauer, Prol. XIII. 105. " Schopenhauer's estimate of, 106. Kant lies nearest to method of Berkeley, [81]. " use of term 'intelligible,' [90]. " definition of consciousness, [117]. Kantianism, in Berkeley, Prin. \ 142, «.; in the sphere of ethics, [95]. Knowledge, objects of human, defined, Pref. 155. Kroeger, translation of Fichte, Prol. X. 92, n. Krug, summary of Berkeley, Prol. III. § 8. " definition of Idealism, Prol. VII. §7- " definition of consciousness, [117]. Language, phenomena of universe as, Prol. XIV. I 5. " difficulty of, Prin. \ 144. " its nature and abuse, In. \ 6, 139- " cause of error, 18-20. " visible ideas are a, Prin. § 44. " of Author of nature, 66. " use of, 83. " and numbers, study of, 122, [105]. Laws of nature, Prin. § 30, 62, [45, 77]. " divine ideas and will coincident with, 57, n. Leibnitz on symbolical knowledge, In. § 19, n. " on the idea, Prin. \ 33, n. " on continual creation, 46, n. " Theodicee, [116]. " apperception, [117]. Leibnitz, [81, 109]. Lewes's estimate of Berkeley, Prol. VI. \ 13- Life and death, Schopenhauer on, Prol. XIII. \ 24. Locke and Berkeley, Prol. II. § 6. " a friend of Molyneux, Pref. 152. " essay introduced into Trinity Col lege by Molyneux, 153. " Berkeley a student of the essay, LS3» In - \ 6 > n " combated by Berkeley, Pref. 154. " quoted, 171, n. INDEX. W Locke on man's finite mind, In. \ 2, n. " principles of knowledge, 6, n. " on abstraction, II. " on generalization, II. " on abstract ideas, 12, 13. " on abuse of words, 23. " ideas of sense and reflection, Trim I 1, n. " notion of material substance self contradictory, 9, 11. " on matter, 10, «., 73, n. " on unity, 13, n. " on methods for exciting ideas, 65, n. " on existence of sensible things, 88, n. " on being, 89, n. " on motion, 114, n. " quoted by Ueberweg, [2, 4, 7, 17, 25, 27, 53, 94]. " anticipations of ' Theory of Vision,' [55] " definition of consciousness, [117]. Locomotive experience in sense, Prin. \ II, n. Logic, In. \ 6. Lossius, Idealism defined, Prol. VII. \ 6. " consciousness defined, [117]. " Realism defined, [117]. Mackintosh, Sir James, estimate of Berke ley, Prol. VI. I II. Maja, popular form of Hindoo Idealism, Prol. XIV. \ 14, 15. Majer and Schopenhauer, Prol. XIII. 105. Malebranche and Berkeley, Prol. II. \ 4. Malebranche, In. \ 2, n. ; Prin. \ 70, n. " influence of, on Berkeley, Pref. 153. " causality of insensible things, Prin. \ 53, n. " on matter, 73, n., 82, «., 88, n. " on motion, 112, n. " seeing in God, 148, [71, 115]. " Norris a disciple of, App. B. Malebranche, occasionalism, [71]. Man and the animals, Schopenhauer on, Prol. XIII. 109. Man, powers of, their feebleness, In. \ 2. " personal unity of, [119]. Manicheism, Manichean heresy, Prin. \ 154. Mankind, assent of, Prin. \ 54, 55. Mansel approaches Berkeley, Prol. IV. \ 8. Materia prima of Aristotle, Prin. \ 11. " " modern notion of matter resembles, II. Material substance defined, Prin. § 17. " motives for supposition of, 73. Material world, extension the characteris tic of, Prin. \ 11. Materialism, Idealism as opposed to, Prol. XIV. I 9. Materialists acknowledge that the senses do not prove the existence of matter, Prin. \ 18. " cannot tell how our ideas are produced, 19. " invent matter to support acci- dents, 74. " Berkeley's peculiar use of the word, [29, 31]. Mathematics, application of Berkeley's principles to, Pref. 165. " a province of speculative science, Prin. \ 58, 118, 119, 123. " discussed, 101. Mathematicians, Prin. \ 132. Matter, what, Prin. \ 9-76. " Descartes' theory of, Pref, 154. " a negative notion, 156. " Locke on, Prin. \ 10, n. " substratum of external qualities, 16. " infinite divisibility of, 47. " unknown occasion, 67, 68, 70, [81]. " support of accidents, 72, 73, 74. " unknown somewhat, 75, 80. " Scriptures on existence of, 82. " idea of, pernicious, 26, 96, 133. " inert, 9. 27 4i8 INDEX. Matter, denied by Ueberweg, [18]. " involves a contradiction, Prin. \ g. " denied by Ueberweg, [20]. " and its qualities, Ueberweg on, [22]. " relation of, to mind, Prol. XIV. §3- " and mind, [119]. M'Cosh, Dr. Jas., against Berkeley, Prol. v. s 19. " estimate of Berkeley, Prol. VI. Mellin, graduated list of Kant's terms, [8]. " definition of consciousness, [117]. Messerschmidt, body and soul, [119]. Metaphysics, nature of, Schopenhauer on, Prol. XIII. no. " abstract ideas, objects of, In. I 6. " true position, [118]. Mill, J. S., defends ' Berkeley's Theory of Vision,' Prol. IV. \ 10. " permanent possibilities of sen sation, Prin. \ 3, n. " on power in ideas, 25, n. " eliminates all power from ma terial world, 32, 11. " on touch, 44, n. Mind, the acting perceiving spirit, Prin. \ 2. " sensible qualities must be in the, 10. " acts and powers, not to be pre scinded, 143, [113]. " its omnipresence, 148. " and matter, [118]. Mind, Prin. g 2. Minimum, sensibile, Prin. \ 132. Miracles, relation to Berkeley's princi ples, Prin. § 84, 63, [79, 88, 89]. Mitchell, James (deaf and blind), case of, App. C. Molyneux, William, made Locke's Essay known in Trinity College, Pref. 152. Monism, systems of, Prol. XIV. \ 8. Morell, on Locke's definition of con sciousness, [117]. Moses' rod, Prin. § 84. Motion of the earth, Prin. \ 58, 186, [73]. Motion, absolute and relative, Prin. §110 in, 112, 113, 114, 115, [102, 103]. Music, Schopenhauer on, Prol. XIII. 116. Names, like letters in algebra, In. \ 19. Natura naturans, is God, Prin. $ 46, n. Natural effects, uniformity in producing, Prin. § 62. Natural philosophy, purified by the Prin ciples, Pref. 165. " " discussed, Prin. § 101. Nature, laws of, Prin. \ 30-32. " laws of, coincident with divine ideas and will, 57, n. " sense symbolism of, 60, n. " methods of, styled language of its Author, 33, 64, 66, 106, n., 107. " volume of, how to read, 109, [100]. " what, 150. Necessary connection between ideas, no, Prin. I 31. Newton, Sir Isaac, on motion, Prin. \ 114. " treatise on mechanics, no, [101]. " on infinites, 130. " and Leibnitz, the calculus, [109]. Nichol, summary of Berkeley, Prol. III. § 10. Nirvana and Sansara, Prol. XIII. 117. Noblest spirits, many, nurtured by Ideal ism, Prol. XIV. I 13. Nominal essence, the real essence of things, Prin. \ 101, n. Nominalism, Pref. 1 19. Nominalist, Berkeley not a, App. 416, n. Nominals, App. A. Norris, John, of Bemerton, a Male branchian, Pref. 153. " on material world, Prin. $ 82, n. " a neighbor of Collier, App. B. Nothing, Prin. § 80. Notion (begriff) and idea (idee), Prin. § 27, [42]. Notions of relations, Pref. 154. INDEX. 419 Notions, particular or universal, In. \ 15, n. " how represented in the phantasy, 18, n. " how applied to the object- world of the senses, Prin. § 5, «. " visibly inactive, 25. Number, a primary quality, Prin. g 9. " a creature of the mind, 12. " abstract ideas of, object of arith metic, 1 19. Nunneley, on case of born blind, App. C. Object, external, Prin. \ 14. " outward, a contradiction, 15, n. " signification of, 5, n. Objections to Berkeley's Principles of Knowledge, Pref. 157, 162 ; Prin. I 34-84 " ninth of these, [72]. Objects of knowledge, defined, Prin. \ I. " perceived by sense, defined, 91. " ideas as objects of knowledge, Ueberweg on, [8]. " of conscious experience, what, Pref. 157. " in themselves, a contradiction, Prin. \ 24; denied by Ueber weg. [3 8 ] Occasion, Prin. \ 68, 69, 70, 74, [82, 85]. Occasional causes, theory of, Prin. \ 53, 68, n. Occasionalists, [71]. Omnipresence of mind, Prin. \ 148. One, the, and all, Schopenhauer on, Prol. XIII. I 23. Optimism, Prin. \ 153, [116]. " Schopenhauer on, Prol. XIII. §-23. " Leibnitz, and Voltaire's Can- dide, Prol. XIII. 119. Origin of Essay towards a New Theory of Vision, Prin. \ 43. Oswald, James, against Berkeley, Prol. V.? 9 Outness, Prin. \ 43. Pain in the world, Prin. \ 153. Pantheism, Schopenhauer on, Prol. XIII. g2 3 . Parr, on mode or attribute, Prin. § 49, n. Passiveness implied in an idea, Prin. \ 25. Pembroke, Earl of, dedication to, Pref. 169. Perceivable, Prin. \ 8. Perceivable, Ueberweg on the term, [16]. Perception of God, Prin. \ 147, 148, n. " images of, [54]. Perceptions, inefficacious, Prin. \ 64. " defined, [117]. Personality of man, and Idealism, Prol. XIV. \ 2. Pessimism, Schopenhauer's, Prol. XIII. \ 2 3 Phantasy, notion how represented in, In. I 1 8, n. Phenomena, sensible things, ideas of sense, Pref. 154. " objects of human knowl- edge, Prin. \ i t n. " numerically different in each mind, 147, n. " explained without matter, 5° " denied by Ueberweg, [70]. Philosophical spirit, and Idealism, Prol. XIV. I 12. Philosophical Transactions, Cheselden's and other cases, App. C. Philosophy defined, In. $ 1. Physical causation, contrasted with effi cient or spiritual, Prin. § 65, «. Physics and metaphysics, [11S]. Pierer (Univ. Lex.), Idealism defined, Prol. VII. I 10. " Realism defined, [117]. Platner, summary of Berkeley, Prol. III. u- " estimate of Berkeley, Prol. VI. \ 8. " definition of Idealism, Prol. VII. §3 Plato and Schelling, Prol. XL \ 97. " idea, [1]. Plotinus and Schelling, Prol. XL \ 97. 420 INDEX. Polytheism, Schopenhauer on, Prol. XIII. §116. Porter, definition of consciousness, [117].. Positivism, spiritual, Berkeleyanism a sort of, Prin. § 102, n. Potential existence, what Berkeley meant by, Prin. \ 45, n. Potentially, sensible things exist, Prin. § 45, »• Power, voluntary activity, Pref. 153. " impossible in world of ideas, Prin. \ 25, n. Practical, arithmetic should be, Prin. \ 1 19, [104]. Prediction, scientific, Prin. \ 59. Presentative and representative experience, Pref. 159. Primary qualities, ideas of, Prin. § 9. " " their absoluteness, 12, n. Primary and secondary qualities, distinc tion between, Prin. \ 9. Primary and secondary qualities, Ueber weg on, [17]. Princeton, Berkeleyanism at, Prol. IV. \ 4 Princeton Club, Prol. XVI. \ 6. Principles of Human Knowledge, present edition, objects and uses of, Prol. XVI. " Berkeley's, best book for com mencing reading, Prol. XVI. I 3- '•' a classic in philosophy and lit erature, Prol. XVI. \ 4. " arranged as an introduction, Prol. XVI. \ 5. " criticisms of, Pref. 151. " editions of, Pref. 151. " analysis of, Pref. 155. " consequences of, Pref. 157. " objections to the, Pref. 157, 162; Prin. I 85-156. '* universals combated in, Pref. 154. " against sceptics, Pref. 171. " original introduction to, App. A. Principles of human knowledge investi gated, In. \ 4. Production of ideas, Prin. $ 19. Prolegomena to Principles, 1-148. Proof, Berkeley's, of his doctrine, Prin. § 4, n. Pravidence, immediate works of, little souls burlesque, Prin. \ 154, [116]. Psychical and physical, [119]. Psychology, its weakness, [118], Qualities, do not exist apart, In. \ 7. " coexistent, idea of, 8. " primary and secondary, Prin. p. " primary, can exist only in the mind, 73, [84]. Quiddity, abstract idea of, Prin. $ 81. Real and substantial in nature, what, Prin. I 34, 3 6 Real, sense-ideas are, Prin. \ 90. Realism defined, [117]. Realism and Idealism contrasted, Prol. XIV. I 10. " Berkeley's, Pref. 155, n. " or dualism, intelligible, Prin. \ 39» »• " foundation of, 92. Reality in ideas, Prin. \ 36. " meaning of, 89. " of things, 91. " not denied, 36, [49]. Reason gives us knowledge of external things, Prin. § 18. Reasoning and thinking, distinction be tween, In. $ 12, n. Reflection, Locke's ideas of sense and, Prin. § I, n. Regis, definition of consciousness, [117]. Reid, summary of Berkeley, Prol. III. §2. " first accepts, then rejects, his views, Prol. V. I 4. " estimate of Berkeley, Prol. VI. \ 9. " on representative perception, Prin. I 86, n. " on plurality of Egos, 145. INDEX. 421 Reid, on definition of consciousness, [»7] Reinhold, K. L., argument against Ideal ism, Prol. X. 87. Relativity of motion, &c, Prin. \ 1 13. Religion, Hegel on, Prol. XII. 104. Representative idea in perception, Prin. \ 86, n. Representative and presentative experi ence, Pref. 159. Rest, a primary quality, Prin. \ 9. Ritter, estimate of Berkeley, Prol. VI. $ 15. Rothenflue, summary of Berkeley, Prol. III. \ 9. " of Hume, Prol. VIII. " of Kant, Prol. IX. " of Fichte, Prol. X. " of Schelling, Prol. XI. " of Jacobi, Prol. XI. of Hegel, Prol. XII. Satze, propositions, Prin. § 129. Sansara and Nirvana, Prol. XIII. 117. Scepticism, refuted by Berkeley's Princi ples, Pref. 165. " its causes, In. \ I. " its root, Prin. \ 86. Sceptics, Principles useful to, Pref. 171. Schelling, system of, Prol. XI. " relation to Hegel, Prol. XII. 102. Schiller, on the laws of nature, Prin. \ 32, n. Schlegel, Frederick, Idealism, definition, Prol. VII. § 4. Schmid, Heinrich Th., on the strength and weakness of Idealism, Prol. XIV. §17. Scholten, summary of Berkeley, Prol. III. " Fichte's system, Prol. X. 89, 92. " on Schelling, Prol. XI. 93. Schoolmen, their doctrine of abstraction, In. I I 7 . " argue for a continued crea tion, Prin. \ 46. Schopenhauer, definition of Idealism, Prol. VII. I 14. Schopenhauer, Idealism of, Prol. XIII. " estimates of, by Herbart and Zeller, Prol. XIII. §25. Schwegler, summary of Berkeley, Prol. III. \ 12. Scotch school, runs into Idealism, [118]. Scotus Erigena, pantheist, [117]. Scripture, on existence of matter,Prin. §82. Secondary qualities, their occasion, Prin. §9- ■ Sensation, signification of, Prin. \ 5, n. Sensations, cannot exist but in a percipient mind, Prin. \ 3. " visibly inactive, 25. " uniformity of, 72. " in the mind are perfectly known, 87. Sense, and reflection, Locke's ideas of, Prin. § l,n. " ideas of, exist without the mind, Sir William Hamilton, 8, n. " locomotive experience in, II, n. " and imagination confused, 23, n. " ideas of, 29, [43]. " supposed want of a, 77, [87]. Sense, common, Beattie's definition, Prol. V.? 8. Sense-ideas, how distinguished from imag ination, Prin. \ 28-30. Sense-objects, archetypes of real things, Prin. \ 41, n. Sense-symbolism of nature, Prin. § 60, n. Senses are to be believed, Prin. \ 40, n. [52] ; distrusted by philoso phers, 88. " do not prove matter, 18 ; Ueber weg on, [28]. Senses, the, Schopenhauer on, Prol. XIII. US- Sensibile, minimum, Prin. § 132. Sensible objects, have no abstract exist ence, Prin. § 4. " " Uebenveg on, [10]. Sensible qualities, are the secondary, Prin. §9 " " must be in the mind, 10, n. 422 INDEX. Sensible system, divine ideas ultimate archetype of, Prin. \ 72, n. Sensible and perceivable, the terms, Ueberweg on, [16]. Sensible things, exist potentially, Prin. \ 45 " " existence of, 88. Shaftesbury, Alciphron, Prol. I. \ 7. Sight, ideas of, distinct from those of touch, Prin. $ 44. " gives the idea of light and colour, I . Sign, a word a sign of general ideas, In. §»• " relation of with thing signified, Prin. I 65, [80]. Signs, regarded by arithmetic, not things, Prin. £ 22. Simon, Collyns T., a Berkeleyan, Prol. IV. I 7 - " suggested rendering of 'idea,' [1]. Sinneswahrnehmung, 'sensation,' Prin. I 137, 146. Siris, Prol. I. § IO. " its relation to the Principles, Prin. \ 67, n. Solidity, a primary quality, Prin. \ 9. " figure, &c, have no activity, 61, [76]. Somewhat, matter as, Prin. \ 75, [86]. Soul, its natural immortality, Prin. \ 141. " and body do not act apart, [119]. " and body distinct, yet in unity, [119]. Sounds, secondary qualities, Prin. \ 10. Space, absolute, Prin. \ 112, n. Spinoza and Berkeley, Prol. II. \ 5. " and Schelling, Prol. XI. 97. " Schopenhauer on, Prol. XIII. \ 21, 22. " on substance, Prin. \ 135, n. ; idea, [1]. Spirit, defined, Pref. 160; Prin. § 27, [40], 89, 138. " is the only substance, 7 ; Ueber weg on, [14, 40]. " alone can act, 57. " the only efficient cause, 102. " no idea of, 135. Spirit and bod}', [118]. Spirits and ideas, or phenomena, every thing known, Prin. § 86. " heterogeneous, 89. " other, how known by us, 145, [114]. Spiritual causation, contrasted with physi cal, Prin. \ 65, n. Spiritual positivism, Berkeleyism a sort of, Prin. \ io2,n. ■ Stars fixed, not attracted, Prin. \ 106; denied by Ueberweg, [98]. Stewart, Dugald, on abstraction, In. § 19, n. " " on Baxter, Prol. V. \ 3. " " on Diderot, 7. " " on Berkeley, 10. " " on Malebranche,Norris, and Reid, 10. " " estimate of Berkeley, Prol. VI. \ 10. " " definition of conscious- ness, [117]. Stirling and Berkeley, Prol. IV. \ II. " estimate of Berkeley, Prol. VI. § 17 Strauss and Hegel, Prol. XII. 104. Subject, Prin. \ 27, [41], 49, [67]. " or substance, 49. " Aristotelian distinctions, [69J. Substance, and Idealism, Prol. XIV. \ 6. " meaning of, Pref. 153, 156, 159; Prin. I 37. " no idea of, [50], 14, n. " unity of, held by Berkeley, 7, «. " is spirit, soul, 135. " no unthinking, 139. " connected by Berkeley with cause, 26, ;z. " cause of ideas must be a, 27. " in vulgar sense, 37. " as a support of qualities, 91. " cannot be an idea, [92], 135. " and accidents, 17; Ueberweg on, [27]. " extended moveable, an idea, 22; denied by Ueberweg, [35]- INDEX. 423 Substantial and real in nature, Prin. \ 34. Substratum, no unthinking, Prin. \ 7. " matter is a, 16. " of qualities, 77. Succession of ideas, Prin. \ 26, 59, 98. Suggestion of experience, Prin. \ 145. Swift, estimate of Berkeley, Prol. I. § 3 ; VI. I 1. Symbolical knowledge, Leibnitz on, In. I I9» «• Symbolism, sense-, of nature, Prin. \ 60, n. Symbolism of nature, universal, Prin. § 65, n. Tar-water, Prol. I. \ 10. Tastes, secondary qualities, Prin. \ 100. Tennemann, summary of Berkeley, Prol. III. I 6. " objections to Berkeley, Prol. V. I 12. " definition of Idealism, Prol. VII. I 8. Theism, Schopenhauer on, Prol. XIII. 116. Thing, meaning of, Pref. 155, 11., Prin. \ 89, n. " in contradistinction to idea, 38, [51]. " real, 33, 172. " not regarded by arithmetic, but sign, 122, 219. Things, reality and existence of, not de nied, Prin. § 36, [49]. Thinking and reasoning, distinction be tween, In. \ 12, n. Thought, universe as a thing of, Prol. XIV. I 4. " divine, absolute truth, Prin. \ 76, n. Tiedemann, estimate of Berkeley, Prol. VI. ?i 7. Time, finite, apprehension of changes of our ideas, Pref. 153. " idea of, Prin. \ 98, [94]. Touch and sight, heterogeneous, Prin. \ 44. " the ideas acquired by, 1. Transcendental, Prin. \ 118. Tuke, literature on mind and body, [119]. Ueberweg, edition of Principles, Prol. I. I IS- " Preface, 15. " summary of Berkeley, Prol. III. I 15. " ' correspondence with Simon, Prol. IV. I 9. " estimate of Berkeley, Prol. VI. \ 16. " Annotations on the Principles, Prol. XV. §4; XVI.; 329. " Logic, Prol. XV. \ 4. Understanding implies spirit, Prin. § 27. Uniformity, in production of natural ef fects, Prin. \ 62. " of sensations, 72. Unity, love of, Idealism appeals to, Prol. XIV. \ 8. " an abstract idea, 13. " arbitrary, 12. " denied by Ueberweg, [24]. " Locke on, quoted by Ueberweg, [25] " in abstract denied, 120. " of substance held by Berkeley, J, n. Universal assent of mankind, an argu ment for matter, Prin. § 54. Universal or particular notions, In. \ 15, n. Universality, in what it consists, In. \ 16, 147. Universals combated in the Principles, Pref. 154. Vanini and Spinoza, Prol. XIII. 118. Virtue, strongest incentive of, Prin. \ 155. Visible ideas, are a language, Prin. \ 44. Vision, origin of Essay towards a New Theory of, Prin. ? 6 43, [55] " essay on, referred to, 116. Vogel, summary of Berkeley, Prol. III. \ 16. Voltaire, opposed to Berkeley, Prol. V. \ 6. Voraussetzung, principle, Prin. \ 129. Vorstellung, Schopenhauer, Prol. XIII. 106, 107. 424 INDEX. Vorstellung, notion, Prin. \ 130, 141, 142. " idea, [43]. Warburton, on Baxter, Prol. V. \ 3. " on Berkeley, Prol. VI. § I. Watch, illustration from, Prin. \ 62, [78]. Will, the world is, Schopenhauer on, Prol. XIII. in, 112. " defined, 113. " world as, universal recognition of, "3- " is active spirit, Prin. \ 27. " or spirit, some other produces our ideas, Prin. g 29. " Ueberweg on, [44]. Willich, Idealism, definition of, Prol. VII. $5- Wolff, definition of Idealism, Pro! " definition of consciousness, Words, deception of, In. § 23. " Locke on abuse of, 23. " embarrass and delude, 24. " men amuse themselves with, ^.... §24. " Ueberweg on, [6]. " Locke on, quoted by Ueberweg, [7] World not a dream, Schopenhauer on, Prol. XIII. in. " is will, III. " a makranthropos, 117. Zeller on Beck, Prol. X. 87. " on Hegel, Prol. XII. 105. " on Schopenhauer, Prol. XIII. \ 25. << Part 1 - The End